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DEOISIYE 

univebsitv  of  iuinois 

BATTLES  OF  THE  WORLD 


PEOM 


MARATHON  TO  WATERLOO. 


BY  E.  S.  CREASY. 

PROFESSOR  OF  ANCIENT  AND  MODERN  HISTORY  IN  UNIVERSITY 
COLLEGE,  LONDON,  LATE  FELLOW  IN  KING’S 
COLLEGE,  CAMBRIDGE. 


Those  few  battles,  of  which  a contrary  event  would  have  essen- 
tially varied  the  drama  of  the  world  in  all  its 
subsequent  scenes. — Hallam. 


NEW  YORK: 

The  Useful  Knowledge  Publishing  Company. 
18  Vesey  Street, 

1882. 


publishers’  notice. 

It  will  be  observed  that  in  this  edition  of  “ Creasy’s 
Fifteen  Decisive  Battles  of  The  World,”  the  para- 
graphs are  numbered.  The  object  of  this  numbering 
is  to  secure  convenience  of  consultation  in  connection 
with  the  “World’s  Index  of  Knowledge,”  the  refer- 
ences in  that  work  applying  equally  to  this  and  to  the 
“ Model  Octavo  ” edition,  and  to  the  paragraphs  in- 
stead of  the  pages,  which  has  been  customary. 


PREFACE. 


It  is  an  honorable  characteristic  of  the  spirit  of  this 
age,  that  projects  of  violence  and  warfare  are  regarded 
among  civilized  states  with  gradually  increasing  aversion. 
The  Universal  Peace  Society  certainly  does  not,  and  pro- 
bably never  will,  enroll  the  majority  of  statesmen  among 
its  members.  But  even  those  who  look  upon  the  appeal 
of  battle  as  occasionally  unavoidable  in  international  con- 
troversies, concur  in  thinking  it  a deplorable  necessity, 
only  to  be  resorted  to  when  all  peaceful  modes  of  arrange- 
ment have  been  vainly  tried,  and  when  the  law  of  self- 
defense  justifies  a state,  like  an  individual,  in  usingforce 
to  protect  itself  from  imminent  and  serious  injury.  For  a 
writer,  therefore,  of  the  present  day  to  choose  battles  for 
his  favorite  topic,  merely  because  they  were  battles; 
merely  because  so  many  myriads  of  troops  were  arrayed 
in  them,  and  so  many  hundreds  or  thousands  of  human 
beings  stabbed,  hewed,  or  shot  each  other  to  death  during 
them,  would  argue  strange  weakness  or  depravity  of 
mind.  Yet  it  can  not  be  denied  that  a fearful  and  wonder- 
ful interest  is  attached  to  these  scenes  of  carnage.  There 
is  undeniable  greatness  in  the  disciplined  courage,  and  in 
the  love  of  honor,  which  makes  the  combatants  confront 
agony  and  destruction.  And  the  powers  of  the  human 
intellect  are  rarely  more  strongly  displayed  than  they  are 
in  the  commander  who  regulates,  arrays,  and  wields  at 
his  will  those  masses  of  armed  disputants;  who,  cool,  yet 
daring  in  the  midst  of  peril,  reflects  on  all,  and  provides 
for  all,  ever  ready  with  fresh  resources  and  designs,  as 
the  vicissitudes  of  the  storm  of  slaughter  require.  But 


PREFACE, 


these  qualities,  however  high  they  may  appear,  are  to  be 
found  in  the  basest  as  well  as  in  the  noblest  of  mankind. 
Catiline  was  as  brave  a soldier  as  Leonidas,  and  a much 
better  officer.  Alva  surpassed  the  Prince  of  Orange  in 
the  field ; and  Su  warrow  was  the  military  superior  of  Kos- 
ciusko. To  adopt  the  emphatic  words  of  Byron, 

“’Tis  the  cause  makes  all, 

Degrades  or  hallows  courage  in  its  fall.” 

There  are  some  battles,  also,  which  claim  our  attention, 
independently  of  the  moral  worth  of  the  combatants,  on 
account  of  their  enduring  importance,  and  by  reason  of 
the  practical  influence  on  our  own  social  and  political  con- 
dition, which  we  can  trace  up  to  the  results  of  those  en- 
gagements. They  have  for  us  an  abiding  and  actual  in- 
terest, both  while  we  investigate  the  chain  of  causes  and 
effects  by  which  they  have  helped  to  make  us  what  we 
are,  and  also  while  we  speculate  on  what  we  probably 
should  have  been,  if  any  one  of  those  battles  had  come  to 
a different  termination.  Hallam  has  admirably  expressed 
this  in  his  remarks  on  the  victory  gained  by  Charles  Mar- 
tel, between  Tours  and  Poictiers,  over  the  invading  Sar- 
acens. 

He  says  of  it  that  “it  may  justly  be  reckoned  among 
those  few  battles  of  which  a contrary  event  would  have 
essentially  varied  the  drama  of  the  world  in  all  its  subse- 
quent scenes : with  Marathon,  Arbela,  the  Metaurus,  Cha- 
lons, and  Leipsic.”  It  was  the  perusal  of  this  note  of 
Hallam’s  that  first  led  me  to  the  consideration  of  my  pres- 
ent subject.  I certainly  differ  from  that  great  historian 
as  to  the  comparative  importance  of  some  of  the  battles 
which  he  thus  enumerates,  and  also  of  some  which  he 
omits.  It  is  probable,  indeed,  that  no  two  historical  in- 
quirers would  entirely  agree  in  their  lists  of  the  Decisive 
Battles  of  the  World.  Different  minds  will  naturally  vary 
in  the  impressions  which  particular  events  make  on  them, 
and  in  the  degree  of  interest  with  which  they  watch  the 
career,  and  reflect  on  the  importance  of  different  histori- 


PREFACE. 


7 


cal  personages.  But  our  concurring  in  our  catalogues 
is  of  little  moment,  provided  we  learn  to  look  on  these 
great  historical  events  in  the  spirit  which  Hallam’s  obser- 
vations indicate.  Those  remarks  should  teach  us  to  watch 
how  the  interests  of  many  states  are  often  involved  in  the 
collisions  between  a few;  and  how  the  effect  of  those  col- 
lisions is  not  limited  to  a single  age,  but  may  give  an 
impulse  which  will  sway  the  fortunes  of  successive 
generations  of  mankind.  Most  valuable,  also,  is  the  men- 
tal discipline  which  is  thus  acquired,  and  by  which  we  are 
trained  not  only  to  observe  what  has  been  and  what  is, 
but  also  to  ponder  on  what  might  have  been.* 

We  thus  learn  not  to  judge  of  the  wisdom  of  measures 
too  exclusively  by  the  results.  We  learn  to  apply  the 
juster  standard  of  seeing  what  the  circumstances  and  the 
probabilities  were  that  surrounded  a statesman  or  a gen- 
eral at  the  time  when  he  decided  on  his  plan:  we  value 
him,  not  by  his  fortune,  but  by  his  opampcai^  , to  adopt 
the  expressive  word  of  Polybius,t  for  which  our  language 
gives  no  equivalent. 

The  reasons  why  each  of  the  following  fifteen  battles 
has  been  selected  will,  I trust,  appear  when  it  is  described. 
But  it  may  be  well  to  premise  a few  remarks  on  the  neg- 
ative tests  which  have  led  me  to  reject  others,  which  at 
first  sight  may  appear  equal  in  magnitude  and  importance 
to  the  chosen  fifteen. 

I need  hardly  remark  that  it  is  not  the  number  of  killed 
and  wounded  in  a battle  that  determines  its  general  his- 
torical importance. $ It  is  not  because  only  a few  hun- 
dreds fell  in  the  battle  by  which  Joan  of  Arc  captured  the 
Tourelles  and  raised  the  siege  of  Orleans,  that  the  effect 
of  that  crisis  is  to  be  judged;  nor  would  a full  belief  in 

* See  Bolingbroke,  “ On  the  Study  and  Use  of  History,” 
vol.  ii.,  p.  497  of  his  collected  notes. 

t Polyb.,  lib.  ix.,  sect.  9. 

t See  Montesquieu,  “ Grandeur  et  Decadence  des  Ro- 
mains,”  p.  35. 


8 


PREFACE. 


the  largest  number  which  Eastern  historians  state  to  have 
been  slaughtered  in  any  of  the  numerous  conflicts  be- 
tween Asiatic  rulers,  make  me  regard  the  engagement  in 
which  they  fell  as  one  of  paramount  importance  to  man- 
kind. But,  besides  battles  of  this  kind,  there  are  many  of 
great  consequence,  and  attended  with  circumstances 
which  powerfully  excite  our  feelings  and  rivet  our  at- 
tention, and  yet  which  appear  to  me  of  mere  secondary 
rank,  inasmuch  as  either  their  effects  were  limited  in 
area,  or  they  themselves  merely  confirmed  some  great 
tendency  or  bias  which  an  earlier  battle  had  originated. 
For  example,  the  encounters  between  the  Greeks  and  Per- 
sians, which  followed  Marathon,  seem  to  me  not  to  have 
been  phenomena  of  primary  impulse.  Greek  superiority 
had  been  already  asserted,  Asiatic  ambition  had  already 
been  checlted,  before  Salamis  and  Plataea  confirmed  the 
superiority  of  European  free  states  over  Oriental  despot- 
ism. So  .(Egospotamos,  which  finally  crushed  the  mari- 
time power  of  Athens,  seems  to  me  inferior  in  interest  to 
the  defeat  before  Syracuse,  where  Athens  received  her 
first  fatal  check,  and  after  which  she  only  struggled  to 
retard  her  downfall.  I think  similarly  of  Zama  with  re- 
spect to  Carthage,  as  compared  with  the  Metaurus ; and, 
on  the  same  principle,  the  subsequent  great  battles  of  the 
Revolutionary  war  appear  to  me  inferior  in  their  import- 
ance to  Valmy,  which  first  determined  the  military  char- 
acter and  career  of  the  French  Revolution. 

I am  aware  that  a little  activity  of  imagination  and  a 
slight  exercise  of  metaphysical  ingenuity  may  amuse  us 
by  showing  how  the  chain  of  circumstances  is  so  linked 
together,  that  the  smallest  skirmish,  or  the  slightest 
occurrence  of  any  kind,  that  ever  occurred,  may  be  said 
to  have  been  essential  in  its  actual  termination  to  the 
whole  order  of  subsequent  events.  But  when  I speak  of 
causes  and  effects,  I speak  of  the  obvious  and  important 
agency  of  one  fact  upon  another,  and  not  of  remote  and 
fancifully  infinitesimal  influences.  I am  aware  that,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  reproach  of  Fatalism  is  justly  in- 


PBEEACE, 


9 


curred  by  those  who,  like  the  writers  of  a certain  school 
in  a neighboring  country,  recognize  in  history  nothing 
more  than  a series  of  necessary  phenomena,  which  fol- 
low inevitably  one  upon  the  other.  But  when,  in  this 
work,  1 speak  of  probabilities,  I speak  of  human  proba- 
bilities only.  When  I speak  of  cause  and  effect,  I speak 
of  those  general  laws  only  by  which  we  perceive  the  se- 
quence of  human  affairs  to  be  usually  regulated,  and  in 
which  we  recognize  emphatically  the  wisdom  and  power 
of  the  supreme  Lawgiver,  the  design  of  the  Designer. 

Mitre  Court  Chambers  Temple,  1 
Jime36,  1851.  j 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

The  Battle  op  Marathon . 13 

Explanatory  Remarks  on  some  of  the  Circumstances 

of  the  Battle  of  Marathon 61 

Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of  Marathon, 

B.  C.  490,  and  the  Defeat  of  the  Athenians  at  Syra- 
cuse. B.C.  413 63 

CHAPTER  II. 

Defeat  of  the  Athenians  at  Syracuse,  B.  C.  413  68 

Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Defeat  of  the  Athe- 
nians at  Syracuse  and  the  Battle  of  Arbela 97 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Battle  oe  Arbela,  B . C.  331 101 

Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of  Arbela 

and  the  Battle  of  the  Metaurus 137 

CHAPTER  IV. 

The  Battle  op  the  Metaurus,  B.  C.  207 143 

Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of  the  Metau- 
rus, B.  C.  207,  and  Arminius’s  Victory  over  the  Ro- 
man Legions  under  Varus,  A D 9 185 

CHAPTER  V. 

Victory  of  Arminius  over  the  Rom  ah'  Legions 

UNDER  Varus,  A.  D.  9 191 

Arminius 213 

Synopsis  of  Events  between  Arminius’s  Victory 

over  Varus  and  the  Battle  of  Chalons 227 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Battle  of  Chalons,  A.  D.  451 231 

Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of  Chalons, 

A.  D.  451,  and  the  Battle  of  Tours,  732 254 

CHAPTER  VII. 

The  Battle  of  Tours,  A.  D.  732 256 

Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of  Tours,  A.D. 

732,  and  the  Battle  of  Hastings,  A.  D.  1066  273 


12 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

The  Battle  of  Hastings,  A.  D.  1066 275 

Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of  Hastings, 

A.  D 1066,  and  Joan  of  Arc’s  Victory  at  Orleans, 

A.  D.  1429 326 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Joan  of  Arc’s  Victory  over  the  English  at  Or- 
leans, A.  D.  1429  332 

Synopsis  of  Events  between  Joan  of  Arc’s  Victory  at 
Orleans, A.  D.  1429,  and  the  Defeat  of  the  Spanish 

Armada,  A.  D.  1588. . 361 

CHAPTER  X. 

The  Defeat  of  the  Spanish  Armada,  A D.  1588..  364 
Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Defeat  of  the  Spanish 
Armada,  A.  D.  1588,  and  the  Battle  of  Blenheim, 

A.  D.  1704 403 

CHAPTER  XI 

The  Battle  of  Blenheim,  A.  D.  1704 406 

Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of  Blenheim, 

A.  D 1704,  and  the  Battle  of  Pultowa,  A.  D.  1709  443 

CHAPTER  XII. 

The  Battle  of  Pultowa,  A.  D.  1709 444 

Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of  Pultowa, 

A.  D.  1709,  and  the  Defeat  of  Burgoyne  at  Saratoga, 

' A.  D.  1777 . 466 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

Victory  of  the  Americans  over  Burgoyne  at 

Saratoga,  A.  D.  1777 469 

Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Defeat  of  Burgoyne 
at  Saratoga,  a.^D.  1777,  and  the  Battle  of  Valmy , A D. 

1792 504 

CHAPTER  XIV 

The  Battle  of  Valmy,  A.  D.  1792  505 

Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of  Valmy, 

A.  D.  1792,  and  the  Battle  of  Waterloo,  A.  D.  1815 — 529 
CHAPTER  XV. 

^he  Battle  op  Waterloo,  A.  D.  1815 53 


FIFTEEN  DECISIVE  BATTLES 
OF  THE  WORLD, 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 

“ Quibus  actus  uterque 
Europae  atque  Asiae  fatis  concurrerit  orbij.” 

1.  Two  thousand  three  hundred  and  forty  years  ago, 
a council  of  Athenian  officers  was  summoned  on  the 
slope  of  one  of  the  mountains  that  look  over  the  plain 
of  Marathon,  on  the  eastern  coast  of  Attica.  The 
immediate  subject  of  their  meeting  was  to  consider 
whether  they  should  give  battle  to  an  enemy  that  lay 
encamped  on  the  shore  beneath  them  ; but  on  the 
result  of  their  deliberations  depended,  not  merely  the 
late  of  two  armies,  but  the  whole  future  progress  of 
human  civilization, 

2.  There  were  eleven  members  of  that  council  of 
war.  Ten  were  the  generals  who  were  then  annually 
elected  at  Athens,  one  for  each  of  the  local  tribes 
into  which  the  Athenians  were  divided.  Each  gen- 
eral led  the  men  of  his  own  tribe,  and  each  was  in- 
vested with  equal  military  authority.  But  one  of 


14 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


the  archons  was  also  associated  with  them  in  the  gen- 
eral command  of  the  army.  This  magistrate  was 
termed  the  polemarch  or  War-ruler ; he  had  the  privi- 
lege of  leading  the  right  wing  of  the  army  in  battle, 
and  his  vote  in  a council  of  war  was  equal  to  that  of 
any  of  the  generals.  A noble  Athenian  named  Calli- 
machus was  the  War-ruler  of  this  year;  and  as  such, 
stood  listening  to  the  earnest  discussion  of  the  ten 
generals.  They  had,  indeed,  deep  matter  for  anxiety, 
though  little  aware  how  momentous  to  mankind  were 
the  votes  they  were  about  to  give,  or  how  the  genera- 
tions to  come  would  read  with  interest  the  record  of 
their  discussions.  They  saw  before  them  the  invad- 
ing forces  of  a mighty  empire,  which  had  in  the  last 
fifty  years  shattered  and  enslaved  nearly  all  the 
kingdoms  and  principalities  of  the  then  known  world. 
They  knew  that  all  the  resources  of  their  own  coun- 
try were  comprised  in  the  little  army  intrusted  to 
their  guidance.  They  saw  before  them  a chosen  host 
of  the  Great  King,  sent  to  wreak  his  special  wrath 
on  that  country,  and  on  the  other  insolent  little 
Greek  community,  which  had  dared  to  aid  his  rebels 
and  burn  the  capital  of  one  of  his  provinces.  That 
victorious  host  had  already  fulfilled  half  its  mission 
of  vengeance.  Eretria,  the  confederate  of  Athens  in 
the  bold  march  against  Sardis  nine  years  before,  had 
fallen  in  the  last  few  days ; and  the  Athenian  gener- 
als could  discern  from  the  heights  the  island  of  ^gilia, 
in  which  the  Persians  had  deposited  their  Eretrian 
prisoners,  whom  they  had  reserved  to  be  led  away 
captives  into  Upper  Asia,  there  to  hear  their  doom 


BATTLE  OF  MABATHOK 


15 


from  the  lips  of  King  Darius  himself.  Moreover,  the 
men  of  Athens  knew  that  in  the  camp  before  them 
was  their  own  banished  tyrant,  who  was  seeking  to 
be  reinstated  by  foreign  cimeters  in  despotic  sway 
over  any  remnant  of  his  countrymen  that  might  sur- 
vive the  sack  of  their  town,  and  might  be  left  behind 
as  too  worthless  for  leading  away  into  Median  bond- 
age. 

3.  The  numerical  disparity  between  the  force  which 
the  Athenian  commanders  had  under  them,  and  that 
which  they  were  called  on  to  encounter,  was  hope- 
lessly apparent  to  some  of  the  council.  The  historians 
who  wrote  nearest  to  the  time  of  the  battle  do  not 
pretend  to  give  any  detailed  statements  of  the  num- 
bers engaged,  but  there  are  sufficient  data  for  our 
making  a general  estimate.  Every  free  Greek  was 
trained  to  military  duty;  and,  from  the  incessant 
border  wars  between  the  different  states,  few  Greeks 
reached  the  age  of  manhood  without  having  seen 
some  service.  But  the  muster-roll  of  free  Athenian 
citizens  of  an  age  fit  for  military  duty  never  exceeded 
thirty  thousand,  and  at  this  epoch  probably  did  not 
amount  to  two-thirds  of  that  number.  Moreover, 
the  poorer  portion  of  these  were  unprovided  with  the 
equipments,  and  untrained  to  the  operations  of  the 
regular  infantry.  Some  detachments  of  the  best- 
armed  troops  would  be  required  to  garrison  the  city 
itself  and  man  the  various  fortified  posts  in  the  ter- 
ritory ; so  that  it  is  impossible  to  reckon  the  fully 
equipped  force  that  marched  from  Athens  to  Mara- 


16 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


thon  when  the  news  of  the  Persian  landing  arrived, 
at  higher  than  ten  thousand  men."^ 

4.  With  one  exception,  the  other  Greeks  held  back 
from  aiding  them.  Sparta  had  promised  assistance, 
but  the  Persians  had  landed  on  the  sixth  day  of  the 
moon,  and  a religious  scruple  delayed  the  march  of 
Spartan  troops  till  the  moon  should  have  reached  its 
full.  From  one  quarter  only,  and  that  from  a most 
unexpected  one,  did  Athens  receive  aid  at  the  mo- 
ment of  her  great  peril. 

5.  Some  years  before  this  time  the  little  state  of 
Platsea  in  Bceotia,  being  hard  pressed  by  her  power- 
ful neighbor,  Thebes,  had  asked  the  protection  of 
Athens,  and  had  owed  to  an  Athenian  army  the  res- 
cue of  her  independence.  Now  when  it  was  noised 
over  Greece  that  the  Mede  had  come  from  the  utter- 
most parts  of  the  earth  to  destroy  Athens,  the  brave 
Platseans,  unsolicited,  marched  with  their  whole 
force  to  assist  the  defense,  and  to  share  the  fortunes 
of  their  benefactors.  The  general  levy  of  the  Platseans 
only  amounted  to  a thousand  men ; and  this  little 
column,  marching  from  their  city  along  the  southern 
ridge  ol  Mount  Cithseron,  and  thence  across  the  Attic 
territory,  joined  the  Athenian  forces  above  Marathon 

* The  historians,  who  lived  long*  after  the  time  of  the 
battle,  such  as  Justin,  Plutarch,  and  others,  give  ten  thou- 
sand as  the  number  of  the  Athenian  array  Not  much  re- 
liance could  be  placed  on  their  authority,  if  unsupported 
by  other  evidence;  but  a calculation  made  for  the  num- 
ber of  the  Athenian  free  population  remarkably  confirms 
it.  For  the  data  of  this  see  Boeckh’s  “ Public  Economy 
of  Athens,’"  vol.  i.,  p 45.  Some  MerotKot  probably  served 
as  Hoplites  at  Marathon,  but  the  number  of  resident 
aliens  at  Athens  can  not  have  been  large  at  this  period. 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON, 


17 


almost  immediately  before  the  battle.  The  re-en- 
forcement was  numerically  small,  but  the  gallant 
spirit  of  the  men  who  composed  it  must  have  made 
it  of  ten-fold  value  to  the  Athenians ; and  its  presence 
must  have  gone  far  to  dispel  the  cheerless  feeling  of 
being  deserted  and  friendless,  which  the  delay  of  the 
Spartan  succors  was  calculated  to  create  among  the 
Athenian  ranks.* 

6.  This  generous  daring  of  their  weak  but  true- 
hearted ally  was  never  forgotten  at  Athens.  The 
Platseans  were  made  the  civil  fellow-countrymen  of 
the  Athenians,  except  the  right  of  exercising  certain 
political  functions ; and  from  that  time  forth,  in  the 
solemn  sacrifices  at  Athens,  the  public  prayers  were 
offered  up  for  a joint  blessing  from  Heaven  upon  the 
Athenians,  and  the  Platseans  also. 

7.  After  the  junction  of  the  column  from  Platsea, 
the  Athenian  commanders  must  have  had  under  them 
about  eleven  thousand  fully-armed  aiud  disciplined  in- 
fantry, and  probably  a larger  number  of  irregular 
light-armed  troops ; as,  besides  the  poorer  citizens 


* Mr  Grote  observes  (vol.  iv.,  p.  464)  that  “this  volun 
teer  march  of  the  whole  Plataean  force  to  Marathon  is  one 
of  the  most  affecting  incidents  of  all  Grecian  history.” 
In  truth,  the  whole  career  of  Plataea,  and  the  friendship, 
strong,  even  unto  death,  between  her  and  Athens,  form 
one  of  the  most  affecting  episodes  in  the  history  of  anti- 
quity. In  the  Peloponnesian  war  the  Plataeans  again 
were  true  to  the  Athenians  against  all  risks,  and  all  calcu- 
lation of  self-interest;  and  the  destruction  of  Plataea  was 
the  consequence.  There  are  few  nobler  passages  in  the 
classics  than  the  speech  in  which  the  Plataea  prisoners  of 
war,  after  the  memorable  siege  of  their  city,  justify  be- 
fore their  Spartan  executioners  their  loyal  adherence  to 
Athens.  See  Thucydides,  lib.  iii.,  secs.  53-60. 


18 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


who  went  to  the  field  armed  with  javelins,  cutlasses, 
and  targets,  each  regular  heavy-armed  soldier  was 
attended  in  the  camp  by  one  or  more  slaves,  who 
were  armed  like  the  inferior  freemen  * Cavalry  or 
archers  the  Athenians  (on  this  occasion)  had  none 
and  the  use  in  the  field  of  military  engines  was  not 
at  that  period  introduced  into  ancient  warfare. 

8.  Contrasted  with  their  own  scanty  forces,  the 
Greek  commanders  saw  stretched  before  them,  along 
the  shores  of  the  winding  bay,  the  tents  and  shipping 
of  the  varied  nations  who  marched  to  do  the  bidding 
of  the  king  of  the  Eastern  world.  The  difficulty  of 
finding  transports  and  of  securing  provisions  would 
form  the  only  limit  to  the  numbers  of  a Persian  army. 
Nor  is  there  any  reason  to  suppose  the  estimate  of 
Justin  exaggerated,  who  rates  at  a hundred  thousand 
the  force  which  on  this  occasion  had  sailed,  under  the 
satraps  Datis  and  Artaphernes,  from  the  Cilician 
shores  against  the  devoted  coasts  of  Euboea  and  Attica. 
And  after  largely  deducting  irom  this  total,  so  as  to 
allow  for  mere  mariners  and  camp  followers,  there 
must  still  have  remained  fearful  odds  against  the 
national  levies  of  the  Athenians.  Nor  could  Greek 
generals  then  feel  that  confidence  in  the  superior 
quality  of  their  troops,  which  ever  since  the  battle 
of  Marathon  has  animated  Europeans  in  conflicts, 
with  Asiatics  ; as,  for  instance,  in  the  after  struggles, 
between  Greece  and  Persia,  or  when  the  Roman 

^ At  the  battle  of  Platma,  eleven  years  after  Marathon, 
each  of  the  eig-ht  thousand  Athenian  reg-ular  infantry  who 
served  them  was  attended  by  a lightrarmed  slave.— Herod.,, 
lib.  viii.,  c.  28,  29. 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


19 


legions  encountered  the  myriads  of  Mithradates  and 
Tigranes,  or  as  is  the  case  in  the  Indian  campaigns  of 
our  own  regiments.  On  the  contrary,  up  to  the  day 
of  Marathon  the  Medes  and  Persians  were  reputed 
invincible.  They  had  more  than  once  met  Greek 
troops  in  Asia  Minor,  in  Cyprus,  in  Egypt,  and  had 
invariably  beaten  them.  Nothing  can  be  stronger 
than  the  expressions  used  by  the  early  Greek  writers 
respecting  the  terror  which  the  name  of  the  Medes 
inspired,  and  the  prostration  of  men’s  spirits  before 
the  apparently  resistless  career  of  the  Persian  arms.* 
It  is,  therefore,  little  to  be  wondered  at,  that  five  of 
the  ten  Athenian  generals  shrank  from  the  prospect 
of  fighting  a pitched  battle  against  an  enemy  so 
superior  in  numbers  and  so  formidable  in  military 
renown.  Their  own  position  on  the  heights  was 
strong,  and  offered  great  advantages  to  a small  de 
fending  force  against  assailing  masses.  They  deemed 
it  mere  foolhardiness  to  descend  into  the  plain  to  be 
trampled  down  by  the  Asiatic  horse,  overwhelmed 
with  the  archery,  or  cut  to  pieces  by  the  invincible 
veterans  of  Cambyses  and  Cyrus.  Moreover,  Sparta, 
the  great  war-state  of  Greece,  had  been  applied  to, 
and  had  promised  succor  to  Athens,  though  the  re- 
ligious observances  which  the  Dorians  paid  to  certain 

* ’AOrjvaloL  TrpS)TOL  aveaxovTO  re  MrjStKTji^  opecDvre?,  /cat 

70U?  dvBpag  TavTTju  i<x9r]pLivov^’  recog  Se  Tolcrt  ”EAAT7crt  /cat  to 
ovvop.a  Tuiv  a/coOtrat. — Herodotus,  lib.  vi.,  c,  112. 

At  yyu)p.ai  Se8ov\a)p.€vaL  dndvTtav  dvOpdiTTtav  ovtuj 

TToWd  Kal  p.€yd\a  at  fidxLp,a  yivt]  /caTa6e6ovA(o/xeV7^  y\v  77  Hepctoi' 

apx»?*— Plato,  Menexenus, 


20 


BATTLE  OF  MAEATHON. 


times  and  seasons  had  for  the  present  delayed  their 
march.  Was  it  not  wise,  at  any  rate,  to  wait  till  the 
Spartans  came  up,  and  to  have  the  help  of  the  best 
troops  in  Greece,  before  they  exposed  themselves  to 
the  shock  of  the  dreaded  Medes  ? 

9.  Specious  as  these  reasons  might  appear,  the 
other  five  generals  were  for  speedier  and  bolder  oper- 
ations. And  fortunately  for  Athens  and  for  the 
world,  one  of  them  was  a man,  not  only  of  the  high- 
est military  genius,  but  also  of  that  energetic  charac- 
ter, which  impresses  its  own  type  and  ideas  upon 
spirits  feebler  in  conception. 

10.  Miltiades  was  the  head  of  one  of  the  noblest 
houses  at  Athens ; he  ranked  the  ^Eacidae  among  his 
ancestry,  and  the  blood  of  Achilles  flowed  in  the 
veins  of  the  hero  of  Marathon.  One  of  his  immediate 
ancestors  had  acquired  the  dominion  of  the  Thracian 
Chersonese,  and  thus  the  family  became  at  the  same 
time  Athenian  citizens  and  Thracian  princes.  This 
occurred  at  the  time  when  Pisistratus  was  tyrant  of 
Athens.  Two  of  the  relatives  of  Miltiades — an  uncle 
of  the  same  name,  and  a brother  named  Stesagoras 
— had  ruled  the  Chersonese  before  Miltiades  became 
its  prince.  He  had  been  brought  up  at  Athens  in  the 
house  of  his  father,  Cimon,*  who  was  renowned 
throughout  Greece  for  his  victories  in  the  Olympic 
chariot-races,  and  who  must  have  been  possessed  of 
great  wealth.  The  sons  of  Pisistratus,  who  succeeded 
the  father  in  the  tyranny  at  Athens,  caused  Cinion  to 


* Herodoius,  lib.  vi.,  c.  103. 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


21 


be  assassinated  ;*  but  they  treated  the  young 
Miltiades  with  favor  and  kindness,  and  when  his 
brother  Stesagoras  died  in  the  Chersonese,  they  sent 
him  out  there  as  lord  of  the  principality.  This 
was  about  twenty-eight  years  before  the  battle  of 
Marathon,  and  it  is  with  his  arrival  in  the  Cheronese 
that  our  first  knowledge  of  the  career  and  character 
ot  Miltiades  commences.  We  find,  in  the  first  act  re- 
corded of  him,  the  proof  of  the  same  resolute  and  un- 
scrupulous spirit  that  marked  his  mature  age.  His 
brother’s  authority  in  the  principality  had  been  shaken 
by  war  and  revolt : Miltiades  determined  to  rule 
more  securely.  On  his  arrival  he  kept  close  within 
his  house,  as  if  he  was  mourning  for  his  brother.  The 
principal  men  of  the  Chersonese,  hearing  of  this,  as- 
sembled from  all  the  towns  and  districts,  and  went 
together  to  the  house  of  Miltiades,  on  a visit  of  con- 
dolence. As  soon  as  he  had  thus  got  them  in  his  pow- 
er he  made  them  all  prisoners.  He  then  asserted  and 
maintained  his  own  absolute  authority  in  the  penin- 
sula, taking  into  his  pay  a body  of  five  hundred  reg- 
ular troops,  and  strengthened  his  interest  by  marry- 
ing the  daughter  of  the  king  of  the  neighboring 
Thracians. 

11.  When  the  Persian  power  was  extended  to  the 
Hellespont  and  its  neighborhood,  Miltiades,  as  prince 
of  the  Chersonese,  submitted  to  King  Darius  ; and  he 
was  one  of  the  numerous  tributary  rulers  who  led 
their  contingents  of  men  to  serve  in  the  Persian  army, 
in  the  expedition  against  Scythia.  Miltiades  and 


* Ib. 


22 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


the  vassal  Greeks  of  Asia  Minor  were  left  by  the  Per- 
sian king  in  charge  of  the  bridge  across  the  Danube, 
when  the  invading  army  crossed  that  river,  and 
plunged  into  the  wilds  of  the  country  that  now  is 
Kussia,  in  vain  pursuit  of  the  ancestors  of  the  mod- 
ern Cossacks.  On  learning  the  reverses  that  Darius 
met  with  in  the  Scythian  wilderness,  Miltiades  pro- 
posed to  his  companions  that  they  should  break  the 
bridge  down,  and  leave  the  Persian  king  and  his 
army  to  perish  by  famine  and  the  Scythian  arrows. 
The  rulers  of  the  Asiatic  Greek  cities,  whom  Miltiades 
addressed,  shrank  from  this  bold  but  ruthless  stroke 
against  the  Persian  power,  and  Darius  returned  in 
safety.  But  it  was  known  what  advice  Miltiades 
had  given,  and  the  vengeance  of  Darius  was  thence- 
forth specially  directed  against  the  man  who  had 
counseled  such  a deadly  blow  against  his  empire 
and  his  pergbn.  The  occupation  of  the  Persian  arms 
in  other  quarters  left  Miltiades  for  soijie  years  after 
this  in  possession  of  the  Chersonese ; but  it  was  pre- 
carious and  interrupted.  He,  however,  availed  him- 
self of  the  opportunity  which  his  position  gave  him 
of  conciliating  the  good  will  of  his  fellow-countrymen 
at  Athens,  by  conquering  and  placing  under  the 
Athenian  authority  the  islands  of  Lemnos  and  Im- 
bros,  to  which  Athens  had  ancient  claims,  but  which 
she  had  never  previously  been  able  to  bring  into 
complete  subjection.  At  length,  in  494  B.  C.,  the 
complete  suppression  of  the  Ionian  revolt  by  the 
Persians  left  their  armies  and  fleets  at  liberty  to  act 
against  the  enemies  of  the  Great  King  to  the  west  of 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


23 


the  Hellespont.  A strong  squadron  of  Phoenician 
galleys  was  sent  against  the  Chersonese.  Miltiades 
knew  that  resistance  was  hopeless ; and  while  the  Phoe- 
nicians were  at  Tenedos,  he  loaded  five’galleys  with  all 
the  treasure  that  he  could  collect,  and  sailed  away 
for  Athens.  The  Phoenicians  fell  in  with  him 
and  chased  him  hard  along  the  north  of  the  ^gean. 
One  of  his  galleys,  on  board  of  which  was  his  eldest 
son  Metiochus,  was  actually  captured.  But  Miltiades, 
with  the  other  four,  succeeded  in  reaching  the 
friendly  coast  of  Imbros  in  safety.  Thence  he  after- 
terward  proceeded  to  Athens,  and  resumed  his  sta- 
tion as  a free  citizen  of  the  Athenian  common- 
wealth. 

12.  The  Athenians,  at  that  time,  had  recently  ex- 
pelled Hippias,  the  son  of  Pisistratus,  the  last  of 
their  tyrants.  They  were  in  the  full  glow  of 
their  newly-recovered  liberty  and  equality;  and 
the  constitutional  changes  of  Cleisthenes  had 
inflamed  their  republican  zeal  to  the  utmost. 
Miltiades  had  enemies  at  Athens;  and  these, 
availing  themselves  of  the  state  of  popular  feel- 
ing, brought  him  to  trial  for  his  life  for  having 
been  tyrant  of  the  Chersonese.  The  charge  did  not 
necessarily  import  any  acts  of  cruelty  or  wrong  to 
individuals : it  was  founded  on  no  specific  law ; but 
it  was  based  on  the  horror  with  which  the  Greeks  of 
that  age  regarded  every  man  who  made  himself  arbi- 
trary master  of  his  fellow-men,  and  exercised  irre- 
sponsible dominion  over  them.  The  fact  of  Miltiades 
having  so  ruled  in  the  Chersonese  was  unde- 


24 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON, 


niable ; but  the  question  which  the  Athenians  as- 
sembled in  judgment  must  have  tried,  was  whether 
Miltiades,  although  tyrant  of  the  Chersonese,  deserved 
punishment  as  an  Athenian  citizen.  The  eminent 
service  that  he  had  done  the  state  in  conquering 
Lemnos  and  Imbros  for  it,  pleaded  strongly  in  his 
favor.  The  people  refused  to  convict  him.  He  stood 
high  in  public  opinion.  And  when  the  coming  in- 
vasion of  the  Persians  was  known,  the  people  wisely 
elected  him  one  of  their  generals  for  the  year. 

13.  Two  other  men  of  high  eminence  in  history, 
though  their  renown  was  achieved  at  a later  period 
than  that  of  Miltiades,  were  also  among  the  ten  Athe- 
nian generals  at  Marathon.  One  was  Themistocles,  the 
future  founder  of  the  Athenian  navy,  and  the  des- 
tined victor  of  Salamis.  The  other  was  Aristides, 
who  afterward  led  the  Athenian  troops  at  Platsea, 
and  whose  integrity  and  just  popularity  acquired  for 
his  country,  when  the  Persians  had  finally  been  re- 
pulsed, the  advantageous  pre-eminence  of  being  ac- 
knowledged by  half  of  the  Greeks  as  their  imperial 
leader  and  protector.  It  is  not  recorded  what  part 
either  Themistocles  or  Aristides  took  in  the  debate  of 
the  council  of  war  at  Marathon.  But,  from  the 
character  of  Themistocles,  his  boldness,  and  his  in- 
tuitive genius  for  extemporising  the  best  measures 
in  every  emergency*  (a  quality  which  the  greatest  of 

* See  the  character  of  Themistocles  in  the  138th  section 
of  the  first  book  of  Thucydides,  especially  the  last  sentence. 

Kal  TO  ^vixnav  einelv  (f>v(r€(og  fjckv  Svvdixei  /ixeAeTTj?  6e  /Bpa^UTTjTt 
KpaTiaro?  5tj  outos  avToaxeSia^eiv  rd  Skovra  iyevero’ 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON, 


historians  ascribes  to  him  beyond  all  his  contempora- 
ries), we  may  well  believe  that  the  vote  of  Theniis- 
tocles  was  for  prompt  and  decisive  action.  On  the 
vote  of  Aristides  it  may  be  more  difficult  to  speculate. 
His  predilection  for  the  Spartans  may  have  made 
him  wish  to  wait  till  they  came  up ; but,  though 
circumspect,  he  was  neither  timid  as  a soldier  nor  as 
a politician,  and  the  bold  advice  of  Miltiades  may 
probably  have  found  in  Aristides  a willing,  most 
assuredly  it  found  in  him  a candid  hearer. 

14.  Miltiades  felt  no  hesitation  as  to  the  course 
which  the  Athenian  army  ought  to  pursue ; and 
earnestly  did  he  press  his  opinion  on  his  brother- 
generals.  Practically  acquainted  with  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  Persian  armies,  ^liltiades  felt  convinced 
of  the  superiority  of  the  Greek  troops,  if  properly 
handled;  he  saw  with  the  military  eye  of  a great 
general  the  advantage  which  the  position  of  the 
forces  gave  him  for  a sudden  attack,  and  as  a pro- 
found politician  he  felt  the  perils  of  remaining  in- 
active, and  of  giving  treachery  time  to  ruin  the 
Athenian  cause. 

15.  One  officer  in  the  council  of  war  had  not  yet 
voted.  This  was  Callimachus,  the  War- ruler.  The 
votes  of  the  generals  were  five  and  five,  so  that  the 
voice  of  Callimachus  would  be  decisive. 

16.  On  that  vote,  in  all  human  probability,  the 
destiny  of  all  the  nations  of  the  world  depended. 
Miltiades  tnrned  to  him,  and  in  simple  soldierly 
eloquence,  the  substance  of  which  we  may  read  faith- 
fully reported  in  Herodotus,  who  had  conversed 


26 


BATTLE  OF  3IARATH0N. 


with  the  veterans  of  Marathon,  the  great  Athenian 
thus  adjured  his  countrymen  to  vote  for  giving 
battle. 

17.  “ It  now  rests  with  you,  Callimachus,  either  to 
enslave  Athens,  or,  by  assuring  her  freedom,  to  win 
yourself  an  immortality  of  fame,  such  as  not  even 
Harmodius  and  Aristogeiton  have  acquired ; for 
never,  since  the  Athenians  were  a people,  were  they 
in  such  danger  as  they  are  in  at  this  moment.  If  they 
bow  the  knee  to  these  Medes,  they  are  to  be  given  up 
to  Hippias,  and  you  know  what  they  then  will  have 
to  suffer.  But  if  Athens  comes  victorious  out  of  this 
contest,  she  has  it  in  her  to  become  the  first  city  of 
Greece.  Your  vote  is  to  decide  whether  we  are  to  join 
battle  or  not.  If  we  do  not  bring  on  a battle  presently, 
some  factious  intrigue  will  disunite  the  Athenians, 
and  the  city  will  be  betrayed  to  the  Medes.  But  if 
we  fight,  before  there  is  anything  rotten  in  the  state 
of  Athens,  I believe  that,  provided  the  gods  will  give 
lair  play  and  no  favor,  we  are  able  to  get  the  best  of 
it  in  an  engagement.”* 

18.  The  vote  of  the  brave  War-ruler  was  gained ; 
tlie  council  determined  to  give  battle;  and  such  was 

* Herodotus,  lib.  vi.,  sec.  109.  The  116th  section  is  to  my 
mind  clear  proof  that  Herodotus  had  personally  con- 
versed with  Epizelus,  one  of  the  veterans  of  Marathon. 
The  substance  of  the  speech  of  Miltiades  would  naturally 
become  known  by  the  report  of  some  of  his  colleagues. 
The  speeches  which  ancient  historians  place  in  the 
mouths  of  kings  and  generals  are  generally  inventions  of 
their  own;  but  part  of  this  speech  of  Miltiades  bears  in- 
ternal evidence  of  authenticity.  Such  is  the  case  with 
the  remarkable  expression  'i]v  5e  $v|Ji^d^^olxev  piv  rt  ^at 
aadpov  ' A9-qva.L<i)v  /aere^eTepottri  eyyeveaOac,  deiov  ^ rd  i(ra 
yefxovTtov,  Qtoc  re  eif-icu  Trepiysrea^at  Tr/  a-vp-^oKij'  This 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


27 


the  ascendency  and  acknowledged  military  eminence 
of  Miltiades,  that  his  brother  generals  one  and  all 
gave  up  their  days  of  command  to  him,  and  cheer- 
fully acted  under  his  orders.  Fearful,  however  of 
creating  any  jealousy,  and  of  so  failing  to  obtain  the 
vigorous  co-operation  of  all  parts  of  his  small  army, 
Miltiades  waited  till  the  day  when  the  chief  com- 
mand would  have  come  round  to  him  in  regular 
rotation  before  he  led  the  troops  against  the  enemy. 

19.  The  inaction  of  the  Asiatic  commanders  dur- 
ing this  interval  appears  strange  at  first  sight ; but 
Hippias  was  with  them,  and  they  and  he  were  aware 
of  their  chance  of  a bloodless  conquest  through  the 
machinations  of  his  partisans  among  the  Athenians. 
The  nature  of  the  ground  also  explains  in  many 
points  the  tactics  of  the  opposite  generals  before  the 
battle,  as  well  as  the  operations  of  the  troops  during 
the  engagement. 

20.  The  plain  of  Marathon,  which  is  about  twenty- 
two  miles  distant  from  Athens,  lies  along  the  bay  of 
the  same  name  on  the  northeastern  coast  of  Attica. 
The  plain  is  nearly  in  the  form  of  a crescent,  and 
about  six  miles  in  length.  It  is  about  two  miles 
broad  in  the  centre,  where  the  space  between  the 
mountains  and  the  sea  is  greatest,  but  it  narrows 
toward  either  extremity,  the  mountains  coming  close 
down  to  the  water  at  the  horns  of  the  bay.  There  is 

daring  and  almost  irreverent  assertion  would  never 
have  been  coined  by  Herodotus,  but  it  is  precisely  conso- 
nant with  what  we  know  of  the  character  of  Miltiades; 
and  it  is  an  expression  which,  if  used  by  him,  would  be 
sure  to  be  remembered  and  repeated  by  his  hearers. 


28 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON, 


a valley  trending  inward  from  the  middle  of  the 
plain,  and  a ravine  comes  down  to  it  to  the  south- 
ward. Elsewhere  it  is  closely  girt  round  on  the  land 
side  by  rugged  limestone  mountains,  which  are 
thickly  studded  with  pines,  olive-trees,  and  cedars, 
and  overgrown  with  the  myrtle,  arbutus,  and  the 
other  low  odoriferous  shrubs  that  every  where  per- 
fume the  Attic  air.  The  level  of  the  ground  is  now 
varied  by  the  mound  raised  over  those  who  fell  in 
the  battle,  but  it  was  an  unbroken  plain  when  the 
Persians  encamped  on  it.  There  are  marshes  at  each 
end,  which  are  dry  in  spring  and  summer,  and  then 
offer  no  obstruction  to  the  horseman,  but  are  common- 
ly flooded  with  rain  and  so  rendered  impracticable 
for  cavalry  jn  the  autumn,  the  time  of  year  at  which 
the  action  took  place. 

21.  The  Greeks,  lying  encamped  on  the  mountain^, 
could  watch  every  movement  of  the  Persians  on  the 
plain  below,  while  they  were  enabled  completely  to 
mask  their  own.  Miltiades  also  had,  from  his 
position,  the  power  of  giving  battle  whenever  he 
pleased,  or  of  delaying  it  at  his  discretion,  unless 
Datis  were  to  attempt  the  perilous  operation  of 
storming  the  heights. 

22.  If  we  turn  to  the  map  of  the  Old  World,  to  test 
the  comparative  territorial  resources  of  the  two  states 
whose  armies  were  now  about  to  come  into  conflict, 
the  immense  preponderance  of  the  material  power  of 
the  Persian  king  over  that  of  the  Athenian  republic 
is  more  striking  than  any  similar  contrast  which 
history  can  supply.  It  has  been  truly  remarked. 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON, 


29 


that,  in  estimating  mere  areas,  Attica,  containing  on 
its  whole  surface  only  seven  hundred  square  miles, 
shrinks  into  insignificance  if  compared  with  many  a 
baronial  fief  of  the  Middle  Ages,  or  many  a colonial 
allotment  of  modern  times.  Its  antagonist,  the 
Persian  empire,  comprised  the  whole  of  modern 
Asiatic  and  much  of  modern  European  Turkey, 
the  modern  kingdom  of  Persia,  and  the  countries  of 
modern  Georgia,  Armenia,  Balkh,  the  Punjaub, 
Afghanistan,  Beloochistan,  Egypt,  and  Tripoli. 

23.  Nor  could  a European,  in  the  beginning  of  the 
fifth  century  before  our  era,  look  upon  this  huge 
accumulation  of  power  beneath  the  scept-re  of  a single 
Asiatic  ruler  with  the  indifference  with  which  we 
now  observe  on  the  maj)  the  extensive  dnminions  of 
modern  Oriental  sovereigns ; for,  as  has  been  already 
remarked,  before  Marathon  was  fought,  the  prestige 
of  success  and  of  supposed  superiority  of  race  was  on 
the  side  of  the  Asiatic  against  the  European.  Asia 
was  the  original  seat  of  human  societies,  and  long 
before  any  trace  can  be  found  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  rest  of  the  world  having  emerged  from  the  rudest 
barbarism,  we  can  perceive  that  mighty  and  brilliant 
empires  flourished  in  the  Asiatic  continent.  They 
appear  before  us  through  the  twilight  of  primeval 
history,  dim  and  indistinct,  but  massive  and  majestic, 
like  mountains  in  the  early  dawn. 

24.  Instead,  however,  of  the  infinite  variety  and 
restless  change  which  has  characterized  the  institu- 
tions and  fortunes  of  European  states  ever  since  the 
commencement  of  the  civilization  of  our  continent. 


30 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


a monotonous  uniformity  pervades  the  histories  of 
nearly  all  Oriental  empires,  from  the  most  ancient 
down  to  the  most  recent  times.  They  are  character- 
ized by  the  rapidity  of  their  early  conquests,  by  the 
immense  extent  of  the  dominions  comprised  in  them, 
by  the  establishment  of  a satrap  or  pasha w system 
of  governing  the  provinces,  by  an  invariable  and 
speedy  degeneracy  in  the  princes  of  the  royal  house, 
the  effeminate  nurslings  of  the  seraglio  succeeding  to 
the  warrior  sovereigns  reared  in  the  camp,  and  by 
the  internal  anarchy  and  insurrections  which  in- 
dicate and  accelerate  the  decline  and  fall  of  these 
un wieldly  and  ill-organized  fabrics  of  power.  It  is 
also  a striking  fact  that  the  governments  of  all  the 
great  Asiatic  empires  have  in  all  ages  been  absolute 
despotisms.  And  Heeren  is  right  in  connecting  this 
with  another  great  fact,  which  is  important  from  its 
influence  both  on  the  political  and  the  social  life  of 
Asiatics.  “ Among  all  the  considerable  nations  of 
Inner  Asia,  the  paternal  government  of  every  house- 
hold was  corrupted  by  polygamy : where  that  cus- 
tom exists,  a good  political  constitution  is  impossible. 
Fathers,  being  converted  into  domestic  despots,  are 
ready  to  pay  the  same  abject  obedience  to  their 
sovereign  which  they  exact  fiom  their  family  and 
dependents  in  their  domestic  economy.”  We  should 
bear  in  mind,  also,  the  inseparable  connection  be- 
tween the  state  religion  and  all  legislation  which 
has  always  prevailed  in  the  East,  and  the  constant 
existence  of  a powerful  sacerdotal  body,  exercising 
some  check,  though  precarious  and  irregular,  over 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


31 


the  throne  itself,  grasping  at  all  civil  administration, 
claiming  the  supreme  control  of  education,  stereotyp- 
ing the  lines  in  which  literature  and  science  must 
move,  and  limiting  the  extent  to  which  it  shall  he 
lawful  for  the  human  mind  to  prosecute  its  in- 
quiries. 

25.  With  these  general  characteristics  rightly  felt 
and  understood,  it  becomes  a comparatively  easy 
task  to  investigate  and  appreciate  the  origin,  pro- 
gress, and  principles  of  Oriental  empires  in  general, 
as  well  as  of  the  Persian  monarchy  in  particular. 
And  we  are  thus  better  enabled  to  appreciate  the  re- 
pulse which  Greece  gave  to  the  arms  of  the  East,  and 
to  judge  of  the  probable  consequences  to  human 
civilization,  if  the  Persians  had  succeeded  in  bring- 
ing Europe  under  their  yoke,  as  they  had  already 
subjugated  the  fairest  portions  of  the  rest  of  the  then 
known  world. 

26.  The  Greeks,  from  their  geographical  position, 
formed  the  natural  van-guard  of  European  liberty 
against  Persian  ambition ; and  they  pre-eminently 
displayed  the  salient  points  of  distinctive  national 
character  which  have  rendered  European  civilization 
so  far  superior  to  Asiatic.  The  nation  that  dwelt  in 
ancient  times  around  and  near  the  northern  shores 
of  the  Mediterranean  Sea,  were  the  first  in  our  con- 
tinent to  receive  from  the  East  the  rudiments  of  art 
and  literature,  and  the  germs  of  social  and  political 
organizations.  Of  these  nations  the  Greeks,  through 
their  vicinity  to  Asia  Minor,  Phoenicia,  and  Egypt, 
were  among  the  very  foremost  in  acquiring  the  prin- 


32 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


ciples  and  habits  of  civilized  life ; and  they  also  at 
once  imparted  a new  and  wholly  original  stamp  on 
all  which  they  received.  Thus,  in  their  religion, 
they  received  from  foreign  settlers  the  names  of  all 
their  deities  and  many  of  their  rites,  but  they  dis- 
carded the  loathsome  monstrosities  of  the  Nile,  the 
Orontes,  and  the  Ganges;  they  nationalized  their  creed; 
and  their  own  poets  created  their  beautiful  mytholo- 
gy. No  sacerdotal  caste  ever  existed  in  Greece.  So  in 
their  governments,  they  lived  long  under  hereditary 
kings,  but  never  endured  the  permanent  establish- 
ment of  absolute  monarchy.  Their  early  kings  were 
constitutional  rulers,  governing  with  defined  prerog- 
atives.* And  long  before  the  Persian  invasion,  the 
kingly  form  of  government  had  given  way  in  almost 
all  the  Greek  states  to  republican  institutions,  pre- 
senting infinite  varieties  of  the  blending  or  the  al- 
ternate predominance  of  the  oligarchical  and  demo- 
cratical  principles.  In  literature  and  science  the 
Greek  intellect  followed  no  beaten  track,  and  ac- 
knowledged no  limitary  rules.  The  Greeks  thought 
their  subjects  boldly  out;  and  the  novelty  of  a specu- 
lation invested  it  in  their  minds  with  interest,  and 
not  with  criminality.  Versatile,  restless,  enterpris- 
ing, and  self-confident,  the  Greeks  presented  the 
most  striking  contrast  to  the  habitual  quietude  and 
snbmissiveness  of  the  Orientals ; and,  of  all  the 
Greeks,  the  Athenians  exhibited  these  national  char- 
acteristics in  the  strongest  degree.  This  spirit  of  ac- 

* ’Etti  prjToIs  yepaai  TrarpiKal  ^a<rt\elaL- — ThUCYD  lib.  i 86C. 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON, 


33 


tivity  and  daring,  joined  to  a generous  sympathy  for 
the  fate  of  their  fellow-Greeks  in  Asia,  had  led  them 
to  join  in  the  last  Ionian  war ; and  now  mingling 
with  their  abhorrence  of  the  usurping  family  of 
their  own  citizens,  which  for  a period  had  forcibly 
seized  an  exercised  despotic  power  at  Athens, 
nerve  1 them  to  defy  the  wrath  of  King  Darius,  and 
to  refuse  to  receive  back  at  his  bidding  the  tyrant 
whom  they  had  some  years  before  driven  out. 

27.  The  enterprise  and  genius  of  an  Englishman 
have  lately  confirmed  by  fresh  evidence,  and  in- 
vested with  fresh  interest,  the  might  of  the  Persian 
monarch  who  sent  his  troops  to  combat  at  Mara- 
thon. Inscriptions  in  a character  termed  the  Ar- 
row-headed, or  Cuneiform,  had  long  been  known  to 
exist  on  the  marble  monuments  at  Persepolis,  near 
the  site  of  the  ancient  Susa,  and  on  the  faces  of  rocks 
in  other  places  formerly  ruled  over  by  the  early 
Persian  kings.  But  for  thousands  of  years  they  had 
been  mere  unintelligible  enigmas  to  the  curious  but 
baffled  beholder ; and  they  were  often  referred  to  as 
instances  of  the  folly  of  human  pride,  which  could 
indeed  write  its  own  praises  in  the  solid  rock,  but 
only  for  the  rock  to  outlive  the  language  as  well  as 
the  memory  of  the  vainglorious  inscribers.  The 
elder  Niebuhr,  Grotefend,  and  Lassen,  had  made 
some  guesses  at  the  meaning  of  the  Cuneiform  let- 
ters; but  Major  Rawlinson,  of  the  East  India  Com- 
pany’s service,  after  years  of  labor,  has  at  last  accom- 
plished the  glorious  achievement  of  fully  revealing 
the  alphabet  and  the  grammar  of  this  long  unknown 


34 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON 


tongue.  He  has,  in  particular,  fully  deciphered  and 
expounded  the  inscription  on  the  sacred  rock  of 
Behistun,  on  the  western  frontiers  of  Media.  These 
records  of  the  Achsemenidse  have  at  length  found 
their  interpreter;  and  Darius  himself  speaks  to  us 
from  the  consecrated  mountain,  and  tells  us  the 
names  of  the  nations  that  obeyed  him,  the  revolts 
that  he  suppressed,  his  victories,  his  piety,  and  his 
glory* 

28.  Kings  who  thus  seek  the  admiration  of  pos- 
terity are  little  likely  to  dim  the  record  of  their  suc- 
cesses by  the  mention  of  their  occasional  defeats ; 
and  it  throws  no  suspicion  on  the  narrative  of  the 
Greek  historians  that  we  find  these  inscriptions 
silent  respecting  the  overthrow  of  Datis  and  Arta- 
phernes,  as  well  as  respecting  the  reverses  which 
Darius  sustainedin  person  during  his  Scythian  cam- 
paigns. But  these  indisputable  monuments  of  Per- 
sian fame  confirm,  and  even  increase  the  opinion  with 
which  Herodotus  inspires  us  of  the  vast  power  which 
Cyrus  founded  and  Cambyses  increased  ; which  Da- 
rius augmented  by  Indian  and  Arabian  conquests  and 
seemed  likely,  when  he  directed  his  arms  against 
Europe,  to  make  the  predominant  monarchy  of  the 
world. 

29.  With  the  exception  of  the  Chinese  empire,  in 
which,  throughout  all  ages  down  to  the  last  few 
years,  one  third  of  the  human  race  has  dwelt  almost 
unconnected  with  the  other  portions,  all  the  grea 

* See  the  tenth  volume  of  the  “Journal  of  theRo^'^i 
Asiatic  Societ5\” 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON, 


35 


kingdoms,  which  we  know  to  have  existed  in  ancient 
Asia,  were,  in  Darius’s’time,  blended  into  the  Persian. 
The  northern  Indians,  the  Assyrians,  the  Syrians, 
the  Babylonians,  the  Chaldees,  the  Phoenicians,  the 
nations  of  Palestine,  the  Armenians,  the  Bactrians, 
the  Lydians,  the  Phrygians,  the  Parthians,  and  the 
Medes,  all  obeyed  the  sceptre  of  the  Great  King : the 
Medes  standing  next  to  the  native  Persians  in  honor, 
and  the  empire  being  frequently  spoken  of  as  that  of  the 
Medes,  or  as  that  of  the  Medes  and  Persians.  Egypt 
and  Cyrene  were  Persian  provinces ; the  Greek  colon- 
ists in  Asia  Minor  and  the  islands  of  the  jEgaean  were 
Dariuses  subjects;  and  their  gallant  but  unsuccessful 
attempts  to  throw  off  the  Persian  yoke  had  only 
served  to  rivet  it  more  strongly,  and  to  increase  the 
general  belief  that  the  Greeks  could  not  stand  before 
the  Persians  in  a field  of  battle.  Darius’s  Scythian 
war,  though  unsuccessful  in  its  immediate  object, 
had  brought  about  the  subjugation  of  Thrace  and 
the  submission  of  Macedonia.  From  the  Indus  to 
the  Peneus,  all  was  his. 

30.  We  may  imagine  the  wrath  with  which  the 
lord  of  so  many  nations  must  have  heard,  nine  years 
before  the  battle  of  Marathon,  that  a strange  nation 
toward  the  setting  sun,  called  the  Athenians, 
had  dared  to  help  his  rebels  in  Ionia  against  him, 
and  that  they  had  plundered  and  burned  the  capital 
of  one  of  his  provinces.  Before  the  burning  of  Sar- 
dis, Darius  seems  never  to  have  heard  of  the  exis- 
tence of  Athens ; but  his  satraps  in  Asia  Minor  had 
for  some  time  seen  Athenian  refugees  at  their  pro- 


2 


56 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON, 


vincial  courts  imploring  assistance  against  their  fel- 
low-countrymen. When  Hippias  was  driven  away 
from  Athens,  and  the  tyrannic  dynasty  of  the  Pisis- 
tratidae  finally  overthrown  in  510  B.  C.,  the  banished 
tyrant  and  his  adherents,  after  vainly  seeking  to  be 
restored  by  Spartan  intervention,  had  betaken  them- 
selves to  Sardis,  the  capital  city  of  the  satrapy  Ar- 
taphernes.  There  Hippias  (in  the  expressive  words 
of  Herodotus*)  began  every  kind  of  agitation,  slan- 
dering the  Athenians  before  Artaphernes,  and  do- 
ing all  he  could  to  induce  the  satrap  to  place  Athens 
in  subjection  to  him,  as  the  tributary  vassal  of  King 
Darius.  When  the  Athenians  heard  of  his  practices, 
they  sent  envoys  to  Sardis  to  remonstrate  with  the 
Persians  against  taking  up  the  quarrel  of  the  Athe- 
nian refugees. 

31.  But  Artaphernes  gave  them  in  reply  a menac- 
ing command  to  receive  Hippias  back  again  if  they 
looked  for  safety.  The  Athenians  were  resolved  not 
to  purchase  safety  at  such  a price,  and  after  rejecting 
the  satrap’s  terms,  they  considered  that  they  and  the 
Persians  were  declared  enemies.  At  this  very  crisis 
the  Ionian  Greeks  implored  the  assistance  of  their 
European  brethren,  to  enabFe  them  to  recover  their 
independence  from  Persia.  Athens,  and  the  city  of 
Eretria  in  Euboea,  alone  consented.  Twenty  Athe- 
nian galleys,  and  five  Eretrian,  crossed  the  ^gsean 
Sea,  and  by  bold  and  sudden  march  upon  Sardis,  the 
Athenians  and  their  allies  succeeded  in  capturing 
the  capital  city  of  the  haughty  satrap,  who  had  re- 


* Herod.,  lib.  v.  c.  96. 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


37 


cently  menaced  them  with  servitude  or  destruction. 
They  were  pursued,  and  defeated  on  their  return  to 
the  coast,  and  Athens  took  no  further  part  in  the 
Ionian  war ; but  the  insults  that  she  had  put  upon 
the  Persian  power  was  speedily  made  known  through- 
out that  empire,  and  was  never  to  he  forgiven  or  Ibr- 
gotten.  In  the  emphatic  simplicity  of  the  narrative  of 
Herodotus,  the  wrath  of  the  Great  King  is  Ihus  de- 
scribed : “Now  when  it  was  told  to  King  Darius  that 
Sardis  had  been  taken  and  burned  by  the  Athenians 
and  lonians,  he  took  small  heed  of  the  lonians,  well 
knowing  who  they  were  and  that  their  revolt  would 
soon  be  put  down ; but  he  asked  who,  and  what  man- 
ner of  men,  the  Athenians  were.  And  when  he  had 
been  told,  he  called  for  his  bow ; and,  having  taken 
it,  and  placed  an  arrow  on  the  string,  he  let  the  ar- 
row fly  toward  heaven ; and  as  he  shot  it  into  the 
air,  he  said,  ‘Oh ! supreme  God,  grant  me  that  I may 
avenge  myself  on  the  Athenians.’  And  when  he  had 
said  this,  he  appointed  one  of  his  servants  to  say  to 
him  every  day  as  he  sat  at  meat,  ^Sire,  remember 
the  Athenians.’” 

32.  Some  years  were  occupied  in  the  complete 
reduction  of  Ionia.  But  when  this  was  Reflected, 
Darius  ordered  his  victorious  forces  to  proceed  to 
punish  Athens  and  Eretria,  and  to  conquer  European 
Greece.  The  flrst  armament  sent  for  this  | purpose 
was  shattered  by  shipwreck,  and  nearly  destroyed  off 
Mount  Athos.  But  the  purpose  of  King  Darius  was 
not  easily  shaken.  A larger  army  was  ordered  to  be 
collected  in  Cilicia,  and  requisitions  were  sent  to  all 


38 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON, 


the  maritime  cities  of  the  Persian  empire  for  ships  of 
war,  and  for  transports  of  sufficient  size  for  carrying 
cavalry  as  well  as  infantry  across  the  JEgsean.  While 
these  preparations  were  being  made,  Darius  sent 
heralds  round  to  the  Grecian  cities  demanding  their 
submission  to  Persia.  It  was  proclaimed  in  the 
market-place  of  each  little  Hellenic  state  (some  with 
territories  not  larger  than  the  Isle  of  Wight),  that 
King  Darius,  the  lord  of  all  men,  from  the  rising  to 
the  setting  sun,*  required  earth  and  water  to  be 
delivered  to  his  heralds,  as  a symbolical  acknowledg- 
ment that  he  was  head  and  master  of  the  country. 
Terror-stricken  at  the  power  of  Persia  and  at  the 
severe  punishment  that  had  recently  been  inflicted 
on  the  refractory  lonians,  many  of  the  continental 
Greeks  and  nearly  all  the  islanders  submitted,  and 
gave  the  required  tokens  of  vassalage.  At  Sparta 
and  Athens  an  indignant  refusal  was  returned  — 
a refusal  which  was  disgraced  by  outrage  and  vio- 
lence against  the  persons  of  the  Asiatic  heralds. 

33.  Fresh  fuel  was  thus  added  to  the  anger  of 
Darius  against  Athens,  and  the  Persian  preparations 
went  on  with  renewed  vigor.  In  the  summer  of  490 
B.  C.,  the  army  destined  for  the  invasion  was  assem- 

* ^schines  in  Ctes.,  p.  523,  ed.  Relske.  Milford,  vol.  i., 
p.  485.  ^schines  is  speaking  of  Xerxes,  but  Mitford  is 
probably  right  in  considering  it  as  the  style  of  the  Persian 
kings  in  their  proclamations.  In  one  of  the  inscriptions 
at  Persepolis,  Darius  terms  himself  “Darius,  the  great 
king,  king  of  kings,  the  king  of  the  many-peopled  coun- 
tries, the  supporter  also  of  this  great  world.”  In  another, 
he  styles  himself  “ the  king  of  all  inhabited  countries.” 
(See  “ Asiatic  Journal,”  vol.  x.,  p.  387  and  393,  and  Major 
Rawlinson’s  Comments.) 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


39 


bled  in  the  Aleian  plain  of  Cilicia,  near  the  sea.  A 
fleet  of  six  hundred  galleys  and  numerous  transports 
was  collected  on  the  coast  for  the  embarkation  of 
troops,  horse  as  well  as  foot.  A Median  general 
named  Datis,  and  Artaphernes,  the  son  of  the  satrap 
of  Sardis,  and  who  was  also  a nephew  of  Darius,  were 
placed  in  titular  joint  command  of  the  expedition. 
The  real  supreme  authority  was  probably  given  to 
Datis  alone,  from  the  way  in  which  the  Greek  writers 
speak  of  him.  We  know  no  details  of  the  previous 
career  of  this  officer;  but  there  is  every  reason  to 
believe  that  his  abilities  and  bravery  had  been 
proved  by  experience,  or  his  Median  birth  would 
have  prevented  his  being  placed  in  high  command  by 
Darius.  He  appears  to  have  been  the  first  Mede  who 
was  thus  trusted  by  the  Persian  kings  after  the 
overthrow  of  the  conspiracy  of  the  Median  magi 
against  the  Persians  immediately  before  Darius 
obtained  the  throne.  Datis  received  instructions  to 
complete  the  subjugation  of  Greece,  and  especial 
orders  were  given  him  with  regard  to  Eretria  and 
Athens.  He  was  to  take  these  two  cities,  and  he 
was  to  lead  the  inhabitants  away  captive,  and  bring 
them  as  slaves  into  the  presence  of  the  Great  King. 

34.  Datis  embarked  his  forces  in  the  fleet  that 
awaited  them,  and  coasting  along  the  shores  of  Asia 
Minor  till  he  was  off  Samos,  he  thence  sailed  due 
westward  through  the  ^gaean  Sea  for  Greece,  taking 
the  islands  in  his  way.  The  Naxians  had,  ten  years 
before,  successfully  stood  siege  against  a Persian 
armament,  but  they  now  were  too  terrified  to  offer 


40 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


any  resistance,  and  fled  to  the  mountain  tops,  while 
the  enemy  burned  their  town  and  laid  waste  their 
lands.  Thence  Datis,  compelling  the  Greek  islanders 
to  join  him  with  their  ships  and  men,  sailed  onward 
to  tho  coast  of  Euboea.  The  little  town  of  Carystus 
essayed  resistance,  but  was  quickly  overpowered. 
He  next  attacked  Eretria.  The  Athenians  sent  four 
thousand  men  to  its  aid ; but  treachery  was  at  work 
among  the  Eretrians ; and  the  Athenian  force  received 
timely  warning  from  one  of  the  leading  men  of  the  city 
to  retire  to  aid  in  saving  their  own  country,  instead  of 
remaining  to  share  in  the  inevitable  destruction  of 
Eretria.  Left  to  themselves,  the  Eretrians  repulsed 
the  assaults  of  the  Persians  against  their  walls  for 
six,  days ; on  the  seventh  they  were  betrayed  by  two 
of  their  chiefs,  and  the  Persians  occupied  the  city. 
The  temples  were  burned  in  revenge  for  the  firing  of 
Sardis,  and  the  inhabitants  were  bound,  and  placed 
as  prisoners  in  the  neighboring  islet  of  ,^Egilia,  to 
wait  there  till  Datis  should  bring  the  Athenians  to 
join  them  in  captivity,  when  both  populations  were 
to  be  led  into  Upper  Asia,  there  to  learn  their  doom 
from  the  lips  of  King  Darius  himself. 

35.  Flushed  with  success,  and  with  half  his  mission 
thus  accomplished,  Datis  re-embarked  his  troops,  and, 
crossing  the  little  channel  that  separates  Euboea  from 
the  main  land,  he  encamped  his  troops  on  the  Attic 
coast  at  Marathon,  drawing  up  his  galleys  on  the 
shelving  beach,  as  was  the  custom  with  the  navies  of 
antiquity.  The  conquered  islands  behind  him  served 
as  places  of  deposit  for  his  provisions  and  military 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


41 


stores.  His  position  at  Marathon  seemed  to  him  in 
every  respect  advantageous,  and  the  level  nature  of 
the  ground  on  vrhich  he  encamped  V7as  favorable  for 
the  employment  of  his  cavalry,  if  the  Athenians 
should  venture  to  engage  him.  Hippias,  v7ho  accom- 
panied him,  and  acted  as  the  guide  of  the  invaders, 
had  pointed  out  Marathon  as  the  best  place  for  a 
landing,  for  this  very  reason.  Probably  Hippias  was 
also  influenced  by  the  recollection  that  forty-seven 
years  previously,  he,  with  his  father  Pisistratus,  had 
crossed  with  an  army  from  Eretria  to  Marathon,  and 
had  won  an  easy  victory  over  their  Athenian  enemies 
on  that  very  plain,  which  had  restored  them  to 
tyrannic  power.  The  omen  seemed  cheering.  The 
place  was  the  same ; but  Hippias  soon  learned  to  his 
cost  how  great  a change  had  come  over  the  spirit  of 
the  Athenians. 

36.  But  though  the  “ fierce  democracy  ” of  Athens 
was  zealous  and  true  against  foreign  invader  and  do- 
mestic tyrant,  a faction  existed  in  Athens,  as  at  Ere- 
tria, who  were  willing  to  purchase  a party  triumph 
over  their  fellow-citizens  at  the  price  of  their  coun- 
try’s ruin.  Communications  were  opened  between 
these  men  and  the  Persian  camp,  which  would  have 
led  to  a catastrophe  like  that  of  Eretria,  if  Miltiades 
had  not  resolved  and  persuaded  his  colleagues  to  re- 
solve on  fighting  at  all  hazards. 

37.  When  Miltiades  arrayed  his  men  for  action,  he 
staked  on  the  arbitrament  of  one  battle  not  only  the 
fate  of  Athens,  but  that  of  all  Greece ; for  if  Athens 
had  fallen,  no  other  Greek  state,  except  Lacedaemon, 


42 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


would  have  had  the  courage  to  resist;  and  the 
Lacedaemonians,  though  they  would  probably  have 
died  in  their  ranks  to  the  last  man,  never  could 
have  successfully  resisted  the  victorious  Persians  and 
the  numerous  Greek  troops  which  would  have  soon 
marched  under  the  Persian  satraps,  had  they  pre- 
vailed over  Athens. 

38.  Nor  was  there  any  power  to  the  westward  of 
Greece  that  could  have  offered  an  effectual  opposi- 
tion to  Persia,  had  she  once  conquered  Greece  and 
made  that  country  a basis  for  future  military  opera- 
tions. Rome  w as  at  this  time  in  her  season  of  utmost 
weakness.  Her  dynasty  of  powerful  Etruscan  kings 
had  been  driven  out;  and  her  infant  commonwealth 
was  reeling  under  the  attacks  of  the  Etruscans  and 
Volscians  from  without,  and  the  fierce  dissensions 
between  the  patricians  and  plebians  within.  Etruria, 
with  her  Lucumos  and  serfs,  was  no  match  for  Persia. 
Samnium  had  not  grown  into  the  might  which  she 
afterward  put  forth  ; nor  could  the  Greek  colonies  in 
South  Italy  and  Sicily  hope  to  conquer  when  their 
parent  states  had  perished.  Carthage  had  escaped 
the  Persian  yoke  in  the  time  of  Cambyses,  through 
the  reluctance  of  the  Phoenician  mariners  to  serve 
against  their  kinsmen.  But  such  forbearance  could 
not  long  have  been  relied  on,  and  the  future  rival  of 
Rome  would  have  become  as  submissive  a minister 
of  the  Persian  power  as  were  the  Phoenician  cities 
themselves.  If  we  turn  to  Spain  ; or  if  we  pass  the 
great  mountain  chain,  which,  prolonged  through  the 
Pyrenees,  the  Cevennes,  the  Alps,  and  the  Balkan, 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON, 


43 


divides  Northern  from  Southern  Europe,  we  shall 
find  nothing  at  that  period  hut  mere  savage  Finns, 
Celts,  Slaves,  and  Teutons.  Had  Persia  beaten 
Athens  at  Marathon,  she  could  have  found  no  obsta- 
cle to  prevent  Darius,  the  chosen  servant  of  Ormuzd, 
from  advancing  his  sway  over  all  the  known  Western 
races  of  mankind.  The  infant  energies  of  Europe 
would  have  been  trodden  out  beneath  universal  con- 
quest, and  the  history  of  the  world,  like  the  history 
of  Asia,  have  become  a mere  record  of  the  rise  and 
fall  of  despotic  dynasties,  of  the  incursions  of  bar- 
barous hordes,  and  of  the  mental  and  political  pros- 
tration of  millions  beneath  the  diadem,  the  tiara,  and 
the  sword. 

39-  Great  as  the  preponderance  of  the  Persian  over 
the  Athenian  power  at  that  crisis  seems  to  have  been, 
it  would  be  unjust  to  impute  wild  rashness  to  the 
policy  of  Miltiades,  and  those  who  voted  with  him  in 
the  Athenian  council  of  war,  or  to  look  on  the  after- 
current of  events  as  the  mere  fortunate  result  of  suc- 
cessful folly.  As  before  has  been  remarked,  Milti- 
ades, while  prince  of  the  Chersonese,  had  seen  service 
in  the  Persian  armies ; and  he  knew  by  personal  ob- 
servation how  many  elements  of  weakness  lurked 
beneath  their  imposing  aspect  of  strength.  He  knew 
that  the  bulk  of  their  troops  no  longer  consisted  of 
the  hardy  shepherds  and  mountaineers  from  Persia 
Proper  and  Kurdistan,  who  won  Cyrus’s  battles ; but 
that  unwilling  contingents  from  conquered  nations 
now  filled  up  the  Persian  muster-rolls,  fighting  more 
from  compulsion  than  from  any  zeal  in  the  cause  of 


44 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON, 


their  masters.  He  had  also  the  sagacity  and  the 
spirit  to  appreciate  the  superiority  of  the  Greek 
armor  and  organization  over  the  Asiatic,  notwith- 
standing former  reverses.  Above  all,  he  felt  and 
worthily  trusted  the  enthusiasm  of  those  whom  he 
led. 

40.  The  Athenians  whom  he  led  had  proved  by 
their  new-born  valor  in  recent  wars  against  the 
neighboring  states  that  “ liberty  and  equality  of  civic 
rights  are  brave  spirit-stirring  things,  and  they  who, 
while  under  the  yoke  of  a despot,  had  been  no  bet- 
ter men  of  war  than  any  of  their  neighbors,  as  soon 
as  they  were  free,  became  the  foremost  men  of  all; 
for  each  felt  that  in  fighting  for  a free  common- 
wealth, he  fought  for  himself,  and  whatever  he  took 
in  hand,  he  was  zealous  to  do  the  work  thoroughly.” 
So  the  nearly  contemporaneous  historian  describes 
the  change  of  spirit  that  was  seen  in  the  Athenians 
after  their  tyrants  were  expelled;*  and  Miltiades 

* ABrjvaiOL  fiev  vvv  f)v^y]VTO‘  firjAot  fie  ov  Kar  ey  fiovov  aWa 
TravTa\ri  i]  larjyoptTj  a>?  cart  \prip.a  (rnovdatov,  et  Kal  'A0y)valoi 
rvpavvevop.evoL  p.ev  ovSapov  TUiv  <T(f)ea^  nepLOLKeouTtov  icray  to. 
TToXep,La  ap.€Lvovs,  aTraWdxB^vreq  fie  Tvpduv(t>v  p.aKp(p  irpuiTOi  eye- 
vouTO’  firjAot  S>v  Tavra  oTt  KarexopevoL  pev  eOeXoKaKeoy,  to?  fietr- 
TTOTYj  epya^opevoL’  eAev0epto0eVTwv  fie  aurb?  e/cacrro?  ewvTtp  npoOv- 
peero  Karepyd^eaOaL — HeROD,  lib.  V.,  C.  87. 

Mr.  Grote’s  commenton  this  is  one  of  the  most  eloquent 
and  philosophical  passages  in  his  admirable  fourth  vol- 
ume. 

The  expression  'la-rjyopty}  xpvi^<^  (rnoySalov  is  like  some  lines 
in  old  Barbeur’s  poem  of  “The  Bruce  : ” 

“Ah,  Fredome  is  a noble  thing; 

Fredome  makes  man  to  haiff  lyking 
Fredome  all  solace  to  men  gives, 

He  lives  at  ease  that  freely  lives.” 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


45 


knew  that  in  leading  them  against  the  invading  army, 
where  they  had  Hippias?  the  foe  they  most  hated  be- 
fore them,  he  was  bringing  into  battle  no  ordinary 
men,  and  could  calculate  on  no  ordinary  heroism. 
As  for  traitors,  he  was  sure,  that  whatever  treachery 
might  lurk  among  some  of  the  higher-born  and 
wealthier  Athenians,  the  rank  and  file  whom  he 
commanded  were  ready  to  do  their  utmost  in  his  and 
their  own  cause.  With  regard  to  future  attacks  from 
Asia,  he  might  reasonably  hope  that  one  victory 
would  inspirit  all  Greece  to  combine  against  the 
common  foe;  and  that  the  latent  seeds  of  revolt  and 
disunion  in  the  Persian  empire  would  soon  burst 
forth  and  paralyze  its  energies  so  as  to  leave  Greek 
independence  secure. 

41.  With  these  hopes  and  risks,  Miltiades,  on  the 
afternoon  of  a September  day,  490  B.  C.,  gave  the 
word  for  the  Athenian  army  to  prepare  for  battle. 
There  were  many  local  associations  connected  with 
those  mountain  heights  which  were  calculated  power- 
fully to  excite  the  spirits  of  the  men,  and  of  which  the 
commanders  well  knew  how  to  avail  themselves  in 
their  exhortations  to  their  troops  before  the  encoun- 
ter. Marathon  itself  was  a region  sacred  to  Her- 
cules. Close  to  them  was  the  fountain  of  Macaria, 
who  had  in  days  of  yore  devoted  herself  to  death 
for  the  liberty  of  her  people.  The  very  plain  on 
which  they  were  to  fight  was  the  scene  of  the  ex- 
ploits of  their  national  hero,  Theseus ; and  there,  too, 
as  old  legends  told,  the  Athenians  and  the  Hera- 
clidae  had  routed  the  invader,  Eurystheus.  These 


46 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


traditions  were  not  mere  clondy  myths  or  idle  fic- 
tions, but  matters  ol  implicit  earnest  faith  to  the 
men  of  that  day,  and  many  a fervent  prayer  arose 
from  the  Athenian  ranks  to  the  heroic  spirits  who, 
while  on  earth,  had  striven  and  suffered  on  that  very 
spot,  and  who  were  believed  to  be  now  heavenly 
powers,  looking  down  with  interest  on  their  still  be- 
loved country,  and  capable  of  interposing  with  super- 
human aid  in  its  behalf. 

42.  According  to  old  national  custom,  the  warriors 
of  each  tribe  were  arrayed  together ; neighbor  thus 
fighting  by  the  side  of  neighbor,  friend  by  friend, 
and  the  spirit  of  emulation  and  the  consciousness  of 
responsibility  excited  to  the  very  utmost.  The  War- 
ruler  Callimachus,  had  the  leading  of  the  right 
wing ; the  Platseans  formed  the  extreme  left ; and 
Themistocles  and  Aristides  commanded  the  centre. 
The  line  consisted  of  the  heavy  armed  spearmen 
only  ; for  the  Greeks  (until  the  time  of  Iphicrates) 
took  little  or  no  account  of  light-armed  soldiers  in  a 
pitched  battle,  using  them  only  in  skirmishes,  or  for 
the  pursuit  of  a defeated  enemy.  The  panoply  of 
the  regular  infantry  consisted  of  a long  spear,  of  a 
shield,  helmet,  breast-plate,  greaves,  and  short  sword. 
Thus  equipped,  they  usually  advanced  slowly  and 
steadily  into  action  in  a uniform  phalanx  of  about 
eight  spears  deep.  But  the  military  genius  of  Mil- 
tiades  led  him  to  deviate  on  this  occasion  from  the 
commonplace  tactics  of  his  countrymen.  It  was  es- 
sential for  him  to  extend  his  line  so  as  to  cover  all 
the  practicable  ground,  and  to  secure  himself  from 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


47 


being  out-flanked  and  charged  in  the  rear  by  the 
Persian  horse.  This  extension  involved  the  weaken- 
ing of  his  line.  Instead  of  a uniform  reduction  of 
its  strength,  he  determined  on  detaching  princi- 
pally from  his  centre,  which,  from  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  would  have  the  best  opportunities  for  rally- 
ing if  broken ; and  on  strengthening  his  wings  so  as 
to  insure  advantage  at  those  points ; and  he  trusted 
to  his  own  skill  and  to  his  soldiers’  discipline  for  the 
improvement  of  that  advantage  into  decisive  vic- 
tory.* 

43.  In  this  order,  and  availing  himself  probably  of 
the  inequalities  of  the  ground,  so  as  to  conceal  his 
preparations  from  the  enemy  till  the  last  possible 
moment,  Miltiades  drew  up  the  eleven  thousand  in- 
fantry whose  spears  were  to  decide  this  crisis  in  the 
struggle  between  the  European  and  the  Asiatic 
worlds.  The  sacriflces  by  which  the  favor  of  heaven 
was  sought,  and  its  will  consulted,  were  announced 
to  show  propitious  omens.  The  trumpet  sounded 
for  action?  and,  chanting  the  hymn  of  battle,  14ie 
little  army  bore  down  upon  the  host  of  the  foe. 
Then,  too,  along  the  mountain  slopes  of  Marathon 
must  have  resounded  the  mutual  exhortation, 

* It  is  remarkable  that  there  Is  no  other  instance  of  a 
Greek  general  deviating  from  the  ordinary  mode  of 
bringing  a phalanx  of  spearmen  into  action  until  the  bat- 
tles of  Leuctra  and  Mantinea,  more  than  a century  after 
Marathon,  when  Epaminondas  introduced  the  tactics 
which  Alexander  the  Great  in  ancient  times,  and  Frederic 
the  Great  in  modern  times,  made  so  famous,  of  concen- 
trating an  overpowering  force  to  bear  on  some  decisive 
point  of  the  enemy’s  line,  while  he  kept  back,  or,  in  mil- 
itary phrase,  refused  the  weaker  part  of  his  own. 

“ Persae,  ” 403. 


48 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


which  J^schylus,  who  fought  in  both  battles,  tells  us 
was  afterward  heard  over  the  waves  of  Salamis : “ On 
sons  of  the  Greeks ! Strike  for  the  freedom  of  your 
country ! strike  for  the  freedom  of  your  children  and 
of  your  wives — for  the  shrines  of  your  father’s  gods, 
and  for  the  sepulchres  of  your  sires.  All — all  are  now 
staked  upon  the  strife.” 

’n  TratSe?  Ire 

’EAevOepovre  irarpiS',  eXevOepovre  Se 
JlatSa?,  yvvaLKa^y  ©ewt'  re  Trarpcoo)*/  eSrj^ 

©r//cas  re  Trpoyovuiu,  Nuv  vnep  ndvroiv  aycoi/. 

44.  Instead  of  advancing  at  the  usual  slow  pace  of 
the  phalanx,  Miltiades  brought  his  men  on  at  a run. 
They  were  all  trained  in  the  exercises  of  the  palaestra, 
so  that  there  was  no  fear  of  their  ending  the  charge 
in  breathless  exhaustion  ; and  it  was  of  the  deepest 
importance  for  him  to  traverse  as  rapidly  as  possible 
the  mile  or  so  of  level  ground  that  lay  between  the 
mountain  foot  and  the  Persian  outposts,  and  so  to  get 
his  troops  into  close  action  before  the  Asiatic  cavalry 
could  mount,  form,  and  maneuver  against  him,  or 
their  archers  keep  him  long  under  fire,  and  before  the 
enemy’s  generals  could  fairly  deploy  their  masses. 

45.  “ When  the  Persians,  ” says  Herodotus,  “ saw 
the  Athenians  running  down  on  them,  without  horse 
or  bowmen,  and  scanty  in  numbers,  they  thought 
them  a set  of  madmen  rushing  upon  certain  destruc- 
tion. ” They  began,  however,  to  prepare  to  receive 
them,  and  the  Eastern  chiefs  arrayed,  as  quickly  as 
time  and  place  allowed,  the  varied  races  who  served 
in  their  motley  ranks.  Mountaineers  from  Hyrcania 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON, 


49 


and  Afghanistan,  wild  horsemen  from  the  steppes  of 
Khorassan,  the  black  archers  of  Ethiopia,  swordsmen 
from  the  hanks  of  the  Indus,  the  Oxus,  the  Euphrates, 
and  the  Nile,  make  ready  against  the  enemies  of  the 
Great  King.  But  no  national  cause  inspired  them 
except  the  division  of  native  Persians ; and  in  the 
large  host  there  was  no  uniformity  of  language,  creed, 
race,  or  military  system.  Still,  among  them  there 
were  many  gallant  men,  under  a veteran  general ; 
they  were  familiarized  with  victory,  and  in  contempt- 
uous confidence,  their  infantry,  which  alone  had 
time  to  form,  awaited  the  Athenian  charge.  On 
came  the  Greeks,  with  one  unwavering  line  of  leveled 
spears,  against  which  the  light  targets,  the  short  lan- 
ces and  cimeters  of  the  Orientals,  offered  a weak  de- 
fense. The  front  rank  of  the  Asiatics  must  have 
gone  down  to  a man  at  the  first  shock.  Still  they 
recoiled  not,  hut  strove  by  individual  gallantry  and 
by  the  weight  of  numbers  to  make  up  for  the  disad- 
vantages of  weapons  and  tactics,  and  to  bear  back  the 
shallow  line  of  the  Europeans.  In  the  centre,  where 
the  native  Persians  and  the  Sacae  fought,  they  suc- 
ceeded in  breaking  through  the  weakened  part  of  the 
Athenian  phalanx ; and  the  tribes  led  by  Aristides 
and  Themistocles  were,  after  a brave  resistance, 
driven  back  over  the  plain,  and  chased  by  the  Per- 
sians up  the  valley  toward  the  inner  country. 
There  the  nature  of  the  ground  gave  the  opportunity 
of  rallying  and  renewing  the  struggle.  Meanwhile, 
the  Greek  wings,  where  Miltiades  had  concentrated 
his  chief  strength,  had  routed  the  Asiatics  opposed 


50 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


to  them  ; and  the  Athenian  and  Platsean  officers,  in- 
stead of  pursuing  the  fugitives,  kept  their  troops 
well  in  hand,  and,  wheeling  round,  they  formed  the 
two  wings  together.  Miltiades  instantly  led  them 
against  the  Persian  centre,  which  had  hitherto  been 
triumphant,  but  which  now  fell  back,  and  prepared 
to  encounter  these  new  and  unexpected  assailants. 
Aristides  and  Themistocles  renewed  the  fight  with 
their  reorganized  troops,  and  the  full  force  of  the 
Greeks  was  brought  into  close  action  with  the  Per- 
sian and  Sacian  divisions  of  the  enemy.  Datis’s  vet- 
eran’s strove  hard  to  keep  their  ground,  and  evening* 
was  approaching  before  the  stern  encounter  was 
decided. 

46.  But  the  Persians,  with  their  slight  wicker 
shields,  destitute  of  body-armor,  and  never  taught  by 
training  to  keep  the  even  front  and  act  with  the 
regular  movement  of  the  Greek  infantry,  fought  at 
heavy  disadvantage  with  their  shorter  and  feebler 
weapons  against  the  compact  array  of  well-armed 
Athenian  and  Plataean  spearmen,  all  perfectly  drilled 
to  perform  each  necessary  evolution  in  concert,  and 
to  preserve  a uniform  and  unwavering  line  in  battle. 
In  personal  courage  and  in  bodily  activity  the  Per- 
sians were  not  inferior  to  their  adversaries.  Their 
spirits  were  not  yet  cowed  by  the  recollection  of 
former  defeats ; and  they  lavished  their  lives  freely, 
rather  than  forfeit  the  fame  which  they  had  won  by 
so  many  victories.  While  their  rear  ranks  poured 

* ’AAA’  6jou>)9  aniaaofXGcrOa  ^vv  ^€ols  Trpbs  — ArISTOPH,, 

Vespse,  1083. 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


51 


an  incessant  shower  of  arrows*  over  the  heads  of 
their  comrades,  the  foremost  Persians  kept  rushing 
forward,  sometimes  singly,  sometimes  in  desperate 
groups  of  twelve  or  ten  upon  the  projecting  spears  of 
the  Greeks,  striving  to  force  a lane  into  the  phalanx, 
and  to  bring  their  cimeters  and  daggers  into  play.f 
But  the  Greeks  felt  their  superiority,  and  though  the 
fatigue  of  the  long-continued  action  told  heavily  on 
their  inferior  numbers,  the  sight  of  the  carnage  that 
they  dealt"upon  their  assailants  nerved  them  to  fight 
still  more  fiercely  on. 

47.  At  last  the  previously  unvanquished  lords  of 
Asia  turned  their  backs  and  fled,  and  the  Greeks 
followed,  striking  them  down,  to  the  water’s  edge,J 
where  the  invaders  were  now  hastily  launching  their 
galleys,  and  seeking  to  embark  and  fly.  Flushed 
with  success,  the  Athenians  attacked  and  strove  to 
fire  the  fleet.  But  here  the  Asiatics  resisted  desper- 

* ’E/u.axojaeo‘0’  avTOtcri,  Bvixov  o^Lvy)v  rrencoKOTeq, 

2ras  avrip  Trap"  ai^8pa  vtt  bpyrj<;  ty)v  \e\vvriv  iadiuiV' 

'Ytto  8k  Tuiv  TO^€vp.a.T(t)v  ovK  ISclv  Tov  ovpavov- 

Aristoph,  Vespae,  1082 

t See  the  description  in  the  62d  section  of  the  ninth 
book  of  Herodotus  of  the  g-allantry  shown  by  the  Persian 
infantry  against  the  Lacedaemonians  atPlatfea.  We  have 
no  similar  detail  of  the  fight  at  Marathon,  but  we  know 
that  it  was  long  and  obstinately  contested  (see  the  1 Kith 
section  of  the  sixth  book  of  Herodotus,  and  the  lines  from 
the  Vespae  already  quoted),  and  the  spirit  of  the  Persians 
must  have  been  even  higher  at  Marathon  than  at  Plataea. 
In  both  battles  it  was  only  the  true  Persians  and  theSacae 
who  showed  this  valor:  the  other  Asiatics  tied  like  sheep. 
$ The  flying  Mede,  his  shaftless  broken  bow; 

The  fiery  Greek,  his  red  pursuing  spear; 
Mountains  above,  Earth’s,  Ocean’s  plain  below, 
Death  in  the  front,  Destruction  in  the  rear! 

Such  was  the  scene.— Byron’s  Childe  Harold. 


52 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHOK 


ately,  and  the  principal  loss  sustained  by  the  Greeks 
was  in  the  assault  on  the  ships.  Here  fell  the  brave 
War-ruler  Callimachus,  the  general  Stesilaus,  and 
other  Athenians  of  note.  Seven  galleys  were  fired ; 
but  the  Persians  succeeded  in  saving  the  rest.  They 
pushed  off  from  the  fatal  shore ; but  even  here  the 
skill  of  Datis  did  not  desert  him,  and  he  sailed  round 
to  the  western  coast  of  Attica,  in  hopes  to  find  the 
city  unprotected,  and  to  gain  possession  of  it  from 
some  of  the  partisans  of  Hippias.  Miltiades,  however, 
saw  and  counteracted  his  maneuver.  Leaving  Aris- 
tides, and  the  troops  of  his  tribe,  to  guard  the  spoil 
and  the  slain,  the  Athenian  commander  led  his  con- 
quering army  by  a rapid  night-march  back  across  the 
country  to  Athens.  And  when  the  Persian  fleet  had 
doubled  the  Cape  of  Sunium  and  sailed  up  to  the 
Athenian  harbor  in  the  morning,  Datis  saw  arrayed 
on  the  heights  above  the  city  the  troops  before  whom 
his  men  had  fled  on  the  preceding  evening.  All 
hope  of  further  conquest  in  Europe  for  the  time  was 
abandoned,  and  the  baffled  armada  returned  to  the 
Asiatic  coasts. 

48.  After  the  battle  had  been  fought,  but  while 
the  dead  bodies  were  yet  on  the  ground,  the  promised 
re-enforcement  from  Sparta  arrived.  Two  thousand 
Lacedasmonian  spearmen,  starting  immediately  after 
the  full  moon,  had  marched  the  hundred  and  fifty 
miles  between  Athens  and  Sparta  in  the  wonderfully 
short  time  of  three  days.  Though  too  late  to  share 
in  the  glory  of  the  action,  they  requested  to  be  al- 
lowed to  march  to  the  battle-field  to  behold  the 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


53 


Medes.  They  proceeded  thither,  gazed  on  the  dead 
bodies  of  the  invaders,  and  then,  praising  the  Athe- 
nians and  what  they  had  done,  they  returned  to 
Lacedaemon. 

49.  The  number  of  the  Persian  dead  was  6400 ; of 
the  Athenians,  192.  The  number  of  the  Platseans 
who  fell  is  not  mentioned ; but,  as  they  fought  in 
the  part  of  the  army  which  was  not  broken,  it  can 
not  have  been  large. 

50.  The  apparent  disproportion  between  the  losses 
of  the  two  armies  is  not  surprising  when  we  remem- 
ber the  armor  of  the  Greek  spearmen,  and  the  im- 
possibility of  heavy  slaughter  being  inflicted  by 
sword  or  lance  on  troops  so  armed,  as  long  as  they 
kept  Arm  in  their  ranks.* 

51.  The  Athenian  slain  were  buried  on  the  field  of 
battle.  This  was  contrary  to  the  usual  custom,  ac- 
cording to  which  the  bones  of  all  who  fell  fighting 
for  their  country  in  each  year  were  deposited  in  a 
public  sepulchre  in  the  suburb  of  Athens  called  the 
Cerameicus.  But  it  was  felt  that  a distinction  ought 
to  be  made  in  the  funeral  honors  paid  to  the  men  of 
Marathon,  even  as  their  merit  had  been  distinguished 
over  that  of  all  other  Athenians.  A lofty  mound 
was  raised  on  the  plain  of  Marathon,  beneath  which 
the  remains  of  the  men  of  Athens  who  fell  in  the 
battle  were  deposited.  Ten  columns  were  erected  on 
the  spot,  one  for  each  of  the  Athenian  tribes ; and  on 

* Mitford  well  refers  to  Crecy,  Poictiers,  and  Agincourt 
as  instances  of  similar  disparity  of  loss  between  the  con 
querors  and  the  conquered. 


54 


Battle  of  marathon. 


the  monumental  column  of  each  tribe  were  graven 
the  names  of  those  of  its  members  whose  glory  it  was 
to  have  fallen  in  the  great  battle  of  liberation.  The 
antiquarian  Pausanias  read  those  names  there  six 
hundred  years  after  the  time  when  they  were  first 
graven.*  The  columns  have  long  perished,  but  the 
mound  still  marks  the  spot  where  the  noblest  heroes 
of  antiquity,  the  Mapa6cov6/j.a^oty  repose. 

52.  A separate  tumulus  was  raised  over  the  bodies 
of  the  slain  Plataeans,  and  another  over  the  light- 
armed slaves  who  had  taken  part  and  had  fallen  in 
the  battle.f  There  was  also  a separate  funeral  monu- 
ment to  the  general  to  whose  genius  the  victory  was 
mainly  due.  Miltiades  did  not  live  long  after  his 
achievement  at  Marathon,  but  he  lived  long  enough 
to  experience  a lamentable  reverse  of  his  popularity 
and  success.  As  soon  as  the  Persians  had  quitted 
the  western  coasts  of  the  jEgsean,  he  proposed  to  an 
assembly  of  the  Athenian  people  that  they  should  fit 
out  seventy  galleys,  with  a proportionate  force  of 
soldiers  and  military  stores,  and  place  it  at  his  dis- 
posal ; not  telling  them  whither  he  meant  to  lead  it. 


* Pausanias  states,with  implicit  belief,  that  the  battle- 
field was  haunted  at  nig-ht  by  supernatural  beings,  and 
that  the  noise  of  combatants  and  the  snorting  of  horses 
were  heard  to  resound  on  it.  The  superstition  has  sur- 
vived the  change  of  creeds,  and  the  shepherds  of  the 
neighborhood  still  believe  that  spectral  warriors  contend 
on  the  plain  at  midnight,  and  they  say  that  they  have 
heard  the  shouts  of  the  combatants  and  the  neighing 
of  the  steeds.  See  Grote  and  Thirlwall. 

t It  is  probable  that  the  Greek  light-armed  irregulars 
were  active  in  the  attack  on  the  Persian  ships,  and  it  was 
in  this  attack  that  the  Greeks  sutfered  their  principal 
loss. 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


55 


but  promising  them  that  if  they  would  equip  the 
force  he  asked  for,  and  give  him  discretionary  powers, 
he  would  lead  it  to  a land  where  there  was  gold  in 
abundance  to  be  won  with  ease.  The  Greeks  of  that 
time  believed  in  the  existence  of  Eastern  realms 
teeming  with  gold,  as  firmly  as  the  Europeans  of  the 
sixteenth  century  believed  in  El  Dorado  of  the  West. 
The  Athenians  probably  thought  that  the  recent  vic- 
tor of  Marathon,  and  former  officer  of  Darius,  was 
about  to  lead  them  on  a secret  expedition  against 
some  wealthy  and  unprotected  cities  of  treasure  in 
the  Persian  dominions.  The  armament  was  voted 
and  equipped,  and  sailed  eastward  from  Attica,  no 
one  but  Miltiades  knowing  its  destination  until  the 
Greek  isle  of  Paros  was  reached,  when  his  true  ob- 
ject appeared.  In  former  years,  while  connected 
with  the  Persians  as  prince  of  the  Chersonese,  Milti- 
ades had  been  involved  in  a quarrel  with  one  of  the 
leading  men  among  the  Parians,  who  had  injured  his 
credit  and  caused  some  slights  to  be  put  upon  him 
at  the  court  of  the  Persian  satrap  Hydarnes.  The 
feud  had  ever  since  rankled  in  the  heart  of  the  Athe- 
nian chief,  and  he  now  attackad  Paros  for  the  sake 
of  avenging  himself  on  his  ancient  enemy.  His  pre- 
text as  general  of  the  Athenians,  was,  that  the  Pa- 
rians had  aided  the  armament  of  Datis  with  a war- 
galley.  The  Parians  pretended  to  treat  about  terms 
of  surrender,  but  used  the  time  which  they  thus 
gained  in  repairing  the  defective  parts  of  the  fortifi- 
cations of  their  city,  and  they  then  set  the  Athenians 
at  defiance.  So  far,  says  Herodotus,  the  accounts  of 


56 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


all  the  Greeks  agree.  But  the  Parians  in  after  years 
told  also  a wild  legend,  how  a captive  priestess  of  a 
Parian  temple  of  the  Deities  of  the  Earth  promised 
Miltiades  to  give  him  the  means  of  capturing  Paros ; 
how,  at  her  bidding,  the  Athenian  general  went  alone 
at  night  and  forced  his  way  into  a holy  shrine,  neai 
the  city  gate,  but  with  what  purpose  it  was  not 
known ; how  a supernatural  awe  came  over  him,  and 
in  his  flight  he  fell  and  fractured  his  leg ; how  an 
oracle  afterward  forbade  the  Parians  to  punish  the 
sacrilegious  and  traitorous  priestess,  “ because  it  was 
fated  that  Miltiades  should  come  to  an  ill  end,  and 
she  was  only  the  instrument  to  lead  him  to  evil.’’ 
Such  was  the  tale  that  Herodotus  heard  at  Paros. 
Certain  it  was  that  Miltiades  either  dislocated  or 
broke  his  leg  during  an  unsuccessful  siege  of  the  city, 
and  returned  home  in  evil  plight  with  his  baffled 
and  defeated  forces. 

53.  The  indignation  of  the  Athenians  was  propor- 
tionate to  the  hope  and  excitement  which  his  promises 
had  raised.  Xanthippus,  the  head  of  one  of  the  first 
families  in  Athens,  indicted  him  before  the  supreme 
popular  tribunal  for  the  capital  offense  of  having  de- 
ceived the  people.  His  guilt  was  undeniable,  and  the 
Athenians  passed  their  verdict  accordingly.  But  the 
recollections  of  Lemnos  and  Marathon,  and  the  sight 
of  the  fallen  general,  who  lay  stretched  on  a couch 
before  them,  pleaded  successfully  in  mitigation  of 
punishment,  and  the  sentence  was  commuted  from 
death  to  a fine  of  fifty  talents.  This  was  paid  by  his 
son,  the  afterward  illustrious  Cimon,  Miltiades  dying, 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON, 


57 


soon  after  the  trial,  of  the  injury  which  he  had  re- 
ceived at  Paros  * 

54.  The  melancholy  end  of  Miltiades,  after  his 
elevation  to  such  a height  of  power  and  glory,  must 
often  have  been  recalled  to  the  minds  of  the  ancient 
Greeks  by  the  sight  of  one  in  particular  of  the  mem- 
orials of  the  great  battle  which  he  won.  This  was 
the  remarkable  statue  (minutely  described  by  Paus- 
anias)  which  the  Athenians,  in  the  time  of  Pericles, 
caused  to  be  hewn  out  of  a huge  block  of  marble, 
which,  it  was  believed,  had  been  provided  by  Datis, 
to  form  a trophy  of  the  anticipated  victory  of  the 
Persians.  Phidias  fashioned  out  of  this  a colossal 
image  of  the  goddess  Nemesis,  the  deity  whose  pecu- 


* The  commonplace  calumnies  against  the  Athenians 
respecting  Miltiades  have  been  well  answered  by  Sir  Ed- 
ward Lytton  Bulwer  in  his  “Rise  and  Fall  of  Athens,” 
and  Bishop  Thirlwall  in  the  second  volume  of  his  “ His- 
tory of  Greece;  ” but  they  have  received  their  most  com- 
plete refutation  from  Mr.  Grote,  in  the  fourth  volume  of 
his  History,  p.  490,  et  seq.,  and  notes.  I quite  concur  with 
him  that,  “looking  to  the  practice  of  the  Athenian  dicas- 
tery  in  criminal  cases,  that  fifty  talents  was  the  minor 
penalty  actually  proposed  by  the  defenders  of  Miltiades 
themselves  as  a substitute  for  the  punishments  of  death 
In  those  penal  cases  at  Athens  where  the  punishment  was 
not  fixed  beforehand  by  the  terms  of  the  law,  if  the  per 
son  accused  was  found  guilty,  it  was  custmary  to  submit 
to  the  jurors  subsequently  and  separately  the  question 
as  to  amount  of  punishment.  First,  the  accuser  named 
the  penalty  which  he  thought  suitable;  next,  the  accused 
person  was  called  upon  to  name  an  amount  of  penalty  for 
himself,  and  the  jurors  were  constrained  to  take  their 
choice  between  these  two,  no  third  gradation  of  penalty 
being  admissible  for  consideration.  Of  course,  under 
such  circumstances,  it  was  the  interest  of  the  accused 
party  to  name,  even  in  his  own  case,  some  real  and  seri- 
ous penalty,  something  which  the  jurors  might  be  likely 
to  deem  not  wholly  inadequate  to  his  crime  just  proved; 
for  if  he  preposed  some  penalty  only  trifling,  he  drove 


58 


BATTLE  OF  3TABATH0N. 


liar  function  was  to  visit  the  exuberant  prosperity 
both  of  nations  and  individuals  with  sudden  and 
awful  reverses.  This  statue  was  placed  in  a temple 
of  the  goddess  at  Rhamnus,  about  eight  miles  from 
Marathon.  Athens  itself  contained  numerous  memo- 
rials of  her  primary  great  victory.  Panenus,  the 
cousin  of  Phidias,  represented  it  in  fresco  on  the 
walls  of  the  painted  porch  ; and,  centuries  afterward, 
the  figures  of  Miltiades  and  Callimachus  at  the  head 
of  the  Athenians  were  conspicuous  in  the  fresco.  The 
tutelary  deities  were  exhibited  taking  part  in  the 
fray.  In  the  back-ground  were  seen  the  Phoenician 
galleys,  and  nearer  to  the  spectator,  the  Athenians 
and  the  Platseans  (distinguished  by  their  leather 
helmets)  were  chasing  routed  Asiatics  into  the 
marshes  and  the  sea.  The  battle  was  sculptured  also 
on  the  Temple  of  Victory  in  the  Acropolis,  and  even 
now  there  may  be  traced  on  the  frieze  the  figures  of 


them  to  prefer  the  heavier  sentence  recommended  by  his 
opponent.”  The  stories  of  Miltiades  having  been  cast 
into  prison  and  died  there,  and  of  his  having  been  saved 
from  death  only  by  the  interposition  of  the  prytanis  of 
the  day,  are,  I think,  rightly  rejected  by  Mr.  Grote  as  the 
fictions  of  after  ages.  The  silence  of  Herodotus  respect- 
ing them  is  decisive.  It  is  true  that  Plato,  in  the  Gorgi  as, 
says  that  the  Athenians  passed  a vote  to  throw  Miltiades 
into  the  Barathrum,  and  speaks  of  the  interposition  of 
the  prytanis  in  his  favor;  but  it  is  to  be  remembered  that 
Plato,  with  all  his  transcendent  genius,  was  (as  Niebuhr 
has  termed  him)  a very  indifferent  patriot,  who  loved  to 
blacken  the  character  of  his  country’s  democratical  insti- 
tutions ; aud  if  the  fact  was  that  the  prytanis,  at  the  trial 
of  Miltiades,  opposed  the  vote  of  capital  punishment,  and 
spoke  in  favor  of  the  milder  sentence,  Plato  (in  a passage 
written  to  show  the  misfortunes  that  befell  Athenian 
statesmen)  would  readily  exaggerate  this  fact  into  the 
story  that  appears  in  his  text. 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON. 


59 


the  Persian  combatants  with  their  lunar  shields, 
their  bows  and  quivers,  their  curved  cimeters,  their 
loose  trowsers,  and  Phrygian  tiaras.* 

55.  These  and  other  memorials  of  Marathon  were 
the  produce  of  the  meridian  age  of  Athenian  intel- 
lectual splendor,  of  the  age  of  Phidias  and  Pericles  ; 
for  it  was  not  merely  by  the  generation  whom  the 
battle  liberated  from  Hippias  and  the  Mede^s  that  the 
transcendent  importance  of  their  victory  was  grate- 
fully recognized.  Through  the  whole  epoch  of  her 
prosperity,  through  the  long  Olympiads  of  her  decay 
through  centuries  after  her  fall,  Athens  looked  back 
on  the  day  of  Marathon  as  the  brightest  of  her 
national  existence. 

56.  By  a natural  blending  of  patriotic  pride  with 
grateful  piety,  the  very  spirits  of  the  Athenians  who 
fell  at  Marathon  were  deified  by  their  countrymen. 
The  inhabitants  of  the  district  of  Marathon  paid  re- 
ligious rites  to  them;  and  orators  solemnly  invoked 
them  in  their  most  impassioned  adjurations  before 
the  assembled  men  of  Athens.  “ Nothing  was  omit- 
ted that  could  keep  alive  the  remembrance  of  a deed 
which  had  first  taught  the  Athenian  people  to  know 
its  own  strength,  by  measuring  it  with  the  power 
which  had  subdued  the  greater  part  of  the  known 
world.  The  consciousness  thus  awakened  fixed  its 
character,  its  station,  aud  its  destiny;  it  was  the 
spring  of  its  later  great  actions  and  ambitious  enter- 
prises.”! 

* Wordsworth’s  “Greece,”  p.  115. 
tThirlwall. 


60 


BATTLE  OF  MARATHON, 


57.  It  was  not  indeed  by  one  defeat,  however  sig- 
nal, that  the  pride  of  Persia  could  be  broken,  and 
her  dreams  of  universal  empire  dispelled.  Ten  years 
afterward  she  renewed  her  attempts  upon  Europe  on 
a grander  scale  of  enterprise,  and  was  repulsed  by 
Greece  with  greater  and  reiterated  loss.  Larger  forces 
and  heavier  slaughter  than  had  been  seen  at  Mara- 
thon signalized  the  conflicts  of*  Greeks  and  Persians 
at  Artemisium,  Salamis,  Platsea,  and  the  Eurymedon. 
But,  mighty  and  momentous  as  these  battles  were, 
they  rank  not  with  Marathon  in  importance.  They 
originated  no  new  impulse.  They  turned  back  no 
current  of  fate.  They  were  merely  confirmatory  of 
the  already  existing  bias  which  Marathon  had 
created.  The  day  of  Marathon  is  the  critical  epoch 
in  the  history  of  the  two  nations.  It  broke  forever 
the  spell  of  Persian  invincibilityj  which  had  pre- 
viously paralyzed  men’s  minds.  It  generated  among 
the  Greeks  the  spirit  which  beat  back  Xerxes,  and 
afterward  led  on  Xenophon,  Agaeilaus,  and  Alexan- 
der, in  terrible  retaliation  through  their  Asiatic  cam- 
paigns. It  secured  for  mankind  the  intellectual 
treasures  of  Athens,  the  growth  of  free  institutions, 
the  liberal  enlightenment  of  the  Western  world,  and 
the  gradual  ascendency  for  many  ages  of  the  great 
principles  of  European  civilization. 


EXPLANATORY  REMARKS, 


61 


Explanatory  Remarks  on  some  of  the'  Cir- 
cumstances OF  THE  Battle  of  Marathon. 

58.  Nothing  is  said  by  Herodotus  of  the  Persian 
cavalry  taking  any  part  in  the  battle,  although  he 
mentions  that  Hippias  recommended  the  Persians  to 
land  at  Marathon,  because  the  plain  was  favorable 
for  cavalry  evolutions.  In  the  life  of  Miltiades  which 
is  usually  cited  as  the  production  of  Cornelius  Nepos, 
but  which  I believe  to  be  of  no  authority  whatever, 
it  is  said  that  Miltiades  protected  his  flanks  from  the 
enemy’s  horse  by  an  abatis  of  felled  trees.  While  he 
was  on  the  high  ground  he  would  not  have  required 
this  defense,  and  it  is  not  likely  that  the  Persians 
would  have  allowed  him  to  erect  it  on  the  plain. 

59.  Bishop  Thirlwall  calls  our  attention  to  a pas- 
sage in  Suidas,  where  the  proverb  Xwptq  tTzirel^  is 
said  to  have  originated  from  some  Ionian  Greeks  who 
were  serving  compulsorily  in  the  army  of  Datis,  con- 
triving to  inform  Miltiades  that  the  Persian  cavalry 
had  gone  away,  whereupon  Miltiades  immediately 
joined  battle  and  gained  the  victory.  There  may 
probably  be  a gleam  of  truth  in  this  legend.  If 
Datis’s  cavalry  was  numerous,  as  the  abundant  pas- 
tures of  Euboea  were  close  at  hand,  the  Persian  gen- 
eral, when  he  thought,  from  the  inaction  of  his 
enemy,  that  they  did  not  mean  to  come  down  from 
the  heights  and  give  battle,  might  naturally  send  the 
larger  part  of  his  horse  back  across  the  channel  to 
the  neighborhood  of  Eretria,  where  he  had  already 
left  a detachment,  and  where  his  military  stores  must 


62 


EXPLANATORY  REMARKS, 


have  been  deposited.  The  knowledge  of  such  a 
movement  would  of  course  confirm  Miltiades  in  his 
resolution  to  bring  on  a speedy  engagement. 

60.  But  in  truth,  whatever  amount  of  cavalry  we 
suppose  Datis  to  have  had  with  him  on  the  day  of 
Marathon,  their  inaction  in  the  battle  is  intelligible, 
if  we  believe  the  attack  of  the  Athenian  spearmen 
to  have  been  as  sudden  as  it  was  rapid.  The  Persian 
horse-soldier,  on  an  alarm  being  given,  had  to  take 
the  shackles  off  his  horse,  to  strap  the  saddle  on,  and 
bridle  him,  besides  equipping  himself  (see  Xenoph., 
“ Anab.,”  lib.  iii.,  c.  4) ; and  when  each  individual 
horseman  was  ready,  the  line  had  to  be  formed ; and 
the  time  that  it  takes  to  form  the  Oriental  cavalry  in 
line  for  a charge  has,  in  all  ages,  been  observed  by 
Europeans. 

61.  The  wet  state  of  the  marshes  at  each  end  of 
the  plain,  in  the  time  of  year  when  the  battle  was 
fought,  has  been  adverted  to  by  Wordsworth,  and 
this  would  hinder  the  Persian  general  from  arranging 
and  employing  his  horsemen  on  his  extreme  wings, 
while  it  also  enabled  the  Greeks,  as  they  came  for- 
ward, to  occupy  the  whole  breadth  of  the  practicable 
ground  with  an  unbroken  line  of  leveled  spears 
against  which,  if  any  Persian  horse  advanced,  they 
would  be  driven  back  in  confusion  upon  their  own 
foot. 

62.  Even  numerous  and  fully-arrayed  bodies  of 
cavalry  have  been  repeatedly  broken,  both  in  ancient 
and  modern  warfare,  by  resolute  charges  of  infantry. 
For  instance,  it  was  by  an  attack  of  some  picked  co- 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS, 


63 


horts  that  Csesar  routed  the  Pompeian  cavalry  (which 
had  previously  defeated  his  own),  and  won  the  battle 
of  Pharsalia. 

63.  I have  represented  the  battle  of  Marathon  as 
beginning  in  the  afternoon  and  ending  toward  even- 
ing. If  it  had  lasted  all  day,  Herodotus  would  have 
probably  mentioned  that  fact.  That  it  ended  toward 
evening  is,  I think,  proved  by  the  line  from  the 
“ Vespae,”  which  I have  already  quoted,  and  to  which 
my  attention  was  called  by  Sir  Edward  Bulwer’s  ac- 
count of  the  battle.  I think  that  the  succeeding 
lines  in  Aristophanes,  also  already  quoted,  justify 
the  description  which  I have  given  of  the  rear  ranks 
of  the  Persians  keeping  up  a fife  of  arrows  over  the 
heads  of  their  comrades,  as  the  Normans  did  at  Has- 
tings. 


Synopsis  of  Events  Between  the  Battle  of 
Marathon,  B.  C.  490,  and  the  Defeat  of  the 
Athenians  at  Syracuse,  B.  C.  413. 

B.  C.  490  to  487.  All  Asia  filled  with  the  prepara- 
tions made  by  King  Darius  for  a nev/  expedition 
against  Greece.  Themistocles  persuades  the  Athe- 
nians to  leave  off  dividing  the  proceeds  of  their  silver 
mines  among  themselves,  and  to  employ  the  money 
in  strengthening  their  navy. 

487.  Egypt  revolts  from  the  Persians,  and  delay 
the  expedition  against  Greece. 


64 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


485.  Darius  dies,  and  Xerxes  his  son  becomes  King 
of  Persia  in  his  stead. 

484.  The  Persians  recover  Egypt. 

480.  Xerxes  invades  Greece.  Indecisive  actions 
between  the  Persian  and  Greek  fleets  at  Artemisium. 
Destruction  of  the  three  hundred  Spartans  at  Ther- 
mopylae. The  Athenians  abandon  Attica  and  go  on 
shipboard.  Great  naval  victory  of  the  Greeks  at 
Salamis.  Xerxes  returns  to  Asia,  leaving  a chosen 
army  under  Mardonius  to  carry  on  the  war  against 
the  Greeks. 

478.  Mardonius  and  his  army  destroyed  by  the 
Greeks  at  Plataea.  The  Greeks  land  in  Asia  Minor, 
and  defeat  a Persian  force  at  Mycale.  In  this  and 
the  following  years  the  Persians  lose  all  their  con- 
quests in  Europe,  and  many  on  the  coast  of  Asia. 

477.  Many  of  the  Greek  maritime  states  take 
Athens  as  their  leader  instead  of  Sparta. 

466.  Victories  of  Cimon  over  the  Persians  at  the 
Eurymedon. 

464.  Revolt  of  the  Helots  against  Sparta.  Third 
Messenian  war. 

460.  Egypt  again  revolts  against  Persia.  The 
Athenians  send  a powerful  armament  to  aid  the 
Egyptians,  which,  after  gaining  some  successes,  is  de- 
stroyed; and  Egypt  submits.  This  war  lasted  six 
years. 

457.  Wars  in  Greece  between  the  Athenian  and 
several  Peloponnesian  states.  Immense  exertions  of 
Athens  at  this  time.  “ There  is  an  original  inscrip- 
tion still  preserved  in  the  Louvre  which  attests  the 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS, 


65 


energies  of  Athens  at  this  crisis,  when  Athens,  like 
England  in  modern  wars,  at  once  sought  conquests 
abroad  and  repelled  enemies  at  home.  At  the  period 
we  now  advert  to  (B.  C.  457),  an  Athenian  armament 
of  two  hundred  galleys  was  engaged  in  a hold  though 
unsuccessful  expedition  against  Egypt.  The  Athen- 
ian crews  had  landed,  had  won  a battle;  they  had 
then  re-embarked  and  sailed  up  the  Nile,  and  were 
busily  besieging  the  Persian  garrison  in  Memphis. 
As  the  complement  of  a trireme  galley  was  at  least 
two  hundred  men,  we  can  not  estimate  the  forces 
then  employed  by  Athens  against  Egypt  at  less  than 
forty  thousand  men.  At  the  same  time,  she  kept 
squadrons  on  the  coasts  of  Phoenicia  and  Cyprus,  and 
yet  maintained  a home  fleet  that  enabled  her  to  de- 
feat her  Peloponnesian  enemies  at  Cecryphalse  and 
iEgina,  capturing  in  the  last  engagement  seventy  gal- 
leys. This  last  fact  may  give  us  some  idea  of  the 
strength  of  the  Athenian  home  fleet  that  gained  the 
victory,  and  by  adopting  the  same  ratio  of  multiply- 
ing whatever  number  of  galleys  we  suppose  to  have 
been  employed  by  two  hundred,  so  as  to  gain  the 
aggregate  number  of  the  crews,  we  may  form  some 
estimate  of  the  forces  which  this  little  Greek  state 
then  kept  on  foot.  Between  sixty  and  seventy  thou- 
sand men  must  have  served  in  her  fleets  during  that 
year.  Her  tenacity  of  purpose  was  equal  to  her  bold- 
ness of  enterprise.  Sooner  than  yield  or  withdraw 
from  any  of  thiir  expeditions,  the  Athenians  at  this 
very  time,  when  Corinth  sent  an  army  to  attack  their 
garrison  at  Megara  did  not  recall  a single  crew  or  a 


66 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


single  soldier  from  jEgina  or  from  abroad ; but  the 
lads  and  old  men,  who  had  been  left  to  guard  the 
city,  fought  and  won  a battle  against  these  new  assail- 
ants. The  inscription  which  we  have  referred  to  is 
graven  on  a votive  tablet  to  the  memory  of  the  dead, 
erected  in  that  year  by  the  Erechthean  tribe,  one  of 
the  ten  into  which  the  Athenians  were  divided.  It 
shows,  as  Thirl  wall  has  remarked,  ‘that  the  Athe- 
nians were  conscious  of  the  greatness  of  their  own 
effort and  in  it  this  little  civic  community  of  the 
ancient  world  still  ‘ records  to  us  with  emphatic  sim- 
plicity, that  its  slain  fell  in  Cyprus,  in  Egypt,  in 
Phoenicia,  at  Haliae,  in  iEgina,  and  in  Megara,  in  the 
same  year.’’  ”* 

445.  A thirty  year’s  truce  concluded  between 
Athens  and  Lacedaemon. 

440.  The  Samians  endeavor  to  throw  off  the 
supremacy  of  Athens.  Samos  completely  reduced  to 
subjection.  Pericles  is  now  sole  director  of  the 
Athenian  councils. 

431.  Commencement  of  the  great  Peloponnesian 
war,  in  which  Sparta,  at  the  head  of  nearly  all  the 
Peloponnesian  states,  and  aided  by  the  Boeotians  and 
some  of  the  other  Greeks  beyond  the  Isthmus, 
endeavors  to  reduce  the  power  of  Athens,  and  to 
restore  independence  to  the  Greek  maritime  states 
who  were  the  subject  allies  of  Athens.  At  the  com- 
mencement of  the  war  the  Peloponnesian  armies 
repeatedly  invade  and  ravage  Attica,  but  Athens 


* Paeans  of  the  Athenian  Navy, 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


67 


herself  is  impregnable,  and  her  fleets  secure  her  the 
dominions  of  the  sea. 

430.  Athens  visited  by  a pestilence, ’'which  sweejDS 
off  large  numbers  of  her  population. 

425.  The  Athenians  gain  great  advantages  over 
the  Spartans  at  Sphacteria,  and  by  occupying  Cy- 
thera  ; but  they  suffer  a severe  defeat  in  Boeotia,  and 
the  Spartan  general,  Brasidas,  leads  an  e^^pedition  to 
the  Thracian  coasts,  and  conquers  many  of  the  most 
valuable  Athenian  possessions  in  those  regions. 

421.  Nominal  truce  for  thirty  years  between  Athens 
and  Sparta,  but  hostilities  continue  on  the  Thracian 
coast  and  in  other  quarters. 

415.  The  Athenians  send  an  exjjedition  to  conquer 
Sicily, 


i 


68 


DEFEAT  OF  TEE  ATHENIANS 


CHAPTER  IL 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS  AT  SYRACUSE,  B.  C.  413. 

The  Romans  knew  not,  and  could  not  know,  how  deeply 
the  greatness  of  their  own  posterity,  and  the  fate  of  the 
whole  Western  world,  were  involved  in  the  destruction  of 
the  fleet  of  Athens  in  the  harbor  of  Syracuse.  Had  that 
g-reat  expedition  proved  victorious,  the  energ:ies  of  Greece 
during  the  next  eventful  century  would  have  found  their 
field  in  the  West  no  less  than  in  the  East;  Greece,  and  not 
Rome,  might  have  conquered  Carthage;  Greek  instead  of 
Latin  might  have  been  at  this  day  the  principal  element 
of  the  language  of  Spain,  of  France,  and  of  Italy;  and 
the  laws  of  Athens,  rather  than  of  Rome,  might  be  the 
foundation  of  the  law  of  the  civilized  world.— Arnold. 


64.  Few  cities  have  undergone  more  memorable 
sieges  during  ancient  and  mediaeval  times  than  has 
the  city  of  Syracuse.  Athenian,  Carthaginian, 
Roman,  Vandal,  Byzantine,  Saracen,  and  ^Norman, 
have  in  turns  beleaguered  her  walls ; and  the  resist- 
ance which  she  successfully  opposed  to  some  of  her 
early  assailants  was  of  the  deepest  importance,  not 
only  to  the  fortunes  of  the  generations  then  in  being, 
but  to  all  the  subsequent  current  of  human  events. 
To  adopt  the  eloquent  expressions  of  Arnold  respect- 
ing the  check  which  she  gave  to  the  Carthaginian 
arms,  ‘‘Syracuse  was  a breakwater  which  God’s 
providence  raised  up  to  protect  the  yet  immature 
strength  of  Rome.’^  And  her  triumphant  repulse  of 
the  great  Athenian  expedition  against  her  was  of 


AT  SYRACUSE, 


69 


even  more  wide-spread  and  enduring  importance. 
It  forms  a decisive  epoch  in  the  strife  for  universal 
empire,  in  which  all  the  great  states  of  antiquity 
successively  engaged  and  failed. 

65.  The  present^city  of  Syracuse  is  a place  of  little 
or  no  military  strength,  as  the  fire  of  artillery  from  the 
neighboring  heights  would  almost  completely  com- 
mand it.  But  in  ancient  warfare,  its  position,  and 
the  care  bestowed  on  its  walls,  rendered  it  formid- 
al)ly  strong  against  the  means  of  offense  which  then 
were  employed  by  besieging  armies. 

66.  The  ancient  city,  in  its  most  prosperous  times, 
was  chiefly  built  on  the  knob  of  land  which  projects 
into  the  sea  on  the  eastern  coast  of  Sicily,  between 
two  bays ; one  of  which,  to  the  north,  was  called  the 
Bay  of  Thapsus,  while  the  southern  one  formed  the 
great  harbor  of  the  city  of  Syracuse  itself.  A small 
island  or  peninsula  (for  such  it  soon  was  rendered), 
lies  at  the  south-eastern  extremity  of  this  knob  of 
land,  stretching  almost  entirely  across  the  mouth  of 
the  great  harbor,  and  rendering  it  nearly  land- 
locked. This  island  comprised  the  original  settle- 
ment of  the  first  Greek  colonists  from  Corinth,  who 
founded  Syracuse  two  thousand  five  hundred  years 
ago;  and  the  modern  city  has  shrunk  again  into 
these  primary  limits.  But,  in  the  fifth  century 
before  our  era,  the  growing  wealth  and  population  of 
the  Syracusans  had  led  them  to  occupy  and  include 
within  their  city  walls  portion  after  portion  of  the 
main  land  lying  next  to  the  little  isle,  so  that  at  the 
time  of  the  Athenian  expedition  the  seaward  part 


70 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS 


of  the  land  between  the  two  bays  already  spoken  of 
was  built  over,  and  fortified  from  bay  to  bay,  and 
constituted  the  larger  part  of  Syracuse. 

67.  The  landward  wall,  therefore,  of  this  district 
of  the  city,  traversed  this  knob  of  Ignd,  which  con- 
tinues to  slope  upward  from  the  sea,  and  which,  to 
the  west  of  the  old  fortifications  (that  is  toward  the 
interior  of  Sicily),  rises  rapidly  for  a mile  or  two, 
but  diminishes  in  width,  and  finally  terminates  in  a 
long  narrow  ridge,  between  which  and  Mount  Hybla 
a succession  of  chasms  and  uneven  low  ground 
extends.  On  each  flank  of  this  ridge  the  descent  is 
steep  and  precipitous  from  its  summits  to  the  strips 
of  level  land  that  lie  immediately  belov/  it,  both  to 
the  southwest  and  northwest. 

68.  The  usual  mode  of  assailing  fortified  towns  in 
the  time  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  was  to  build  a 
double  wall  round  them,  sufficiently  strong  to  check 
any  sally  of  the  garrison  from  within,  or  any  attack 
of  a relieving  force  from  without.  The  interval 
within  the  two  walls  of  the  circumvallation  was 
roofed  over,  and  formed  barracks,  in  which  the 
besiegers  posted  themselves,  and  awaited  the  effects 
of  want  or  treachery  among  the  besieged  in  produc- 
ing a surrender ; and,  in  every  Greek  city  of  those 
days,  as  in  every  Italian  republic  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
the  rage  of  domestic  sedition  between  aristocrats  and 
democrats  ran  high.  Rancorous  refugees  swarmed  in 
the  camp  of  every  invading  enemy;  and  every 
blockaded  city  was  sure  to  contain  within  its  walls  a 
body  of  intriguing  malcontents,  who  were  eager  to 


AT  SYRACUSE. 


71 


purchase  a party  triumph  at  the  expense  of  a national 
disaster.  Famine  and  faction  were  the  allies  on 
whom  besiegers  relied.  The  generals  of  that  time 
trusted  to  the  operation  of  these  sure  confederates  as 
soon  as  they  could  establish  a complete  blockade. 
They  rarely  ventured  on  the  attempt  to  storm  any 
fortified  post,  for  the  military  engines  of  antiquity 
were  feeble  in  breaching  masonry  before  the  improve- 
ments which  the  first  Dionysius  effected  in  the 
mechanics  of  destruction ; and  the  lives  of  spearmen 
the  boldest  and  most  high-trained  would,  of  course, 
have  been  idly  spent  in  charges  against  unshattered 
walls. 

69.  A city  built  close  to  the  sea,  like  Syracuse,  was 
impregnable,  save  by  the  combined,  operations  of  a 
superior  hostile  fleet  and  a superior  hostile  army; 
and  Syracuse,  from  her  size,  her  population,  and  her 
military  and  naval  resources,  not  unnaturally  thought 
herself  secure  from  finding  in  another  Greek  city  a 
foe  capable  of  sending  a sufficient  armament  to 
menace  her  with  capture  and  subjection.  But  in  the 
spring  of  414  B.  C.,  the  Athenian  navy  was  mistress 
of  her  harbor  and  the  adjacent  seas;  an  Athenian 
army  had  defeated  her  troops,  and  cooped  them 
within  the  town ; and  from  bay  to  bay  a blockading 
wall  was  being  rapidly  carried  across  the  strips  of 
level  ground  and  the  high  ridge  outside  the  city 
(then  termed  Epipolse),  which,  if  completed,  would 
have  cut  the  Syracusans  off  from  all  succor  from  the 
interior  of  Sicily,  and  have  left  them  at  the  mercy  of 
the  Athenian  generals.  The  besieger’s  works  were, 


72 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS 


indeed,  unfinished;  but  every  day  the  unfortified 
interval  in  their  lines  grew  narrower,  and  with  it 
diminished  all  apparent  hope  of  safety  for  the 
beleaguered  town. 

70.  Athens  was  now  staking  the  flower  of  her 
forces,  and  the  accumulated  fruits  of  seventy  years 
of  glory,  on  one  bold  throw  for  the  dominion  of  the 
Western  world.  As  Napoleon  from  Mount  Coeur  de 
Lion  pointed  to  St.  Jean  d’Acre,  and  told  his  staff 
that  the  capture  of  that  town  would  decide  his  des- 
tiny and  would  change  the  face  of  the  world,  so  the 
Athenian  officers,  from  the  heights  of  Epipolse,  must 
have  looked  on  Syracuse,  and  felt  that  with  its  fall 
all  the  known  powers  of  the  earth  would  fall 
beneath  them.  They  must  have  felt,  also,  that 
Athens,  if  repulsed  there,  must  pause  forever  from 
her  career  of  conquest,  and  sink  from  an  imperial 
republic  into  a ruined  and  subservient  community. 

71.  At  Marathon, the  first  in  date  of  the  great  battles 
of  the  world,  we  beheld  Athens  struggling  for  self- 
preservation  against  the  invading  armies  of  the  East, 
At  Syracuse  she  appears  as  the  ambitious  and  oppres- 
sive invader  of  others.  In  her,  as  in  other  republics 
of  old  and  of  modern  times,  the  same  energy  that  had 
inspired  the  most  heroic  efforts  in  defense  of  the  na- 
tional independence,  soon  learned  to  employ  itself 
in  daring  and  unscrupulous  schemes  of  self-aggran- 
dizement at  the  expense  of  neighboring  nations. 
In  the  inter val^bet ween,  the  Persian  and  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian wars  she  had  rapidly  grown  into  a con- 
quering and  dominant  state,  the  chief  of  a thousand 


AT  SYRACUSE, 


73 


tributary  cities,  and  the  mistress  of  the  largest  and 
best-manned  navy  that  the  Mediterranean  had  yet 
beheld.  The  occupations  of  her  territory  by  Xerxes 
and  Mardonius,  in  the  second  Persian  war,  had 
forced  her  whole  population  to  become  mariners ; 
and  the  glorious  results  of  that  struggle  confirmed 
them  in  their  zeal  for  their  country’s  service  at  sea. 
The  voluntary  suffrage  of  the  Greek  cities  of  the 
coasts  and  islands  of  the^gsean  first  placed  Athens 
at  the  head  of  the  confederation  formed  for  the  fur- 
ther prosecution  of  the  war  against  Persia.  But  this 
titular  ascendency  was  soon  converted  by  her  into 
practical  and  arbitrary  dominion.  She  protected  them 
from  piracy  and  the  Persian  power,  which  soon  fell 
into  decrepitude  and  decay,  but  she  exacted  in  re- 
turn implicit  obedience  to  herself.  She  claimed  and 
enforced  a prerogative  of  taxing  them  at  her  discre- 
tion, and  proudly  refused  to  be  accountable  for  her 
mode  of  expending  their  supplies.  Eemonstrance 
against  her  assessments  was  treated  as  factious  dis- 
loyalty, and  refusal  to  pay  was  promptly  punished  as 
revolt.  Permitting  and  encouraging  her  subject  al- 
lies to  furnish  all  their  contingents  in  money,  instead 
of  part  consisting  of  ships  and  men,  the  sovereign 
republic  gained  the  double  object  of  training  her  own 
citizens  by  constant  and  well-paid  service  in  her 
fleets,  and  of  seeing  her  confederates  lose  their  skill 
and  discipline  by  inaction,  and  become  more  and. 
more  passive  and  powerless  under  her  yoke.  Their 
towns  were  generally  dismantled,  while  the  imperial 
city  herself  was  fortified  with  the  greatest  care  and 


74 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS 


sumptuousness ; the  accumulated  revenues  from  her 
tributaries  serving  to  strengthen  and  adorn  to  the 
utmost  her  havens,  her  docks,  her  arsenals, 
her  theatres  and  her  shrines,  and  to  array 
her  in  that  plentitude  of  architectural  magnificence, 
the  ruins  of  which  still  attest  the  intellectual  gran- 
deur of  the  age  and  people  which  produced  a Pericles 
to  plan  and  a Phidias  to  execute. 

72.  All  republics  that  acquire  supremacy  over 
other  nations  rule  them  selfishly  and  oppressively. 
There  is  no  exception  to  this  in  either  ancient  or 
modern  times.  Carthage,  Rome,  Venice,  Genoa. 
Florence,  Pisa,  Holland,  and  Republican  France,  all 
tyrannized  over  every  province  and  subject  state 
where  they  gained  authority  But  none  of  them  open- 
ly avowed  their  system  of  doing  so  upon  principle 
with  the  candor  which  the  Athenian  republicans 
displayed  when  any  remonstrance  was  made  against 
the  severe  exactions  which  they  imposed  upon 
their  vassal  allies.  They  avowed  that  their  empire 
was  a tyranny,  and  frankly  stated  that  they  solely 
trusted  to  force  and  terror  to  uphold  it.  They  ap- 
pealed to  what  they  called  “the  eternal  law  of  nature, 
that  the  weak  should  be  coerced  by  the  strong.”* 
Sometimes  they  stated,  and  not  without  some  truth, 
that  the  unjust  hatred  of  Sparta  against  themselves 
forced  them  to  be  unjust  to  others  in  self-defense. 
To  be  safe  they  must  be  powerful ; and  to  be  power- 
ful, they  must  plunder  and  coerce  their  neighbors. 

* ’Act  /cadeo-T«T05  tov  r)<T<X(a  viro  Svyarwrepov  KareipyeaOai. — 

Thug  i.,  77. 


AT  SYRACUSE, 


75 


They  nearer  dreamed  of  communicating  any  franchise, 
or  share  in  office,  to  their  dependents,  hut  jealously 
monopolized  every  post  of  command,  and  all  political 
and  judicial  power ; exposing  themselves  to  every 
risk  with  unflinching  gallantry  ; embarking  readily 
in  every  ambitious  scheme  ; and  never  suffering  diffi- 
culty or  disaster  to  shake  their  tenacity  of  purpose : in 
the  hope  of  acquiring  unbounded  empire-  for  their 
country,  and  the  means  of  maintaining  each  of  the 
thirty  thousand  citizens  who  made  up  the  sovereign 
republic,  in  exclusive  devotion  to  military  occupa- 
tions, and  to  those  brilliant  sciences  and  arts  in 
which  Athens  already  had  reached  the  meridian  of 
intellectual  splendor. 

73.  Her  great  political  dramatist  speaks  of  the 
Athenian  empire  as  comprehending  a thousand 
states.  The  language  of  the  stage  must  not  be  taken 
too  literally ; but  the  number  of  the  dependencies 
of  Athens,  at  the  time  when  the  Peloponnesian  con^ 
federacy  attacked  her,  was  undoubtedly  very  great. 
With  a few  trifling  exceptions,  all  the  islands  of  the 
^gsean,and  all  the  Greek  cities,  in  which  that  age  fring- 
ed the  coasts  of  Asia  Minor,  the  Hellespont, and  Thrace, 
paid  tribute  to  Athens,  and  implicitly  obeyed  her  or- 
ders. The  jHgsean  .Sea  was  an  Attic  lake.  West- 
ward of  Greece,  her  influence,  though  strong,  was  not 
equally  predominant.  She  had  colonies  and  allies 
among  the  wealthy  and  populous  Greek  settlements 
in  Sicily  and  South  Italy,  but  she  had  no  organized 
system  of  confederates  in  those  regions ; and  her 
galleys  brought  her  no  tribute  from  the  Western  seas. 


76 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS 


The  extension  of  her  emx)ire  over  Sicily  was  the 
favorite,  project  of  her  ambitious  orators  and  generals. 
While  her  great  statesman,  Pericles,  lived,  his  com- 
manding genius  kept  his  countrymen  under  control, 
and  forbade  them  to  risk  the  fortunes  of  Athens  in 
distant  enterprises,  while  they  had  unsubdued  and 
powerful  enemies  at  their  own  doors.  He  taught  Athens 
this  maxim;  hut  he  also  taught  her  to  know  and  to  use 
her  own  strength,  and  when  Pericles  had  de- 
parted, the  hold  spirit,  which  he  had  fostered 
overleaped  the  salutary  limits  which  he  had  pre- 
scribed. When  her  hitter  enemies,  the  Corin- 
thians, succeeded,  in  431  B.  C.,  in  inducing  Sparta  to 
attack  her,  and  a confederacy  was  formed  of  five- 
sixths  of  the  continental  Greeks,  all  animated  hy  anx- 
* ions  jealously  and  bitter  hatred  of  Athens;  when 
armies  far  superior  in  numbers  and  equipment  to 
those  which  had  marched  against  the  Persians  were 
poured  into  the  Athenian  territory,  and  laid  to 
waste  to  the  city  walls,  the  general  opinion  was  that 
Athens  would  be  reduced,  in  two  or  three  years  at 
the  farthest,  to  submit  to  the  requisitions  of  her  in- 
vaders. But  her  strong  fortifications,  by  which  she 
was  girt  and  linked  to  her  principal  haven,  gave  her 
in  those  ages,  almost  all  the  advantages  of  an  insular 
position.  Pericles  had  made  her  trust  to  her  empire 
of  the  seas.  Every  Athenian  in  those  days  was  a 
practiced  seaman.  A state,  indeed,  whose  members, 
of  an  age  fit  for  service,  at  no  time  exceeded  thirty 
thousand,  and  whose  territorial  extent  did  not  equal 
half  Sussex,  could  only  have  acquired  such  a naval 


AT  SYRACUSE. 


77 


dominion  as  Athens  once  held,  by  devoting,  and 
zealously  training,  all  its  sons  to  service  in  its  fleets. 
In  order  to  man  the  numerous  galleys  which  she 
sent  out,  she  necessarily  employed  large  numbers 
of  hired  mariners  and  slaves  at  the  oar  ; hut  the  sta- 
ple of  her  crews  was  Athenian,  and  all  posts  of  com- 
mand were  held  by  native  citizens.  It  was  by  re- 
minding them  of  this,  of  their  long  practice  in  sea- 
manship, and  the  certain  superiority  which  their 
discipline  gave  them  over  the  enemy’s  marine,  that 
their  great  minister  mainly  encouraged  them  to  re- 
sist the  combined  power  of  Lacedaemon  and  her  al- 
lies. He  taught  them  that  Athens  might  thus  reap 
the  fruit  ofher  zealous  devotion  to  maritime  affairs 
ever  since  the  invasion  of  the  Medes ; she  had  not, 
indeed,  perfected  herself ; but  the  reward  of  her  su- 
perior training  was  the  rule  of  the  sea — a mighty 
dominion,  for  it  gave  her  the  rule  of  much  fair  land 
beyond  its  waves,  safe  from  the  idle  ravages  with 
which  the  Lacedaemonians  might  harass  Attica,  but 
never  could  subdue  Athens.”* 

74.  Athens  accepted  the  war  with  which  her  ene- 
mies threatened  her  rather  than  descend  from  her 
pride  of  place  ; and  though  the  awful  visitation  of 
the  Plague  came  upon  her,  and  swept  away  more  of 
her  citizens  than  the  Dorian  spear  laid  low,  she  held 
her  own  gallantly  against  her  enemies.  If  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian armies  in  irresistible  strength  wasted  every 
spring  her  cornlands,  her  vineyards,  and  her  olive 
groves  with  fire  and  sword,  she  retaliated  on  their 
* Thuc.,  lib.,  i.  sec.  144. 


78 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS 


coasts  with  her  fleets  ; which,  if  resisted,  were  only 
resisted  to  display  the  pre*eminent  skill  and  bravery 
of  her  seamen.  Some  of  her  subject  allies  revolted, 
but  the  revolts  were  in  general  sternly  and  promptly 
quelled.  The  genius  of  one  enemy  had  indeed  in- 
flicted blows  on  her  power  in  Thrace  which  she  was 
unable  to  remedy  ; but  he  fell  in  battle  in  the  tenth 
year  of  the  war,  and  with  the  loss  of  Brasidas  the 
Lacedaemonians  seemed  to  have  lost  all  energy  and 
judgment.  Both  sides  at  length  grew  weary  of  the 
war,  and  in  421  a truce  for  fifty  years  was  concluded, 
which,  though  ill  kept,  and  though  many  of  the 
confederates  of  Sparta  refused  to  recognize  it,  and 
hostilities  still  continued  in  many  parts  of  Greece, 
protected  the  Athenian  territory  from  the  ravages  of 
enemies,  and  enabled  Athens  to  accumulate  large 
sums  out  of  the  proceeds  of  her  annual  revenues. 
So  also,  as  a few  years  passed  by,  the  havoc  which 
the  pestilence  and  the  sword  had  made  in  her  popu- 
lation was  repaired;  and  in  415  B.  C.  Athens  was 
full  of  bold  and  restless  spirits,  who  longed  for  some 
field  of  distant  enterprise  wherein  they  might  signal- 
ize themselves  and  aggrandize  the  state,  and  who 
looked  on  the  alarm  of  Spartan  hostility  as  a mere 
old  woman’s  tale.  When  Sparta  had  wasted  their 
territory  she  had  done  her  worst ; and  the  fact  of 
its  always  being  in  her  power  to  do  so  seemed  a 
strong  reason  for  seeking  to  increase  the  trans- 
marine dominion  of  Athens. 

75.  The  West  was  now  the  quarter  toward  which 
the  thoughts  of  every  aspiring  Athenian  were  di- 


AT  SYRACUSE. 


79 


rected.  From  the  very  beginning  of  the  war  Athens 
had  kept  up  an  interest  in  Sicily,  and  her  squadron 
had,  from  time  to  time,  appeared  on  its  coasts  and 
taken  part  in  the  dissensions  in  which  the  Sicilian 
Greeks  were  universally  engaged  one  against  each 
other.  There  were  plausible  grounds  for  a direct 
quarrel,  and  an  open  attack  by  the  Athenians  upon 
Syracuse. 

76.  With  the  capture  of  Syracuse,  all  Sicily,  it  was 
hoped,  would  be  secured.  Carthage  and  Italy  were 
next  to  be  attacked.  With  large  levies  of  Iberian 
mercenaries  she  then  meant  to  overwhelm  her  Pelo- 
ponnesian enemies.  The  Persian  monarchy  lay  in 
hopeless  imbecility,  inviting  Greek  invasion ; nor 
did  the  known  world  contain  the  power  that  seemed 
capable  of  checking  the  growing  might  of  Athens,  if 
Syracuse  once  could  be  hers. 

77.  The  national  historian  of  Rome  has  left  us  an 
episode  of  his  great  work,  a disquisition  on  the  prob- 
able effects  that  would  have  followed  if  Alexander 
the  Great  had  invaded  Italy.  Posterity  has  gen- 
erally regarded  that  disquisition  as  proving  Livy’s 
patriotism  more  strongly  than  his  impartiality  or 
acuteness.  Yet,  right  or  wrong,  the  speculations  of 
the  Roman  writer  were  directed  to  the  consideration 
of  a very  remote  possibility.  To  whatever  age  Alex- 
ander’s life  might  have  been  prolonged,  the  East 
would  have  furnished  full  occupation  for  his  martial 
ambition,  as  well  as  for  those  schemes  of  commercial 
grandeur  and  imperial  amalgamation  of  nations  in 
which  the  truly  great  qualities  of  his  mind  loved  to 


80 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS 


display  themselves.  With  his  death  the  dismember- 
ment of  his  empire  among  his  generals  was  certain, 
even  as  the  dismemberment  of  Napoleon’s  empire 
among  his  marshals  would  certainly  have  ensued  if 
he  had  been  cut  off  in  the  zenith  of  his  power. 
Rome,  also,  was  far  weaker  when  the  Athenians 
were  in  Sicily  than  she  was  a century  afterward  in 
Alexander’s  time.  There  can  be  little  doubt  but 
that  Rome  would  have  been  blotted  out  from  the 
independent  powers  of  the  West,  had  she  been  at- 
tacked at  the  end  of  the  fifth  century  B.  C.  by  an 
Athenian  army,  largely  aided  by  Spanish  mercena- 
ries, and  flushed  with  triumi^hs  over  Sicily  and 
Africa,  instead  of  the  collision  between  her  and 
Greece  having  been  deferred  until  the  latter  had 
sunk  into  decrepitude,  and  the  Roman  Mars  had 
grown  into  full  vigor. 

78.  The  armament  which  the  Athenians  equipped 
against  Syracuse  was  in  every  way  worthy  of  the 
state  which  formed  such  projects  of  universal  em- 
pire, and  it  has  been  truly  termed  “ the  noblest  that 
ever  yet  had  been  set  forth  by  a free  and  civilized 
commonwealth.  ” * The  fleet  consisted  of  one  hun- 
dred and  thirty-four  war-galleys,  with  a multitude 
of  store-ships.  A powerful  force  of  the  best  heavy- 
armed  infantry  that  Athens  and  her  allies  could  fur- 
nish was  sent  on  board  it,  together  with  a smaller 
number  of  slingers  and  bowmen.  The  quality  of 
the  forces  was  even  more  remarkable  than  the  num- 

* Arnold’s  “ History  of  Rome.” 


AT  SYRACUSE, 


81 


her.  The  zeal  of  individuals  vied  with  that  of  the 
republic  in  giving  every  galley  the  best  possible 
crew,  and  every  troop  the  most  perfect  accoutre- 
ments. And  with  private  as  well  as  public  wealth 
eagerly  lavished  on  all  that  could  give  splendor  as 
well  as  efficiency  to  the  expedition,  the  fated  fleet 
began  its  voyage  for  the  Sicilian  shores  in  the  sum- 
mer of  415. 

79.  The  Syracusans  themselves,  at  the  time  of  the 
Peloponnesian  war,  were  a bold  and  turbulent  democ- 
racy, tyrannizing  over  the  weaker  Greek  cities  in 
Sicily,  and  trying  to  gain  in  that  island  the  same 
arbitrary  supremacy  which  Athens  maintained  along 
the  eastern  coast  of  the  Mediterranean.  In  numbers 
and  in  spirit  they  were  fully  equal  to  the  Athenians, 
but  far  inferior  to  them  in  military  and  naval  disci- 
pline. When  the  probability  of  an  Athenian  inva- 
sion was  flrst  publicly  discussed  at  Syracuse,  and 
efforts  were  made  by  some  of  the  wiser  citizens  to 
improve  the  state  of  the  national  defenses,  and  pre- 
pare for  the  impending  danger,  the  rumors  of  coming 
war  and  the  proposal  for  preparation  were  received 
by  the  mass  of  the  Syracusans  with  scornful  incredu- 
lity. The  speech  of  one  of  their  popular  orators  is 
preserved  to  us  in  Thucydides,*  and  many  of  its  top- 
ics might,  by  a slight  alteration  of  names  and  details, 
serve  admirably  for  the  party  among  ourselves  at 
present,  which  opposes  the  augmentation  of  our 
forces,  and  derides  the  idea  of  our  being  in  any  peril 

* Lib.  vi.,  sec.  36,  et  seq„  Arnold’s  edition.  I have  almost 
literally  transcribed  some  of  the  marginal  epitomes  of  the 
original  speech. 


82 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS 


from  the  sudden  attack  of  a French  expedition.  The 
Syracusan  orator  told  his  countrymen  to  dismiss 
with  scorn  the  visionary  terrors  which  a set  of  design ^ 
ing  men  among  themselves  strove  to  excite,  in  order 
to  get  power  and  influence  thrown  into  their  own 
hands.  He  told  them  that  Athens  knew  her  own  in- 
terest too  well  to  think  of  wantonly  provoking  their 
hostility  : “ Even  if  the  enemies  were  to  come^'^  said 

he,  “so  distant  from  their  resources^  and  opposed  to  such 
a power  as  ours^  their  destruction  would  he  easy  and 
inevitable.  Their  ships  will  have  enough  to  do  to  get  to 
our  island  at  all^  and  to  carry  such  stores  of  all  sorts  as 
will  he  needed.  They  cannot  therefore  carry ^ besides^  an 
army  large  enough  to  cope  with  such  a population  as  ours. 
They  will  have  no  fortified  place  from  which  to  com- 
mence their  operations^  hut  must  rest  them  on  no  bet- 
ter base  than  a set  of  wretched  tents,  and  such  means  as 
the  necessities  of  the  moment  will  allow  them.  But,  in 
truth,  I do  not  believe  that  they  would  even  be  able  to  effect 
a disembarkation.  Let  us,  therefore,  set  at  naught  these 
reports  as  altogether  of  home  manufacture ; and  be  sure 
that  if  any  enemy  does  come,  the  state  will  know  how  to 
defend  itself  in  a manner  ivorthy  of  the  national  honor. 

80.  Such  assertions  pleased  the  Syracusan  assembly, 
and  their  counterparts  And  favor  now  among  some 
portion  of  the  English  public.  But  the  invaders  of 
Syracuse  came ; made  good  their  landing  in  Sicily ; 
and,  if  they  had  promptly  attacked  the  city  itself, 
instead  of  wasting  nearly  a year  in  desultory  opera- 
tions in  other  parts  of  Sicily,  the , Syracusans  must 
have  paid  the  penalty  of  their  self-sufficient  care- 


AT  SYEACUSE. 


83 


lessness  in  submission  to  the  Athenian  yoke.  But, 
of  the  three  generals  who  led  the  Athenian  expedi- 
tion, two  only  were  men  of  ability,  and  one  was  most 
weak  and  incompetent.  'J'ortunately  for  Syracuse, 
Alcibiades,  the  most  skillful  of  the  three,  was  soon 
deposed  from  his  command  by  a factious  and  fanatic 
vote  of  his  fellow-countrymen, and  the  other  competent 
one,  Lamachus,  fell  early  in  a skirmish ; while,  more 
fortunately  still  for  her,  the  feeble  and'^  vacillating 
Nicias  remained  unrecalled  and  unhurt,  to  assume 
the  undivided  leadership  of  the  Athenian  army  and 
fleet,  and  to  mar,  by  alternate  over-caution  and  over- 
carelessness, every  chance  of  success  which  the  early 
part  of  the  operations  offered.  Still,  even  under  him, 
the  Athenians  nearly  won  the  town.  They  defeated 
the  raw  levies  of  the  Syracusans,  cooped  them  within 
the  walls,  and,  as  before  mentioned,  almost  effected  a 
continuous  fortification  from  bay  to  bay  over  Epipolse, 
the  completion  of  which  would  certainly  have  been 
followed  by  a capitulation. 

81.  Alcibiades,  the  most  complete  example  of 
genius  without  principle  that  history  produces,  the 
Bolingbroke  of  antiquity,  but  with  high  military 
talents  superadded  to  diplomatic  and  oratorical  pow- 
ers, on  being  summoned  home  from  his  command  in 
Sicily  to  take  his  trial  before  the  Athenian  tribunal, 
had  escaped  to  Sparta,  and  had  exerted  himself  there 
with  all  the  selfish  rancor  of  a renegade  to  renew  the 
war  with  Athens,  and  to  send  instant  assistance  to 
Syracuse. 

82.  When  we  read  his  words  in  the  pages  of 


84 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS 


Thucydides  (who  was  himself  an  exile  from  Athens 
at  this  period,  and  may  probably  have  been  at  Sparta 
and  heard  Alcibiades  speak),  we  are  at  a loss  whether 
most  to  admire  or  abhor  his  subtile  and  traitorous 
counsels.  After  an  artful  exordium,  in  which  he 
tried  to  disarm  the  suspicions  which  he  felt  must  be 
entertained  of  him,  and  to  point  out  to  the  Spartans 
how  completely  his  interests  and  theirs  were  identi- 
fied, through  hatred  of  the  Athenian  democracy,  he 
thus  proceeded : 

83.  Hear  me,  at  any  rate,  on  the  matters  which 
require  your  grave  attention,  and  which  I,  from  the 
personal  knowledge  that  I have  of  them,  can  and 
ought  to  bring  before  you.  We  Athenians  sailed  to 
Sicily  with  the  design  of  subduing,  first  the  Greek 
cities  there,  and  next  those  in  Italy.  Then  we  in- 
tended to  make  an  attempt  on  the  dominions  of 
Carthage,  and  on  Carthage  itself.*  If  all  these  pro- 
jects succeeded  (nor  did  we  limit  ourselves  to  them 
in  these  quarters),  we  intended  to  increase  our  fleet 
with  the  inexhaustible  supplies  of  ship  timber  which 
Italy  affords, to  put  in  requisition  the  whole  military 
force  of  the  conquered  Greek  states,  and  also  to  hire 
large  armies  of  the  barbarians,  of  the  Iberians,!  and 

* Arnold, in  his  notes  on  this  passage,  well  reminds  the 
reader  that  Agathocles,  with  a Greek  force  far  inferior  to 
that  of  the  Athenians  at  this  period,  did,  some  years  after- 
ward, very  nearly  conquer  Carthage. 

t It  will  be  remembered  that  Spanish  infantry  were  the 
staple  of  the  Carthaginian  armies.  Doubtless  Alcibiades 
and  other  leading  Athenians  had  made  themselves  ac- 
quainted with  the  Carthaginian  system  of  carrying  on 
war,  and  meant  to  adopt  it.  With  the  marvelous  powers 
which  Alcibiades  possessed  of  ingratiating  himself  with 


AT  SYRACUSE. 


85 


others  in  those  regions,  who  are  allowed  to  make  the 
best  possible  soldiers.  Then^  when  we  had  done  all 
this,  we  intended  to  assail  Peloponnesus  with  our 
collected  force.  Our  fleets  would  blockade  you  by 
sea,  and  desolate  your  coasts,  our  armies  would  be 
landed  at  different  points  and  assail  your  cities. 
Some  of  these  we  expected  to  storm,*  and  others  we 
meant  to  take  by  surrounding  them  with  fortified 
lines.  We  thought  that  it  would  thu^  be  an  easy 
matter  thoroughly  to  war  you  down ; and  then  we 
should  become  the  masters  of  the  whole  Greek  race. 
As  for  expense,  we  reckoned  that  each  conquered 
state  would  give  us  supplies  of  money  and  provisions 
sufficient  to  pay  for  its  own  conquest,  and  furnish 
the  means  for  the  conquest  of  its  neighbors. 

84.  “ Such  are  the  designs  of  the  present  Athenian 
expedition  to  Sicily,  and  you  have  heard  them  from 
the  lips  of  the  man  who,  of  all  men  living,  is  most 
accurately  acquainted  with  them.  The  other  Athe- 
nian generals,  who  remain  with  the  expedition,  will 
endeavor  to  carry  out  these  plans.  And  be  sure  that 
without  your  speedy  interference  they  will  all  be 
accomplished.  The  Sicilian  Greeks  are  deficient  in 
military  training ; but  still,  if  they  could  at  once  be 
brought  to  combine  in  an  organized  resistance  to 
Athens,  they  might  even  now  be  saved.  But  as  for 

men  of  every  class  and  every  nation,  and  his  high  military 
genius,  he  would  have  been  as  formidable  a chief  of  an 
army  of  condottieri  as  Hannibal  afterward  was. 

* Alcibiades  here  alluded  to  Sparta  itself  which  was 
unfortified.  His  Spartan  hearers  must  have  glanced 
round  them  at  these  words  with  mixed  alarm  and  indigna- 
tion. 


86 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIAm 


the  Syracusans  resisting  Athens  by  themselves,  they 
have  already,  with  the  whole  strength  of  their 
population,  fought  a battle  and  been  beaten  ; they 
can  not  face  the  Athenians  at  sea ; and  it  is  quite 
impossible  for  them  to  hold  out  against  the  force  of 
their  invaders.  And  if  this  city  falls  into  the  hands 
of  the  Athenians,  all  Sicily  is  theirs,  and  presently 
Italy  also  ; and  the  danger,  which  I warned  you  of 
from  that  quarter,  will  soon  fall  upon  yourselves. 
You  must;  therefore,  in  Sicily,  fight  for  the  safety  of 
Peloponnesus.  Send  some  galleys  thither  instantly. 
Put  men  on  board  who  can  work  their  own  way 
over,  and  who,  as  soon  as  they  land,  can  do  duty  as 
regular  troops.  But,  above  all,  let  one  of  yourselves, 
let  a man  of  Sparta  go  over  to  take  the  chief  com- 
mand, to  bring  into  order  and  effective  discipline  the 
forces  that  are  in  Syracuse,  and  urge  those  who  at 
present  hang  back  to  come  forward  and  aid  the 
Syracusans.  The  presence  of  a Spartan  general  at 
this  crisis  will  do  more  to  save  the  city  than  a whole 
army.”*  The  renegade  then  proceeded  to  urge  on 
them  the  necessity  of  encouraging  their  friends  in 
Sicily,  by  showing  that  they  themselves  were  in 
earnest  in  hostility  to  Athens.  He  exhorted  them 
not  only  to  march  their  armies  into  Attica  again, 
but  to  take  up  a permanent  fortified  position  in  the 
country ; and  he  gave  them  in  detail  information  of 
all  that  the  Athenians  most  dreaded,  and  how  his 
country  might  receive  the  most  distressing  and  en- 
during injury  at  their  hands. 


* Thuc.,  lib.  vi.,  sec.  90,  91. 


AT  SYRACUSE, 


87 


85.  The  Spartans  resolved  to  act  on  his  advice,  and 
appointed  Gylippus  to  the  Sicilian  command.  Gylip- 
pns  wsis  a man  who,  to  the  national  bravery  and 
military  skill  of  a Spartan,  united  political  sagacity 
that  was  worthy  of  his  great  fellow-countryman 
Brasidas ; but  his  merits  were  debased  by  mean  and 
sordid  vices ; and  his  is  one  of  the  cases  in  which 
history  has  been  austerely  just,  and  where  little  or 
no  fame  has  been  accorded  to  the  successful  but 
venal  soldier.  But  for  the  purpose  for  which  he  was 
required  in  Sicily,  an  abler  man  could  not  have  been 
found  in  Lacedaemon.  His  country  gave  him  neither 
men  nor  money,  but  she  gave  him  her  authority ; 
and  the  influence  of  her  name  and  his  own  talents 
was  speedily  seen  in  the  zeal  with  which  the  Corin- 
thians and  other  Peloponnesian  Greeks  began  to 
equip  a squadron^to  act  under  him  for  the  rescue  of 
Sicily.  As  soon  as  four  galleys  were  ready,  he  hur- 
ried over  with  them  to  the  southern  coast  of  Italy, 
and  there,  though  he  received  such  evil  tidings  of 
the  state  of  Syracuse  that  he  abandoned  all  hope  of 
saving  that  city,  he  determined  to  remain  on  the 
coast,  and  do  what  he  could  in  preserving  the  Ital- 
ian cities  from  the  Athenians. 

86.  So  nearly,  indeed,  had  Nicias  completed  his 
beleaguering  lines,  and  so  utterly  desperate  had  the 
state  of  Syracuse  seemingly  become,  that  an  assem- 
bly of  the  Syracusans  was  actually  convened,  and 
they  were  discussing  the  terms  on  which  they  should 
ofier  to  capitulate,  when  a galley  was  seen  dashing 
into  the  great  harbor,  and  making  her  way  toward 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS 


the  town  with  all  the  speed  which  her  rowers  could 
supply.  From  her  shunning  the  part  of  the  harbor 
where  the  Athenian  fleet  lay,  and  making  straight 
for  the  Syracusan  side,  it  was  clear  that  she  was  a 
friend ; the  enemy’s  cruisers,  careless  through  confl- 
dence  of  success,  made  no  attempt  to  cut  her  off ; 
she  touched  the  beach,  and  a Corinthian  captain, 
springing  on  shore  from  her,  was  eagerly  conducted 
to  the  assembly  of  the  Syracusan  people  just  in  time 
to  prevent  the  fatal  vote  being  put  for  a surrender. 

87.  Providentially  for  Syracuse,  Gongylus,  the 
commander  of  the  galley,  had  been  prevented  by  an 
Athenian  squadron  from  following  Gylippus  to  South 
Italy,  and  he  had  been  obliged  to  push  direct  for 
Syracuse  from  Greece. 

88.  The  sight  of  actual  succor,  and  the  promise  of 
more,  revived  the  drooping  spirits  of  the  Syracusans. 
They  felt  that  they  were  not  left  desolate  to  perish, 
and  the  tidings  that  a Spartan  was  coming  to  com- 
mand them  confirmed  their  resolution  to  continue 
their  resistance.  Gylippus  was  already  near  the 
city.  He  had  learned  at  Locri  that  the  first  report 
which  had  reached  him  of  the  state  of  Syracuse  was 
exaggerated,  and  that  there  was  unfinished  space  in 
the  besiegers’  lines  through  which  it  was  barely  pos- 
sible to  introduce  re-enforcements  into,  the  town. 
Crossing  the  Straits  of  Messina,  which  the  culpable 
negligence  of  Nicias  had  left  unguarded,  Gylippus 
landed  on  the  northern  coast  of  Sicily,  and  there  be- 
gan to  collect  from  the  Greek  cities  an  army,  of 
which  the  regular  troops  that  he  brought  from 


AT  SYRACUSE. 


89 


Peloponnesus  formed  the  nucleus.  Such  was  the  in- 
fluence of  the  name  of  Sparta,"^*  and  such  was  his  own 
abilities  and  activity,  that  he  succeeded  in  raising 
a force  of  about  two  thousand  fully-armed  infantry, 
with  a larger  number  of  irregular  troops.  Nicias,  as 
if  infatuated,  made  no  attempt  to  counteract  his 
operations,  nor,  when  Gylippus  marched  his  little 
army  toward  Syracuse,  did  the  Athenian  commander 
endeavor  to  check  him.  The  Syracusan:^  marched 
out  to  meet  him ; and  while  the  Athenians  were 
solely  intent  on  completing  their  fortifications  on 
the  southern  side  toward  the  harbor,  Gylippus  turned 
their  position  by  occupying  the  high  ground  in  the 
extreme  rear  of  Epi poise.  He  then  marched  through 
the  unfortified  interval  of  Nicias’s  lines  into  the 
besieged  town,  and  joining  his  troops  with  the  Syra- 
cusan forces,  after  some  engagements  with  varying 
success,  gained  the  mastery  over  Nicias,  drove  the 
Athenians  from  Epipolse,  and  hemmed  them  into  a 
disadvantageous  position  in  the  low  grounds  near 
the  great  harbor. 

89.  The  attention  of  all  Greece  was  now  fixed  on 
Syracuse ; and  every  enemy  of  Athens  felt  the  im- 
portance of  the  opportunity  now  offered  of  checking 
her  ambition,  and,  perhaps,  of  striking  a deadly 
blow  at  her  power.  Large  re-enforcements  from 
Corinth,  Thebes,  and  other  cities  now  reached  the 
Syracusans,  while  the  baffied  and  dispirited  Athenian 

* The  effect  of  the  presence  of  a Spartan  officer  on  the 
troops  of  the  other  Greeks  eeems  to  have  been  like  the 
effect  of  the  presence  of  an  English  officer  upon  native 
Indian  troops. 


90 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS 


general  earnestly  besought  his  countrymen  to  recall 
him,  and  represented  the  further  prosecution  of  the 
siege  as  hopeless. 

90.  But  Athens  had  made  it  a maxim  never  to  let 
difficulty  or  disaster  drive  her  back  from  any  enter- 
prise once  undertaken,  so  long  as  she  possessed  the 
means  of  making  any  effort,  however  desperate,  for 
its  accomplishment.  With  indomitable  pertinacity, 
she  now  decreed,  instead  of  recalling  her  first  arma- 
ment from  before  Syracuse,  to  send  out  a second, 
though  her  enemies  near  home  had  now  renewed 
open  warfare  against  her,  and  by  occupying  a perma- 
nent fortification  in  her  territory  had  severely  dis- 
tressed her  population,  and  were  pressing  her  with 
almost  all  the  hardships  of  an  actual  siege.  She 
still  was  mistress  of  the  sea,  and  she  sent  forth  an- 
other fleet  of  seventy  galleys,  and  another  army, 
which  seemed  to  drain  almost  the  last  reserves  of 
her  military  population,  to  try  if  Syracuse  could  not 
yet  be  won,  and  the  honor  of  the  Athenian  arms  be 
preserved  from  the  stigma  of  a retreat.  Hers  was, 
indeed,  a spirit  that  might  be  broken,^  but  never 
would  bend.  At  the  head  of  this  second  expedition 
she  wisely  placed  her  best  general,  Demosthenes, 
one  of  the  most  distinguished  officers  that,  the  long 
Peloponnesian  war  had  produced,  and  who,  if  he  had 
originally  held  the  Sicilian  command,  would  soon 
have  brought  Syracuse  to  submission. 

91.  The  fame  of  Demosthenes  the  general  has  been 
dimmed  by  the  superior  lustre  of  his  great  country- 
man, Demosthenes  the  orator.  When  the  name  of 


AT  SYRACUSE, 


91 


Demosthenes  is  mentioned,  it  is  the  latter  alone 
that  is  thought  of.  The  soldier  has  found  no  bio- 
grapher. Yet  out  of  the  long  list  of  great  men 
whom  the  Athenian  republic  produced,  there  are 
few  that  deserve  to  stand  higher  than  this  brave, 
though  finally  unsuccessful  leader  of  her  fieets  and 
armies  in  the  first  half  of  the  Peloponnesian  war. 
In  his  first  campaign  in  ^tolia  he  had  shown  some 
of  the  rashness  of  youth,  and  had  received  a lesson 
of  caution  by  which  he  profited  throughout  the  rest 
of  his  career,  but  without  losing  any  of  his  natural 
energy  in  enterprise  or  in  execution.  He  had  per- 
formed the  distinguished  service  of  rescuing  Nau- 
pactus  from  a powerful  hostile  armament  in  the  sev- 
enth year  of  the  war ; he  had  then,  at  the  request  of 
the  Arcanian  republics,  taken  on  himself  the  office 
of  commander-in-chief  of  all  their  forces,  and  at 
their  head  he  had  gained  some  important  advantages 
over  the  enemies  of  Athens  in  Western  Greece.  His 
most  celebrated  exploits  had  been  the  occupation  of 
Pylos  on  the  Messenian  coast,  the  successful  defense 
of  that  place  against  the  fieet  and  armies  of  Lacedai- 
mon,  and  the  subsequent  capture  of  the  Spartan 
forces  on  the  isle  of  Sphacteria,  which  was  the  se- 
verest blow  dealt  to  Sparta  throughout  the  war,  and 
which  had  mainly  caused  her  to  humble  herself  to 
make  the  truce  with  Athens.  Demosthenes  was  as 
honorably  unknown  in  the  war  of  party  politics  at 
Athens  as  he  was  eminent  in  the  war  against  the 
foreign  enemy.  We  read  of  no  intrigues  of  his  on 
either  the  aristocratic  or  democratic  side.  He  was 


92 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS 


neither  in  the  interest  of  Nicias  nor  of  Cleon.  His 
private  character  was  free  from  any  of  the  stains 
which  pointed  that  of  Alcihiades.  On  all  these 
points  the  silence  of  the  comic  dramatist  is  decisive 
evidence  in  his  favor.  He  had  also  the  moral  cour- 
age, not  always  combined  with  physical,  of  seeking 
to  do  his  duty  to  his  country,  irrespective  of  any  odi- 
um that  he  himself  might  incur,  and  unhampered  by 
any  petty  jealousy  of  those  who  were  associated 
with  him  in  command.  There  are  few  men  named 
in  ancient  history  of  whom  posterity  would  gladly 
know  more,  or  whom  we  sympathize  with  more 
deeply  in  the  calamities  that  befell  them,  than  De- 
mosthenes, the  son  of  Alcisthenes,  who,  in  the 
spring  of  the  year  413  B.  C.,  left  Piraeus  at  the  head 
of  the  second  Athenian  expedition  against  Sicily. 

92.  His  arrival  was  critically  timed ; for  Gylippus 
had  encouraged  the  Syracusans  to  attack  the  Athe- 
nians under  Mcias  by  sea  as  well  as  by  land,  and 
by  one  able  stratagem  of  Ariston,  one  of  the  admi- 
rals of  the  Corinthian  auxiliary  squadron,  the  Syra- 
cusans and  their  confederates  had  inflicted  on  the 
fleet  of  Nicias  the  flrst  defeat  that  the  Athenian 
navy  had  ever  sustained  from  a numerically  inferi- 
or enemy.  Gylippus  was  preparing  to  follow  up 
his  advantage  by  fresh  attacks  on  the  Athenians  on 
both  elements,  when  the  arrival  of  Demosthenes 
comifletely  changed  the  aspect  of  affairs,  and  re- 
stored the  superiority  to  the  invaders.  With  sev- 
enty-three war-galleys  in  the  highest  state  of  efiicien- 
cy,  and  brilliantly  equipped,  with  a force  of  five 


AT  SYRACUSE, 


93 


thousand  picked  men  of  the  regular  infantry  of 
Athens  and  her  allies,  and  a still  larger  number  of 
bo w-men,  javelin-men,  and  slingers  on  board,  De- 
mosthenes rowed  round  the  great  harbor  with  loud 
cheers  and  martial  music,  as  if  in  defiance  of  the 
Syracusans  and  their  confederates.  His  arrival  had 
indeed  changed  their  newly-born  hopes  into  the 
deepest  consternation.  The  resources  df  Athens 
seemed  inexhaustible  and  resistance  to  her  hopeless. 
They  had  been  told  that  she  was  reduced  to  the  last 
extremities,  and  that  her  territory  was  occupied  by 
an  enemy ; and  yet  here  they  saw  her  sending  forth, 
as  if  in  prodigality  of  power,  a second  armament  to 
make  foreign  conquests,  not  inferior  to  that  with 
which  Nicias  had  first  landed  on  the  Sicilian  shores. 

93.  With  the  intuitive  decision  of  a great  com- 
mander, Demosthenes  at  once  saw  that  the  posses- 
sion of  Epipolse  was  the  key  to  the  possession  of 
Syracuse,  and  he  resolved  to  make  a prompt  and 
vigorous  attempt  to  recover  that  position,  while  his 
force  was  unimpaired,  and  the  consternation  which 
its  arrival  had  produced  among  the  besieged 
remained  unabated.  The  Syracusans  and  their  allies 
had  run  out  an  outwork  along  Epipolse  from  the 
city  walls,  intersecting  the  fortified  lines  of  circum- 
vallation  which  Nicias  had  commenced,  but  from 
which  he  had  been  driven  by  Gylippus.  Could 
Demosthenes  succeed  in  storming  this  outwork,  and 
in  re-establishing  the  Athenian  troops  on  the  high 
ground,  he  might  fairly  hope  to  be  able  to  resume 
the  circumvallation  of  the  city,  and  become  the  con- 


94 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATHENIANS 


qiieror  of  Syracuse;  for  when  once  the  besiegers’ 
lines  were  completed,  the  number  of  the  troops  with 
which  Gylippus  had  garrisoned  the  place  would  only 
tend  to  exhaust  the  stores  of  provisions  and  acceler- 
ate its  downfall. 

94.  An  easily-repelled  attack  was  first  made  on 
the  outwork  in  the  day-time,  probably  more  with 
the  view  of  blinding  the  besieged  to  the  nature  of 
the  main  operations  than  with  i\nj  expectation  of 
succeeding  in  an  open  assault,  with  every  disadvan- 
tage of  the  ground  to  contend  against.  But,  when 
the  darkness  had  set  in,  Demosthenes  formed  his 
men  in  columns,  each  soldier  taking  with  him  five 
days’  provisions,  and  the  engineers  and  workmen 
of  the  camp  following  the  troops  with  their  tools, 
and  all  portable  implements  of  fortification,  so  as  at 
once  to  secure  any  advantage  of  ground  that  the  army 
might  gain.  Thus  equipped  and  prepared,  he  led  his 
men  along  by  the  foot  of  the  southern  fiahk  of  Epi- 
polse,  in  a direction  toward  the  interior  of  the  island, 
till  he  came  immediately  below  the  narrow  ridge 
that  forms  the  extremity  of  the  high  ground  looking 
westward.  He  then  wheeled  his  vanguard  to  the 
right,  sent  them  rapidly  up  the  paths  that  wind 
along  the  face  of  the  cliff,  and  succeeded  in  com- 
pletely surprising  the  Syracusan  outposts,  and  in 
placing  his  troops  fairly  on  the  extreme  summit  of 
all-important  Epipolse.  Thence  the  Athenians 
marched  eagerly  down  the  slope  toward  the  town, 
routing  some  Syracusan  detachments  that  were  quar- 
tered in  their  way,  and  vigorously  assailing  the  un- 


AT  SYRACUSE, 


95 


protected  side  of  the  outwork.  All  at  [first  favored 
them.  The  outwork  was  abandoned  by  its  garrison, 
and  the  Athenian  engineers  began  to  dismantle  it. 
In  vain  Gylippus  brought  up  fresh  troops  to  check 
the  assault ; the  Athenians  broke  and  drove  them 
back,  and  continued  to  press  hotly  forward,  in  the 
full  confidence  of  victory.  But,  amid  the  general 
consternation  of  the  Syracusans  and  theiu  confeder- 
ates, one  body  of  infantry  stood  firm.  This  was  a 
brigade  of  their  Boeotian  allies,  which  was  posted 
low  down  the  slope  of  Epipolse,  outside  the  city 
walls.  Coolly  and  steadily  the  Boeotian  infantry 
formed  their  line,  and,  undismayed  by  the  current  of 
flight  around  them,  advanced  against  the  advancing 
Athenians.  This  was  the  crisis  of  the  battle.  But 
the  Athenian  van  was  disorganized  by  its  own  pre- 
vious successes;  and,  yielding  to  the  unexpected 
charge  thus  made  on  it  by  troops  in  perfect  order, 
and  of  the  most  obstinate  courage,  it  was  driven 
back  in  confusion  upon  the  other  divisions  of  the 
army,  that  still  continued  to  press  forward.  When 
once  the  tide  was  thus  turned,  the  Syracusans  passed 
rapidly  from  the  extreme  of  panic  to  the  extreme  of 
vengeful  daring,  and  with  all  their  forces  they  now 
fiercely  assailed  the  embarrassed  and  receding  Athe- 
nians. In  vain  did  the  officers  of  the  latter  strive  to 
re-form  their  line.  Amid  the  din  and  the  shouting 
of  the  fight,  and  the  confusion  inseparable  upon  a 
night  engagement,  especially  one  where  many  thous- 
and combatants  were  pent  and  whirled  together  in  a 
narrow  and  uneven  area,  the  necessary  maneuvers 


96 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  ATREmAm 


were  impracticable;  and  though  many  companies 
still  fought  on  desperately,  wherever  the  moonlight 
showed  them  the  semblance  of  a foe,*  they  fougjit 
without  concert  or  subordination ; and  not  unfre- 
quently,  amid  the  deadly  chaos,  Athenian  troops 
assailed  each  other.  Keeping  their  ranks  close,  the 
Syracusans  and  their  allies  pressed  on  against  the 
disorganized  masses  of  the  besiegers,  and  at  length 
drove  them,  with  heavy  slaughter,  over  the  cliffs, 
which  an  hour  or  two  before  they  had  scaled  full  of 
hope,  and  apparently  certain  of  success. 

95.  This  defeat  was  dicisive  of  the  event  of  the 
siege.  The  Athenians  afterward  struggled  only  to 
protect  themselves  from  the  vengeance  which  the 
Syracusans  sought  to  wreak  in  the  complete  destruc- 
tion of  their  invaders.  Never,  however,  was  venge- 
ance more  complete  and  terrible.  A series  of  sea- 
fights  followed,  in  which  the  Athenian  galleys  were 
utterly  destroyed  or  captured.  The  mariners  and 
soldiers  who  escaped  death  in  disastrous  engagements, 
and  a vain  attempt  to  force  a retreat  into  the  inte- 
rior of  the  island,  became  prisoners  of  w^ar ; Nicias 
and  Demosthenes  were  put  to  death  in  cold  blood, 
and  their  men  either  perished  miserably  in  the  Syra- 
cusan dungeons,  or  were  sold  into  slavery  to  the 

yap  (reKrivrj  \annpa,  edopiav  8e  outw5  aAAT^Aov?,  w? 
a-eX^vrj  clkos  rr)v  fxkv  oxj/iu  rov  o-w/aaro?  npoopav  r'r}v  Sk  yv^cnv  tov 
oUeCov  ania-elaBai — ThuO-,  lib.  vii.,  44.  Compare  Tacitus’s 
description  of  the  night  engagement  in  the  civil  Avar 
betAveen  Vespasian  and  Vitellius.  “Neutro  inclinave- 
rat  fortuna,  donee  adulta  nocte,  luna  ostenderet  ados, 
falleretqueF—Hist.,  lib.  iii.,  sec.  33. 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS 


97 


very  persons  whom,  in  their  pride  of  power,  they  had 
crossed  the  seas  to  enslave. 

96.  All  danger  from  Athens  to  the  independent 
nations  of  the  West  was  now  forever  at  an  end.  She, 
indeed,  continued  to  struggle  against  her  combined 
enemies  and  revolted  allies  with  unparalleled  gal- 
lantry, and  many  more  years  of  varying  warfare 
passed  away  before  she  surrendered  to  their  arms. 
But  no  success  in  subsequent  contests  could  ever  have 
restored  her  to  the  pre-eminence  in  enterprise,  re- 
sources, and  maritime  skill  which  she  had  acquired 
before  her  fatal  reverses  in  Sicily.  Nor  among  the 
rival  Greek  republics,  whom  her  own  rashness  aided 
to  crush  her,  was  there  any  capable  of  reorganizing 
her  empire,  or  resuming  her  schemes  of  conquest. 
The  dominion  of  Western  Europe  was  left  for  Rome 
and  Carthage  to  dispute  two  centuries  later,  in  con- 
flicts still  more  terrible,  and  with  even  higher  dis- 
plays of  military  daring  and  genius  than  Athens  had 
witnessed  either  in  her  rise,  her  meridian,  or  her  fall. 


Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Defeat  of 
THE  Athenians  at  Syracuse  and  the 
Battle  of  Arbela 

412  B.  C.  Many  of  the  subject  allies  of  Athens  re- 
volt from  her  on  her  disasters  before  Syracuse  being 
known ; the  seat  of  war  is  transferred  lo  the  Helles- 
pont and  eastern  side  of  the  ^gsean. 

410.  The  Carthaginians  attempt  to  make  conquests 
in  Sicily. 


98 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


407.  Cyrus  the  Younger  is  sent  by  the  King  of 
Persia  to  take  the  government  of  all  the  maritime 
parts  of  Asia  Minor,  and  with  orders  to  help  the 
Lacedaemonian  fleet  against  the  Athenian. 

406.  Agrigentum  taken  by  the  Carthaginians. 

405.  The  last  Athenian  fleet  destroyed  by  Lysander 
at  -®gospotami.  Athens  closely  besieged.  Rise  of 
the  power  of  Dionysius  at  Syracuse. 

404.  Athens  surrendered.  End  of  the  Peloponne- 
sian war.  The  ascendency  of  Sparta  complete  through- 
out Greece. 

403.  Thrasybulus,  aided  by  the  Thebans  and  with 
the  connivance  of  one  of  the  Spartan  kings,  liberates 
Athens  from  the  Thirty  Tyrants,  and  restores  the 
democracy. 

401.  Cyrus  the*Younger  commences  his  expedition 
into  Upper  Asia  to  dethrone  his  brother  Artaxerxes 
Mnemon.  He  takes  with  him  an  auxiliary  force  of 
ten  thousand  Greeks.  He  is  killed  in  battle  at 
Cunaxa,  and  the  ten  thousand,  led  by  Xenophon, 
effect  their  retreat  in  spite  ol‘  the  Persian  armies  and 
the  natural  obstacles  of  their  march. 

399.  In  this  and  the  flve  following  years,  the  Lace- 
daemonians, under  Agesilaus  and  other  commanders, 
carry  on  war  against  the  Persian  satraps  in  Asia 
Minor. 

396.  Syracuse  besieged  by  the  Carthaginians,  and 
successfully  defended  by  Dionysius. 

394.  Rome  makes  her  flrst  great  stride  in  the 
career  of  conquest  by  the  capture  of  Veii. 

393.  The  Athenian  admiral,  Conon,  in  conjunction 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


99 


with  the  Persian  satrap  Pharnahazns,  defeats  the 
Lacedsemdnian  fleet  off  Cnidus,  and  restores  the  for- 
tiflcations  of  Athens.  Several  of  the  former  allies  of 
Sparta  in  Greece  carry  on  hostilities  against  her. 

388.  The  nations  of  Northern  Europe  now  first  ap- 
pear in  authentic  history.  The  Gauls  overrun  great 
part  of  Italy  and  burn  Eome.  Eome  recovers  from 
the  blow,  but  her  old  enemies  the  ^quian^  and  Yol- 
scians  are  left  completely  crushed  by  the  Gallic  in- 
vaders. 

387.  The  peace  of  Antalcidas  is  concluded  among 
the  Greeks  by  the  mediation,  and  under  the  sanction, 
of  the  Persian  king. 

378  to  361.  Fresh  wars  in  Greece.  Epaminondas 
raises  Thebes  to  be  the  leading  state  of  Greece,  and 
the  supremacy  of  Sparta  is  destroyed  at  the  battle  of 
Leuctra.  Epaminondas  is  killed  in  gaining  the  vic- 
tory of  Mantinea,  and  the  power  of  Thebes  falls  with 
him.  The  Athenians  attempt  a balancing  system 
between  Sparta  and  Thebes. 

359.  Philip  becomes  king  of  Macedon. 

357.  The  Social  War  breaks  out  in  Greece,  and 
lasts  three  years.  Its  result  checks  the  attempt  of  ^ 
Athens  to  regain  her  old  maritime  empire. 

356.  Alexander  the  Great  is  born. 

343.  Eome  begins  her  wars  with  the  Samnites : 
they  extend  over  a period  of  fifty  years.  The  end 
of  this  obstinate  contest  is  to  secure  for  her  the  do- 
minion of  Italy. 

340.  Fresh  attempts  of  the  Carthaginians  upon 


4 


100 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS, 


Syracuse.  Timoleon  defeats  them  with  great  slaugh- 
ter. 

338.  Philip  defeats  the  confederate  armies  of 
Athens  and  Thebes  at  Chseronea,  and  the  Macedonian 
supremacy  over  Greece  is  firmly  established. 

336.  Philip  is  assassinated,  and  Alexander  the 
Great  becomes  king  of  Macedon.  He  gains  several 
victories  over  the  northern  barbarians  who  had  at- 
tacked Macedonia,  and  destroys  Thebes,  which,  in 
conjunction  with  Athens,  had  taken  up  arms  against 
the  Macedonians. 

334.  Alexander  passes  the  Hellespont. 


BATTLE  OF  AEBELA. 


101 


CHAPTER  HI. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  AKBELA,  B.C.  331. 

Alexander  deserves  the  glory  which  he  has  enjoyed  for 
60  many  centuries  and  among  all  nations : but  what  if  he 
had  been  beaten  at  Arbela,  having  the  Euphrates,  the  Ti- 
gris, and  the  deserts  in  his  rear,  without  any  strong  places 
of  refuge,  nine  hundred  leagues  from  Macedonia !— Napo- 
leon. 

Asia  beheld  with  astonishment  and  awe  the  uninter- 
rupted progress  of  a hero,  the  sweep  of  whose  conquests 
was  as  wide  and  rapid  as  that  of  her  own  barbar  ic  kings, 
or  of  the  Scythian  or  Chaldaean  hordes ; but,  far  unlike 
the  transient  whirlwinds  of  Asiatic  warfare,  the  advance 
of  the  Macedonian  leader  was  no  less  deliberate  than 
rapid : at  every  step  the  Greek  power  took  root,  and  the 
language  and  the  civilization  of  Greece  were  planted 
from  the  shores  of  the  ^gaean  to  the  banks  of  the  Indus, 
from  the  Caspian  and  the  great  Hyrcanian  plain  to  the 
cataracts  of  the  Nile;  to  exist  actually  for  nearly  a thou- 
sand years,  and  in  their  effects  to  endure  forever.— Ar- 
nold. 

97.  A long  and  not  uninstructive  list  might  be 
made  out  of  illustrious  men  whose  characters  have 
been  vindicated  during  recent  times  from  aspersions 
which  for  centuries  had*  been  thrown  on  them.  The 
spirit  of  modern  inquiry,  and  the  tendency  of  mod- 
ern scholarship,  both  of  which  are  often  said  to  he 
solely  negative  and  destructive,  have,  in  truth,  res- 
tored to  splendor,  and  almost  created  anew,  far  more 
than  they  have  assailed  with  censure,  or  dismissed 


102 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA. 


from  consideration  as  unreal.  The  truth  of  many  a 
brilliant  narrative  of  brilliant  exploits  has  of  late 
years  been  triumphantly  demonstrated,  and  the  shal- 
lowness of  the  skeptical  scoffs  with  which  little 
minds  have  carped  at  the  great  minds  of  antiquity 
has  been  in  many  instances  decisively  exposed.  The 
laws,  the  politics,  and  the  lines  of  action  adopted  or 
recommended  by  eminent  men  and  powerful  nations 
have  been  examined  with  keener  investigation  and 
considered  with  more  comprehensive  judgment 
than  formerly  were  brought  to  bear  on  these 
subjects.  The  result  has  been  at  least  as  often  favor- 
able as  unfavorable  to  the  persons  and  the  states  so 
scrutinized,  and  many  an  oft-repeated  slander  against 
both  measures  and  men  has  thus  been  silenced,  we 
may  hope  forever. 

98.  The  veracity  of  Herodotus,  the  pure  patriotism ' 
of  Pericles,  of  Demosthenes,  and  of  the  Gracchi,  the 
wisdom  of  Clisthenes  and  of  Licinius  as  constitu- 
tional reformers,  may  be  mentioned  as  facts  which 
recent  writers  have  cleared  from  unjust  suspicion  and 
censure.  And  it  might  be  easily  shown  that  the 
defensive  tendency,  which  distinguishes  the  present 
and  recent  great  writers  of  Germany,  France,  and 
England,  has  been  equally  manifested  in  the  spirit 
in  which  they  have  treated,  the  heroes  of  thought 
and  heroes  of  action  who  lived  during  what  we  term 
the  Middle  Ages,  and  whom  it  was  so  long  the  fash- 
ion to  sneer  at  or  neglect. 

99.  The  name  of  the  victor  of  Arbela  has  led  to 
tJiese  reflections;  for,  although  the  rapidity  and 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA. 


103 


extent  of  Alexander’s  conquests  have  through  all 
ages  challenged  admiration  and  amazement,  the 
grandeur  of  genius  which  he  displayed  in  his  schemes 
of  commerce,  civilization,  and  of  comprehensive 
union  and  unity  among  nations,  has,  until  lately, 
been  comparatively  unhonored.  This  long-continued 
depreciation  was  of  early  date.  The  ancient  rheto- 
ricians— a class  of  babblers,  a school  for  lie^  and  scan- 
dal, as  Niebuhr  justly  termed  them — chose,  among 
the  stock  themes  for  their  commonplaces,  the  char- 
acter and  exploits  of  Alexander.  They  had  their 
followers  in  every  age;  and,  until  a very  recent 
period,  all  who  wished  to  “ point  a moral  or  adorn  a 
tale,  ” about  unreasoning  ambition,  extravagant 
pride,  and  the  formidable  phrensies  of  free  will  when 
leagued  with  free  power,  have  never  failed  to  blazon 
forth  the  so-called  madman  of  Macedonia  as  one  of 
the  most  glaring  examples.  Without  doubt,  many 
of  these  writers  adopted  with  implicit  credence  tra- 
ditional ideas,  and  supposed,  with  uninquiring  phil- 
anthropy, that  in  blackening  Alexander  they  were 
doing  humanity  good  service.  But  also,  without 
doubt,  many  of  his  assailants,  like  those  of  other 
great  men,  have  been  mainly  instigated  by  “that 
strongest  of  all  antipathies,  the  antipathy  of  a second- 
rate  mind  to  a first-rate  one,”  * and  by  the  envy 
which  talent  too  often  bears  to  genius. 

100.  Arrian,  who  wrote  his  history  of  Alexander 
when  Hadrian  was  emperor  of  the  Roman  world, 
and  when  the  spirit  of  declamation  and  dogmatism 


* DeStael. 


104 


BATTLE  OF  ARBELA. 


was  at  its  full  height,  but  who  was  himself,  unlike 
the  dreaming  pedants  of  the  schools,  astatesman  and 
a soldier  of  practical  and  proved  ability,  well  rebuked 
the  malevolent  aspersions  which  he  heard  continu- 
ally thrown  upon  the  memory  of  the  great  conqueror 
of  the  East.  He  truly  says,  “ Let  the  man  who 
speaks  evil  of  Alexander  not  merely  bring  forward 
those  passages  of  Alexander’s  life  which  were  really 
evil,  but  let  him  collect  and  review  all  the  actions  of 
Alexander,  and  then  let  him  thoroughly  consider 
first  who  and  what  manner  of  man  he  himself  is,  and 
what  has  been  his  own  career;  and  then  let  him 
consider  who  and  what  manner  of  man  Alexander 
was,  and  to  what  an  eminence  of  human  grandeur  he 
arrived.  Let  him  consider  that  Alexander  was  a 
king,  and  the  undisputed  lord  of  the  two  continents, 
and  that  his  name  is  renowned  throughout  the  whole 
earth.  Let  the  evil-speaker  against  Alexander  bear 
all  this  in  mind,  and  then  let  him  reflect  on  his  own 
insignificance,  the  pettiness  of  his  own  circumstances 
and  affairs,  and  the  blunder^  that  he  makes  about 
these,  paltry  and  trifling  as  they  are.  Let  him  then 
ask  himself  whether  he  is  a fit  person  to  censure  and 
revile  such  a man  as  Alexander.  I believe  that 
there  was  in  his  time  no  nation  of  men,  no  city,  nay, 
no  single  individual  with  whom  Alexander’s  name 
had  not  become  a familiar  word.  I therefore  hold 
that  such  a man,  who  was  like  no  ordinary  mortal, 
wa«  not  born  into  the  world  without  some  special 
providence.”  * 

* Arrian,  lib.  vii.,  adfinem. 


BATTLE  OF  ARBELA. 


105 


101.  And  one  of  the  most  distinguished  soldiers 
and  writers  of  our  own  nation,  Sir  Walter  Ealeigh, 
though  he  failed  to  estimate  justly  the  full  merits  of 
Alexander,  has  expressed  his  sense  of  the  grandeur 
of  the  part  played  in  the  world  by  “ the  great  Ema- 
thian  conqueror  ” in  language  that  well  deserves  quo- 
tation : “ So  much  hath  the  spirit  of  some  one  man 
excelled  as  it  hath  undertaken  and  effected  the  alter- 
ation of  the  greatest  states  and  commonweals,  the 
erection  of  monarchies,  the  conquest  of  kingdoms 
and  empires,  guided  handfuls  of  men  against  multi- 
tudes of  equal  bodily  strength,  contrived  victories 
beyond  all  hope  and  discourse  of  reason,  converted 
the  fearful  passions  of  his  own  followers  into  magna- 
nimity, and  the  valor  of  his  enemies  into  cowardice  ; 
such  spirits  have  been  stirred  up  in  sundry  ages  of 
the  world,  and  in  divers  parts  thereof,  to  erect  and 
cast  down  again,  to  establish  and  to  destroy,  and  to 
bring  all  things,  persons,  and  states  to  the  same  cer- 
tain ends,  which  the  infinite  spirit  of  the  Universal^ 
piercing,  moving,  and  governing  all  things,  hath  or- 
dained. Certainly  the  things  that  this  king  did  were 
marvelous,  and  would  hardly  have  been  undertaken 
by  any  one  else ; and  though  his  father  had  deter- 
mined to  have  invaded  the  Lesser  Asia,  it  is  like 
enough  that  he  would  have  contented  himself  with 
some  part  thereof,  and  not  have  discovered  the  river 
of  Indus,  as  this  man  did.  ” * 

102.  A higher  authority  than  either  Arrian  or 

* “ The  Historie  of  the  World,”  by  Sir  Walter  Raleigh, 
Knight,  p.  648. 


106 


BATTLE  OF  ABB  EL  A. 


Raleigh  may  now  he  referred  to  by  those  who  wish 
to  know  the  real  merit  of  Alexander  as  a general,  and 
how  far  the  commonplace  assertions  are  true  that  his 
successes  were  the  mere  results  of  fortunate  rashness 
and  unreasoning  pugnacity.  Napoleon  selected  Alex- 
ander as  one  of  the  seven  greatest  generals  whose 
noble  deeds  history  has  handed  down  to  us,  and  from 
the  study  of  whose  campaigns  the  principles  of  war 
are  to  be  learned.  The  critique  of  the  greatest  con- 
queror of  modern  times  on  the  military  career  of  the 
great  conqueror  of  the  Old  World  is  no  less  graphic 
than  true. 

103.  “ Alexander  crossed  the  Dardanelles  334  B.  C., 
with  an  army  of  about  forty  thousand  men,  of  which 
one  eighth  was  cavalry  ; he  forced  the  passage  of  the 
Granicus  in  opposition  to  an  army  under  Memnon, 
the  Greek,  who  commanded  for  Darius  on  the  coast 
of  Asia,  and  he  spent  the  whole  of  the  year  333  in 
establishing  his  power  in  Asia  Minor.  He  was  sec- 
onded by  the  Greek  colonies,  who  dwelt  on  the  bor- 
ders of  the  Black  Sea  and  on  the  Mediterranean,  and 
in  Sardis,  Ephesus,  Tarsus,  Miletus,  etc.  The  kings 
of  Persia  left  their  provinces  and  towns  to  be  govern- 
ed according  to  their  own  particular  laws.  Their 
empire  was  a union  of  confederated  states,  and  did 
not  form  one  nation;  this  facilitated  its  conquest. 
As  Alexander  only  wished  for  the  throne  of  the  mon- 
arch, he  easily  effected  the  change  by  respecting  the 
customs,  manners,  and  laws  of  the  people,  who  expe- 
rienced no  change  in  their  condition. 

104.  “ In  the  year  332  he  met  with  Darius  at  the 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA, 


107 


head  of  sixty  thousand  men,  who  had  taken  up  a 
position  near  Tarsus,  on  the  hanks  of  the  Issus,  in 
the  province  of  Cilicia.  He  defeated  him,  entered 
Syria,  took  Damascus,  which  contained  all  the  riches 
of  the  Great  King,  and  laid  siege  to  Tyre.  This 
superb  metropolis  of  the  commerce  of  the  world 
detained  him  nine  months.  He  took  Gaza  after  , a 
siege  ot  two  months ; crossed  the  Deserl^  in  seven 
days  ; entered  Pelusium  and  Memphis,  and  founded 
Alexandria.  In  less  than  two  years,  after  two  bat- 
tles and  four  or  five  sieges,  the  coasts  of  the  Black 
Sea,  from  Phasis  to  Byzantium,  those  of  the  Medit- 
erranean as  far  as  Alexandria,  all  Asia  Minor,  Syria, 
and  Egypt,  had  submitted  to  his  arms. 

105.  ‘‘In  331  he  repassed  the  Desert,  encamped  in 
Tyre,  recrossed  Syria,  entered  Damascus,  passed  the 
Euphrates  and  Tigris,  and  defeated  Darius  on  the 
field  of  Arbela,  when  he  was  at  the  head  of  a still 
stronger  army  than  that  which  he  commanded  on 
the  Issus,  and  Babylon  opened  her  gates  to  him.  In 
330  he  overran  Susa  and  took  that  city,  Persepolis, 
and  Pasargada,  which  contained  the  tomb  of  Cy- 
rus. In  329  he  directed  his  course  northward,  en- 
tered Ecbatana,  and  extended  his  conquests  to  the 
coasts  of  the  Caspian,  punished  Bessus,  the  coward- 
ly assassin  of  Darius,  penetrated  into  Scythia 
and  subdued  the  Scythians.  In  328  he  forced 
the  passage  of  the  Oxus,  received  sixteen  thou- 
sand recruits  from  Macedonia,  aud  reduced  the 
neighboring  people  to  subjection.  In  327  he  crossed 
the  Indus,  vanquished  Porsus  in  a pitched  battle, 


108 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA, 


took  him  prisoner,  and  treated  him  as  a king.  He 
contemplated  passing  the  Ganges,  hut  his  army  re- 
fused. He  sailed  down  the  Indus,  in  the  year  326, 
with  eight  hundred  vessels ; having  arrived  at  the 
ocean,  he  sent  Nearchus  with  a fleet  to  run  along 
the  coasts  of  the  Indian  Ocean  and  the  Persian  Gulf 
as  far  as  the  mouth  of  the  Euphrates.  In  325  he 
took  sixty  days  in  crossing  from  Gedrosia,  entered 
Keramania,  returned  to  Pasargada,  Persepolis,  and 
Susa,  and  married  Statira,  the  daughter  of  Darius. 
In  324  he  marched  once  more  to  the  north,  passed 
Ecbatana,  and  terminated  his  career  at  Babylon.”* 

106.  The  enduring  importance  of  Alexander’s  con- 
quests is  to  be  estimated,  not  by  the  duration  of  his 
own  life  and  empire,  or  even  by  the  duration  of  the 
kingdoms  which  his  generals  after  his  death  formed 
out  of  the  fragments  of  that  mighty  dominion.  In 
every  region  of  the  world  that  he  traversed,  Alex- 
ander planted  Greek  settlements  and  founded  cities, 
in  the  populations  of  which  the  Greek  element  at 
once  asserted  its  predominance.  Among  his  succes- 
sors, the  Seleucidae  and  the  Pfcolemies  imitated  their 
great  captain  in  blending  schemes  of  civilization,  of 
commercial  intercourse,  and  of  literary  and  scientific 
research  with  all  their  enterprises  of  military  aggran- 
dizement and  with  all  their  systems  of  civil  adminis- 
tration. Such  was  the  ascendency  of  the  Greek  ge- 
nius, so  wonderfully  comprehensive  and  assimilating 
was  the  cultivation  which  it  introduced,  that,  within 
thirty  years  after  Alexander  crossed  the  Hellespont, 

^ Count MoutUolon’s  “Memoirs of  Napoleon," 


BATTLE  OF  ARBELA. 


109 


the  Greek  language  was  spoken  in  every  country  from 
the  shores  of  the  iEgsean  to  the  Indus, and  also  through- 
out Egypt — not  indeed,  wholly,  to  the  extirpation  of 
the  native  dialects,  but  it  became  the  language  of 
every  court,  of  all  literature,  of  every  judicial  and 
political  function,  and  formed  a medium  of  com- 
munication among  the  many  myriads  of  mankind 
inhabiting  these  large  portions  of  the  Old  World  * 
Throughout  Asia  Minor,  Syria,  and  Egypt,  the  Hel- 
lenic character  that  thus  imparted  remained  in  full 
vigor  down  to  the  time  of  Mohammedan  conquests. 
The  infinite  value  of  this  to  humanity  in  the  highest 
and  holiest  point  of  view  has  often  been  pointed  out, 
and  the  workings  of  the  finger  of  Providence  have 
been  gratefully  recognized  by  those  who  have  ob- 
served how  the  early  growth  and  progress  of  Chris- 
tianity were  aided  by  that  diffusion  of  the  Greek 
language  and  civilization  throughout  Asia  Minor, 
Syria,  and  Egypt,  which  had  been  caused  by  the 
Macedonian  conquest  of  the  East. 

107.  In  Upper  Asia,  beyond  the  Euphrates,  the 
direct  and  material  infiuence  of  Greek  ascendency 
was  more  short-lived.  Yet,  during  the  existence  of 
the  Hellenic  kingdoms  in  these  regions,  especially  of 
the  Greek  kingdom  of  Bactria,  the  modern  Bokhara, 
very  important  effects  were  produced  on  the  intellec- 
tual tendencies  and  tastes  of  the  inhabitants  of  those 
countries,  and  of  the  adjacent  ones,  by  the  animating 
contact  of  the  Grecian  spirit.  Much  of  Hindoo 
science  and  philosophy,  much  of  the  literature  of  the 

* See  Arnold,  Hist.  Rome,  ii.,  p.  406. 


110 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA. 


later  Persian  kingdom  of  the  Arsacidae,  either  origi- 
nated from,  or  was  largely  modified  by,  Grecian  in- 
fiuences.  So,  also,  the  learning  and  science  of  the 
Arabians  were  in  a far  less  degree  the  result  of  orig- 
inal invention  and  genius,  then  the  reproduction,  in 
an  altered  form,  of  the  Greek  philosophy  and  the 
Greek  lore,  acquired  by  the  Saracenic  conquerors, 
together  with  their  acquisition  of  the  provinces 
which  Alexander  had  subj  ugated,  nearly  a thousand 
years  before  the  armed  disciples  of  Mohammed  com- 
menced their  career  in  the  East.  It  is  well  known 
that  Western  Europe  in  the  Middle  Ages  drew  its 
philosophy,  its  arts,  and  its  science  principally  from 
Arabian  teachers.  And  thus  we  see  how  the  intel- 
lectual influence  of  ancient  Greece  poured  on  the 
Eastern  world  by  Alexander’s  victories,  and  then 
brought  back  to  bear  on  Mediaeval  Europe  by  the 
spread  of  the  Saracenic  powers,  has  exerted  its  action 
on  the  elements  of  modern  civilization  by  this  power- 
ful though  indirect  channel,  as  well  as  by  the  more 
obvious  effects  of  the  remnants  of  classic  civiliza- 
tion which  survived  in  Italy,  Gaul,  Britain,  and 
Spain,  after  the  irruption  of  the  Germanic  nations.* 

108.  These  considerations  invest  the  Macedonian 
triumphs  in  the  East  with  never-dying  interest, 
such  as  the  most  showy  and  sanguinary  successes  of 
mere  “low  ambition  and  the  pride  of  kings,”  however 
they  may  dazzle  for  a moment,  can  never  retain  with 
posterity.  Whether  the  old  Persian  empire  which 
Cyrus  founded  could  have  survived  much  longer 

* See  Humboldt’s  “Cosmos.” 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA. 


Ill 


then  it  did,  even  if  Darius  had  been  victorious  at 
Arhela,  may  safely  be  disputed.  That  ancient  do- 
minion, like  the  Turkish  at  the  present  time,  labored 
under  every  cause  of  decay  and  dissolution.  The 
satraps,  like  the  modern  pashaws,  continually  re- 
belled against  the  central  power,  and  Egypt  in  par- 
ticular was  almost  always  in  a state  of  insurrection 
against  its  nominal  sovereign.  There  was  no  longer 
any  effective  central  control,  or  any  intetnal  princi- 
ple of  unity  fused  through  the  huge  mass  of  the  em- 
pire, and  binding  it  together.  Persia  was  evidently 
about  to  fall ; but,  had  it  not  been  for  Alexander’s 
invasion  of  Asia,  she  would  most  probably  have  fal- 
len beneath  some  other  Oriental  power,  as  Media  and 
Babylon  had  formerly  fallen  before  herself,  and  as, 
in  after  times,  the  Parthian  supremacy  gave  way  to 
the  revived  ascendency  of  Persia  in  the  East,  under 
the  sceptres  of  the  Arsacidae.  A revolution  that 
merely  substituted  one  Eastern  power  for  another 
would  have  been  utterly  barren  and  unprofitable  to 
mankind. 

109.  Alexander’s  victory  at  Arbela  not  only  over- 
threw an  Oriental  dynasty,  but  established  Euro- 
pean rulers  in  its  stead.  It  broke  the  monotony  of 
the  Eastern  world  by  the  impression  of  Western 
energy  and  superior  civilization,  even  as  England’s 
present  mission  is  to  break  up  the  mental  and  moral 
stagnation  of  India  and  Cathay  by  pouring  upon  and 
through  them  the  inpulsive  current  of  Anglo-Saxon 
commerce  and  conquest. 

110.  Arbela,  the  city  which  has  furnished  its  name 


112 


BATTLE  OF  ARBELA. 


to  the  decisive  battle  which  gave  Asia  to  Alexander, 
lies  more  than  twenty  miles  from  the  actual  scene  of 
conflict.  The  little  village,  then  named  Gaugamela, 
is  close,  to  the  spot  where  the  armies  met,  hut  has 
ceded  the  honor  of  naming  the  battle  to  its  more 
euphonious  neighbor.  Gaugamela  is  situate  in  one 
of  the  wide  plains  that  lie  between  the  Tigris  and  the 
mountains  of  Kurdistan.  A few  undulating  hillocks 
diversify  the  surface  of  this  sandy  track;  but  the 
ground  is  generally  level,  and  admirably  qualified 
for  the  evolutions  of  cavalry,  and  also  calculated  to 
give  the  larger  of  two  armies,  the  full  advantage  of 
numerical  superiority.  The  Persian  king  (who,  be- 
fore he  came  to  the  throne,  had  proved  his  personal 
valor  as  a soldier  and  his  skill  as  a general)  had 
wisely  selected  this  region  for  the  third  and  decisive 
encounter  between  his  forces  and  the  invader.  The 
previous  defeats  of  his  troops,  however  severe  they 
had  been,  were  not  looked  on  as  irreparable.  The 
Granicus  had  been  fought  by  his  generals  rashly  and 
without  mutual  concert ; and,  though  Darius  him- 
self had  commanded  and  been  beaten  at  Issus,  that 
defeat  might  be  attributed  to  the  disadvantageous 
nature  of  the  ground,  where,  cooped  up  between  the 
mountains,  the  river,  and  the  sea,  the  numbers  of  the 
Persians  confused  and  clogged  alike  the  general’s 
skill  and  the  soldiers’  prowess,  and  their  very  strength 
had  been  made  their  weakness.  Here,  on  the  broad 
plains  of  Kurdistan,  there  was  scope  for  Asia’s  largest 
host  to  array  its  lines,  to  wheel,  to  skirmish,  to  con- 
dense or  expand  its  squadrons,  to  maneuver,  and  to 


BATTLE  OF  ARB  EL  A. 


113 


charge  at  will.  Should  Alexander  and  his  scanty 
band  dare  to  plunge  into  that  living  sea  of  war,  their 
destruction  seemed  inevitable. 

111.  Darius  felt,  however,  the  critical  nature  to 
himself  as  well  as  to  his  adversary  of  the  coming  en- 
counter. He  could  not  hope  to  retrieve  the  con- 
sequences of  a third  overthrow.  The  great  cities  of 
Mesopotamia  and  Upper  Asia,  the  central  provinces 
of  the  Persian  empire,  were  certain  to^  be  at  tlie 
mercy  of  the  victor.  Darius  knew  also  the  Asiatic 
character  well  enough  to  be  aware  how  it  yields  to 
the  Prestige  of  success  and  the  apparent  career  of 
destiny.  He  felt  that  the  diadem  was  now  either  to 
be  firmly  replaced  on  his  own  brow,  or  to  be  irrevoc- 
ably transferred  to  the  head  of  his  European  con- 
queror. He,  therefore,  during  the  long  interval  left 
him  after  the  battle  of  Issus,  while  Alexander  was 
subjugating  Syria  and  Egypt,  assiduously  busied 
himself  in  selecting  the  best  troops  which  his  vast 
empire  supplied,  and  in  training  his  varied  forces  to 
act  together  with  some  uniformity  of  discipline  and 
system. 

112.  The  hardy  mountaineers  of  Afghanistan, 
Bokhara,  Khiva,  and  Thibet  were  then,  as  at  present, 
far  different  to  the  generality  of  Asiatics  in  warlike 
spirit  and  endurance.  From  these  districts  Darius 
eollected  large  bodies  of  admirable  infantry ; and  the 
countries  of  the  modern  Kurds  and  Turkomans  sup- 
plied, as  they  do  now,  squadrons  of  horsemen,  hardy, 
skillful,  bold,  and  trained  to  a life  of  constant  activity 
md  war%e,  It  is  mt  llRifiteresting  to  notico  tb^t 


114 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA. 


the  ancestors  of  our  own  late  enemies,  the  Sikhs, 
served  as  allies  of  Darius  against  the  Macedonians. 
They  are  spoken  of  in  Arrian  as  Indians  who  dwelt 
near  Bactria.  They  were  attached  to  the  troops  of 
that  satrapy,  and  their  cavalry  was  one  of  the  most 
formidable  forces  in  the  whole  Persian  army. 

113.  Besides  these  picked  troops,  contingents  also' 
came  in  from  the  numerous  other  provinces  that  yet 
obeyed  the  Great  King.  Altogether,  the  horse  are 
said  to  have  been  forty  thousand,  the  scythe-bearing 
chariots  two  hundred,  and  the  armed  elephants 
fifteen  in  number.  The  amount  of  the  infantry  is 
uncertain;  but  the  knowledge  which  both  ancient 
and  modern  times  supply  of  the  usual  character  of 
Oriental  armies,  and  of  their  populations  of  camp- 
followers,  may  warrant  us  in  believing  that  many 
myriads  were  prepared  to  fight,  or  to,  encumber  those 
who  fought  for  the  last  Darius. 

1 14.  The  position  of  the  Persian  king  near  Mesopo- 
tamia was  chosen  with  great  military  skill.  It  was 
certain  that  Alexander,  on  his  return  from  Egypt, 
must  march  northward  along  the  Syrian  coast  before 
he  attacked  the  central  provinces  of  the  Persian  em- 
pire. A direct  eastward  march  from  the  lower  part 
of  Palestine  across  the  great  Syrian  Desert  was  then 
as  ever,  utterly  impracticable.  Marching  eastward 
from  Syria,  Alexander  would,  on  crossing  the 
Euphrates,  arrive  at  the  vast  Mesopotamian  plains. 
The  wealthy  capitals  of  the  empire,  Babylon,  Susa, 
and  Persepolis,  would  then  lie  to  the  south ; and  if  he 
marched  down  through  Mesopotamia  to  attack  them, 


BATTLE  OF  ARBELA. 


115 


Darius  might  reasonably  hope  to  follow  the  Macedo- 
nians with  his  immense  force  of  cavalry,  and,  with- 
out even  risking  a pitched  battle,  to  harass  and 
finally  overwhelm  them.  We  may  remember  that 
three  centuries  afterward  a Roman  army  under 
Crassus  was  thus  actually  destroyed  by  the  Oriental 
archers  and  horsemen  in  these  very  plains,*  and  that 
the  ancestors  of  the  Parthians  who  thus  v’anquished 
the  Roman  legion  served  by  thousands  under  King 
Darius.  If,  on  the  contrary,  Alexander  should  defer 
his  march  against  Babylon,  and  first  seek  an  encoun- 
ter with  the  Persian  army,  the  country  on  each  side 
of  the  Tigris  in  this  latitude  was  highly  advantageous 
for  such  an  army  as  Darius  commanded,  and  he  had 
close  in  his  rear  the  mountainous  districts  of  Northern 
Media,  where  he  himself  had  in  early  life  been  satrap, 
where  he  had  acquired  reputation  as  a soldier  and  a 
general,  and  where  he  justly  expected  to  find  loyalty 
to  his  person,  and  a safe  refuge  in  case  of  defeat.f 
115.  His  great  antagonist  came  on  across  the 
Euphrates  against  him,  at  the  head  of  an  army  which 
Arrian,  copying  from  the  journals  of  Macedonian 
officers,  states  to  have  consisted  of  forty  thousand 


* See  Mitford. 

t Mitford’s  remarkson  the  strategy  of  Darius  in  his  last 
campaign  are  very  just.  After  having  been  unduly  ad- 
mired as  an  historian,  Mitford  is  now  unduly  neglected. 
His  partiality,  and  his  deficiency  in  scholarship  have  been 
exposed  suflBciently  to  make  him  no  longer  a dangerous 
guide  as  to  Greek  politics,  while  the  clearness  and  bril- 
liancy of  his  narrative,  and  the  strong  common  sense  of 
his  remarks  (where  his  party  prejudices  do  not  interfere), 
must  always  make  his  volumes  valuable  as  well  as  enter- 
taining. 


116 


BATTLE  OF  ARBELA. 


foot  and  seven  thousand  horse.  In  studying  the 
campaigns  of  Alexander,  we  possess  the  peculiar  ad- 
vantage of  deriving  our  information  from  two  of 
Alexander’s  generals  of  division,  who  bore  an  im- 
portant part  in  all  his  enterprises.  Aristobulus  and 
Ptolemy  (who  afterward  became  king  of  Egypt)  kept 
regular  journals  of  the  military  events  which  they 
witnessed,  and  these  journals  were  in  the  possession 
of  Arrian  when  he  drew  up  his  history  of  Alexander’s 
expedition.  The  high  character  of  Arrian  for  in- 
tegrity makes  us  confident  that  he  used  them  fairly, 
and  his  comments  on  the  occasional  discrepancies 
between  the  two  Macedonian  narratives  prove  that 
he  used  them  sensibly.  He  frequently  quotes  the 
very  words  of  his  authorities ; and  his  history  thus 
acquires  a charm  such  as  very  few  ancient  or  modern 
military  narratives  possess.  The  anecdotes  and  ex- 
pressions which  he  records  we  fairly  believe  to  be 
genuine,  and  not  to  be  the  coinage  of  a rhetorician 
like  those  in  Curtius.  In  fact,  in  reading  Arrian,  we 
read  General  Aristobulus  and  General  Ptolemy  on 
the  campaigns  of  the  Macedonians,  and  it  is  like 
reading  General  Jomini  or  General  Foy  on  the  cam- 
paigns of  the  French. 

116.  The  estimate  which  we  find  in  Arrian  of  the 
strength  of  Alexander’s  army  seems  reasonable  enough 
when  we  take  into  account  both  the  losses  which  he 
had  sustained  and  the  re-enforcements  which  he  had 
received  since  he  left  Europe.  Indeed,  to  English- 
men, who  know  with  wh^t  mere  handfuls  of  men 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA, 


117 


our  own  generals  have,  at  Plassy,  at  Assaye,  at  Mee- 
anee,  and  other  Indian  battles,  routed  large  hosts  of 
Asiatics,  the  disparity  of  numbers  that  we  read  of  in 
the  victories  won  hy  the  Macedonians  over  the  Per- 
sians presents  nothing  incredible.  The  army  which 
Alexander  now  led  was  wholly  composed  of  veteran 
troops  in  the  highest  possible  state  of  equipment  and 
discipline,  enthusiastically  devoted  to  their  leader, 
and  full  of  confidence  in  his  military  genius  and  his 
victorious  destiny. 

117.  The  celebrated  Macedonian  phalanx  formed 
the  main  strength  of  his  infantry.  This  force  had 
been  raised  and  organized  by  his  father  Philip,  who, 
on  his  accession  to  the  Macedonian  throne,  needed  a 
numerous  and  quickly- formed  army,  and  who,  by 
lengthening  the  spear  of  the  ordinary  Greek  phalanx, 
and  increasing  the  depth  of  the  files,  brought  the 
tactic  of  armed  masses  to  the  highest  extent  of  which 
it  was  capable  with  such  materials  as  he  possessed.  * 
He  formed  his  men  sixteen  deep,  and  placed  in  their 
grasp  the  sarissa,  as  the  Macedonian  pike  was  called, 
which  was  four-and-twenty  feet  in  length,  and  when 
couched  for  action,  reached  eighteen  feet  in  front  of 
the  soldier ; so  that,  as  a space  of  about  two  feet  was 
allowed  between  the  ranks,  the  spears  of  the  five  files 
behind  him  projected  in  front  of  each  front-rank 
man.  The  phalangite  soldier  was  fully  equipped  in 
the  defensive  armor  of  the  regular  Greek  infantry. 
And  thus  the  phalanx  presented  a ponderous  and 
bristling  mass,  which,  as  long  as  its  order  was  kept 
* See  Niebuhr’s  “ Hist,  of  Rome,”  vol.  iii.  p.  466. 


118 


BATTLE  OF  ARBELA. 


compact,  was  sure  to  bear  down  all  opposition.  The 
defects  of  such  an  organization  are  obvious,  and  were 
proved  in  after  years,  when  the  Macedonians  were 
opposed  to  the  Roman  legions.  But  it  is  clear  that 
under  Alexander  the  phalanx  was  not  the  cumbrous 
unwieldy  body  which  it  was  at  Cynoscephalse  and 
Pydna.  His  men  were  veterans ; and  he  could  ob- 
tain from  them  an  accuracy  of  movement  and  steadi- 
ness of  evolution  such  as  probably  the  recruits  of  his 
father  would  only  have  floundered  in  attempting, 
and  such  as  certainly  were  impracticable  in  the  pha- 
lanx when  handled  by  his  successors,  especially  as 
under  them  it  ceased  to  be  a standing  force,  and  be- 
came only  a militia.*  Under  Alexander  the  phalanx 
consisted  of  an  aggregate  of  eighteen  thousand  men, 
who  were  divided  into  six  brigades  of  three  thousand 
each.  These  were  again  subdivided  into  regiments 
and  companies ; and  the  men  were  carefully  trained 
to  wheel,  to  face  about,  to  take  more  ground,  or  to 
close  up,  as  the  emergencies  of  the  battle  required. 
Alexander  also  arrayed  troops  armed  in  a different 
manner  in  the  intervals  of  the  regiments  of  his  pha- 
langites, who  could  prevent  their  line  from  being 
pierced,  and  their  companies  taken  in  flank,  when 
the  nature  of  the  ground  prevented  a close  formation, 
and  who  could  be  withdrawn  when  a favorable  oppor- 
tunity arrived  for  closing  up  the  phalanx  or  any  of 
its  brigades  for  a charge,  or  when  it  was  necessary  to 
prepare  to  receive  cavalry. 

118.  Besides  the  phalanx,  Alexander  had  a consid- 


* See  Niebuhr. 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA. 


119 


erable  force  of  infantry  who  were  called  Shield-bear- 
ers : they  were  not  so  heavily  armed  as  the  phalan- 
gites, or  as  was  the  case  with  the  Greek  regular 
infantry  in  general,  but  they  were  equipped  for  close 
fight  as  well  as  for  skirmishing,  and  were  far  supe- 
rior to  the  ordinary  irregular  troops  of  Greek  war- 
fare. They  were  about  six  thousand  strong.  Besides 
these,  he  had  several  bodies  of  Greek  regular  infantry ; 
and  he  had  archers,  slingers,  and  javelin-men,  who 
fought  also  with  broadsword  and  target,  and  who 
were  principally  supplied  him  by  the  highlanders  of 
Illyria  and  Thracia.  The  main  strength  of  his  cav- 
alry consisted  in  two  chosen  regiments  of  cuirassiers, 
one  Macedonian  and  one  Thessalian,  each  of  which 
was  about  fifteen  hundred  strong.  They  were  pro- 
vided with  long  lances  and  heavy  swords,  and  horse 
as  well  as  man  was  fully  equipped  with  defensive 
armor.  Other  regiments  of  regular  cavalry  were  less 
heavily  armed,  and  there  were  several  bodies  of  light 
horsemen,  whom  Alexander’s  conquests  in  Egypt  and 
Syria  had  enabled  him  to  mount  superbly. 

119.  A little  before  the  end  of  August,  Alexander 
crossed  the  Euphrates  at  Thapsacus,  a small 
corps  of  Persian  cavalry  under  Mazaeus  retiring  before 
him.  Alexander  was  too  prudent  to  march  down 
through  the  Mesopotamian  deserts,  and  continued  to 
advance  eastward  with  the  intention  of  passing  the 
Tigris,  and  then,  if  he  was  unable  to  find  Darius  and 
bring  him  to  action,  of  marching  southward  on  the 
left  side  of  that  river  along  the  skirts  of  a mountain- 
ous district  where  his  men  would  suffer  less  from 


120 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA. 


heat  and  thirst,  and  where  provisions  would  be  more 
abundant. 

120.  Darius,  finding  that  his  adversary  was  not  to 
be  enticed  into  the  march  through  Mesopotamia 
against  his  capital,  determined  to  remain  on  the  bat- 
tle ground,  which  he  had  chosen  on  the  left  of  the 
TigTis  ; where,  if  his  enemy  met  a defeat  or  a check, 
the  destruction  of  the  invaders  would  be  certain  with 
two  such  rivers  as  the  Euphrates  and  the  Tigris  in 
their  rear.  The  Persian  king  availed  himsell  to  the 
utmost  of  every  advantage  in  his  power.  He  caused 
a large  space  of  ground  to  be  carefully  leveled  for  the 
operation  of  his  scythe-armed  chariots ; and  he  depos- 
ited his  military  stores  in  the  strong  town  of  Arbela, 
about  twenty  miles  in  his  rear.  The  rhetoricians  of 
after  ages  have  loved  to  describe  Darius  Codomam^  b 
as  a second  Xerxes  in  ostentation  and  imbecility; 
but  a fair  examination  of  his  generalship  in  this  his 
last  campaign,  shows  that  he  was  worthy  of  bearing 
the  same  name  as  his  great  predecessor,  the  royal  son 
of  Hystaspes. 

121  On  learning  that  Darius  was  with  a large 
army  on  the  left  of  the  Tigris,  Alexander  hurried 
forward  and  crossed  that  river  without  opposition. 
He  was  at  first  unable  to  procure  any  certain  intelli- 
gence of  the  precise  position  of  the  enemy,  and  after 
giving  his  army  a short  interval  of  rest,  he  marched 
for  four  days  down  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  A 
moralist  may  pause  upon  the  fact  that  Alexander 
must  in  this  march  have  passed  within  a few  miles 
of  the  ruins  oi  Nineveh,  the  great  city  of  the  primse- 


BATTLE  OF  ABB  EL  A. 


121 


val  conquerors  of  the  human  race.  Neither  the 
Macedonian  King  nor  any  of  his  followers  knew 
what  those  vast  mounds  had  once  been.  They  had 
already  sunk  into  utter  destruction ; and  it  is  only 
within  the  last  few  years  that  the  intellectual  energy 
of  one  of  our  own  countrymen  has  rescued  Nineveh 
from  its  long  centpries  ot  oblivion.* 

122.  On  the  fourth  day  of  Alexander’s  southward 
march,  his  advanced  guard  reported  that  a body  ol 
the  enemy’s  cavalry  was  in  sight.  He  instantly 
formed  his  army  in  order  for  battle,  and  directing 
them  to  advance  steadily,  he  rode  forward  at  the 
head  of  some  squadrons  of  cavalry,  and  charged  the 
Persian  horse,  w^hom  he  found  before  him.  This  was 
a mere  reconnoitering  party,  and  they  broke  and  fled 
immediately ; but  the  Macedonians  made  some  pris- 
oners, and  from  them  Alexander  found  that  Darius 
was  posted  only  a few  miles  off,  and  learned  the 
strength  of  the  army  that  he  had  with  him.  On 
receiving  this  news  Alexander  halted,  and  gave  his 
men  repose  for  four  days,  so  that  they  should  go  into 
action  fresh  and  vigorous.  He  also  fortified  his  camp 
and  deposited  in  it  all  his  military  stores,  and  all  his 
sick  and  disabled  soldiers,  intending  to  advance 
upon  the  enemy  with  the  serviceable  part  of  his 
army  perfectly  unencumbered.  After  this  halt,  he 
moved  forward,  while  it  was  yet  dark,  with  the 
intention  of  reaching  the  enemy,  and  attacking  them 
at  break  of  day.  About  half  way  between  the 

* See  Layard’s ‘ Nineveh,”  and  see  Yauj’s  “Nineveh 
and  Porsepolis,”  p.  16. 


122 


BATTLE  OF  ARBELA. 


camps  there  were  some  undulations  of  the  ground, 
which  concealed  the  two  armies  from  each  other’s 
view;  hut,  on  Alexander  arriving  at  their  summit, 
he  saw,  by  the  early  light,  the  Persian  host  arrayed 
before  him,  and  he  probably  also  observed  traces  of 
some  engineering  operation  having  been  carried  on 
along  part  of  the  ground  in  front  of  them.  Not 
knowing  that  these  marks  had  been  caused  by  the 
Persians  having  leveled  the  ground  for  the  free  use 
of  their  war-chariots,  Alexander  suspected  that 
hidden  pitfalls  had  been  prepared  with  a view  of 
disordering  the  approach  of  cavalry.  He  summoned 
a council  of  war  forthwith.  Some  of  the  officers 
were  for  attacking  instantly,  at  all  hazards ; but  the 
more  prudent  opinion  of  Parmenio  prevailed,  and  it 
was  determined  not  to  advance  further  till  the  battle- 
ground had  been  carefully  surveyed. 

123.  Alexander  halted  his  army  on  the  heights^ 
and,  taking  with  him  some  light-armed  infantry  and 
some  cavalry,  he  passed  part  of  the  day  in  reconnoit- 
ering  the  enemy,  and  observing  the  nature  of  the 
ground  which  he  had  to  fight  on.  Darius  wisely 
refrained  from  moving  from  his  position  to  attack 
the  Macedonians  on  the  eminences  which  they 
occupied,  and  the  two  armies  remained  until  night 
without  molesting  each  other.  On  Alexander’s 
return  to  his  head-quarters,  he  summoned  his  generals 
and  superior  officers  together,  and  telling  them  that 
he  well  knew  that  their  zeal  wanted  no  exhortation, 
he  besought  them  to  do  their  utmost  in  encouraging 
and  instructing  those  whom  each  commanded,  to  do 


BATTLE  OF  ARBELA, 


123 


their  best  in  the  next  day’s  battle.  They  were  to 
remind  them  that  they  wei;e  now  not  going  to  fight 
for  a province  as  they  had  hitherto  fought,  but  they 
were  about  to  decide  by  their  swords  the  dominion 
of  all  Asia.  Each  officer  ought  to  impress  this  upon 
his  subalterns,  and  they  should  urge  it  on  their  men. 
Their  natural  courage  required  no  long  words  to 
excite  its  ardor;  but  they  should  be  reminded  of  the 
paramount  importance  of  steadiness  in  action.  The 
silence  in  the  ranks  must  be  unbroken  as  long  as 
silence  was  proper ; but  when  the  time  came  for  the 
charge,  the  shout  and  the  cheer  must  be  full  of  terror 
for  the  foe.  The  officers  were  to  be  alert  in  receiving 
and  communicating  orders;  and  every  one  was  to 
act  as  if  he  felt  that  the  whole  result  of  the  battle 
depended  on  his  own  single  good  conduct. 

Having  thus  briefly  instructed  his  generals,  Alex- 
ander ordered  that  the  drmy  should  sup,  and  take 
their  rest  for  the  night. 

124.  Darkness  had  closed  over  the  tents  of  the 
Macedonians,  when  Alexander’s  veteran  general, 
Parmenio,  came  to  him,  and  proposed  that  they 
should  make  a night  attack  on  the  Persians.  The 
king  is  said  to  have  answered  that  he  scorned  to 
filch  a victory,  and  that  Alexander  must  conquer 
openly  and  fairly.  Arrian  justly  remarks  that  Alex- 
ander’s resolution  was  as  wise  as  it  was  spirited.  Be- 
sides the  confusion  and  uncertainty  which  are  insep- 
arable from  night  engagements,  the  value  of  Alexan- 
der’s victory  would  have  been  impaired,  if  gained 
under  circumstances  which  might  supply  the  enemy 


124 


BATTLE  OF  ARBELA. 


with  any  excuse  for  his  defeat,  and  encouraged  him 
to  renew  the  contest.  It  was  necessary  for  Alexan- 
der not  only  to  heat  Darius,  hut  to  gain  such  a vic- 
tory as  should  leave  his  rival  without  apology  and 
without  hope  of  recovery. 

125.  The  Persians,  in  fact,  expected,  and  were  pre- 
pared to  meet,  a night  attack.  Such  was  the  appre- 
hension that  Darius  entertained  of  it,  that  he  formed 
his  troops  at  evening  in  order  of  battle,  and  kept 
them  under  arms  all  night.  The  effect  of  this  was, 
that  the  morning  found  them  jaded  and  dispirited, 
while  it  brought  their  adversaries  all  fresh  and  vig- 
orous against  them. 

126.  The  written  order  of  battle  which  Darius 
himself  caused  to  be  drawn  up,  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  Macedonians  after  the  engagement,  and  Aristo- 
bulus  copied  it  into  his  journal.  We  thus  possess, 
through  Arrian,  unusually  authentic  information  as 
to  the  composition  and  arrangement  of  the  Persian 
army.  On  the  extreme  left  were  the  Bactrian,  Daan, 
and  Arachosian  cavalry.  Next  to  these  Darius  placed 
the  troops  from  Persia  proper,  both  horse  and  foot. 
Then  came  the  Susians,  and  next  to  these  the  Cadu- 
sians.  These  forces  made  up  the  left  wing.  Darius’s 
own  station  was  in  the  centre.  This  was  composed 
of  the  Indians,  the  Carians,  the  Mardian  archers,  and 
the  division  of  Persians  who  were  distinguished  by 
the  golden  apples  that  formed  the  knobs  of  their 
spears.  Here  also  were  stationed  the  body-guard  of 
the  Persian  nobility.  Besides  these,  there  were,  in 
the  centre,  formed  in  deep  order,  the  Uxian  and 


BATTLE  OF  ARBELA. 


125 


Babylonian  troops,  and  the  soldiers  from  the  Red 
Sea.  The  brigade  of  Greek  mercenaries,  whom 
Darius  had  in  his  service,  and  who  alone  were  con- 
sidered fit  to  stand  the  charge  of  the  Macedonian 
phalanx,  was  drawn  up  on  either  side  of  the  royal 
chariot.  The  right  wing  was  composed  of  the  Coelo- 
syrians  and  Mesopotamians,  the  Medes,  the  Parthi- 
ans,  the  Sacians,  the  Tapurians,  Hyrcanians,  Albani-  . 
ans,  and  Sacesinse.  In  advance  of  the  line  on  the 
left  wing  were  placed  the  Scythian  cavalry,  with  a 
thousand  of  the  Bactrian  horse,  and  a hundred 
scythe-armed  chariots.  The  elephants  and  fifty 
scythe-armed  chariots  were  ranged  in  front  of  the 
centre ; and  fifty  more  chariots,  with  the  Amenian 
and  Cappadocian  cavalry,  were  drawn  up  in  advance 
of  the  right  wing. 

127.  Thus  arrayed,  the  great  host  of  King  Darius 
passed  the  night,  that  to  many  thousands  of  them 
was  the  last  of  their  existence.  The  morning  of  the 
first  of  October,*  two  thousand  one  hundred  and 
eighty-two  years  ago,  dawned  slowly  to  their  wearied 
watching,  and  they  could  hear  the  note  of  the  Mace- 
donian trumpet  sounding  to  arms,  and  could  see 
King  Alexander’s  forces  descend  from  their  tents  on 
the  heights,  and  form  in  order  of  battle  on  the  plain. 

128.  There  was  deep  need  of  skill,  as  well  as  of 
valor,  on  Alexander’s  side ; and  few  battle-fields  have 
witnessed  more  consummate  generalship  than  was  now 
displayed  by  the  Macedonian  king.  There  was  no 

* See  Clinton’s  “Fasti  Helleniei.”  The  battle  was  fought 
eleven  days  after  an  eclipse  of  the  moon  which  g-ives  the 
means  of  fixing  the  precise  date. 


126 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA, 


natural  barriers  by  which  he  could  protect  his  flanks ; 
and  not  only  was  he  certain  to  be  overlapped  on  eith- 
er wing  by  the  vast  lines  of  the  Persian  army,  but 
there  was  imminent  risk  of  their  circling  round  him, 
and  charging  him  in  the  rear,  while  he  advanced 
against  their  centre.  He  formed,  therefore,  a second 
or  reserve  line,  which  was  to  wheel  round,  if  required, 
or  to  detach  troops  to  either  flank,  as  the  enemy’s 
movements  might  necessitate ; and  thus,  with  their 
whole  army  ready*  at  any  moment  to  be  thrown  into 
one  vast  hollow  square,  the  Macedonians  advanced 
in  two  lines  against  the  enemy,  Alexander  himself 
leading  on  the  right  wing,  and  the  renowned  phalanx 
forming  the  centre,  while  Parmenio  commanded  on 
the  left. 

129.  Such  was  the  general  nature  of  the  disposition 
which  Alexander  made  of  his  army.  But  we  have  in 
Arrian  the  details  of  the  position  of  each  brigade  and 
regiment ; and  as  we  know  that  these  details  were 
taken  from  the  journals  of  Macedonian  generals,  it  is 
interesting  to  examine  them,  and  to  read  the  names 
and  stations  of  King  Alexander’s  generals  and  colon- 
els in  this,  the  greatest  of  his  battles. 

130.  The  eight  regiments  of  the  royal  horse-guards 
formed  the  right  of  Alexander’s  line.  Their  colonels 
were  Cleitus  (whose  regiment  was  on  the  extreme 
right,  the  post  of  peculiar  danger),  Glaucias,  Ariston, 
Sopolis,  Heracleides,  Demetrias,  Meleager,  and  Hege- 
lochus.  Philotas  was  general  of  the  whole  division. 
Then  came  the  Shield-bearing  infantry : Nicanor  was 
their  general.  Then  came  the  phalanx  in  six  brig- 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELJ 


127 


ades.  Ccenus’s  brigade  was  on  the  right,  and  near- 
est to  the  Shield-bearers ; next  to  this^stood  the  brig- 
ade of  Perdiccas,  then  Meleager’s,  then  Polysper- 
chon’s;  and  then  the  brigade  of  Amynias,  but  which 
was  now  commanded  by  Simmias,  as  Amynias  had 
been  sent  to  Macedonia  to  levy  recruits.  Then  came 
tffe  infantry  of  the  left  wing,  under  the  command  of 
Craterus.  Next  to  Craterus’s  infantry  w^re  placed 
the  cavalry  regiments  of  the  allies,  with  Eriguius  for 
their  general.  The  Thessalian  cavalry,  commanded 
by  Philippus,  were  next,  and  held  the  extreme  left 
of  the  whole  army.  The  whole  left  wing  was  in- 
trusted to  the  command  of  Parmenio,  who  had  round 
his  person  the  Pharsalian  regiment  of  cavalry,  which 
was  the  strongest  and  best  of  all  the  Thessalian  horse 
regiments. 

131.  The  centre  of  the  second  line  was  occupied  by 
a body  of  phalangite  infantry,  formed  of  companies 
which  were  drafted  for  this  purpose  from  each  of  the 
brigades  of  their  phalanx.  The  officers  in  command 
of  this  corps  were  ordered  to  be  ready  to  face  about, 
if  the  enemy  should  succeed  in  gaining  the  rear  of  the 
army.  On  the  right  of  this  reserve  of  infantry,  in 
the  second  line,  and  behind  the  royal  horse-guards, 
Alexander  placed  half  the  Agrian  light-armed  infan- 
try under  Attains,  and  with  them  Prison’s  body  of 
Macedonian  archers  and  Oleander’s  regiment  of  foot. 
He  also  placed  in  this  part  of  his  army  Menidas’s 
squadron  of  cavalry  and  Aretes’s  and  Ariston’s  light 
horse.  Menidas  was  ordered  to  watch  if  the  enemy’s 
cavalry  tried  to  turn  their  flank,  and,  if  they  did  so, 


128 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA. 


to  charge  them  before  they  wheeled  completely  round, 
and  so  take  t];iem  in  flank  themselves.  A similar 
force  was  arranged  on  the  left  of  the  second  line  for 
the  same  purpose.  The  Thracian  infantry  of  Sitalces 
were  placed  there,  and  Coeranus’s  regiment  of  the 
cavalry  of  the  Greek  allies,  and  Agathon’s  troops  of 
the  Odrysian  irregular  horse.  The  extreme  left  of 
the  second  line  in  this  quarter  was  held  by  Andro- 
machus’s  cavalry.  A division  of  Thracian  infantry 
was  left  in  guard  of  the  camp.  In  advance  of  the 
right  wing  and  centre  was  scattered  a number  of  light- 
armed troops,  of  javelin-men  and  bow-men,  with  the 
intention  of  warding  off  the  charge  of  the  armed 
chariots.* 

132.  Conspicuous  by  the  brilliancy  of  his  armor, 
and  by  the  chosen  band  of  ofiicers  who  were  round 
his  person,  Alexander  took  his  own  station,  as  his 
custom  was,  in  the  right  wing,  at  the  head  of  his 
cavalry  ; and  when  all  the  arrangements  for  the  bat- 
tle were  complete,  and  his  generals  were  fully  in- 
structed how  to  act  in  each  probable  emergency,  he 
began  to  lead  his  men  toward  the  enemy. 

133.  It  was  ever  his  custom  to  expose  his  life  freely 
in  battle,  and  to  emulate  the  personal  prowess  of  his 
great  ancestor,  Achilles.  Perhaps,  in  the  bold  enter- 
prise of  conquering  Persia,  it  was  politic  for  Alex- 
ander to  raise  his  army’s  daring  to  the  utmost  by  the 

* Kleber’s  arrangement  of  his  troops  at  the  battle  of 
Heliopolis,  where,  with  ten  thousand  Europeans,  he  had 
to  encounter  eighty  thousand  Asiatics  in  an  open  plain, 
is  worth  comparing  with  Alexander’s  tactics  at  Arbela. 
See  Thiers’s  “ Histoire  du  Consulat,”  etc.,  vol.  ii.,  livre  v. 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA, 


129 


example  of  his  own  heroic  valor  ; and,  in  his  subse- 
quent campaigns,  the  love  of  the  excitement,  of  “ the 
raptures  of  the  strife,”  may  have  made  him,  like 
Murat,  coutinue  from  choice  a custom  which  he  com- 
menced from  duty.  But  he  never  suffered  the  ardor 
of  the  soldier  to  make  him  lose  the  coolness  of  the 
general,  and  at  Arbela,  in  particular,  he  showed  that 
he  could  act  up  to  his  favorite  Homerio  maxim  of 
being 

'Afx<j)6Tepov  |8a(rtAeus  t ayaOb^  /cparepd?  r aixp.rirriq> 

1 34.  Great  reliance  had  been  placed  by  the  Persian  king 
on  the  effects  of  the  scythe-bearing  chariots.  It  was 
designed  to  launch  these  against  the  Macedonian  pha- 
lanx, and  to  follow  them  up  by  a heavy  charge  of 
cavalry,  which,  it  was  hoped,  would  find  the  ranks  of 
the  spearmen  disordered  by  the  rush  of  the  chariots, 
and  easily  destroy  this  most  formidable  part  of  Alex- 
ander’s force.  In  front,  therefore,  of  the  Persian 
centre,  where  Darius  took  his  station,  and  which  it 
was  supposed  that  the  phalanx  would  attack,  the 
ground  had  been  carefully  leveled  and  smoothed,  so 
as  to  allow  the  chariots  to  charge  over  it  with  their 
full  sweep  and  speed.  As  the  Macedonian  army  ap- 
proached the  Persian,  Alexander  found  that  the 
front  of  his  whole  line  barely  equaled  the  front  of  the 
Persian  centre,  so  that  he  was  outfianked  on  his  right 
by  the  entire  left  wing  of  the  enemy,  and  by  their  en- 
tire right  wing  on  his  left.  His  tactics  were  to  assail 
some  one  point  of  the  hostile  army,  and  gain  a deci- 
sive advantage,  while  he  refused,  as  far  as  possible. 


130 


BATTLE  OF  ARBELA. 


the  encounter  along  the  rest  of  the  line.  He  there- 
fore  inclined  his  order  of  march  to  the  right,  so  as  to 
enable  his  right  wing  and  centre  to  come  into  colli- 
sion with  the  enemy  on  as  favorable  terms  as  possi- 
ble, although  the  maneuver  might  in  some  respect 
compromise  his  left. 

135.  The  effect  of  this  oblique  movement  was  to 
bring  the  phalanx  and  his  own  wing  nearly  beyond 
the  limits  of  the  ground  which  the  Persians  had  pre- 
pared for  the  operations  of  the  chariots ; and  Darius, 
fearing  to  lose  the  benefit  of  this  arm  against  the 
most  important  parts  of  the  Macedonian  force,  or- 
dered the  Scythian  and  Bactrian  cavalry,  who  were 
drawn  up  in  advance  on  his  extreme  left,  to  charge 
round  upon  Alexander’s  right  wing,  and  check  its 
further  lateral  progress.  Against  these  assailants 
Alexander  sent  from  his  second  line  Menida’s  cav- 
alry. As  these  proved  too  few  to  make  head  against 
the  enemy,  he  ordered  Ariston  also  from  the  second 
line  with  his  light  horse,  and  Oleander  with  his  foot, 
in  support  of  Menidas.  The  Batricians  and  Scyth- 
ians now  began  to  give  way ; but  Darius  re-enforced 
them  by  the  mass  of  Batrician  cavalry  from  his  main 
line,  and  an  obstinate  cavalry  fight  now  took  place. 
The  Bactrians  and  Scythians  were  numerous,  and 
were  better  armed  than  the  horsemen  under  Menidas 
and  Ariston ; and  the  loss  at  first  was  heaviest  on 
the  Macedonian  side.  But  still  the  European  cavalry 
stood  the  charge  of  the  Asiatics,  and  at  last,  by  their 
superior  discipline,  and  by  acting  in  squadrons  that 


BATTLE  OF  ABB  EL  A. 


131 


supported  each  other,*  instead  of  fighting  in  a con- 
fused mass  like  the  barbarians,  the  Macedonians 
broke  their  adversaries,  and  drove  them  off  the  field. 

136.  Darius  now  directed  the  scythe-armed  chariots 
to  be  driven  against  Alexander’s  horse-guards  and 
the  phalanx,  and  these  formidable  vehicles  were  ac- 
cordingly sent  rattling  across  the  plain,  against  the 
Macedonian  line.  When  we  remember  the  alarm 
which  the  war-chariots  of  the  Britons  created  among 
Csesar’s  legions,  we  shall  not  be  prone  to  deride  this 
arm  of  ancient  warfare  as  always  useless.  The  ob- 
ject of  the  chariots  was  to  create  unsteadiness  in  the 
ranks  against  which  they  were  driven,  and  squadrons 
of  cavalry  followed  close  upon  them  to  profit  by  such 
disorder.  But  the  Asiatic  chariots  were  rendered  in- 
effective at  Arbela  by  the  light-armed  troops,  whom 

* 'AAAa  /cal  rd?  Trpoo-jSoAd?  avToiv  eSexovTO  ol  Ma/ceSdve?,  /cal 
jSi'a  /car’  lAa?  TrpocrnLTrTOVTes  e^(x>6ovp  e/c  ti)?  rd^ecos. — ArriAN,  lib. 
iii.,  c.  13. 

The  best  explanation  of  this  maybe  found  in  Napoleon’s 
account  of  the  cavalry  fights  between  the  French  and  the 
Mamelukes.  “ Two  Mamelukes  were  able  to  make  head 
againstthree  Frenchmen,  because  they  were  better  armed, 
better  mounted,  and  better  trained;  they  had  two  pair  of 
pistols,  a blunderbuss,  a carabine,  a helmet  with  a visor, 
and  a coat  of  mail;  they  had  several  horses,  and  several 
attendants  on  foot.  One  hundred  cuirassiers,  however, 
were  not  afraid  of  one  hundred  Mamelukes;  three  hun- 
dred could  beat  an  equal  number,  and  one  thousand  could 
easily  put  to  rout  fifteen  hundred,  so  great  is  the  influence 
of  tactics,  order,  and  evolutions!  Leclerc  and  Lasalle 
presented  their  men  to  the  Mamelukes  in  severa,!  lines. 
When  the  Arabs  were  on  the  point  of  overwhelming  the 
first,  the  second  came  to  its  assistance  on  the  right  and 
left;  the  Mamelukes  then  halted  and  wheeled,  in  order  to 
turn  the  wings  of  this  new  line;  this  moment  was  always 
seized  upon  to  charge  them,  and  they  were  uniformly 
broken.”— Montholon’s  “ History  of  Captivity  of  Napo- 
leon,” vol.  iv.,  p.  70. 


m 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA. 


Alexander  had  specially  appointed  for  the  service, 
and  who,  wounding  the  horses  and  drivers  with  their 
missile  weapons,  and  running  alongside  so  as  to  cut 
the  traces  or  seize  the  reins,  marred  the  intended 
charge ; and  the  few  chariots  that  reached  the 
phalanx  passed  harmlessly  through  the  intervals 
which  the  spearmen  opened  for  them,  and  were  easily 
captured  in  the  rear. 

137.  A mass  of  the  Asiatic  cavalry  was  now,  for 
the  second  time,  collected  against  Alexander’s  ex- 
treme right,  and  moved  round  it,  with  the  view  of 
gaining  the  flank  of  his  army.  At  the  critical 
moment,  when  their  own  flanks  were  exposed  by  this 
evolution.  Aretes  dashed  on  the  Persian  squadrons 
with  his  horsemen  from  Alexander’s  second  line. 
While  Alexander  thus  met  and  baffled  all  the  flank- 
ing attacks  of  the  enemy  with  troops  brought  up 
from  his  second  line,  he  kept  his  own  horse-guards 
and  the  rest  of  the  front  line  of  his  wing  fresh,  and 
ready  to  take  advantage  of  the  first  opportunity  for 
striking  a decisive  blow.  This  soon  came.  A large 
body  of  horse,  who  were  posted  on  the  Persian  left 
wing  nearest  to  the  centre,  quitted  their  station,  and 
rode  off  to  help  their  comrades  in  the  cavalry  fight, 
that  still  was  going  on  at  the  extreme  right  of  Alex- 
ander’s wing  against  the  detachments  from  his  sec- 
ond line.  This  made  a huge  gap  in  the  Persian  array, 
and  into  this  space  Alexander  instantly  charged  with 
his  guard  and  all  the  cavalry  of  his  wing ; and  then 
pressing  toward  his  left,  he  soon  began  to  make  havoc 
in  the  left  flank  of  the  Persian  centre.  The  Shield- 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA. 


133 


bearing  infantry  now  charged  also  among  the  reeling 
masses  of  the  Asiatics ; and  five  of  the  brigades  ot 
the  phalanx,  with  the  irresistible  might  of  their  saris- 
sas,  bore  down  the  Greek  mercenaries  of  Darius,  and 
dug  their  way  through  the  Persian  centre.  In  the 
early  part  of  the  battle  Darius  had  showed  skill  and 
energy ; and  he  now,  for  some  time,  encourged  his 
men,  by  voice  and  example,  to  keep  firm.  ''But  the 
lances  of  Alexander’s  cavalry  and  the  pikes  of  the 
phalanx  now  pressed  nearer  and  nearer  to  him.  His 
charioteer  was  struck  down  by  a javelin  at  his  side; 
and  at  last  Darius’s  nerve  failed  him,  and,  descending 
from  his  chariot,  he  mounted  on  a fieet  horse  and 
galloped  from  the  plain,  regardless  of  the  state  of 
the  battle  in  other  parts  of  the  field,  where  matters 
were  going  on  much  more  favorably  for  his  cause, 
and  where  his  presence  might  have  done  much 
toward  gaining  a victory. 

138.  Alexander’s  operations  with  his  right  and 
centre  had  exposed  his  left  to  an  immensely  prepon- 
derating force  of  the  enemy.  Parmenio  kept  out  of 
actiou  as  long  as  possible ; but  Mazseus,  who  com- 
manded the  Persian  right  wing,  advanced  against 
him,  completely  outfianked  him,  and  pressed  him 
severely  with  reiterated  charges  by  superior  num- 
bers. Seeing  the  distress  of  Parmenio’s  wing,  Sim- 
mias,  who  commanded  the  sixth  brigade  of  the 
phalanx,  which  was  next  to  the  left  wing,  did  not 
advance  with  the  other  brigades  in  the  great  charge 
upon  the  Persian  centre,  but  kept  back  to  cover  Par- 
menio’s troops  on  their  right  flank,  as  otherwise  they 


134 


BATTLE  OF  ABBELA. 


would  have  been  completely  surrounded  and  cut  off 
from  the  rest  of  the  Macedonian  army.  By  so  doing, 
Simmias  had  unavoidably  opened  a gap  in  the  Mace- 
donian left  centre ; and  a large  column  of  Indian 
and  Persian  horse,  from  the  Persian  right  centre,  had 
galloped  forward  through  this  interval,  and  right 
through  the  troops  of  the  Macedonian  second  line. 
Instead  of  then  wheeling  round  upon  Parmenio,  or 
upon  the  rear  of  Alexander’s  conquering  wing,  the 
Indian  and  Persian  cavalry  rode  straight  on  to  the 
Macedonian  camp,  overpowered  the  Thracians  who 
were  left  in  charge  of  it,  and  began  to  plunder.  This 
was  stopped  by  the  phalangite  troops  of  the  second 
line,  who,  after  the  enemy’s  horsemen  had  rushed  by 
them,  faced  about,  countermarched  upon  the  camp, 
killed  many  of  the  Indians  and  Persians  in  the  act 
of  plundering,  and  forced  the  rest  to  ride  off  again. 
Just  at  this  crisis,  Alexander  had  been  recalled  from 
his  pursuit  of  Darius  by  tidings  of  the  distress  of 
Parmenio  and  his  inability  to  bear  up  any  longer 
against  the  hot  attacks  of  Mazaeus.  Taking  his 
horse-guards  with  him,  Alexander  rode  toward  the 
part  of  the  field  where  his  left  wing  was  fighting ; 
but  on  his  way  thither  he  encountered  the  Persian 
and  Indian  cavalry,  on  their  return  from  his  camp. 

139.  These  men  now  saw  that  their  only  chance  of 
safety  was  to  cut  their  way  through,  and  in  one  huge 
column  they  charged  desperately  upon  the  Macedo- 
nian regiments.  There  was  here  a close  hand-to-hand 
fight,  which  lasted  some  time,  and  sixty  of  the  royal 
horse-guards  fell,  and  three  generals,  who  fought 


BATTLE  OF  A REEL  A. 


135 


close  to  Alexander’s  side,  were  wounded.  At  length 
the  Macedonian  discipline  and  valor  again  prevailed, 
and  a large  number  of  the  Persian  and  Indian  horse- 
men were  cut  down,  some  few  only  succeeded  in 
breaking  through  and  riding  away.  Eelieved  of 
these  obstinate  enemies,  Alexander  again  formed  his 
regiments  of  horse-guards,  and  led  them  toward  Par- 
menio ; hut  by  this  time  that  general  alsd  was  vic- 
torious. Probably  the  news  of  Darius’s  flight  had 
reached  Mazaeus,  and  had  damped  the  ardor  of  the 
Persian  right  wing,  while  the  tidings  of  their  com- 
rades’ success  must  have  proportionately  encouraged 
the  Macedonian  forces  under  Parmenio.  His  Thes- 
salian cavalry  particularly  distinguished  themselves 
by  their  gallantry  and  persevering  good  conduct ; and 
by  the  time  that  Alexander  had  ridden  up  to  Par- 
menio, the  whole  Persian  army  was  in  full  flight  from 
the  fleld. 

140.  It  was  of  the  deepest  importance  to  Alexan- 
der to  secure  the  person  of  Darius,  and  he  now  urged 
on  the  pursuit.  The  River  Lycus  was  between  the 
field  of  battle  and  the  city  of  Arhela,  whither  the 
fugitives  directed  their  course,  and  the  passage  of 
this  river  was  even  more  destructive  to  the  Persians 
than  the  swords  and  spears  of  the  Macedonians  had 
been  in  the  engagement.*  The  narrow  bridge  was 
soon  choked  up  by  the  flying  thousands  who  rushed 
toward  it,  and  vast  numbers  of  the  Persians  threw 

* I purposely  omit  any  statement  of  the  loss  in  the  bat- 
tle. There  is  a palpable  error  of  the  transcribers  in  the 
numbers  which  we  find  in  our  present  manurcript.of  Ar- 
rian, and  Curtius  is  of  no  authority. 


136 


BATTLE  OE  ABBELA. 


themselves,  or  were  hurried  by  others,  into  the  rapid 
stream,  and  perished  in  its  waters.  Darius  had 
crossed  it,  and  had  ridden  on  through  Arbela  without 
halting.  Alexander  reached  that  city  on  the  next 
day,  and  made  himself  master  of  all  Darius’s  trea- 
sure and  stores ; but  the  Persian  king,  unfortunately 
for  himself,  had  fled  too  fast  for  his  conqueror,  but 
had  only  escaped  to  perish  by  the  treachery  of  his 
Bactrian  satrap,  Bessus. 

141.  A few  days  after  the  battle,  Alexander  entered 
Babylon,  “ the  oldest  seat  of  earthly  empire  ” then  in 
existence,  as  its  acknowledged  lord  and  master. 
There  were  yet  some  campaigns  of  his  brief  and 
bright  career  to  be  accomplished.  Central  Asia  was 
yet  to  w'itness  the  march  of  his  phalanx.  He  was 
yet  to  eflect  that  conquest  of  Afghanistan  in  which 
England  since  has  failed.  His  generalship,  as  well 
as  his  valor,  were  yet  to  be  signalized  on  the  banks 
of  the  Hydaspes  and  the  field  of  Chillianwallah ; and 
he  was  yet  to  precede  the  Queen  of  England  in  an- 
nexing the  Punjaub  to  the  dominions  of  a European 
sovereign.  But  the  crisis  of  his  career  was  reached  ; 
the  great  object  of  his  mission  was  accomplished ; 
and  the  ancient  Persian  empire,  which  once  menaced 
all  the  nations  of  the  earth  Avith  subjection,  was  irre- 
parably crushed  when  Alexander  had  won  his  crown- 
ing victory  at  Arbela. 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


137 


Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of 
Akbela  and  the  Battle  of  the 
Metaukus. 

B.  C.  330.  The  Lacedsenionians  endeavor  to  create  a 
rising  in  Greece  against  the  Macedonian  power ; they 
are  defeated  by  Antipater,  Alexander’s  viceroy  ; and 
their  king,  Agis,  falls  in  the  battle. 

330  to  327.  Alexander’s  campaigns  in  llpper  Asia. 

327,  326.  Alexander  marches  through  Afghanistan 
to  the  Punjaub.  He  defeats  Porus.  His  troops  re- 
fuse to  march  toward  the  Ganges,  and  he  commences 
the  descent  of  the  Indus.  On  his  march  he  attacks 
and  subdues  several  Indian  tribes — among  others,  the 
Malli,  in  the  storming  of  whose  capital  (Mooltan)  he 
is  severely  wounded.  He  directs  his  admiral,  Near- 
chus,  to  sail  round  from  the  Indus  to  the  Persian 
Gulf,  and  leads  the  army  back  across  the  Scinde  and 
Beloochistan. 

324.  Alexander,  returns,  to  Babylon.  In  the  tenth 
year  after  he  had  crossed  the  Hellespont,  Alexander, 
having  won  his  vast  dominion,  entered  Babylon ; and 
resting  from  his  career  in  that  oldest  seat  of  earthly 
empire,  he  steadily  surveyed  the  mass  of  various  na- 
tions which  owned  his  sovereignty,  and  resolved  in 
his  mind  the  great  work  of  breathing  into  this  huge 
but  inert  body  the  living  spirit  of  Greek  civilization. 
In  the  bloom  of  youthful  manhood,  at  the  age  of 
thirty-two,  he  paused  from  the  fiery  speed  of  his 
earlier  course,  and  for  the  first  time  gave  the  nations 
an  opportunity  of  offering  their  homage  before  his 
throne.  They  came  from  all  the  extremities  of  the 


138 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS, 


earth  to  propitiate  his  anger,  to  celebrate  his  great- 
ness, or  to  solicit  his  protection.  * * * History  may 
allow  us  to  think  that  Alexander  and  a Roman  em- 
bassador did  meet  at  Babylon  ; that  the  greatest  man 
of  the  ancient  world  saw  and  spoke  with  a citizen  of 
that  great  nation  which  was  destined  to  succeed  him 
in  his  appointed  work,  and  to  found  a wider  and  still 
more  enduring  empire.  They  met,  too,  in  Babylon, 
almost  beneath  the  shadow  of  the  Temple  of  Bel, 
perhaps  the  earliest  monument  ever  raised  by  human 
pride  and  power  in  a city,  stricken,  as  it  were,  by  the 
word  of  God’s  heaviest  judgment,  as  the  symbol  of 
greatness  apart  from  and  opposed  to  goodness.” — 
(Aenold.) 

323.  Alexander  dies  at  Babylon.  On  his  death  be- 
ing known  at  Greece,  the  Athenians,  and  others  of 
the  southern  states,  take  up  arms  to  shake  off  the 
domination  of  Macedon.  They  are  at  first  success- 
ful ; but  the  return  of  some  of  Alexander’s  veterans 
from  Asia  enables  Antipater  to  prevail  over  them. 

317  to  289.  Agathocles  is  tyrant  of  Syracuse,  and 
carries  on  repeated  wars  with  the  Carthaginians,  in 
the  course  of  which  (311)  he  invades  Africa,  and  re- 
duces the  Carthaginians  to  great  distress. 

306.  After  a long  series  of  wars  with  each  other, 
and  after  all  the  heirs  of  Alexander  had  been  mur- 
dered, his  principal  surviving  generals  assume  the 
title  of  king,  each  over  the  provinces  which  he  has 
occupied.  The  four  chief  among  them  were  Anti- 
gonus,  Ptolemy,  Lysimachus,  and  Seleucus.  Anti- 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS 


139 


pater  was  now  dead,  but  his  son  Cassander  succeeded 
to  his  power  in  Macedonia  and  Greece. 

301.  Seleucus  and  Lysimachus  defeat  Antigonus 
at  Ipsus.  Antigonus  is  killed  in  the  battle. 

280.  Seleucus,  the  last  of  Alexander’s  captains,  is 
assassinated.  Of  all  of  Alexander’s  successors,  Se- 
leucus had  formed  the  most  poAverful  empire.  He 
had  acquired  all  the  provinces  between  Phrygia  and 
the  Indus.  He  extended  his  dominion  in  India  be- 
yond the  limits  reached  by  Alexander.  Seleucus  had 
some  sparks  of  his  great  master’s  genius  in  promot- 
ing civilization  and  commerce,  as  well  as  in  gaining 
victories.  Under  his  successors,  the  Seleucidse,  this 
vast  empire  rapidly  diminished : Bactria  became  in- 
dependent, and  a separate  dynasty  of  Greek  kings 
ruled  there  in  the  year  125,  when  it  was  overthrown 
by  the  Scythian  tribe.  Parthia  threw  off  its  alle- 
giance to  the  Seleucidse  in  250  B.  C.,  and  the  power- 
ful Parthian  kingdom,  which  afterward  proved  so 
formidable  a foe  to  Rome,  absorbed  nearly  all  the 
provinces  west  of  the  Euphrates  that  had  obeyed  the 
first  Seleucus.  Before  the  battle  of  Ipsus,  Mithra- 
dates,  a Persian  prince  of  the  blood-royal  of  the 
Achsemenidae,  had  escaped  to  Pontus,  and  founded 
there  the  kingdom  of  that  name. 

Besides  the  kingdom  of  Seleucus,  which,  when 
limited  to  Syria,  Palestine,  the  parts  of  Asia  Minor 
long  survived,  the  most  important  kingdom  formed 
by  a general  of  Alexander  was  that  of  the  Ptolemies 
in  Egypt.  The  throne  of  Macedonia  was  long  and 
obstinately  contended  for  by  Cassander,  Polysperchon, 


140 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS, 


Lysimachus,  Pyrrhus,  Antigonus,  and  others,  hut  at 
last  was  secured  by  the  dynasty  of  Antigonus  Gona- 
tas.  The  old  republics  of  Southern  Greece  suffered 
severely  during  these  tumults,  and  the  only  Greek 
states  that  showed  any  strength  and  spirit  were  the 
cities  of  the  Achaean  league,  the  ^tolians,  and  the 
islanders  of  Rhodes. 

290.  Rome  had  now  thoroughly  subdued  the  Sam' 
nites  and  the  Etruscans,  and  had  gained  numerous 
victories  over  the  Cisalpine  Gauls.  Wishing* to  con- 
firm her  dominion  in  Lower  Italy,  she  became  en- 
tangled in  a war  with  Pyrrhus,  fourth  king  of  Epi- 
rus, who  was  called  over  by  the  Tarentines  to  aid 
them.  Pyrrhus  was  at  first  victorious,  but  in  the  year 
275  was  defeated  by  the  Roman  legions  in  a pitched 
battle.  He  returned  to  Greece,  remarking  of  Sicily, 
Olwj  dTToXetTZOfjLev  Kap^r]dovtatg  xo.VPo)/iatot<;  izalai- 
ffvpav.  Romebecomes  mistress  of  all  Italy  from  the  Ru- 
bicon to  the  Straits  of  Messina. 

264.  The  first  Punic  war  begins.  Its  primary  cause 
was  the  desire  of  both  the  Romans  and  the  Cartha- 
ginians to  possess  themselves  of  Sicily.  The  Romans 
form  a fleet  and  successfully  compete  with  the  marine 
of  Carthage.*  During  the  latter  half  of  the  war  the 
military  genius  of  Hamilcar  Barca  sustains  the  Car- 

* There  is  at  this  present  moment  in  the  Great  Exhibi- 
tion at  Hyde  Park  a model  of  apiratical  galley  of  Labuan, 
part  of  the  mast  of  which  can  be  letdown  on  the  enemy, 
and  form  a bridge  for  boarders . It  is  worth  while  to  com- 
pare this  with  the  account  of  Polybius  of  the  boarding 
bridges  which  the  Roman  admiral,  Duillius,  affixed  to  the 
masts  of  his  galleys,  and  by  means  of  which  he  won  his 
great  victory  over  the  Carthaginian  fleet. 


SYNOFSIjS  of  events. 


141 


thaginian  cause  in  Sicily.  At  the  end  of  twenty - 
four  years  the  Carthaginians  sue  for  peace,  though 
their  aggregate  loss  in  ships  and  men  had  been  less 
than  that  sustained  by  the  Homans  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war.  Sicily  becomes  a Roman  province. 

240  to  218.  The  Carthaginian  mercenaries  who  had 
been  brought  back  from  Sicily  to  Africa,  mutiny 
against  Carthage,  and  nearly  succeed  in  destroying 
her.  After  a sanguinary  and  desperate  struggle,  Ham- 
ilcar  Barca  crushes  them.  During  this  season  of 
weakness  to  Carthage,  Rome  takes  from  her  the  island 
of  Sardinia.  Hamilcar  Barca  forms  the  project  of 
obtaining  compensation  by  conquests  in  Spain,  and 
thus  enabling  Carthage  to  renew  the  struggle  with 
Rome.  He  takes  Hannibal  (then  a child)  to  Spain 
with  him.  He,  and,  after  his  death,  his  brother  win 
great  part  of  Southern  Spain  to  the  Carthaginian  in- 
terest. Hannibal  obtains  the  command  of  the  Car- 
thaginian armies  in  Spain  221  B.  C.,  being  then  twen- 
ty-six years  old.  He  attacks  Saguntum,  a city  on 
the  Ebro,  in  alliance  with  Rome,  which  is  the  imme- 
diate pretext  for  the  second  Punic  war. 

During  this  interval  Rome  had  to  sustain  a storm 
from  the  North.  The  Cisalpine  Gauls,  in  226,  formed 
an  alliance  with  one  of  the  fiercest  tribes  of  their 
brethren  north  of  the  Alps,  and  began  a furious  war 
against  the  Romans,  which  lasted  six  years.  The 
Romans  gave  them  several  severe  defeats,  and  took 
from  them  part  of  their  territories  near  the  Po.  It 
was  on  this  occasion  that  the  Roman  colonies  of 
Cremona  and  Placentia  were  founded,  the  latter  of 


142 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVEN  IS, 


which  did  such  essential  service  to  Rome  in  the  sec- 
ond Punic  war  by  the  resistance  which  it  made  to 
the  army  of  Hasdrubal.  A muster-roll  was  made  in 
this  war  of  the  effective  military  force  of  the  Ro- 
mans themselves,  and  of  those  Italian  states  that 
were  subject  to  them.  The  return  showed  a force  of 
seven  hundred  thousand  foot  and  seventy  thousand 
horse.  Polybius,  who  mentions  this  muster,  remarks, 
00 16 aq  iAarrouq  di(TfjLup{aJv^  i7ii6aXeu 
eiq  TTjv  Urakiav. 

218.  Hannibal  crosses  the  Alps  and  invades  Italy. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBUS, 


143 


CHAPTER  IV. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS,  B.  C.  207. 


Quid  debeas,  O Roma,  Neronibus, 

Testis  Metaurum  flumen,  et  Hasdrubal 
Devictus,  et  pulcher  fug-atis 
Hie  dies  Latio  tenebris,  etc. 

Horatius,  iv.  Od.,  4. 

- The  consul  Nero,  ^ho  made  the  unequal  march  which 
deceived  Hannibal  and  defeated  Hasdrubal,  thereby  ac- 
complishing an  achievement  almost  unrivaled  in  military 
annals . The  first  intelligence  of  his  return,  to  Hannibal, 
was  the  sight  of  Hasdrubal’s  head  thrown  into  his  camp. 
When  Hannibal  saw  this,  he  exclaimed  with  a sigh,  that 
“ Rome  would  now  be  the  mistress  of  the  world.  ’ ’ To  this 
victory  of  Nero’s  it  might  be  owing  that  his  imperial 
namesaKe  reigned  at  all.  But  the  infamy  of  the  one  has 
eclipsed  the  glory  of  the  other.  When  the  name  of  Nero 
isheard,  who  thinks  of  the  consul?  But  such  are  human 
things.— Byron. 

142.  About  midvray  between  Rimini  and  Ancona 
a little  river  falls  into  the  Adriatic,  after  traversing 
one  of  those  districts  of  Italy  in  which  a vain  attempt 
has  lately  been  made  to  revive,  after  long  centuries 
of  servitude  and  shame,  the  spirit  of  Italian  nation- 
ality and  the  energy  of  free  institutions.  That 
stream  is  still  called  the  Metauro,  and  wakens  by  its 
name  the  recollections  of  the  resolute  daring  of 


144 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUEU8, 


ancient  Konie,  and  of  the  slaughter  that  stained  its 
current  two  thousand  and  sixty-three  years  ago, 
when  the  combined  consular  armies  of  Livius  and 
Nero  encountered  and  crushed  near  its  banks  the 
varied  hosts  which  Hannibal’s  brother  was  leading 
from  the  Pyrenees,  the  Rhone,  the  Alps,  and  the  Po, 
to  aid  the  great  Carthaginian  in  his  stern  struggle  to 
annihilate  the  growing  might  of  the  Roman  republic, 
and  make  the  Punic  power  supreme  over  all  the 
nations  of  the  world. 

143  The  Roman  historian,  who  termed  that  strug- 
gle the  most  memorable  of  all  wars  that  ever  were 
carried  on,*  wrote  in  no  spirit  of  exaggeration ; for  it 
is  not  in  ancient,  but  in  modern  history,  that  par- 
allels for  its  incidents  and  its  heroes  are  to  be  found. 
The  similitude  between  the  contest  which  Rome 
maintained  against  Hannibal,  and  that  which  Eng- 
land was  for  many  years  engaged  in  against  Napo- 
leon, has  not  passed  unobserved  by  recent  historians. 
“ Twice,”  says  Arnold,!  has  there  been  witnessed 
the  struggle  of  the  highest  individual  genius  against 
the  resources  and  institutions  of  a great  nation,  and 
in  both  cases  the  nation  has  been  victorious.  For 
seventeen  years  Hannibal  strove  against  Rome ; for 
sixteen  years  Napoleon  Bonaparte  strove  against 
England:  the  efforts  of  the  first  ended  in  Zama; 
those  of  the  second,  in  Waterloo.”  One  point,  how- 
ever, of  the  similitude  between  the  two  wars  has 
scarcely  been  adequately  dwelt  on ; that  is,  the  re- 

* Livy,  lib.  xxi.,  sec.  1. 

t Vol.  iii.,  p.  63  See  also  Alison,  passim^ 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS. 


145 


markable  parallel  between  the  Roman  general  who 
finally  defeated  the  great  Carthaginian,  and  the 
English  general  who  gave  the  last  deadly  overthrow 
to  the  French  emperor.  Scipio  and  Wellington  both 
held  for  many  years  commands  of  high  importance,, 
but  distant  from  the  main  theatres  of  warfare.  The 
same  country  was  the  scene  of  the  principal  military 
career  of  each.  It  was  in  Spain  that  Scipio,  like 
Wellington,  successively  encountered  and'  overthrew 
nearly  all  the  subordinate  generals  of  the  enemy 
before  being  opposed  to  the  chief  champion  and  con- 
queror himself  Both  Scipio  and  Wellington  restored 
their  countrymen’s  confidence  in  arms  when  shaken 
by  a series  of  reverses,  and  each  of  them  closed  a long 
and  perilous  war  by  a complete  and  overwhelming 
defeat  of  the  chosen  leader  and  the  chosen  veterans 
of  the  foe. 

144.  Nor  is  the  parallel  between  them  limited  to 
their  military  characters  and  exploits.  Scipio,  like 
Wellington,  became  an  important  leader  of  the 
aristocratic  party  among  his  countrymen,  and  was 
exposed  to  the  unmeasured  invectives  of  the  violent 
section  of  his  political  antagonists.  When,  early  in 
the  last  reign,  an  infuriated  mob  assaulted  the  Duke 
of  W ellington  in  the  streets  of  the  English  capital  on 
the  anniversary  of  Waterloo,  England  was  even  more 
disgraced  by  that  outrage  than  Rome  was  by  the 
factious  accusations  which  demagogues  brought 
against  Scipio,  but  which  he  proudly  repelled  on  the 
day  of  trial  by  reminding  the  assembled  people  that 
it  was  the  annivejsarj  of  the  battle  of  Zama.  Hap- 


146 


BATTLE  OF  THE  MET AU BUS. 


pily,  a wiser  and  a better  spirit  has  now  -for  years 
pervaded  all  classes  of  our  community,  and  we  shall 
be  spared  the  ignominy  of  having  worked  out  to  the 
end  the  parallel  of  national  ingratitude.  Scipio  died 
a voluntary  exile  from  the  malevolent  turbulence  of 
Rome.  Englishmen  of  all  ranks  and  politics  have 
now  long  united  in  affectionate  admiration  of  our 
modern  Scipio  ; and  even  those  who  have  most  wide- 
ly differed  from  the  duke  on  legislative  or  ad- 
ministrative questions,  forget  what  they  deem  the 
political  errors  of  that  time-honored  head,  while  they 
gratefully  call  to  mind  the  laurels  that  have  wreathed 
it. 

145.  Scipio  at  Zama  trampled  in  the  dust  the 
power  of  Carthage,  but  that  power  had  been  already 
irreparably  shatterd  in  another  field,  where  neither 
Scipio  nor  Hannibal  commanded.  When  the 
Metaurus  witnessed  the  defeat  and  death  of  Hasdru- 
bal,  it  witnessed  the  ruin  of  the  scheme  by  which 
alone  Carthage  could  hope  to  organize  decisive  suc- 
cess— the  scheme  of  enveloping  Rome  at  once  from 
the  north  and  the  south  of  Italy  by  two  chosen 
armies,  led  by  two  sons  of  Hamilcar.*  That  battle 
was  the  determining  crisis  of  the  contest,  not  merely 
between  Rome  and  Carthage,  but  between  the  two 
great  families  of  the  world,  which  then  made  Italy 
the  arena  of  their  oft-renewed  contest  for  pre-emi- 
nence. 

146.  The  French  historian,  Michelet,  whose  “His- 
toire  Romaine  ” would  have  been  invaluable  if  the 


* See  Arnold,  vol.  iii.,  387. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  META  UE US. 


147 


general  industry  and  accuracy  of  the  writer  had  in 
any  degree  equaled  his  originality  and  brilliancy, 
eloquently  remarks,  “It  is  not  without  reason  that 
so  universal  and  vivid  a remembrance  of  the  Punic 
wars  has  dwelt  in  the  memories  of  men.  They 
formed  no  mere  struggle  to  determine  the  lot  of  two 
cities  or  two  empires ; hut  it  was  a strife,  on  the 
event  of  which  depended  the  fate  of  two  races  of 
mankind,  whether  the  dominion  of  the  world  should 
belong  to  the  Indo-Germanic  or  to  the  Semitic  family 
of  nations.  Bear  in  mind  that  the  first  of  these  com- 
prises, besides  the  Indians  and  the  Persians,  the 
Greeks,  the  Romans,  and  the  Germans.  In  the  other 
are  ranked  the  Jews  and  the  Arabs,  the  Phoenicians 
and  the  Carthaginians.  On  the  one  side  is  the  genius 
of  heroism,  of  art,  and  legislation  ; on  the  other  is 
the  spirit  of  industry,  of  commerce,  of  navigation. 
The  two  opposite  races  have  every  where  come  into 
contact,  every  where  into  hostility.  In  the  primitive 
history  of  Persia  and  Chaldea,  the  heroes  are  perpet- 
ually engaged  in  combat  with  their  industrious  and 
perfidious  neighbors.  The  struggle  is  renewed  be- 
tween the  Phoenicians  and  the  Greeks  on  every 
coast  of  the  Mediterranean.  The  Greek  supplants 
the  Phoenician  in  all  his  factories,  all  his  colonies  in 
the  East ; soon  will  the  Roman  come,  and  do  like- 
wise in  the  West.  Alexander  did  far  more  against 
Tyre  than  Salmanasar  or  Nabuchodonosor  had  done. 
Not  content  with  crushing  her,  he  took  care  that  she 
never  should  revive ; for  he  founded  Alexandria  as 
her  substitute,  and  changed  forever  the  track  of  the 


148 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS, 


commerce  of  the  world.  There  remained  Carthage — 
the  great  Carthage,  and  her  mighty  empire — mighty 
in  a far  different  degree  than  Phoenicia’s  had  been. 
Rome  annihilated  it.  Then  occurred  that  which  has 
no  parallel  in  history — an  entire  civilization  perished 
at  one  blow — vanished,  like  a falling  star.  The 

Periplus”  of  Hanno,  a few  coins,  a score  of  lines  in 
Plautus,  and,  lo,  all  that  remains  of  the  Carthaginian 
world ! 

147.  “ Many  generations  must  needs  pass  away  be- 
fore the  struggle  between  the  two  races  could  be  re- 
newed ; and  the  Arabs,  that  formidable  rear-guard 
of  the  Semitic  world,  dashed  forth  from  their  deserts. 
The  conflict  between  the  two  races  then  became  the 
conflict  of  two  religions.  Fortunate  was  it  that  those 
daring  Saracenic  cavaliers  encountered  in  the  East 
the  impregnable  walls  of  Constantinople,  in  the  West 
the  chivalrous  valor  of  Charles  Martel  and  the  sword 
of  the  Cid.  The  crusades  were  the  natural  reprisals 
for  the  Arab  invasions,  and  form  the  last  epoch  of 
that  great  struggle  between  the  two  principal  families 
of  the  human  race.” 

148.  It  is  difficult,  amid  the  glimmering  light  sup- 
plied by  the  allusions  of  the  classical  writers,  to  gain 
a full  idea  of  the  character  and  institutions  of  Rome’s 
great  rival.  But  we  can  perceive  how  inferior  Carth- 
age was  to  her  competitor  in  military  resources,  and 
how  far  less  fitted  than  Rome  she  was  to  become  the 
founder  of  centralized  and  centralizing  dominion, 
that  should  endure  for  centuries,  and  fuse  into  im- 
perial unity  the  narrow  nationalities  of  the  ancient 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBUS. 


14D 


races,  that  dwelt  around  and  near  the  shores  of  the 
Mediterranean  Sea. 

149.  Carthage  was  originally  neither  the  most  an- 
cient nor  the  most  powerful  of  the  numerous  col- 
onies which  the  Phcenicians  planted  on  the  coast  of 
Northern  Africa.  But  her  advantageous  iDOsition, 
the  excellence  of  her  constitution  (of  which,  though 
ill  informed  as  to  its  details,  we  know  tlmt  it  com- 
manded the  admiration  of  Aristotle),  and  the  com- 
mercial and  political  energy  of  her  citizens,  gave  her 
the  ascendency  over  Hippo,  Utica,  Leptis,  and  her 
other  sister  Phcenician  cities  in  those  regions ; and 
she  finally  reduced  them  to  a condition  of  depend- 
ency, similar  to  that  which  the  subject  allies  of 
Athens  occupied  relatively  to  that  once  imperial  city. 
When  Tyre  and  Sidon,  and  the  other  cities  of  Phoe- 
nicia itself  sank  from  independent  republics  into 
mere  vassal  states  of  the  great  Asiatic  monarchies, 
and  obeyed  by  turns  a Babylonian,  a Persian,  and  a 
Macedonian  master,  their  power  and  their  traffic 
rapidly  declined,  and  Carthage  succeeded  to  the  im- 
portant maritime  and  commercial  character  which 
they  had  previously  maintained.  The  Carthaginians 
did  not  seek  to  compete  with  the  Greeks  on  the 
northeastern  shores  of  the  Mediterranean,  or  in  the 
three  inland  seas  which  are  connected  with  it ; but 
they  maintained  an  active  intercourse  with  the 
Phcenicians,  and  through  them  with  Lower  and  Cen- 
tral Asia ; and  they,  and  they  alone,  after  the  decline 
and  fall  of  Tyre,  navigated  the  waters  of  the  Atlantic. 
They  had  the  monopoly  of  all  the  commerce  of  the 


150 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBUS. 


world  that  was  carried  on  beyond  the  Straits  of 
Gibraltar.  We  have  yet  extant  (in  a Greek  transla- 
tion) the  narrative  of  the  voyage  of  Hanno,  one  of 
their  admirals,  along  the  western  coast  of  Africa  as 
far  as  Sierra  Leone ; and  in  the  Latin  poem  of  Festus 
Avienus,  frequent  references  are  made  to  the  records 
of  the  voyages  of  another  celebrated  Carthaginian 
admiral,  Himilco,  who  had  explored  the  northwestern 
coast  of  Europe.  Our  own  islands  are  mentioned  by 
Himilco  as  the  lands  of  the  Hiberni  and  the  Albioni. 
It  is  indeed  certain  that  the  Carthaginians  frequented 
the  Cornish  coast  (as  the  Phoenicians  had  done  before 
them)  for  the  purpose  of  procuring  tin ; and  there  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  they  sailed  as  far  as  the 
coasts  of  the  Baltic  for  amber.  When  it  is  remem- 
bered that  the  mariner’s  compass  was  unknown  in 
those  ages,  the  boldness  and  skill  of  the  seamen  of 
Carthage,  and  the  enterprise  of  her  merchants,  may 
be  paralleled  with  any  achievements  that  the  history 
of  modern  navigation  and  commerce  can  produce. 

150.  In  their  Atlantic  voyages  along  the  African 
shores,  the  Carthaginians  followed  the  double  object 
of  traffic  and  colonization.  The  numerous  settle- 
ments that  were  planted  by  them  along  the  coast 
from  Morocco  to  Senegal  provided  for  the  needy 
members  of  the  constantly  increasing  population  of  a 
great  commercial  capital,  and  also  strengthened  the 
influence  which  Carthage  exercised  among  the  tribes 
of  the  African  coast.  Besides  her  fleets  her  caravans 
gave  her  a large  and  lucrative  trade  with  the  native 
Africans ; nor  must  we  limit  our  belief  of  the  extent 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS. 


151 


ot  the  Carthaginian  trade  with  the  tribes  of  Central 
and  Western  Africa  by  the  narrowness  of  the  com- 
mercial intercourse  which  civilized  nations  of  modern 
times  have  been  able  to  create  in  those  regions. 

151.  Although  essentially  a mercantile  and  seafar- 
ing people,  the  Carthaginians  by  no  means  neglected 
agriculture.  On  the  contrary,  the  whole  of  their  ter- 
ritory was  cultivated  like  a garden.  The  fertility  of 
the  soil  repaid  the  skill  and  toil  bestowed  on  it ; and 
every  invader,  from  Agathocles  to  Scipio  ^milianus, 
was  struck  with  admiration  at  the  rich  pasture  lands 
carefully  irrigated,  the  abundant  harvests,  the  luxu- 
riant vineyards,  the  plantation  of  fig  and  olive  trees, 
the  thriving  villages,  the  populous  towns,  and  the 
splendid  villas  of  the  wealthy  Carthaginians,  through 
which  his  march  lay,  as  long  as  he  was  on  Cartha" 
ginian  ground. 

152.  Although  the  Carthaginians  abandoned  the 
jEgsean  and  the  Pontus  to  the  Greek,  they  were  by 
no  means  disposed  to  relinquish  to  those  rivals  the 
commerce  and  the  dominion  of  the  coasts  of  the  Med- 
iterranean westward  of  Italy.  For  centuries  the 
Carthaginians  strove  to  make  themselves  masters  of 
the  islands  that  lie  between  Italy  and  Spain.  They 
acquired  the  Balearic  Islands,  where  the  principal 
harbor.  Port  Mahon,  still  bears  the  name  of  a Cartha- 
ginian admiral.  They  succeeded  in  reducing  the 
great  part  of  Sardinia ; but  Sicily  could  never  be 
brought  into  their  power.  They  repeatedly  invaded 
that  island,  and  nearly  overran  it ; but  the  resistance 
which  was  opposed  to  them  by  the  Syracusans  under 


152 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBUS. 


Gelon,  Dionysius,  Timoleon,  and  Agathocles,  pre- 
served the  island  from  becoming  Punic,  though  many 
of  its  cities  remained  under  the  Carthaginian  rule 
until  Rome  finally  settled  the  question  to  whom 
Sicily  was  to  belong  by  conquering  it  for  herself. 

153.  With  so  many  elements  of  success,  with  al- 
most unbounded  wealth,  with  commercial  and  mari- 
time activity,  with  a fertile  territory,  with  a capital 
city  of  almost  impregnable  strength,  with  a constitu- 
tion that  insured  for  centuries  the  blessing  of  social 
order,  with  an  aristocracy  singularly  fertile  in  men 
of  the  highest  genius,  Carthage  yet  failed  signally 
and  calamitously  in  her  contest  for  power  with  Rome. 
One  of  the  immediate  causes  of  this  may  seem  to  have 
been  the  want  of  firmness  among  her  citizens,  which 
made  them  terminate  the  first  Punic  war  by  begging 
peace,  sooner  than  endure  any  longer  the  hardships 
and  burdens  caused  by  a state  of  warfare,  although 
their  antagonists  had  suffered  far  more  severely  than 
themselves.  Another  cause  was  the  spirit  of  faction 
among  their  leading  men,  which  prevented  Hannibal 
in  the  second  war  from  being  properly  re-enforced 
and  supported.  But  there  were  also  more  general 
causes  why  Carthage  proved  inferior  to  Rome.  These 
were  her  position  relatively  to  the  mass  of  the  in- 
habitants of  the  country  which  she  ruled,  and  her 
habit  of  trusting  to  mercenary  armies  in  her  wars. 
154.  Our  clearest  information  as  to  the  different  races 
of  men  in  and  about  Carthage  is  derived  from  Diod- 
orus Siculus.^'  That  historian  enumerates  four  dif- 
* Vol.  ii.,  p.  44T,  Wesseling’s  ed. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBUS. 


153 


ferent  races : first  he  mentions  the  Phoenicians  who 
dwelt  in  Carthage ; next,  he  speaks  of  the  Lihy- Phoe- 
nicians : these,  he  tells  us,  dwelt  in  many  of  the  mar- 
itime cities,  and  were  connected  by  intermarriages 
with  the  Phoenicians,  which  was  the  cause  of  their 
compound  name ; thirdly,  he  mentions  the  Libyans, 
the  bulk  and  the  most  ancient  part  of  the  population 
hating  the  Carthaginians  intensely  on  accoulit  of  the 
oppressiveness  of  their  domination  ; lastly,  he  names 
the  Numidi^ns,  the  nomade  tribes  of  the  frontier. 

155.  It  is  evident,  from  this  description,  that  the 
native  Libyans  were  a subject  class,  without  fran- 
chise or  political  rights ; and  accordingly,  we  find  no 
instance  specified  in  history  of  a Libyan  holding  po- 
litical office  or  military  command.  The  half-castes, 
the  Liby-Phoenicians  seems  to  have  been  sometimes 
sent  out  as  colonists  ;*  but  it  may  be  inferred,  from 
what  Diodorus  says  of  their  residence,  that  they  had 
not  the  right  of  the  citizenship  of  Carthage  ; and  only 
a single  solitary  case  occurs  of  one  of  this  race  being 
intrusted  with  authority,  and  that,  too,  not 
emanating  from  the  home  government.  This  is  the  in- 
stance of  the  officer  sent  by  Hannibal  to  Sicily  after 
the  fall  of  Syracuse,  whom  Polybius|  calls  Myttinus 
the  Libyan,  but  whom,  from  the  fuller  account  in 
Livy  we  find  to  have  been  a Liby-Phoenician  and  it 
expressly  mentioned  what  indignation  was  felt  by  the 

* See  the  “Periplus’*  of  Hanno. 

t Lib.  ix.,  22. 

$ Lib.  XXV.,  40. 


154 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS. 


Carthaginian  commanders  in  the  island  that  this 
half-caste  should  control  their  operations. 

156.  With  respect  to  the  composition  of  their  armies, 
it  is  observable  that,  though  thirsting  for  extended 
empire,  and  though  some  of  her  leading  men  became 
generals  of  the  highest  order,  the  Carthaginians,  as  a 
people,  vrere  any  thing  hut  personally  warlike.  As 
long  as  they  could  hire  mercenaries  to  fight  for  them, 
they  had  little  appetite  for  the  irksome  training  and 
the  loss  of  valuable  time  which  military  service 
would  have  entailed  on  themselves. 

157.  As  Michelet  remarks,  ‘‘The  life  <^f  an  indus- 
trious merchant,  of  a Carthaginian,  was  too  precious 
to  be  risked,  as  long  as  it  was  possible  to  substitute 
advantageously  for  it  that  of  a barbarian  from 
Spain  or  Gaul.  Carthage  knew,  and  could  tell  to  a 
drachma,  what  the  life  of  a man  of  each  nation  came  to. 
A Greek  was  worth  more  than  a Campanian,  a 
Campanian  worth  more  than  a Gaul  or  a Spaniard. 
When  once  this  tariff  of  blood  was  correctly  made 
out,  Carthage  began  a war  as  a mercantile  specula- 
tion. She  tried  to  make  conquests  in  the  hope  of 
getting  new  mines  to  work,  or  to  open  fresh  markets 
for  her  exports.  In  one  venture  she  could  afford  to 
spend  fifty  thousand  mercenaries,  in  another  rather 
more.  If  the  returns  were  good,  there  were  no  re- 
gret felt  for  the  capital  that  had  been  sunk  in  the  in- 
vestment; more  money  got  more  men,  and  all  went 
on  well.”* 

158.  Armies  composed  of  foreign  mercenaries  have 

* “ Histoire  Romaine,”  vol.ih,  p.  40, 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBUS, 


155 


in  all  ages  been  as  formidable  to  their  employers  as 
to  the  enemy  against  whom  they  were  directed.  We 
know  of  one  occasion  (between  the  first  and  second 
Punic  wars)  when  Carthage  was  brought  to  the  very 
brink  of  destruction  by  a revolt  of  her  foreign  troops. 
Other  mutinies  of  the  same  kind  must  from  time  to 
time  have  occurred.  Probably  one  of  these  was  the  cause 
of  the  comparative  weakness  of  Carthage  at  the  time 
of  the  Athenian  expedition  against  Syracuse,  so  dif- 
ferent from  the  energy  with  which  she  attacked  Ge- 
lon  half  a century  earlier,  and  Dionysius  half  a cen- 
tury later.  And  even  when  we  consider  her  armies 
with  reference  only  to  their  efficiency  in  warfare,  we 
perceive  at  once  the  inferiority  of  such  bands  of  con- 
dottieri,  brought  together  without  any  common 
bond  of  origin,  tactics,  or  cause,  to  the  legions  of 
Rome,  which  at  the  time  of  the  Punic  wars,  were 
raised  from  the  very  flower  of  a hardy  agricultural 
population,  trained  in  the  strictest  discipline,  habitu- 
ated to  victory,  and  animated  by  the  most  resolute 
patriotism.  And  this’shows,  also,  the  transcendency 
of  the  genius  of  Hannibal,  which  could  form  such 
discordant  materials  into  a compact  organized  force, 
and  inspire  them  with  the  spirit  of  patient  discipline 
and  loyalty  to  their  chief,  so  that  they  were  true  to 
him  in  his  adverse  as  well  as  in  his  prosperous  for- 
tunes ; and  throughout  the  checkered  series  of  his 
campaigns,  no  panic  rout  ever  disgraced  a division 
under  his  command,  no  mutiny,  or  even  attempt  at 
mutiny,  was  ever  known  in  his  camp;  and  finally, 
after  fifteen  years  of  Italian  warfare,  his  men  fol- 


156 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBU8. 


lowed  their  old  leader  to  Zama,  “with  no  fear  and 
little  hope,”  * and  there,  on  that  disastrous  field, 
stood  firm  around  him,  his  Old  Guard,  till  Scipio’s 
Numidian  allies  came  up  on  their  flank,  when  at 
last,  surrounded  and  overpowered,  the  veteran  bat- 
talions sealed  their  devotion  to  their  general  hy 
their  blood ! 

159.  “But  if  Hannibal’s  genius  may  be  likened  to  the 
Homeric  god,  who,'in  his  hatred  to  the  Trojans,  rises 
from  the  deep  to  rally  the  fainting  Greeks  and  to 
lead  them  against  the  enemy,  so  the  calm  courage  with 
which  Hector  met  his  more  than  human  adversary 
in  his  country’s  cause  is  no  unworthy  image  of  the 
unyielding  magnanimity  displayed  by  the  aristocracy 
of  Rome.  As  Hannibal  utterly  eclipses  Carthage,  so 
on  the  contrary,  Fabius,  Marcell  us,  Claudius  Nero, 
even  Scipio  himself,  are  as  nothing  when  compared 
to  the  spirit,  and  wisdom,  and  power  of  Rome.  The 
senate,  which  voted  its  thanks  to  its  political  enemy, 
Varro,  after  his  disastrous  defeat,  ‘ because  he  had 
not  despaired  of  the  commonwealth,’  and  which  dis- 
dained either  to  solicit,  or  to  reprove,  or  to  threaten^ 
or  in  any  way  to  notice  the  twelve  colonies  which 
had  refused  their  accustomed  supplies  of  men  for  the 
army,  is  far  more  to  be  honored  than  the  conqueror 
of  Zama.  This  we  should  the  more  carefully 
bear  in  mind,  because  our  tendency  is  to  ad- 
mire individual  greatness  far  more  than  national ; 

* “ We  advanced  to  Waterloo  as  the  Greeks  did  to 
Thermopylae:  allot  us  without  fear,  and  mostof  us  with- 
out hope.”— Speech  of  General  Foy, 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBUS, 


157 


and,  as  no  single  Koman  will  bear  comparison  to 
Hannibal,  we  are  apt  to  murmur  at  the  event  of  the 
contest,  and  to  think  that  the  victory  was  awarded 
to  the  least  worthy  of  the  combatants.  On  the  con- 
trary, never  was  the  wisdom  of  God’s  providence 
more  manifest  than  in  the  issue  of  the  struggle  be  - 
tween  Rome  and  Carthage.  It  was  clearly  for  the 
good  of  mankind  that  Hannibal  should  be  conquered ; 
his  triumph  would  have  stopped  the  progress  of  the 
world;  for  great  men  can  only  act  permanently 
by  forming  great  nations ; and  no  one  man,  even 
though  it  were  Hannibal  himself,  can  in  one  genera- 
tion effect  such  a work.  But  where  the  nation  has 
been  merely  enkindled  for  a while  by  a great  man’s 
spirit,  the  light  passes  away  with  him  who  commu- 
nicated it;  and  the  nation,  when  he  is  gone,  is  like  a 
dead  body,  to  which  magic  power  had  for  a moment 
given  unnatural  life : when  the  charm  has  ceased 
the  body  is  cold  and  stiff  as  before.  He  who  grieves 
over  the  battle  of  Zama  should  carry  on  his  thoughts 
to  a period  thirty  years  later,  when  Hannibal  must, 
in  the  course  of  nature,  have  been  dead,  and  consider 
how  the  isolated  Phoenician  city  of  Carthage  was 
fitted  to  receive  and  to  consolidate  the  civilization  of 
Greece,  or  by  its  laws  and  institutions  to  bind  to- 
gether barbarians  of  every  race  and  language  into  an 
organized  empire,  and  prepare  them  for  becoming, 
when  that  empire  was  dissolved,  the  free  members  of 
the  commonwealth  of  Christian  Europe.”* 

^ Arnold,  vol.  iii.,  p.  61.  The  above  is  one  of  the  numer- 
ous bursts  of  eloquence  that  adorn  Arnold’s  last  volume 


158 


BATTLE  OF  THE  3IETAUBUS, 


160.  It  was  in  the  spring  of  207  B.  C.  that  Has- 
drubal,  after  skillfully  disentangling  himself  from 
the  Koman  forces  in  Spain,  and  after  a march  con- 
ducted with  great  judgment  and  little  loss  through 
the  interior  of  Gaul  and  the  passes  of  the  Alps,  ap- 
peared in  the  country  that  now  is  the  north  of  Lom- 
bardy at  the  h^ad  of  troops  which  he  had  partly 
brought  out  of  Spain  and  partly  levied  among  the 
Gauls  and  Ligurians  on  his  way.  At  this  time  Han- 
nibal, with  his  unconquered  and  seemingly  uncon- 
querable army,  had  been  eight  years  in  Italy,  executing 
with  strenuous  ferocity  the  vow  of  hatred  to  Rome 
which  had  been  sworn  by  him  while  yet  a child  at 
the  bidding  of  his  father  Hamilcar;  who,  as  he 
boasted,  had  trained  up  his  three  sons,  Hannibal, 
Hasdrubal,  and  Mago,  like  three  lion’s  whelps,  to 
prey  upon  the  Romans.  But  Hannibal’s  latter  cam- 
paigns had  not  been  signalized  by  any  such  great 
victories  as  marked  the  first  years  of  his  invasion  of 
Italy.  The  stern  spirit  of  Roman  resolution,  ever 
highest  in  disaster  and  danger,  had  neither  bent  nor 
despaired  beneath  the  merciless  blows  which  “ the 
dire  African  ” dealt  her  in  rapid  succession  at  Trebia, 
at  Thrasymene,  and  at  Cannae.  Her  population  was 
thinned  by  repeated  slaughter  in  the  field ; poverty 
and  actual  scarcity  ground  down  the  survivors,  through 
the  fearful  ravages  which  Hannibal’s  cavalry  spread 
through  their  corn-fields,  their  pasture  lands,  and 
their  vineyards ; many  of  her  allies  went  over  to  the 

and  cause  such  deep  regret  that  that  volume  should  have 
been  the  last,  and  its  grreat  and  good  author  have  been  cut 
off  with  his  work  thus  incomplete. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBUS, 


159 


invader’s  side  ; and  new  clouds  of  foreign  war  threat- 
ened her  from  Macedonia  and  Gaul.  But  Eome 
receded  not.  Eich  and  poor  among  her  citizens  vied 
with  each  other  in  devotion  to  their  country.  The 
wealthy  placed  their  stores,  and  all  placed  their  lives, 
at  the  state’s  disposal.  And  though  Hannibal  could 
not  be  driven  out  of  Italy,  though  every  year  brought 
its  sufferings  and  sacrifices,  Eome  felt  that/  her  con- 
stancy had  not  been  exerted  in  vain.  If  she  was 
weakened  by  the  continued  strife,  so  was  Hannibal 
also ; and  it  was  clear  that  the  unaided  resources  of 
his  army  were  unequal  to  the  task  of  her  destruction. 
The  single  deer-hound  could  not  pull  down  the 
quarry  which  he  had  so  furiously  assailed.  Eome 
not  only  stood  fiercely  at  bay,  but  had  pressed  back 
and  gored  her  antagonist,  that  still,  however,  watched 
her  in  act  to  spring.  She  was  weary,  and  bleeding 
at  every  pore ; and  there  seemed  to  be  little  hope  of 
her  escape,  if  the  other  hound  of  old  Hamilcar’s  race 
should  come  up  in  time  to  aid  his  brother  in  the 
death-grapple. 

161.  Hasdrubal  had  commanded  the  'Carthaginian 
armies  in  Spain  for  some  time  with  varying  but  gen- 
erally unfavorable  fortune.  He  had  not  the  full 
authority  over  the  Punic  forces  in  that  country 
which  his  brother  and  his  father  had  previously  ex- 
ercised. The  faction  at  Carthage,  which  was  at  feud 
with  his  family,  succeeded  in  fettering  and  interfer- 
ing with  his  power ; and  other  generals  were  from 
time  to  time  sent  into  Spain,  whose  errors  and  mis- 
conduct caused  the  reverses  that  Hasdrubal  met  with. 


160 


BATTLE  OE  THE  METAUBU8, 


This  is  expressly  attested  by  the  Greek  historian 
Polybius,  who  was  the  intimate  friend  of  the  younger 
Africanus,  and  drew  his  information  respecting  the 
second  Punic  war  from  the  best  possible  authorities. 
Livy  gives  a long  narrative  of  campaigns  between  the 
Roman  commanders  in  Spain  and  Hasdrubal,  which 
is  so  palpably  deformed  by  fictions  and  exaggerations 
as  to  be  hardly  deserving  of  attention.* 

162.  It  is  clear  that,  in  the  year  208  B.  C.,  at  least 
Hasdrubal  out-maneuvered  Publius  Scipio,  who  held 
the  command  of  the  Roman  forces  in  Spain,  and 
whose  object  was  to  prevent  him  from  passing  the 
Pyrenees  and  marching  upon  Italy.  Scipio  expected 
that  Hasdrubal  would  attempt  the  nearest  route 
along  the  coast  of  the  Mediterranean,  and  he  there- 
fore carefully  fortified  and  guarded  the  passes  of  the 
eastern  Pyrenees.  But  Hasdrubal  passed  these  moun- 
tains near  their  western  extremity ; and  then,  with 
a considerable  force  of  Spanish  infantry,  with  a small 
number  of  African  troops,  with  some  elephants  and 
much  treasure,  he  marched,  not  directly  toward  the 
coast  of  the  Mediterranean,  but  in  a northeastern 
line  toward  the  centre  of  Gaul.  He  halted  for  the 
winter  in  the  territory  of  the  Arverni,  the  modern 
Auvergne,  and  conciliated  or  purchased  the  good 
will  of  the  Gauls  in  that  region  so  far  that  he  not 
only  found  friendly  winter  quaters  among  them,  but 
great  numbers  of  them  enlisted  under  him ; and  on 

* See  the  excellent  criticisms  of  Sir  Walter  Raleigh  on 
this,  in  his  “History  of  the  World,”  book  v.,  chap,  iii., 
sec.  11. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUEUS, 


161 


the  approach  of  spring,  marched  with  him  to  invade 
Italy. 

163.  By  thus  entering  Gaul  at  the  southwest,  and 
avoiding  its  southern  maritime  districts,  Hasdruhal 
kept  the  Romans  in  complete  ignorance  of  his  pre- 
cise operations  and  movements  in  that  country  ; all 
that  they  knew  was  that  Hasdruhal  had  baffled 
Scipio’s  attempts  to  detain  him  in  Spain';  that  he 
had  crossed  the  Pyrenees  with  soldiers,  elephants, 
and  money,  and  that  he  was  raising  fresh  forces 
among  the  Gauls.  The  spring  was  sure  to  bring  him 
into  Italy,  and  then  would  come  the  real  tempest  of 
the  war,  when  from  the  north  and  from  the  south  the 
two  Carthaginian  armies,  each  under  a son  ot  the 
Thunderbolt,*  were  to  gather  together  round  the 
seven  hills  of  Rome. 

164.  In  this  emergency  the  Romans  looked  among 
themselves  earnestly  and  anxiously  for  leaders  fit  to 
meet  the  perils  of  the  coming  campaign. 

165.  The  senate  recommended  the  people  to  elect, 
as  one  of  their  consuls,  Caius  Claudius  Nero,  a patri- 
cian of  one  of  the  families  of  the  great  Claudian  house. 
Nero  had  served  during  the  preceding  years  of  the 
war  both  against  Hannibal  in  Italy  and  against  Has- 
drubal  in  Spain ; but  it  is  remarkable  that  the  his- 
tories which  we  possess  record  no  successes  as  having 
been  achieved  by  him  either  before  or  after  his  great 
campaign  of  the  Metaurus.  It  proves  much  for  the 
sagacity  of  the  leading  men  of  the  senate  that  they 

* Hamilcar  was  surnamed  Barca,  which  means  the 
Thunderbolt.  Sultan  Bajazet  had  the  similar  surname 
of  Yilderim. 


162 


BATTLE  OF  THE  MET AU BUS, 


recognized  in  Nero  the  energy  and  spirit  which  were 
required  at  this  crisis,  and  it  is  equally  creditable  to 
the  patriotism  of  the  people  that  they  followed  the 
advice  of  the  senate  by  electing  a general  who  had  no 
showy  exploits  to  recommend  him  to  their  choice. 

166.  It  was  a matter  of  great  difficulty  to  find  a 
second  consul;  the  laws  required  that  one  consul 
should  be  a plebeian ; and  the  plebeian  nobility  had 
been  fearfully  thinned  by  the  events  of  the  war. 
While  the  senators  anxiously  deliberated  among 
themselves  what  fit  colleague  for  Nero  could  be 
nominated  at  the  coming  comitia,  and  sorrowfully 
recalled  the  names  of  Marcellus,  Gracchus,  and  other 
plebeian  generals  who  were  no  more,  one  taciturn 
and  moody  old  man  sat  in  sullen  apathy  among  the 
conscript  fathers.  This  was  Marcus  Livius,  who  had 
been  consul  in  the  year  before  the  beginning  of  this 
war,  and  had  then  gained  a victory  over  the  Illy- 
rians. After  his  consulship  he  had  been  impeached 
before  the  people  on  a charge  of  peculation  and  un- 
fair division  of  the  spoils  among  his  soldiers;  the 
verdict  was  unjustly  given  against  him,  and  the 
sense  of  this  wrong,  and  of  the  indignity  thus  put 
upon  him,  had  rankled  unceasingly  in  the  bosom  of 
Livius,  so  that  for  eight  years  after  his  trial  he  had 
lived  in  seclusion  in  his  country  seat,  taking  no  part 
in  any  affairs  of  state.  Latterly  the  censors  had 
compelled  him  to  come  to  Rome  and  resume  his 
place  in  the  senate,  where  he  used  to  sit  gloomily 
apart,  giving  only  a silent  vote.  At  last  an  unjust 
accusation  against  one  of  his  near  kinsmen  made 


BATTLE  OF  THE  META UB US. 


163 


him  break  silence,  and  he  harrangued  the  house  in 
words  of  weight  aud  sense,  which  drew  attention  to 
him,  and  taught  the  senators  that  a strong  spirit 
dwelt  beneath  that  unimposing  exterior.  Now, 
while  they  were  debating  on  what  noble  of  a plebeian 
house  was  fit  to  assume  the  perilous  honors  of  the 
consulate,  some  of  the  elder  of  them  looked  on  Mar- 
cus Livius,  and  remembered  that  in  the  very  last 
triumph  which  had  been  celebrated  in  the  streets  of 
Rome,  this  grim  old  man  had  sat  in  the  car  of  vic- 
tory, and  that  he  had  offered  the  last  thanksgiving 
sacrifice  for  the  success  of  the  Roman  arms  which 
had  bled  before  Capitoline  Jove.  There  had  been 
no  triumphs  since  Hannibal  came  into  Italy.  The 
Illyrian  campaign  of  Livius  was  the  last  that  had 
been  so  honored;  perhaps  it  might  be  destined 
for  him  now  to  renew  the  long-interrupted  series. 
The  senators  resolved  that  Livius  should  be  put 
in  nomination  as  consul  with  Nero;  the  people 
were  willing  to  elect  him  ; the  only  opposition  came 
from  himself.  He  taunted  them  with  their  incon- 
sistency in  honoring  the  man  whom  they  had  con- 
victed of  a base  crime.  ‘Tf  I am  innocent,”  said  he, 
“why  did  you  place  such  a stain  on  me  ? If  I am 
guilty,  why  am  I more  fit  for  a second  consulship 
than  I was  for  my  first  one  ?”  The  other  senators 
remonstrated  with  him,  urging  the  example  of  the 
great  Camillus,  who,  after  an  unjust  condemnation  on 
a similar  charge,  both  served  and  saved  his  country. 
At  last  Livius  ceased  to  object ; and  Cains  Claudius 


6 


164 


BATILE  OF  THE  METAUBUS, 


Nero  and  Marcus  Livius  were  chosen  consuls  of 
Kome. 

167.  A quarrel  had  long  existed  between  the  two 
consuls,  and  the  senators  strove  to  effect  a reconcilia- 
tion between  them  before  the  campaign.  Here  again 
Livius  for  a long  time  obstinately  resisted  the  wish 
of  his  fellow-senators.  He  said  it  was  best  for  the 
state  that  he  and  Nero  should  continue  to  hate  one 
another.  Each  would  do  his  duty  better  when  he 
knew  that  he  was  watched  by  an  enemy  in  the  per- 
son of  his  own  colleague.  At  last  the  entreaties  of 
the  senate  prevailed,  and  Livius  consented  to  forego 
the  feud,  and  to  co-operate  with  Nero  in  preparing 
for  the  coming  struggle. 

168.  As  soon  as  the  winter  snows  were  thawed, 
Hasdrubal  commenced  his  march  from  Auvergne  to 
the  Alps.  He  experienced  none  of  the  difficulties 
which  his  brother  had  met  with  from  the  mountain 
tribes.  Hannibal’s  army  had  been  the  first  body  of 
regular  troops  that  had  ever  traversed  their  regions ; 
and,  as  wild  animals  assail  a traveler,  the  natives 
rose  against  it  instinctively,  in  imagined  defense  of 
their  own  habitations,  which  they  supposed  to  be 
the  objects  of  Carthaginian  ambition.  But  the  fame 
of  the  war,  with  which  Italy  had  now  been  convulsed 
for  twelve  years,  had  penetrated  into  the  Alpine  pas- 
ses, and  the  mountaineers  now  understood  that  a 
mighty  city  southward  of  the  Alps  was  to  be  at- 
tacked by  the  troops  whom  they  saw  marching 
among  them.  They  now  not  only  opposed  no  resis- 
tance to  the  passage  of  Hasdrubal,  but  many  of  them, 


BATTLE  OF  THE  META  UE US. 


165 


out  of  the  love  of  enterprise  and  plunder,  or  allured 
by  the  high  pay  that  he  offered,  took  service  with 
him ; and  thus  he  advanced  upon  Italy  with  an  army 
that  gathered  strength  at  every  league.  It  is  said, 
also,  that  some  of  the  most  important  engineering 
works  which  Hannibal  had  constructed  were  found 
by  Hasdrubal  still  in  existence,  and  materially  fav- 
ored the  speed  of  his  advance.  He  thus  emerged  in- 
to Italy  from  the  Alpine  valleys  much  sooner  than 
had  been  anticipated.  Many  warriors  of  the  Ligu- 
rian tribes  joined  him ; and,  crossing  the  River  Po, 
he  marched  down  its  southern  bank  to  the  city  of 
Placentia,  which  he  wished  to  secure  as  a base  for 
his  future  operations.  Placentia  resisted  him  as 
bravely  as  it  had  resisted  Hannibal  twelve  years 
before,  and  for  some  time  Hasdrubal  was  occupied 
with  a fruitless  siege  before  its  walls. 

169.  Six  armies  were  levied  for  the  defense  of  Italy 
when  the  long  dreaded  approach  of  Hasdrubal  was 
announced.  Seventy  thousand  Romans  served  in 
the  fifteen  legions,  of  which,  with  an  equal  number 
of  Italian  allies,  those  armies  and  the  garrisons  were 
composed.  Upward  of  thirty  thousand  more  Romans 
were  serving  in  Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  Spain.  The 
whole  number  of  Roman  citizens  of  an  age  fit  for 
military  duty  scarcely  exceeded  a hundred  and  thirty 
thousand.  The  census  taken  before  the  commence- 
ment of  the  war  had  shown  a total  of  two  hundred  and 
seventy  thousand,  which  had  been  diminished  by 
more  than  half  during  twelve  years.  These  numbers 
are  fearfully  emphatic  of  the  extremity  to  which 


166 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS, 


Rome  was  reduced,  and  of  her  gigantic  efforts  in  that 
great  agony  of  her  fate.  Not  merely  men,  hut  money 
and  military  stores,  were  drained  to  the  utmost ; and 
if  the  armies  of  that  year  should  he  swept  off  by  a 
repetition  of  the  slaughters  of  Thrasymene  and  Can- 
nae, all  felt  that  Rome  would  cease  to  exist.  Even  if 
the  campaign  were  to  be  marked  by  no  decisive  suc- 
cess on  either  side,  her  ruin  seemed  certain.  In 
South  Italy,  Hannibal  had  either  detached  Rome’s 
allies  from  her,  or  had  impoverished  them  by  the  rav- 
ages of  his  army.  If  Hasdrubal  could  have  done  the 
same  in  Upper  Italy;  if  Etruria,  Umbria,  and 
Northern  Latium  had  either  revolted  or  been 
laid  waste,  Rome  must  have  sunk  beneath  sheer 
starvation,  for  the  hostile  or  desolated  territory 
would  have  yielded  no  supplies  of  corn  for  her  popu. 
lation,  and  money  to  purchase  it  from  abroad  there 
was  none.  Instant  victory  was  a matter  of  life  or 
death.  Three  of  her  six  armies  were  ordered  to  the 
north,  but  the  first  of  these  was  required  to  overawe 
the  disaffected  Etruscans.  The  second  army  of  the 
north  was  pushed  forward,  under  Porcius,  the  praetor, 
to  meet  and  keep  in  check  the  advanced  troops  of 
Hasdrubal ; while  the  third,  the  grand  army  of  the 
north,  which  was  to  be  under  the  immediate  com- 
mand of  the  cansul  Livius,  who  had  the  chief  com- 
mand in  all  North  Italy,  advanced  more  slowly  in  its 
support.  There  were  similarly  three  armies  in  the 
south,  under  the  orders  of  the  other  consul,  Claudius 
Nero. 

170.  The  lot  had  decided  that  Livius  was  to  be 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBIJS, 


167 


opposed  to  Hasdrubal,  and  that  Nero  should  face 
Hannibal.  And  “ when  all  was  ordered  as  themselves 
thought  best,  the  two  consuls  went  forth  of  the  city, 
each  his  several  way.  The  people  of  Rome  were  now 
quite  otherwise  affected  than  they  had  been  when  L. 
jEmilius  Paulus  and  C.  Terentius  Varro  were  sent 
against  Hannibal.  They  did  no  longer  tgke  upon 
them  to  direct  their  generals,  or  bid  them  dispatch 
and  win  the  victory  betimes,  but  rather  they  stood 
in  fear  lest  all  diligence,  wisdom,  and  valor  should 
prove  too  little ; for  since  few  years  had  passed 
wherein  some  one  of  their  generals  had  not  been 
slain,  and  since  it  was  manifest  that,  if  either  of  these 
present  consuls  were  defeated,  or  put  to  the  worst, 
the  two  Carthaginians  would  forthwith  join,  and 
make  short  work  with  the  other,  it  seemed  a greater 
happiness  than  could  be  expected  that  each  of  them 
should  return  home  victor,  and  come  off  with  honor 
from  such  mighty  opposition  as  he  was  like  to  find. 
With  extreme  difficulty  had  Rome  held  up  her  hand 
ever  since  the  battle  of  Cannae  : though  it  were  so, 
that  Hannibal  alone,  with  little  help  from  Carthage, 
had  continued  the  war  in  Italy.  But  there  was  now 
arrived  another  son  of  Hamilcar,  and  one  that,  in  his 
present  expedition,  had  seemed  a man  of  more  suffi- 
ciency than  Hannibal  himself for  whereas,  in  that 
long  and  dangerous  march  through  barbarous  nations, 
over  great  rivers,  and  mountains  that  were  thought 
unpassable,  Hannibal  had  lost  a great  part  of  his  army, 
this  Hasdrubal,  in  the  same  places,  had  multiplied  his 
numbers,  and  gathering  the  people  that  he  found  in 


168 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS. 


the  way,  descended  from  the  Alps  like  a rolling 
snow-ball,  far  greater  than  he  came  over  the  Pyre- 
nees at  his  first  setting  out  of  Spain.  These  considera- 
tions and  the  like,  of  which  fear  presented  many 
unto  them,  caused  the  people  of  Rome  to  wait  upon 
their  consuls  out  of  the  town,  like  a pensive  train  of 
mourners,  thinking  upon  Marcellus  and  Crispinus, 
upon  whom,  in  the  like  sort,  they  had  given  attend- 
ance the  last  year,  but  saw  neither  of  them  return 
alive  from  a less  dangerous  war.  Particularly  old  Q. 
Fabius  gave  his  accustomed  advice  to  M.  Livius,  that 
he  should  abstain  from  giving  or  taking  battle  until 
he  well  understood  the  enemies  condition.  But  the 
consul  made  him  a froward  answer,  and  said  that  he 
would  fight  the  very  first  day,  for  that  he  thought  it 
long  till  he  should  either  recover  his  honor  by  vic- 
tory, or,  by  seeing  the  overthrow  of  his  own  unjust 
citizens,  satisfy  himself  with  the  joy  of  a great  though 
not  an  honest  revenge.  But  his  meaning  was  better 
than  his  words.”* 

171.  Hannibal  at  this  period  occupied  with  his 
veteran  but  much-reduced  forces,  the  extreme  south 
of  Italy.  It  had  not  been  expected  either  by  friend 
or  foe  that  Hasdrubal  would  effect  his  passage  of  the 
Alps  so  early  in  the  year  as  actually  occurred.  And 
even  when  Hannibal  learned  that  his  brother  was  in 
Italy,  and  had  advanced  as  far  as  Placentia,  he  was 
obliged  to  pause  for  further-  intelligence  before  he 
himself  commenced  active  operations,  as  he  could  not 
tell  whether  his  brother  might  not  be  invited  into 

* Sir  Walter  Raleigh. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBU8. 


169 


Etruria,  to  aid  the  party  there  that  was  disaffected 
to  Rome,  or  whether  he  would  march  down  by  the 
Adriatic  Sea.  Hannibal  led  his  troops  out  of  their 
winter  quarters  in  Bruttium,  and  marched  north- 
ward as  f^r  as  Canusium.  Nero  had  his  headquar- 
ters near  Venusia,  with  an  army  which  he  had  im 
creased  to  forty  thousand  foot  and  two  thousand  five 
hundred  horse,  by  incorporating  under  his  own  com- 
mand some  of  the  legions  which  had  been  intended 
to  act  under  other  generals  in  the  south.  There  was 
another  Roman  army,  twenty  thousand  strong,  south 
of  Hannibal,  at  Tarentum.  The  strength  of  that  city 
secured  this  Roman  force  from  any  attack  by  Hanni- 
bal, and  it  was  a serious  matter  to  march  northward 
and  leave  it  in  his  rear,  free  to  act  against  all  his 
depots  and  allies  in  the  friendly  part  of  Italy,  which 
for  the  two  or  three  last  campaigns  had  served  him 
for  a base  of  his  operations.  Moreover,  Nero’s  army 
was  so  strong  that  Hannibal  could  not  concentrate 
troops  enough  to  assume  the  offensive  against  it  with- 
out weakening  his  garrisons,  and  relinquishing,  at 
least  for  a time,  his  grasp  upon  the  southern  prov- 
inces. To  do  this  before  he  was  certainly  informed 
of  his  brother’s  operations  would  have  been  a useless 
sacrifice,  as  Nero  could  retreat  before  him  upon  the 
other  Roman  armies  near  the  capital,  and  Hannibal 
knew  by  experience  that  a mere  advance  of  his  army 
upon  the  walls  of  Rome  would  have  no  effect  on  the 
fortunes  of  the  war.  In  the  hope,  probably,  of  induc- 
ing Nero  to  follow  him  and  of  gaining  an  opportunity 
of  out-maneuvering  the  Roman  consul  and  attacking 


170 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS. 


him  on  his  march,  Hannibal  moved  into  Lncania,  and 
then  back  into  Apulia  ; he  again  marched  down  into 
Bruttium,  and  strengthened  his  army  by  a levy  of 
recruits  in  that  district.  Nero  followed  him,  but 
gave  him  no  chance  of  assailing  him  at  a disadvan- 
tage. Some  partial  encounters  seem  to  have  taken 
place ; but  the  consul  could  not  prevent  Hannibaks 
junction  with  his  Bruttian  levies,  nor  could  Hannibal 
gain  an  opportunity  of  surprising  and  crushing  the 
consul.*  Hannibal  returned  to  his  former  head- 
quarters at  Canusium,  and  halted  there  in  expecta- 
tion of  further  tidings  of  his  brother’s  movements. 
Nero  also  resumed  his  former  position  in  observation 
of  the  Carthaginian  army. 

172.  Meanwhile,  Hasdrubal  had  raised  the  siege  of 
Placentia,  and  was  advancing  toward  Ariminum  on 

* The  annalists  whom  Livy  copied  spoke  of  Nero’s  gain- 
ing- repeated  victories  over  Hannibal,  and  killing  and 
taking  his  men  by  tens  of  thousands.  The  falsehood  of 
all  this  is  self-evident.  If  Nero  could  thus  always  beat 
Hannibal,  the  Romans  would  not  have  been  in  such  an 
agony  of  dread  about  Hasdrubal  as  all  writers  describe. 
Indeed,  we  have  the  express  testimony  of  Polybius  that 
the  statements  which  we  read  in  Li vy  of  Marcellus,  Nero, 
and  others  gaining  victories  over  Hannibal  in  Italy,  must 
be  all  fabrications  of  Roman  vanity.  Polybius  states 
lib.  XV.,  sec.  16,  that  Hannibal  was  never  defeated  before 
the  battle  of  Zama;  and  in  another  passage,  book  ix., 
chap.  3,  he  mentions  that  after  the  defeats  which  Hanni- 
bal inflicted  on  the  Romans  in  the  early  years  of  the  war, 
they  no  longer  dared  face  his  army  in  a pitched  battle  on 
a fair  field,  and  yet  they  resolutely  maintained  the  war. 
He  rightly  explains  this  by  referring  to  the  superiority 
of  Hannibal’s  cavalry,  the  arm  which  gained  him  all  his 
victories.  By  keeping  within  fortified  lines,  or  close  to 
the  sides  of  the  mountains  when  Hannibal  approached 
them,  the  Romans  rendered  his  cavalry  ineffective;  and 
a glance  at  the  geography  of  Italy  will  show  how  an  army 
can  traverse  the  greaterpart  of  that  country  without  ven- 
turing far  from  the  high  grounds. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBUS. 


171 


the  Adriatic,  and  driving  before  him  the  Roman 
army  under  Porcius.  Nor  when  the  consul  Livius 
had  come  up,  and  united  the  second  and  third  armies 
of  the  north,  could  he  make  head  against  the  invad- 
ers. The  Romans  still  fell  back  before  Hasdrubal, 
beyond  Ariminum,  beyond  the  Metaurus,  and  as  far 
as  the  little  town  of  Sena,  to  the  southeast  of  that 
river.  Hasdrubal  was  not  unmindful  of  the  neces- 
sity of  acting  in  concert  with  his  brother.  He  sent 
messengers  to  Hannibal  to  announce  his  own  line  oi 
march,  and  to  propose  that  they  should  unite  their 
armies  in  South  Umbria,  and  then  wheel  round 
against  Rome.  Those  messengers  traverse  the  greater 
part  OI  Italy  in  safety,  but,  when  close  to  the  object 
of  their  mission,  were  captured  by  a Roman  detach- 
ment; and  Hasdrubaks  letter,  detailing  his  whole 
plan  of  the  campaign,  was  laid,  not  in  his  brother’s 
hands,  but  in  those  of  the  commander  of  the  Roman 
armies  of  the  south.  Nero  saw  at  once  the  full  im- 
portance of  the  crisis.  The  two  sons  of  Hamilcar 
were  now  within  two  hundred  miles  of  each  other, 
and  if  Rome  were  to  be  saved,  the  brothers  must 
never  meet  alive.  Nero  instantly  ordered  seven 
thousand  picked  men,  a thousand  being  cavalry,  to 
hold  themselves  in  readiness  for  a secret  expedition 
againt  one  of  Hannibal’s  garrisons,  and  as  soon  as 
night  had  set  in,  he  hurried  forward  on  his  bold  en- 
terprise ; but  he  quickly  left  the  southern  road 
toward  Lucania,  and,  wheeling  round,  pressed  north- 
ward with  the  utmost  rapidity  toward  Picenum. 
He  had,  during  the  preceding  afternoon,  sent  iressen- 


172 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS. 


gers  to  Eome,  who  were  to  lay  Hasdruhal’s  letters 
before  the  senate.  There  was  a law  forbidding  a 
consul  to  make  war  or  march  his  army  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  province  assigned  to  him  ; but  in  such 
an  emergency,  Nero  did  not  wait  for  the  permission 
of  the  senate  to  execute  his  j)roject,  but  informed 
them  that  he  was  already  on  his  march  to  join  Livius 
against  Hasdrubal.  He  advised  them  to  send  the 
two  legions  which  formed  the  home  garrison  on  to 
Narnia,  so  as  to  defend  that  pass  of  the  Flaminian 
road  against  Hasdrubal,  in  case  he  should  march 
upon  Rome  before  the  consular  armies  could  attack 
him.  They  were  to  supply  the  place  af  these  two 
legions  at  Rome  by  a levy  en  masse  in  the  city,  and 
by  ordering  up  the  reserve  legion  from  Capua.  These 
were  his  communications  to  the  senate.  He  also 
sent  horsemen  forward  along  his  line  of  march,  with 
orders  to  the  local  authorities  to  bring  stores  of  pro- 
visions and  refreshment  of  every  kind  to  the  road- 
side, and  to  have  relays  of  carriages  ready  for  the 
conveyance  of  the  wearied  soldiers.  Such  were  the 
precautions  which  he  took  for  accelerating  his  march ; 
and  when  he  had  advanced  some  little  distance  from 
his  camp,  he  briefly  informed  his  soldiers  of  the  real 
object  of  their  expedition.  He  told  them  that  never 
was  there  a design  more  seemingly  audacious  and 
more  really  safe.  He  said  he  was  leading  them  to  a 
certain  victory,  for  his  colleague  had  an  army  large 
enough  to  balance  the  enemy  already,  so  that  their 
swords  would  decisively  turn  the  scale.  The  very 
rumor  that  a fresh  consul  and  a fresh  army  had  come 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBU8. 


173 


up,  when  heard  on  the  battle-field  (and  he  would 
take  care  that  they  should  not  be  heard  of  before  they 
were  seen  and  felt),  would  settle  the  business.  They 
would  have  all  the  credit  of  the  victory,  and  of  hav- 
ing dealt  the  final  decisive  blow.  He  appealed  to  the 
enthusiastic  reception  which  they  already  met  with 
on  their  line  of  march  as  a proof  and  an  omen  of 
their  good  fortune.*  And,  indeed,  their  whole  path 
was  amid  the  vows,  and  prayers,  and  praises  of  their 
countrymen.  The  entire  population  of  the  districts 
through  which  they  passed  flocked  to  the  road-side 
to  see  and  bless  the  deliverers  of  their  country. 
Food,  drink,  and  refreshments  of  every  kind  were 
eagerly  pressed  on  their  acceptance.  Each  peasant 
thought  a favor  was  conferred  on  him  if  one  of  Nero’s 
chosen  band  would  accept  aught  at  his  hands.  The 
soldiers  caught  the  full  spirit  of  their  leader.  Night 
and  day  they  marched  forward,  taking  their  hurried 
meals  in  the  ranks,  and  resting  by  relays  in  the  wag- 
ons which  the  zeal  of  the  country  people  provided, 
and  which  followed  in  the  rear  of  the  column. 

173.  Meanwhile,  at  Eome,  the  news  of  Nero’s  ex- 
pedition had  caused  the  greatest  excitement  and 
alarm.  All  men  felt  the  full  audacity  of  the  enter- 
prise, but  hesitated  what  epithet  to  apply  to  it.  It 
was  evident  that  Nero’s  conduct  would  be  judged  of 
by  the  event,  that  most  unfair-criterion,  as  the  Roman 
historian  truly  terms  it.f  People  reasoned  on  the 

* Livy,  lib.  xxvii.,  c 45. 

t “ Adparebat  (luo  nihil  iniquius  est)  ex  eventu  famam 
haditurum.”— Livy,  lib.  xxvii.,  c.  44. 


174 


BATTLE  OF  IHE  METAUBUE, 


perilous  state  in  which  Nero  had  left  the  rest  of  his 
army,  without  a general,  and  deprived  of  the  core  of 
its  strength,  in  the  vicinity  of  the  terrible  Hannibal. 
They  speculated  on  how  long  it  would  take  Hannibal 
to  pursue  and  overtake  Nero  himself,  and  his  expe- 
ditionary force.  They  talked  over  the  former  disas- 
ters of  the  war,  and  the  fall  of  both  the  consuls  of 
the  last  year.  All  these  calamities  had  come  on 
them  while  they  had  only  one  Carthaginian  general 
and  army  to  deal  with  in  Italy.  Now  they  had  two 
Punic  wars  at  a time.  They  had  two  Carthaginian 
armies,  they  had  almost  two  Hannibals  in  Italy. 
Hasdrubal  was  sprung  from  the  same  father ; trained 
up  in  the  same  hostility  to  Rome ; equally  practised 
in  battle  against  their  legions ; and,  if  the  compara- 
tive speed  and  success  with  which  he  had  crossed 
the  Alps  was  a fair  test,  he  was  even  a better  general 
than  his  brother.  With  fear  for  their  interpreter  of 
every  rumor,  they  exaggerated  the  strength  of  their 
enemy’s  forces  in  every  quarter,  and  criticised  and 
distrusted  their  own. 

174.  Fortunately  for  Rome,  while  she  was  thus  a 
prey  to  terror  and  anxiety,  her  consul’s  nerves  were 
stout  and  strong,  and  he  resolutely  urged  on  his 
march  toward  Sena,  where  his  colleague  Livius  and 
the  praetor  Porcius  were  encamped,  Hasdrubal’s  army 
being  in  position  about  half  a mile  to  their  north. 
Nero  had  sent  couriers  forward  to  apprise  his  col- 
league of  his  project  and  of  his  approach ; and  by  the 
advice  of  Livius,  Nero  so  timed  his  final  march  as  to 
"each  the  camp  at  Sena  by  night.  According  to  a 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBUS. 


175 


previous  arrangement,  Nero’s  men  were  received 
silently  into  the  tents  of  their  comrades,  each  ac- 
cording to  his  rank.  By  these  means  there  was  ho 
enlargement  of  the  camp  that  could  betray  to  Has- 
drubal  the  accession  of  force  which  the  Romans  had 
received.  This  was  considerable,  as  Nero’s  numbers 
had  been  increased  oh  the  march  by  the  volunteers, 
who  offered  themselves  in  crowds,  and  from  whom 
he  selected  the  most  promising  men,  and  especially 
the  veterans  of  former  campaigns.  A council  of  war 
was  held  on  the  morning  after  his  arrival,  in  which 
some  advised  that  time  should  be  given  for  Nero’s 
men  to  refresh  themselves  after  the  fatigue  of  such  a 
march.  But  Nero  vehemently  opposed  all  delay 
“ The  officer,”  said  he,  “ who  is  for  giving  time  to  my 
men  here  to  rest  themselves,  is  for  giving  time  to  Han- 
nibal to  attack  my  men,  whom  I have  left  in  the  camp 
in  Apulia.  He  is  for  giving  time  to  Hannibal  and 
Hasdrubal  to  discover  my  march,  and  to  maneuver 
for  a junction  with  each  other  in  Cisalpine  Gaul  at 
their  leisure.  We  must  fight  instantly,  while  both 
the  foe  here  and  the  foe  in  the  south  are  ignorant  of 
our  movements.  We  must  destroy  this  Hasdrubal, 
and  I must  be  back  in  Apulia  before  Hannibal 
awakes  from  his  torpor.”*  Nero’s  advice  prevailed. 
It  was  resolved  to  fight  directly,  and  before  the  con- 
suls and  praetor  left  the  tent  of  Livius,  the  red  ensign, 
which  was  the  signal  to  prepare  for  immediate  action, 
was  hoisted,  and  the  Romans  forthwith  drew  up  in 
battle  array  outside  the  camp. 

* Livy,  lib.  xxvii.,  c.  46. 


176 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBUS. 


175.  Hasdrubal  had  been  anxious  to  bring  Livius 
and  Porcius  to  battle,  though  he  had  not  judged  it 
expedient  to  attack  them  in  their  lines.  And  now, 
on  hearing  that  the  Romans  offered  battle,  he  also 
drew  up  his  men,  and  advanced  toward  them.  No 
spy  or  deserter  had  informed  him  of  Nero’s  arrival, 
nor  had  he  received  any  direct  information  that  he 
had  more  than  his  old  enemies  to  deal  with.  But  as 
he  rode  forward  to  reconnoiter  the  Roman  line,  he 
thought  that  their  numbers  seemed  to  have  increased, 
and  that  the  armor  of  some  of  them  was  unusually 
dull  and  stained.  He  noticed,  also,  that  the  horses 
of  some  of  the  cavalry  appeared  to  be  rough  and  out 
of  condition,  as  if  they  had  just  come  from  a succes- 
sion of  forced  marches.  So  also,  though,  owing  to 
the  precaution  of  Livius,  the  Roman  camp  showed 
no  change  of  size,  it  had  not  escaped  the  quick  ear  of 
the  Carthaginian  general  that  the  trumpet  which 
gave  the  signal  to  the  Roman  legions  sounded  that 
morning  once  oftener  than  usual,  as  if  directing  the 
troops  of  some  additional  superior  officer.  Hasdru- 
bal, from  his  Spanish  campaigns,  was  well  acquainted 
with  all  the  sounds  and  signals  of  Roman  war,  and 
from  all  that  he  heard  and  saw,  he  felt  convinced 
that  both  the  Roman  consuls  were  before  him.  In 
doubt  and  difficulty  as  to  what  might  have  taken 
place  between  the  armies  of  the  south,  and  probably 
hoping  that  Hannibal  also  was  approaching,  Hasdru- 
bal determined  to  avoid  an  encounter  with  the  com- 
bined Roman  forces,  and  to  endeavor  to  retreat  upon 
Insubrian  Gaul,  where  he  would  be  in  a friendly 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS. 


177 


country,  and  could  endeavor  to  re-open  his  communi- 
cation with  his  brother.  He  therefore  led  his  troops 
back  into  their  camp ; and  as  the  Romans  did  not 
venture  on  an  assault  upon  his  intrenchments,  and 
Hasdruhal  did  not  choose  to  commence  his  retreat  in 
their  sight,  the  day  passed  away  in  inaction.  At  the 
first  watch  of  the  night,  Hasdrubal  led  his  men  silently 
out  of  their  camp,  and  moved  northward  toward  the 
Metaurus,  in  the  hope  of  placing  that  river  between 
himself  and  the  Romans  before  his  retreat  was  dis- 
covered. His  guides  betrayed  him ; and  having  pur- 
posely led  him  away  from  the  part  of  the  river  that 
was  fordable,  they  made  their  escape  in  the  dark, 
and  left  Hasdrubal  and  his  army  wandering  in  con- 
fusion along  the  steep  bank,  and  seeking  in  vain  for 
a spot  where  the  stream  could  be  safely  crossed.  At 
last  they  halted ; and  when  day  dawned  on  them, 
Hasdrubal  found  that  great  numbers  of  his  men,  in 
their  fatigue  and  impatience,  had  lost  all  discipline 
and  subordination,  and  that  many  of  his  Gallic  aux- 
iliaries had  got  drunk,  and  were  lying  helpless  in 
their  quarters.  The  Roman  cavalry  was  soon  seen 
coming  up  in  pursuit,  followed  at  no  great  distance 
by  the  legions,  which  marched  in  readiness  for  an 
instant  engagement.  It  was  hopeless  for  Hasdrubal 
to  think  of  continuing  his  retreat  before  them.  The 
prospect  of  immediate  battle  might  recall  the  disor- 
dered part  of  his  troops  to  a sense  of  duty,  and  revive 
the  instinct  of  discipline.  He  therefore  ordered  his 
men  to  prepare  for  action  instantly,  and  made  the 


178 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS. 


best  arrangement  of  them  that  the  nature  of  the 
ground  would  permit. 

176.  Heeren  has  well  described  the  general  appear- 
ance of  a Carthaginian  army.  He  says,  ‘‘  It  was  an 
assemblage  of  the  most  opposite  races  of  the  human 
species  from  the  fartherest  parts  of  the  globe.  Hordes 
of  half-naked  Gauls  were  ranged  next  to  companies 
of  white-clothed  Iberians,  and  savage  Ligurians  next 
to  the  far- traveled  Nasamones  and  Lotophagi.  Car- 
thaginians and  Phoenici- Africans  formed  the  centre, 
while  innumerable  troops  of  Numidian  horsemen, 
taken  from  all  the  tribes  of  the  Desert,  swarmed 
about  on  unsaddled  horses,  and  formed  the  wings ; 
the  van  was  composed  of  Balearic  slingers ; and  a 
line  of  colossal  elephants,  with  their  Ethiopian  guides, 
formed,  as  it  were,  a chain  of  moving  fortresses  be- 
fore the  whole  army.”  Such  were  the  usual  mater- 
ials and  arrangements  of  the  hosts  that  fought  for 
Carthage ; but  the  troops  under  Hasdrubal  were  not 
in  all  respects  thus  constituted  or  thus  stationed. 
He  seems  to  have  been  especially  deficient  in  cavalry, 
and  he  had  few  African  troops,  though  some  Cartha- 
ginians of  high  rank  were  with  him.  His  veteran 
Spanish  infantry,  armed  with  helmets  and  shields, 
and  short  cut-and-thrust  swords,  were  the  best  part 
of  his  army.  These,  and  his  few  Africans,  he  drew 
up  on  his  right  wing,  under  his  own  personal  com- 
mand. In  the  centre  he  placed  his  Ligurian  infan- 
try, and  on  the  left  wing  he  placed  or  retained  the 
Gauls,  who  were  armed  with  long  javelins  and  with 
huge  broad-swords  and  targets.  The  rugged  nature 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS. 


179 


of  the  ground  in  front  and  on  the  flank  of  this  part 
of  his  line  made  him  hope  that  the  Roman  right  wing 
would  be  unable  to  come  to  close  quarters  with  these 
unserviceable  barbarians  before  he  could  make  some 
impression  with  his  Spanish  veterans  on  the  Roman 
left.  This  was  the  only  chance  he  had  of  victory  or 
safety,  and  he  seems  to  have  done  every  thing  that 
good  generalship  could  do  to  secure  it.  He  placed 
his  elephants  in  advance  of  his  centre  and  right  wing. 
He  had  caused  the  driver  of  each  of  them  to  be  pro- 
vided with  a sharp  iron  spike  and  mallet,  and  had 
given  orders  that  every  beast  that  became  unman- 
ageable, and  ran  back  upon  his  own  ranks,  should  be 
instantly  killed  by  driving  the  spike  into  the  verte- 
bra at  the  junction  of  the  head  and  the  spine.  Has- 
drubal’s  elephant’s  were  ten  in  number.  We  have 
no  trustworthy  information  as  to  the  amount  of  his 
infantry,  but  it  is  quite  clear  that  he  was  greatly  out- 
numberedbythe  combined  Roman  forces. 

177.  The  tactic  of  the  Roman  legions  had  not  yet 
acquired  that  perfection  which  it  received  from  the 
military  genius  of  Marius,"^  and  which  we  read  of  in 
the  first  chapter  of  Gibbon.  We  possess,  in  that 
great  work,  an  account  of  the  Roman  legions  at  the 
end  of  the  commonwealth,  and  during  the  early  ages 
of  the  empire,  which  those  alone  can  adequately  ad- 
mire who  have  attempted  a similar  description.  We 
have  also,  in  the  sixth  and  seventeenth  books  of 

* Most  probably  during  the  period  of  his  prolonged  con- 
sulship, from  B C.  104  to  B.  C.  101,  while  he  was  training 
his  army  against  the  Cimbri  and  the  Teutons. 


180 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAVBUS, 


Polybius,  an  elaborate  discussion  on  the  military 
system  of  the  Romans  in  his  time,  which  was  not  far 
distant  from  the  time  of  the  battle  of  the  Metaurus. 
But  the  subject  is  beset  with  difficulties  ; and  instead 
of  entering  into  minute  but  inconclusive  details,  I 
would  refer  to  Gibbon’s  first  chapter  as  serving  for  a 
general  description  of  the  Roman  army  in  its  period 
of  perfection,  and  remark,  that  the  training  and 
armor  which  the  whole  legion  received  in  the  time 
of  Augustus  was,  two  centuries  earlier,  only  partially 
introduced.  Two  divisions  of  troops,  called  Hastati 
and  Principes,  formed  the  bulk  of  each  Roman  legion 
in  the  second  Punic  war.  Each  of  these  divisions 
was  twelve  hundred  strong.  The  Hastatus  and  the 
Princeps  legionary  bore  a breast-plate  or  a coat  of 
mail,  brazen  greaves,  and  a brazen  helmet,  with  a 
lofty  upright  crest  of  scarlet  or  black  feathers.  He 
had  a large  oblong  shield ; and,  as  weapons  of 
offense,  two  javelins,  one  of  which  was  light  and 
slender,  but  the  other  was  a strong  and  massive 
weapon,  with  a shaft  about  four  feet  long,  and  an 
iron  head  of  equal  length.  The  sword  w^as  carried 
on  the  right  thigh,  and  was  a short  cut-and- thrust 
weapon,  like  that  which  was  used  by  the  Spaniards. 
Thus  armed,  the  Hastati  formed  the  front  division  of 
the  legion,  and  the  Principes  the  second.  Each 
division  was  drawn  up  about  ten  deep,  a space  of 
three  feet  being  allowed  between  the  files  as  well  as 
the  ranks,  so  as  to  give  each  legionary  ample  room 
for  the  use  of  his  javelins,  and  of  his  sword  and 
shield.  The  men  in  the  second  rank  did  not  stand 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBUS. 


181 


immediately  behind  those  in  the  first  rank,  but  the 
files  were  alternate,  like  the  position  of  the  men  on  a 
draught-board.  This  was  termed  the  quincunx 
order.  Niebuhr  considers  that  this  arrangement 
enabled  the  legion  to  keep  up  a shower  of  javelins  on 
the  enemy  for  some  considerable  time.  He  says, 
“ When  the  first  line  had  hurled  its  pila,  it  probably 
stepped  back  between  those  who  stood  behind  it,  and 
two  steps  forward  restored  the  front  nearly  to  its 
first  position ; a movement  which,  on  account  of  the 
arrangement  of  the  quincunx,  could  be  executed 
without  losing  a moment.  Thus  one  line  succeeded 
the  other  in  the  front  till  it  was  time  to  draw  the 
swords  ; nay,  when  it  was  found  expedient,  the  lines 
which  had  already  been  in  the  front  might  repeat 
this  change,  since  the  stores  of  pila  were  surely  not 
confined  to  the  two  which  each  soldier  took  with 
him  into  battle. 

178.  “ The  same  change  must  have  taken  place  in 
fighting  with  the  sword,  which,  when  the  same  tactic 
was  adopted  on  both  sides,  was  any  thing  but  a con- 
fused melee  ; on  the  contrary,  it  was  a series  of  single 
combats.’^  He  adds,  that  a military  man  of  ex- 
perience had  been  consulted  by  him  on  the  subject, 
and  had  given  it  as  his  opinion  that  the  change  of 
the  lines  as  described  above  was  by  no  means  im- 
practicable ; but,  in  the  absence  of  the  deafening 
noise  of  gunpowder,  it  can  not  have  had  even  any 
difficulty  with  well-trained  troops.” 

179.  The  third  division  of  the  legion  was  six  hun- 
dred strong,  and  acted  as  a reserve.  It  was  always 


182 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAURUS. 


composed  of  veteran  soldiers,  who  were  called  the 
Taiarii.  Their  arms  were  the  same  as  those  of  the 
Principes  and  Hastati,  except  that  each  Triarian 
carried  a spear  instead  of  javelins.  The  rest  of  the 
legion  consisted  of  light-armed  troops,  who  acted  as 
skirmishers.  The  cavalry  of  each  legion  was  at  this 
period  about  three  hundred  strong.  The  Italian 
allies,  who  were  attached  to  the  legion,  seem  to  have 
been  similarly  armed  and  equipped,  but  their 
numerical  proportion  of  cavalry  was  much  larger. 

180.  Such  was  the  nature  of  the  forces  that  ad- 
vanced on  the  Roman  side  to  the  battle  of  the 
Metaurus.  Nero  commanded  the  right  wing,  Livius 
the  left,  and  the  prsetor  Porcius  had  the  command  of 
the  centre.  “ Both  Romans  and  Carthaginians  well 
understood  how  much  depended  upon  the  fortune  of 
this  day,  and  how  little  hope  of  safety  there  was  for 
the  vanquished.  Only  the  Romans  herein  seemed  to 
have  had  the  better  in  conceit  and  opinion  that  they 
were  to  fight  with  men  desirous  to  have  fled  from 
them ; and  according  to  this  presumption  came 
Livius  the  consul,  with  a proud  bravery,  to  give 
charge  on  the  Spaniards  and  Africans,  by  whom  he 
was  so  sharply  entertained  that  the  victory  seemed 
very  doubtful.  The  Africans  and  Spaniards  ‘were 
stout  soldiers,  and  well  acquainted  with  the  manner 
of  the  Roman  fight.  The  Ligurians,  also,  were  a 
hardy  nation,  and  not  accustomed  to  give  ground, 
which  they  needed  the  less,  or  were  able  now  to  do, 
being  placed  in  the  midst.  Livius,  therefore,  and 
Porcius  found  great  4>pposition;  and  with  great 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBUS. 


183 


slaughter  on  both  sides  prevailed  little  or  nothing. 
Besides  other  difficulties,  they  were  exceedingly 
troubled  by  the  elephants,  that  brake  their  first 
ranks,  and  put  them  in  such  disorder  as  the  Koman 
ensigns  were  driven  to  fall  back ; all  this  while 
Claudius  Nero,  laboring  in  vain  against  a steep  hill, 
was  unable  to  come  to  blows  with  the  Gauls  that 
stood  opposite  him,  but  out  of  danger.  This  made 
Hasdrubal  the  more  confident,  who,  seeing  his  own 
left  wing  safe,  did  the  more  boldly  and  fiercely  make 
impression  on  the  other  side  upon  the  left  wing  of 
the  Romans.”* 

181.  But  at  last  Nero,  who  found  that  Hasdrubal 
refused  his  left  wing,  and  who  could  not  overcome 
the  difficulties  of  the  ground  in  the  quarter  assigned 
to  him,  decided  the  battle  by  another  stroke  of  that 
military  genius  which  had  inspired  his  march. 
Wheeling  a brigade  of  his  best  men  round  the  rear 
of  the  rest  of  the  Roman  army,  Nero  fiercely  charged 
the  fiank  of  the  Spaniards  and  Africans.  The  charge 
was  as  successful  as  it  was  sudden.  Rolled  back  in 
disorder  upon  each  other,  and  overwhelmed  by  num- 
bers, the  Spaniards  and  Ligurians  died,  fighting  gal- 
lantly to  the  last.  The  Gauls,  who  had  taken  little 
or  no  part  in  the  strife  of  the  day,  were  then  sur- 
rounded, and  butchered  almost  without  resistance. 
Hasdrubal,  after  having,  by  the  confession  of  his  ene- 
mies, done  all  that  a general  could  do,  when  he  saw 
that  the  victory  was  irreparably  lost,  scorning  to  sur- 
vive the  gallant  host  which  he  had  led,  and  to  gratify 

* “Historie  of  the  World,”  bySir  Walter  Raleigh,  p.946. 


184 


BATTLE  OF  THE  METAUBUS. 


as  a captive,  Koman  cruelty  and  pride,  spurred  his 
horse  into  the  midst  of  a Roman  cohort,  and,  sword 
in  hand,  met  the  death  that  was  worthy  of  the  son 
of  Hamilcar  and  the  brother  of  Hannibal. 

182.  Success  the  most  complete  had  crowned  Nero's 
enterprise.  Returning  as  rapidly  as  he  had  advanced, 
he  was  again  facing  the  inactive  enemies  in  the  south 
before  they  even  knew  of  his  march.  But  he  brought 
with  him  a ghastly  trophy  of  what  he  had  done.  In 
the  true  spirit  of  that  savage  brutality  which  de- 
formed the  Roman  national  character,  Nero  ordered 
Hasdrubal’s  head  to  be  flung  into  his  brother’s  camp. 
Ten  years  had  passed  since  Hannibal  had  last  gazed 
on  those  features.  The  sons  of  Hamilcar  had  then 
planned  their  system  of  warfare  against  Rome,  which 
they  had  so  nearly  brought  to  successful  accomplish- 
ment. Year  after  year  had  Hannibal  been  strug- 
gling in  Italy,  in  the  hope  of  one  day  hailing  the 
arrival  of  him  whom  he  had  left  in  Spain,  and  of 
seeing  his  brother’s  eye  flash  with  affection  and  pride 
at  the  junction  of  their  irresistible  hosts.  He  now 
saw  that  eye  glazed  in  death,  and  in  the  agony  of 
his  heart  the  great  Carthaginian  groaned  aloud  that 
he  recognized  his  country’s  destiny. 

183.  Meanwhile,  at  the  tidings  of  the  great  battle, 
Rome  at  once  rose  Irom  the  thrill  of  anxiety  and  ter- 
ror to  the  full  confidence  of  triumph.  Hannibal 
might  retain  his  hold  on  Southern  Italy  for  a few 
years  longer,  but  the  imperial  city  and  her  allies 
were  no  longer  in  danger  from  his  arms;  and,  after 
Hannibal’s  downfall,  the  great  military  republic  of 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS, 


185 


the  ancient  world  met  in  her  career  of  conquest  no 
other  worthy  competitor.  Byron  has  termed  Nero’s 
march  “ unequaled,”  and,  in  the  magnitude  of  its  con- 
sequences, it  is  so.  Viewed  only  as  a military  ex- 
ploit, it  reinains  unparalleled  save  by  Marlborough’s 
bold  march  from  Flanders  to  the  Danube  in  the  cam- 
paign of  Blenheim,  and  perhaps  also  by  the  Arch- 
duke Charles’s  lateral  march  in  1796,  by^  which  he 
overwhelmed  the  French  under  Jourdain,  and  then, 
driving  Moreau  through  the  Black  Forest  and  across 
the  Ehine,  for  a while  freed  Germany  from  her  in- 
vaders. 


Synopsis  of  Events  Between  the  Battle  of 
THE  Metaurus,  B.  C.  207,  AND  Arminius’s  Vic- 
tory over  the  Roman  Legions  under  Varus, 

A.  D.  9. 

B.  C.  205  to  201.  Scipio  is  made  consul,  and  carries 
the  war  into  Africa.  He  gains  several  victories 
there,  and  the  Carthaginians  recall  Hannibal  from 
Italy  to  oppose  him.  Battle  of  Zama  in  201.  Han- 
nibal is  defeated,  and  Carthage  sues  for  peace.  End 
of  the  second  Punic  war,  leaving  Rome  confirmed  in 
the  dominion  of  Italy,  Sicily,  Sardinia,  and  Corsica, 
and  also  mistress  of  great  part  of  Spain,  and  vir- 
tually predominant  in  North  Africa. 

200.  Rome  makes  war  upon  Philip,  king  of  Mace- 
donia. She  pretends  to  take  the  Greek  cities  of  the 
Achaean  league  and  the  -^tolians  under  her  protec- 


186 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS, 


tion  as  allies.  Philip  is  defeated  by  the  proconsul 
Flaminius  at  Cynoscephalac,  198,  and  begs  for  peace. 
The  Macedonian  influence  is  now  completely  de- 
stroyed in  Greece,  and  the  Roman  established  in  its 
stead,  though  Rome  pretends  to  acknowledge  the  in- 
dependence or  the  Greek  cities. 

194.  Rome  makes  war  upon  Antiochus,  king  of 
Syria.  He  is  completely  defeated  at  the  battle  of 
Magnesia,  192,  and  is  glad  to  accept  peace  on  condi- 
tions which  leave  him  dependent  upon  Rome. 

200-190.  “Thus,  within  the  short  space  of  ten 
years  was  laid  the  foundation  of  the  Roman  author- 
ity in  the  East,  and  the  general  state  of  affairs  en- 
tirely changed.  If  Rome  was  not  yet  the  ruler,  she 
was  at  least  the  arbitress  of  the  world  from  the  At- 
lantic to  the  Euphrates.  The  power  of  the  three 
principal  states  was  so  completely  humbled,  that 
they  durst  not,  without  the  permission  of  Rome, 
begin  any  new  war  ; the  fourth,  Egypt,  had  already, 
in  the  year  201,  placed  herself  under  the  guardian- 
ship of  Rome;  and  the  lesser  powers  followed  of 
themselves,  esteeming  it  an  honor  to  be  called  the 
allies  of  Borne.  With  this  name  the  nations  were 
lulled  into  security,  and  brought  under  the  Roman 
yoke ; the  new  political  system  of  Rome  was  founded 
and  strengthened,  partly  by  exciting  and  supporting 
the  weaker  states  against  the  stronger,  however  un- 
just the  cause  of  the  former  might  be,  and  partly  by 
factions  which  she  found  means  to  raise  in  every 
state,  even  the  smallest.” — (Heeren.) 

172.  War  renewed  between  Macedon  and  Rome. 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


187 


Decisive  defeat  of  Perses,  the  Macedonian  king,  by 
Panins  jEmilins  at  Pydna,  168.  Destrnction  of  the 
Macedonian  monarchy. 

150.  Rome  oppresses  the  Carthaginians  till  they 
are  driven  to  take  np  arms,  and  the  third  Pnnic  war 
begins.  Carthage  is  taken  and  destroyed  by  Scipio 
^milianns,  146,  and  the  Carthaginian  territory  is 
made  a Roman  province. 

146.  In  the  same  year  in  which  Carthage  falls,  Cor- 
inth is  stormed  by  the  Roman  army  nnder  Mnmmins. 
The  Achaean  leagne  had  been  goaded  into  hostilities 
with  Rome  by  means  similar  to  those  employed 
against  Carthage.  The  greater  part  of  Southern 
Greece  is  made  a Roman  province  under  the  name  of 
Achaia. 

133.  Numantium  is  destroyed  by  Scipio  .Emilianus. 
“ The  war  against  the  Spaniards,  w'ho,  of  all  the  na- 
tions subdued  by  the  Romans,  defended  their  liberty 
with  the  greatest  obstinacy,  began  in  the  year  200, 
six  years  after  the  total  expulsion  of  the  Carthagin- 
ians from  their  country,  206.  It  was  exceedingly 
obstinate,  partly  from  the  natural  state  of  the  coun- 
try, which  was  thickly  populated,  and  where  every 
place  became  a fortress ; partly  from  the  courage  of 
the  inhabitants ; but  above  all,  owing  to  the  peculiar 
policy  of  the  Romans,  who  were  wont  to  employ  their 
allies  to  subdue  other  nations.  This  war  continued, 
almost  without  interruption,  from  the  year  200  to 
133,  and  was  for  the  most  part  carried  on  at  the  same 
time  in  Hispania  Citerior,  where  the  Celtiberi  w^ere 
the  most  formidable  adversaries,  and  in  Hispania 


188 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS, 


Ulterior,  where  the  Lusitani  were  equally  powerful. 
Hostilities  were  at  the  highest  pitch  in  195,  under 
Cato,  who  reduced  Hispania  Citerior  to  a state  of 
tranquillity  in  185-179,  when  the  Celtiheri  were 
attacked  in  their  native  territory ; and  155-150,  when 
the  Romans  in  both  provinces  were  so  often  beaten, 
that  nothing  wa^  more  dreaded  by  the  soldiers  at 
home  than  to  be  sent  there.  The  extortions  and  per- 
fidy of  Servius  Gralba  placed  Viriathus,  in  the  year 
146,  at  the  head  of  his  nation,  the  Lusitani ; the  war, 
however,  soon  extended  itself  to  Hispania  Citerior, 
where  many  nations,  particularly  the  Numantines, 
took  up  arms  against  Rome,  143.  Viriathus,  some- 
times victorious  and  sometimes  defeated,  was  never 
more  formidable  than  in  the  moment  of  defeat,  be- 
cause he  knew  how  to  take  advantage  of  his  know- 
ledge of  the  country  and  of  the  dispositions  of  his 
countrymen.  After  his  murder,  caused  by  the  treach- 
ery of  Csepio,  140,  Lusitania  was  subdued ; but  the 
Numantine  war  became  still  more  violent,  and  the 
Numantines  compelled  the  consul  Mancinus  to  a dis- 
advantageous treaty,  137.  When  Scipio,  in  the  year 
133,  put  an  end  to  this  war,  Spain  was  certainly  tran- 
quil ; the  northern  parts,  however,  were  still  unsub- 
dued, though  the  Romans  iienetrated  as  far  as  Gala- 
tia.”— (Heeren.) 

134.  Commencement  of  the  revolutionary  century 
at  Rome,  i.  c,,  from  the  time  of  the  excitement 
produced  by  the  attempts  made  by  the  Gracchi  to 
reform  the  commonwealth,  to  the  battle  of  Actium 
(B.  C.  31),  which  established  Octavianus  Caesar  as  sole 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENIS, 


189 


master  of  the  Roman  world.  Throughout  this  period 
Rome  was  engaged  in  important  foreign  wars,  most 
of  which  procured  large  accessions  to  her  territory. 

118-106.  The  Jugur thine  war.  Numidia  is  con- 
quered, and  made  a Roman  conquest. 

113-101.  The  great  and  terrible  war  of  the  Cimbri 
and  Teutones  against  Rome.  These  nations^ of  north- 
ern warriors  slaughter  several  Roman  armies  in  Gaul, 
and  in  102  attempt  to  penetrate  into  Italy.  The 
military  genius  of  Marius  here  saves  his  country  ; he 
defeats  the  Teutones  near  Aix,  in  Provence ; and  in 
the  following  year  he  destroys  the  army  of  the  Cim- 
bri, who  had  passed  the  Alps,  near  Vercellse. 

91-88.  The  war  of  the  Italian  allies  against  Rome. 
This  was  caused  by  the  refusal  of  Rome  to  concede 
to  them  the  rights  of  Roman  citizenship.  After  a 
sanguinary  struggle,  Rome  gradually  concedes  it. 

89-85.  First  war  of  the  Romans  against  Mithra- 
dates  the  Great,  king  of  Pontus,  who  had  overrun 
Asia  Minor,  Macedonia,  and  Greece.  Sylla  defeats 
his  armies,  and  forces  him  to  withdraw  his  forces 
from  Europe.  Sylla  returns  to  Rome  to  carry  on  the 
civil  war  against  the  son  and  partisans  of  Marius. 
He  makes  himself  dictator. 

74-64.  The  last  Mithradatic  wars.  Lucullus,  and 
after  him  Pompeius,  command  against  the  great 
king  of  Pontus,  who  at  last  is  poisoned  by  his  son, 
while  designing  to  raise  the  warlike  tribes  of  the 
Danube  against  Rome,  and  to  invade  Italy  from  the 
northeast.  Great  Asiatic  conquests  of  the  Romans. 
Besides  the  ancient  province  of  Pergamus,  the  mari- 


190 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS, 


time  countries  of  Bithynia  and  nearly  all  Paphlago- 
•nia  and  Pontus,  are  formed  into  a Roman  province 
under  the  name  of  Bithynia,  while  on  the  southern 
coast  Cilicia  and  Pamphylia  form  another  under  the 
name  of  Cilicia ; Phoenicia  and  Syria  compose  a third, 
under  the  name  of  Syria.  On  the  other  hand,  Great 
Armenia  is  left  to  Tigranes  ; Cappadocia  to  Ariobar- 
zanes ; the  Bosphorus  to  Pharnaces ; Judaea  to  Hyr- 
canus  ; and  some  other  small  states  are  also  given  to 
petty  princes,  all  of  whom  remain  dependent  on 
Rome. 

58-50.  Caesar  conquers  Gaul. 

54.  Crassus  attacks  the  Parthians  with  a Roman 
army,  hut  is  overthrown  and  killed  at  Carrhae  in 
Mesopotamia.  His  lieutenant  Cassius  collects  the 
wrecks  of  the  army,  and  prevents  the  Parthians  from 
conquering  Syria. 

49-45.  The  civil  war  between  Caesar  and  the  Pom- 
peian party.  Egypt,  Mauritania,  and  Pontus  are  in- 
volved in  the  consequences  of  this  war. 

44.  Caesar  is  killed  in  the  Capitol ; the  civil  wars 
are  soon  renewed. 

42.  Death  of  Brutus  and  Cassius  at  Philippi. 

31.  Death  of  Antony  and  Cleopatra.  Egypt  be- 
comes a Roman  province,  and  Augustus  Caesar  is  left 
undisputed  master  of  Rome,  and  all  that  is  Rome’s. 


VICTORY  OF-ABMINIUSr 


191 


CHAPTER  V. 

VICTOEY  OF  AEMINIUS  OVER  THE  ROMAN  LEGIONS 
UNDER  VARUS,  A.  D.  9. 

Hac  clade  factum,  ut  Imperium  quod  in  litore  oceani 
non  steterat,  in  ripa  Rheni  tluminis  staret.— Florus. 

184.  To  a truly  illustrious  Frenchman,  whose  re- 
verses as  a minister  can  never  obscure  his  achieve- 
ments in  the  world  of  letters,  we  are  indebted  for  the 
most  profound  and  most  eloquent  estimate  that  we 
possess  of  the  importance  of  the  Germanic  element 
in  European  civilization,  and  of  the  extent  to  which 
the  human  race  is  indebted  to  those  brave  warriors 
who  long  were  the  unconquered  antagonists,  and  final- 
ly became  the  conquerors  of  imperial  Rome. 

185.  Twenty-three  eventful  years  have  passed 
away  since  M.  Guizot  delivered  from  the  chair  of 
modern  history  at  Paris  his  course  of  lectures  on  the 
history  of  Civilization  in  Europe.  During  those 
years  the  spirit  of  earnest  inquiry  into  the  germs  and 
primary  developments  of  existing  institutions  has 
become  more  and  more  active  and  universal,  and  the 
merited  celebrity  of  M.  Guizot’s  work  has  propor- 
tionately increased.  Its  admirable  analysis  of  the 


192 


VICTORY  OF  ABMimUS 


complex  political  and  social  organizations  of  which 
the  modern  civilized  world  is  made  up,  must  have 
led  thousands  to  trace  with  keener  interest  the  great 
crises  of  times  past,  by  which  the  characteristics  of 
the  present  were  determined.  The  narrative  of  one 
of  these  great  crises,  of  the  epoch  A.  D.  9,  when  Ger- 
many took  up  arms  for  her  independence  against 
Roman  invasion,  has  for  us  this  special  attraction — 
that  it  forms  part  of  our  own  national  history.  Had 
Arminius  been  supine  or  unsuccessful,  our  Germanic 
ancestors  would  have  been  enslaved  or  exterminated 
in  their  original  seats  along  the  Eyder  and  the  Elbe. 
This  island  would  never  have  borne  the  name  of 
England,  and  “ we,  this  great  English  nation,  whose 
race  and  language  are  now  overrunning  the  earth, 
from  one  end  of  it  to  the  other,”*  would  have  been 
utterly  cut  off  from  existence. 

186.  Arnold  may,  indeed,  go  too  far  in  holding  that 
we  are  wholly  unconnected  in  race  with  the  Romans 
and  Britons  who  inhabited  this  country  before  the 
coming  over  of  the  Saxons ; that,  “ nationally  speak- 
ing, the  history  of  Caesar’s  invasion  has  no  more  to  do 
with  us  than  the  natural  history  of  the  animals  which 
then  inhabited  our  forests.”  There  seems  ample  evi- 
dence to  prove  that  the  Romanized  Celts  whom  our 
Teutonic  forefathers  found  here  influenced  materially 
the  character  of  our  nation.  But  the  main  stream 
of  our  people  was  and  is  Germanic.  Our  language 
alone  decisively  proves  this.  Arminius  is  far  more 
truly  one  of  our  national  heroes  than  Caractacus ; 

* Arnold’s  “ Lectures  on  Modern  History.” 


OVER  THE  ROMAN  LEGIONS, 


193 


and  it  was  our  own  primeval  fatherland  that  the 
brave  German  rescued  when  he  slaughtered  the  Ro- 
man legions  eighteen  centuries  ago,  in  the  marshy 
glens  between  the  Lippe  and  the  Ems* 

187.  Dark  and  disheartening,  even  to  heroic  spirits, 
must  have  seemed  the  prospects  of  Germany  when 
Arminius  planned  the  general  rising  of  h^s  country- 
men against  Rome.  Half  the  land  was  occupied  by 
Roman  garrisons  ; and,  what  was  worse,  many  of  the 
Germans  seemed  patiently  acquiescent  in  their  state 
of  bondage.  The  braver  portion,  whose  patriotism 
could  be  relied  on,  was  ill  armed  and  undisciplined, 
while  the  enemy’s  troops  consisted  of  veterans  in  the 
highest  state  of  equipment  and  training,  familiarized 
with  victory,  and  commanded  by  officers  of  proved 
skill  and  valor.  The  resources  of  Rome  seemed 
boundless ; her  tenacity  of  purpose  was  believed  to 
be  invincible.  There  was  no  hope  of  foreign  sympa- 
thy or  aid ; for  “ the  self-governing  powers  that  had 
filled  the  Old  World  had  bent  one  after  another  be- 
fore the  rising  power  of  Rome,  and  had  vanished. 
The  earth  seemed  left  void  of  independent  nations. f 

188.  The  German  chieftain  knew  well  the  gigantic 
power  of  the  oppressor.  Arminius  was  no  rude  sav- 
age, fighting  out  of  mere  animal  instinct,  or  in  igno- 
rance of  the  might  of  his  adversary.  He  was  famil- 
iar with  the  Roman  language  and  civilization ; he 
had  served  in  the  Roman  armies  ; he  had  been  ad- 

* See  post,  remarks  on  the  relationship  between  the 
Cherusci  and  the  English. 

t Ranke. 


194 


VICTORY  OF  ARMINIUS 


mitted  to  the  Eoman  citizenship  and  raised  to  the 
rank  of  the  equestrian  order.  It  was  part  of  the 
subtle  policy  of  Rome  to  confer  rank  and  privileges 
on  the  youth  of  the  leading  familes  in  the  nations 
which  she  wished  to  enslave.  Among  other  young 
German  chieftains,  Arminius  and  his  brother,  who 
were  the  heads  of  the  noblest  house  in  the  tribe  of 
the  Cherusci,  had  been  selected  as  fit  objects  for  the 
exercise  of  this  insidious  system.  Eoman  refine- 
ments and  dignities  succeeded  in  denationalizing 
the  brother,  who  assumed  the  Eoman  name  of  Fla- 
vius, and  adhered  to  Rome  throughout  all  her  wars 
against  his  country.  Arminius  remained  unbought 
by  honors  or  wealth,  uncorrupted  by  refinement  or 
luxury.  He  aspired  to  and  obtained  from  Eoman 
enmity  a higher  title  than  ever  could  have  been 
given  him  by  Eoman  favor.  It  is  in  the  page  of 
Rome’s  greatest  historian  that  his  name  has  come 
down  to  us  with  the  proud  addition  of  “ Liberator 
hand  dubie  Germanise.”  * 

189.  Often  must  the  young  chieftain,  while  medi- 
tating the  exploit  which  has  thus  immortalized  him, 
have  anxiously  revolved  in  his  mind  the  fate  of  the 
many  great  men  who  had  been  crushed  in  the  at- 
tempt which  he  was  about  to  renew — the  attempt 
to  stay  the  chariot-wheels  of  triumphant  Rome. 
Could  he  hope  to  succeed  where  Hannibal  and  Mith- 
radates  had  perished  ? What  had  been  the  doom  of 
Viriathus?  and  what  warning  against  vain  valor 
was  written  on  the  desolate  site  where  Numantia 


* Tacitus,  “ Annals,”  ii.,  88. 


OVER  THE  R03IAN  LEGIONS. 


195 


once  had  flourished  ? Nor  was  a caution  wanting  in 
scenes  nearer  home  and  more  recent  times.  The 
Gauls  had  fruitlessly  struggled  for  eight  years 
against  Csesar  ; and  the  gallant  Vercingetorix,  who 
in  the  last  year  of  the  war  had  roused  all  his  coun- 
trymen to  insurrection,  who  had  cut  off  Eoman  de- 
tachments, and  brought  Csesar  himself  to  the  extreme 
of  peril  at  Alesia — he,  too,  had  finally  succumbed, 
and  had  been  led  captive  in  Csesar’s  trium]3h,  and 
had  then  been  butchered  in  cold  blood  in  a Homan 
dungeon. 

190.  It  was  true  that  Rome  was  no  longer  the 
great  military  republic  which  for  so  many  ages  had 
shattered  the  kingdoms  of  the  world.  Her  system  of 
government  was  changed ; and  after  a century  of  re- 
volution and  civil  war,  she  had  placed  herself  under 
the  despotism  of  a single  ruler.  But  the  discipline 
of  her  troops  was  yet  unimpaired,  and  her  warlike 
spirit  seemed  unabated.  The  first  year  of  the  em- 
pire had  been  signalized  by  conquests  as  valuable  as 
any  gained  by  the  republic  in  a corresponding  period. 
It  is  a great  fallacy,  though  apparently  sanctioned 
by  great  authorities,  to  suppose  that  the  foreign  pol- 
icy pursued  by  Augustus  was  pacific;  he  certainly 
recommended  such  a policy  to  his  successors  {incer- 
turn  metu  an  per  invidiam^  Tag.,  Ann.^  i.,  11),  but  he 
himself,  until  Arminius  broke  his  spirit,  had  fol- 
lowed a very  different  course.  Besides  his  Spanish 
wars,  his  generals,  in  a series  of  generally  aggressive 
campaigns,  had  extended  the  Roman  frontier  from 
the  Alps  to  the  Danube,  and  had  reduced  into  sub- 
7 


196 


VICTORY  OF  ARMINIUS 


jection  the  large  and  important  countries  that  now 
form  the  territories  of  all  Austria  south  of  that  river, 
and  of  East  Switzerland,  Lower  Wirtemherg,  Bavaria, 
the  Valtelline,  and  the  Tyrol.  While  the  progress 
of  the  Eoman  arms  thus  pressed  the  Germans  from 
the  south,  still  more  formidable  inroads  had  been 
made  by  the  imperial  legions  on  the  west.  Eoman 
armies,  moving  from  the  province  of  Gaul,  estab- 
lished a chain  of  fortresses  along  the  right  as  well  as 
the  left  bank  of  the  Ehine,  and,  in  a series  of  victorious 
campaigns,  advanced  their  eagles  as  far  as  the  Elbe, 
which  now  seemed  added  to  the  list  of  vassal  rivers,  to 
the  Nile,  the  Ehine,  the  Ehone,  the  Danube,  the  Tagus, 
the  Seine,  and  many  more,  that  acknowledged  the  su- 
premacy of  the  Tiber.  Eoman  fleets  also,  sailing  from 
the  harbors  of  Gaul  along  the  German  coasts  and  up 
the  estuaries,  co-operated  with  the  land-forces  of  the 
empire,  and  seemed  to  display  even  more  decisively 
than  her  armies,  her  overwhelming  superiority  over 
the  rude  Germanic  tribes.  Throughout  the  territory 
thus  invaded,  the  Eomans  had,  vrith  their  usual 
military  skill,  established  fortified  posts;  and  a 
powerful  army  of  occupation  was  kept  on  foot  ready 
to  move  instantly  on  any  spot  where  any  popular 
outbreak  might  be  attempted. 

191.  Vast,  however,  and  admirably  organized  as 
the  fabric  of  Eoman  power  appeared  on  the  frontiers 
and  in  the  provinces,  there  was  rottenness  at  the 
core.  In  Eome’s  unceasing  hostilities  with  foreign 
foes,  and  still  more  in  her  long  series  of  desolating 
civil  wars,  the  free  middle  classes  of  Italy  had  almost 


OVER  THE  ROMAN  LEGIONS, 


197 


wholly  disappeared.  Above  the  position  which  they 
had  occupied,  an  oligarchy  of  wealth  had  reared  it- 
self ; beneath  that  position,  a degraded  mass  of  pov- 
erty and  misery  was  fermenting.  Slaves,  the  chance 
sweepings  of  every  conquered  country,  shoals  of 
Africans,  Sardinians,  Asiatics,  Illyrians,  and  others, 
made  up  the  bulk  of  the  population  of  the  Italian 
peninsula.  The  foulest  profligacy  of  manners  was 
general  in  all  ranks.  In  universal  weariness  of  re- 
volution and  civil  war,  and  in  consciousness  of  being 
too  debased  for  self-government,  the  nation  had  sub- 
mitted itself  to  the  absolute  authority  of  Augustus. 
Adulation  was  now  the  chief  function  of  the  senate  ; 
and  the  gifts  of  genius  and  accomplishments  of  art 
were  devoted  to  the  elaboration  of  eloquently  false 
panegyrics  upon  the  prince  and  his  favorite  courtiers. 
With  bitter  indignation  must  the  German  chieftain 
have  beheld  all  this  and  contrasted  with  it  the  rough 
worth  of  his  own  countrymen ; their  bravery,  their 
fidelity  to  their  word,  their  manly  independence  of 
spirit,  their  love  of  their  national  free  institutions, 
and  their  loathing  of  every  pollution  and  meanness. 
Above  all,  he  must  have  thought  of  the  domestic  virtues 
that  hallowed  a German  home ; of  the  respect  there 
shown  to  the  female  character,  and  of  the  pure  affection 
by  which  that  respect  was  repaid.  His  soul  must  have 
burned  within  him  at  the  contemplation  of  such  a 
race  yielding  to  these  debased  Italians. 

192.  Still,  to  persuade  the  Germans  to  combine,  in 
spite  of  their  frequent  feuds  among  themselves,  in 
one  sudden  outbreak  against  Rome ; to  keep  the 


198 


VICTORY  OF  ARM1N1U8 


scheme  concealed  from  the  Romans  until  the  hour 
for  action  arrived  ; and  then,  without  possessing  a 
single  walled  town,  without  military  stores,  without 
training,  to  teach  his  insurgent  countrymen  to  de- 
feat veteran  armies  and  storm  fortifications,  seemed 
so  perilous  an  enterprise,  that  probably  Arminius 
would  have  receded  from  it  had  not  a stronger  feel- 
ing even  than  patriotism  urged  him  on.  Among 
the  Germans  of  high  rank  who  had  most  readily 
submitted  to  the  invaders,  and  become  zealous  parti- 
sans of  Roman  authority,  was  a chieftain  named 
Segestes.  His  daughter,  Thusnelda,  was  pre-emi- 
nent among  the  noble  maidens  of  Germany.  Armi- 
nius had  sought  her  hand  in  marriage  ; but  Segestes, 
who  probably  discerned  the  young  cheif ’s  disaffec- 
tion to  Rome,  forbade  his  suit,  and  strove  to  preclude 
all  communication  between  him  and  his  daughter. 
Thusnelda,  however,  sympathized  far  more  with  the 
heroic  spirit  of  her  lover  than  with  the  time-serving 
policy  of  her  father.  An  elopement  baffled  the  pre- 
cautions of  Segestes,  who,  disappointed  in  his  hope 
of  preventing  the  marriage,  accused  Arminius  before 
the  Roman  governor  of  having  carried  off  his  daugh- 
ter, and  of  planning  treason  against  Rome.  Thus 
assailed,  and  dreading  to  see  his  bride  torn  from  him 
by  the  offlcials  of  the  foreign  oppressor.  Arminius  de- 
layed no  longer,  but  bent  all  his  energies  to  organize 
and  execute  a general  insurrection  of  the  great  mass 
of  his  countrymen  who  hitherto  had  submitted  in 
sullen  hatred  to  the  Roman  dominion. 

193.  A change  of  governors  had  recently  taken 


OVER  THE  ROMAH  LEGIONS. 


199 


place,  which,  while  it  materially  favored  the  ulti- 
mate success  of  the  insurgents,  served,  by  the  im- 
mediate aggravation  of  the  Roman  oppressions  which 
it  produced,  to  make  the  native  population  more 
universally  eager  to  take  arms.  Tiberius,  who  was 
afterward  emperor,  and  recently  been  recalled  from 
the  command  in  Germany,  and  sent  inta  Pannonia 
to  put  down  a dangerous  revolt  which  had  broken 
out  against  the  Romans  in  that  province.  The  Ger- 
man patriots  were  thus  delivered  from  the  stern 
supervision  of  one  of  the  most  suspicious  of  mankind, 
and  were  also  relieved  from  having  to  contend 
against  the  high  military  talents  of  a veteran  com- 
mander, who  thoroughly  understood  their  national 
character,  and  also  the  nature  of  the  country,  which 
he  himself  had  principally  subdued.  In  the  room  of 
Tiberius,  Augustus  sent  into  Germany  Quintilius 
Varus,  who  had  lately  returned  from  the  proconsu- 
late of  Syria.  Varus  was  a true  representative  of 
the  higher  classes  of  the  Romans,  among  whom  a gene- 
ral taste  for  literature,  a keen  susceptibility  to  all 
intellectual  gratifications,  a minute  acquaintance 
with  the  principles  and  practice  of  their  own  na- 
tional jurisprudence,  a careful  training  in  the 
schools  of  the  rhetoricians  and  a fondness  for  either 
partaking  in  or  watching  the  intellectual  strife  of 
forensic  oratory,  had  become  generally  diffused,  with- 
out, however,  having  humanized  the  old  Roman 
spirit  of  cruel  indifference  for  human  feelings  and 
human 'sufferings,  and  without  acting  as  the  least 
checks  on  unprincipled  avarice  and  ambition,  or  on 


200 


VICTORY  OF  ARMINIUS 


habitual  and  gross  profligacy.  Accustomed  to  govern 
the  depraved  and  debased  natives  of  Syria,  a country 
vrhere  courage  in  man  and  virtue  in  woman  had  for 
centuries  been  unknown,  Varus  thought  that  he 
might  gratify  his  licentious  and  rapacious  passions 
with  equal  impunity  among  the  high-minded  sons 
and  pure  spirted  daughters  of  Germany.*  When  the 
general  of  an  army  sets  the  example  of  outrages  of 
this  description,  he  is  soon  faithfully  imitated  by  his 
officers,  and  surpassed  by  his  still  more  brutal  sol- 
diery, The  Romans  now  habitually  indulged  in 
those  violations  of  the  sanctity  of  the  domestic 
shrine,  and  those  insults  upon  honor  and  modesty, 
by  which  far  less  gallant  spirits  than  those  of  our 


* I can  not  forbear  quoting  Macaulay’s  oeautiful  lines, 
where  he  describes  how  similar  outrages  in  the  early 
times  of  Rome  goaded  the  plebeians  to  rise  against  the 
patricians: 

“ Heap  heavier  still  the  fetters ; bar  closer  still  the  grate ; 

Patient  as  sheep  we  yield  us  up  unto  your  cruel  hate. 

But  by  the  shades  beneath  us,  and  by  the  gods  above. 

Add, not  unto  your  cruel  hate  your  still  more  cruel  love. 

* He  * * * 

Then  leave  the  poor  plebeian  his  single  tie  to  like— 

The  sweet,  sweet  love  of  daughter,  of  sister,  and  of  wife. 

The  gentle  speech,  the  balm  of  all  that  his  vex’d  soul 
endures. 

The  kiss  in  which  he  half  forgets  even  such  a yoke  as 
yours. 

Still  let  the  maiden’s  beauty  swell  the  father’s  breast 
with  pride; 

Still  let  the  bridegroom’s  arms  enfold  an  unpolluted 
bride. 

Spare  us  the  inexpiable  wrong,  the  unutterable  shame. 

That  turns  the  coward’s  heart  to  steel,  the  sluggard’s 
blood  to  dame: 

Lest  when  our  latest  hope  is  fled  yetaste  of  ourdespair. 

And  learn  by  proof,  in  some  wild  hour,  how  much  the 
wretched  dare.” 


OVER  THE  ROMAN  LEGIONS. 


201 


Teutonic  ancestors  have  often  been  maddened  into 
insurrection. 

194.  Arminius  found  among  the  other  German 
chiefs  many  who  sympathized  with  him  in  his  in- 
dignation at  their  country’s  abasement,  and  many 
whom  private  wrongs  had  stung  yet  more  deeply. 
There  was  little  difficulty  in  collecting  bold  leaders 
for  an  attack  on  the  oppressors,  and  little  fear  of  the 
population  not  rising  readily  at  those  leaders’  call. 
But  to  declare  open  war  against  Kome,  and  to  encoun- 
ter Varus’s  army  in  a pitched  hattle,^would  have  been 
merely  rushing  upon  certain  destruction.  Varus  had 
three  legions  under  him,  a force  which,  after  allow- 
ing for  detachments,  can  not  he  estimated  at  less 
than  fourteen  thousand  Roman  infantry.  He  had 
also  eight  or  nine  hundred  Roman  cavalry,  and  at 
least  an  equal  number  of  horse  and  foot  sent  from 
the  allied  states,  or  raised  among  those  provincials 
who  had  not  receiyed  the  Roman  franchise. 

195.  It  was  not  merely  the  number,  but  the  quality 
of  this  force  that  made  them  formidable ; and,  how- 
ever contemptible  Varus  might  he  as  a general,  Ar- 
minius well  knew  how  admirably  the  Roman  armies 
were  organized  and  officered,  and  how  perfectly  the 
legionaries  understood  every  maneuver  and  every 
duty  which  the  varying  emergencies  of  a stricken 
field  might  require.  Stratagem  was,  therefore,  indis- 
pensable ; and  it  was  necessary  to  blind  Varus  to 
their  schemes  until  a favorable  opportunity  should 
arrive  for  striking  a decisive  blow. 

196.  For  this  purpose,  the  German  confederates 


202 


VICTORY  OF  ARMINIUS 


frequented  the  headquarters  of  Varus,  which  seem 
to  have  been  near  the  centre  of  the  modern  country 
of  Westphalia,  where  the  Roman  general  conducted 
himself  with  all  the  arrogant  security  of  the  gov- 
ernor of  a perfectly  submissive  province.  There 
Varus  gratified  at  once  his  vanity,  his  rhetorical 
tastes,  and  his  avarice,  by  holding  courts,  to  which 
he  summoned  the  Germans  for  the  settlement  of  all 
their  disputes,  while  a bar  of  Roman  advocates  at- 
tended to  argue  the  cases  before  the  tribunal  of 
Varus,  who  did  not  omit  the  opportunity  of  exacting 
court-fees  and  accepting  bribes.  Varus  trusted  im- 
plicitly to  the  respect  which  the  Germans  pretended 
to  pay  to  his  abilities  as  a judge,  and  to  the  interest 
which  they  affected  to  take  in  the  forensic  eloquence 
of  their  conquerors.  Meanwhile,  a succession  of 
heavy  rains  rendered  the  country  more  difficult  for 
the  operations  of  regular  troops,  and  Arminius,  see- 
ing that  the  infatuation  of  Varus  was  complete, 
secretly  directed  the  tribes  near  the  Weser  and  the 
Ems  to  take  up  arms  in  open  revolt  against  the 
Romans.  This  was  represented  to  Varus  as  an  occa- 
sion which  required  his  prompt  attendance  at  the 
spot ; but  he  was  kept  in  studied  ignorance  of  its 
being  part  of  a concerted  national  rising ; and  he 
still  looked  on  Arminius  as  his  submissive  vassal, 
whose  aid  he  might  rely  on  in  facilitating  the  march 
of  his  troops  against  the  rebels,  and  in  extinguishing 
the  local  disturbance.  He  therefore  set  his  army  in 
motion,  and  marched  eastward  in  a line  parallel  to  the 
course  of  the  Lippe.  For  some  distance  his  route  lay 


OVER  THE  ROMAN  LEGIONS, 


203 


along  a level  plain ; but  on  arriving  at  the  tract  be- 
tween the  curve  of  the  upper  part  of  that  stream  and 
the  sources  of  the  Ems,  the  country  assumes  a very 
different  character ; and  here,  in  the  territory  of  the 
modem  little  principality  of  Lippe,  it  was  that  Ar- 
minius  had  fixed  the  scene  of  his  enterprise. 

197.  A woody  and  hilly  region  intervenes  between 
the  heads  of  the  two  rivers,  and  forms  the  water- 
shed of  their  streams.  This  region  still  retains  the 
name  (Teutoberger  = Teutobergiensis  saltus)  which 
it  bore  in  the  days  of  Arminius,  The  nature  of  the 
ground  has  probably  also  remained  unaltered.  The 
eastern  part  of  it,  round  Detmold,  the  modern  capi- 
tal of  the  principality  of  Lippe,  is  described  by  a 
modern  German  scholar.  Dr.  Platte,  as  being  a “table- 
land intersected  by  numerous  deep  and  narrow  val- 
leys, which  in  some  places  form  small  plains,  sur- 
rounded by  steep  mountains  and  rocks,  and  only  ac- 
cessible by  narrow  defiles.  All  the  valleys  are  trav- 
ersed by  rapid  streams,  shallow  in  the  dry  season, 
but  subject  to  sudden  swellings  in  autumn  and  win- 
ter. The  vast  forests  which  cover  the  summits  and 
slopes  of  the  hills  consist  chiefly  of  oak ; there  is 
little  underwood,  and  both  men  and  horse  would 
move  with  ease  in  the  forests  if  the  ground  were  not 
broken  by  gulleys,  or  rendered  impracticable  by 
fallen  trees.”  This  is  the  district  to  which  Varus  is 
supposed  to  have  marched  ; and  Dr.  Platte  adds,  that 
“the  names  of  several  localities  on  and  near  that 
spot  seem  to  indicate  that  a great  battle  has  once  been 
fought  there.  We  find  the  names  ‘ das  Winnefeld  ’ 


204 


VICTORY  OF  ABMINIUS 


(the  field  of  victory),  ‘die  Knochenbahn’  (the  hone- 
lane),  ‘die  Knochenleke’  (the  bone-brook),  ‘ der 
Mordkessel  ’ (the  kettle  of  slaughter),  and  others.”* 

198.  Contrary  to  the  usual  strict  principles  of 
Roman  discipline,  Varus  had  suffered  his  army  to  be 
accompanied  and  impeded  by  an  immense  train  of 
baggage- wagons  and  by  a rabble  of  camp  followers, 
as  if  his  troops  had  been  merely  changing  their  quar- 
ters in  a friendly  country.  When  the  long  array 
quitted  the  firm  level  ground,  and  began  to  wind  its 
way  among  the  woods,  the  marshes,  and  the  ravines, 
the  difficulties  of  the  march,  even  without  the  inter- 
vention of  an  armed  foe,  became  fearfully  apparent. 
In  many  places,  the  soil,  sodden  with  rain,  was  im- 
practicable for  cavalry,  and  even  for  infantry,  until 
trees  had  been  felled,  and  a rude  causeway  formed 
through  the  morass. 

199.  The  duties  of  the  engineer  were  familiar  to 
all  who  served  in  the  Roman  armies.  But  the  crowd 
and  confusion  of  the  columns  embarrassed  the  work- 
ing parties  of  the  soldiery,  and  in  the  midst  of  their 
toil  and  disorder  the  word  was  suddenly  passed 
through  their  ranks  that  the  rear  guard  was  at- 
tacked by  the  barbarians.  Varus  resolved  on  press- 
ing forward  ; but  a heavy  discharge  of  missiles  from 
the  woods  on  either  fiank  taught  him  how  serious 
was  the  peril,  and  he  saw  his  best  men  falling  round 
him  without  the  opportunity  of  retaliation ; for  his 
light-armed  auxiliaries,  who  were  principally  of 

* I am  indebted  for  much  valuable  information  on  this 
subject  to  my  friend,  Mr.  Henry  Pearson. 


OVER  THE  ROMAN  LEGIONS. 


205 


Germanic  race,  now  rapidly  deserted,  and  it  was  im- 
possible to  deploy  the  legionaries  on  such  broken 
ground  for  a charge  against  the  enemy.  Choosing 
one  of  the  most  open  and  firm  spots  which  they  could 
force  their  way  to,  the  Komans  halted  for  the  night ; 
and,  faithful  to  their  national  discipline  and  tactics, 
formed  their  camp  amid  the  harassing  attacks  of  the 
rapidly  thronging  foes,  with  the  elaborate  toil  and 
systematic  skill,  the  traces  of  which  are  impressed 
permanently  on  the  soil  of  so  many  European  coun- 
tries, attesting  the  presence  in  the  olden  time  of  the 
imperial  eagles. 

200.  On  the  morrow  the  Romans  renewed  their 
march,  the  veteran  officers  who  served  under  Varus 
now  probably  directing  the  operations,  and  hoping 
to  find  the  Germans  drawn  up  to  meet  them,  in 
which  case  they  relied  on  their  own  superior  disci- 
pline and  tactics  for  such  a victory  as  should  reassure 
the  supremacy  of  Rome.  But  Arminius  was  far  too 
sage  a commander  to  lead  on  his  followers,  with  their 
unwieldy  broadswords  and  inefficient  defensive 
armor,  against  the  Roman  legionaries,  fully  armed 
with  helmet,  cuirass,  greaves,  and  shield,  who  were 
skilled  to  commence  the  confiict  with  a murderous 
volley  of  heavy  javelins,  hurled  upon  the  foe  when  a 
few  yards  distant,  and  then,  with  their  short  cut- 
and-thrust  swords,  to  hew  their  way  through  all 
opposition,  preserving  the  utmost  .steadiness  and 
coolness,  and  obeying  each  word  of  command  in  the 
midst  of  strife  and  slaughter  with  the  same  precision 


206 


VICTORY  OF  ABMINIUS 


and  alertness  as  if  upon  parade  * Arminius  suffered 
the  Romans  to  march  out  from  their  camp,  to  form 
first  in  line  for  action,  and  then  in  column  for  march- 
ing, without  the  show  of  opposition.  For  some  dis- 
tance Varus  was  allowed  to  move  on,  only  harassed 
by  slight  skirmishes,  but  struggling  with  difiBiculty 
through  the  broken  ground,  the  toil  and  distress  of 
his  men  being  aggravated  by  heavy  torrents  of  rain, 
which  burst  upon  the  devoted  legions,  as  if  the  angry 
gods  of  Germany  were  pouring  out  the  vials  of  their 
wrath  upon  the  invaders.  After  some  little  time 
their  van  approached  a ridge  of  high  woody  ground, 
which  is  one  of  the  offshoots  of  the  great  Hercynian 
forest,  and  is  situate  between  the  modern  villages  of 
Driburg  and  Bielefeld.  Arminius  had  caused  barri- 
cades of  hewn  trees  to  be  formed  here,  so  as  to  add 
to  the  natural  difficulties  of  the  passage.  Fatigue 
and  discouragement  now  began  to  betray  themselves 
in  the  Roman  ranks.  Their  line  became  less  steady ; 
baggage- wagons  were  abandoned  from  the  impossi- 
bility of  forcing  them  along ; and,  as  this  happened 
many  soldiers  left  their  ranks  and  crowded  round  the 
wagons  to  secure  the  most  valuable  portions  of  their 
property : each  was  busy  about  his  own  affairs,  and 
purposely  slow  in  hearing  the  word  of  command  from 
his  officers.  Arminius  now  gave  the  signal  for  a gen- 
eral attack.  The  fierce  shouts  of  the  Germans  pealed 

* See  Gibbon’s  description  (vol.  i.,  chap,  i.)  of  the  Ro- 
man legions  in  the  time  of  Augustus;  and  see  the  de- 
scription in  Tacitus,  “Ann.,”  lib.  i.,of  the  subsequent  bat- 
tles between  Caecina  and  Arminius. 


OVER  THE  ROMAN  LEGIONS. 


207 


through  the  gloom  of  the  forests,  and  in  thronging 
multitudes  they  assailed  the  flanks  of  the  invad- 
ers, pouring  in  clouds  of  darts  on  the  encumbered 
legionaries,  as  they  struggled  up  the  glens  or  floun- 
dered in  the  morasses,  and  watching  every  opportu- 
nity of  charging  through  the  intervals  of  the  dis- 
jointed column,  and  so  cutting  off  the  copimunica- 
tion  between  its  several  brigades.  Arminius,  with  a 
chosen  band  of  personal  retainers  round  him,  cheered 
on  his  countrymen  by  voice  and  example.  He  and 
his  men  aimed  their  weapons  particularly  at  the 
horses  of  the  Roman  cavalry.  The  wounded  animals, 
slipping  about  in  the  mire  and  their  own  blood, 
threw  their  riders  and  plunged  among  the  ranks  of 
the  legions,  disordering  all  round  them.  Varus  now 
ordered  the  troops  to  be  countermarched,  in  the 
hope  of  reaching  the  nearest  Roman  garrison  on  the 
Lippe.*  But  retreat  now  was  as  impracticable  as 
advance ; and  the  falling  back  of  the  Romans  only 
augmented  the  courage  of  their  assailants,  and 


* The  circumstances  of  the  early  part  of  the  battle 
which  Arminius  fought  with  Caecina  six  years  afterward 
evidently  resembled  those  of  his  battle  with  Varus,  and 
the  result  was  very  near  being  the  same:  I havethere- 
f ore  adopted  part  of  the  description  which  Tacitus  gives 
(‘•Annal,,”  lib  i.,  c.  65)  of  the  last-mentioned  engage- 
ment: “Neque  tamen  Arminius,  quamquam  libero  in- 
cursa,  statim  prurupit:  sed  ut  hgesere  coeno  fossisque 
impedimenta,  turbati  circum  milites;  incertus  signorum 
ordo;  utque  talion  tempore  sibi  quisque  properus,  et 
lentae  adversum  mperia  aures,  irrumpere  Germanos 
jubet,  clamitans  ‘ En  varus,  et  eodem  iterum  fate  victae 
legiones!’  Simul  haec,  et  cum  delectis  scindit  agmen, 
equisque  maxime  vulnera  ingerit ; illi  sanguine  suo  et 
lubrico  paludum  lapsantes,  excussis  rectoribus,  disjicere 
obvois , proterere  jacentes .” 


208 


VICTORY  OF  ABMINIUS 


caused  fiercer  and  more  frequent  charges  on  the 
fianks  of  the  disheartened  army.  The  Roman  officer 
who  commanded  the  cavalry,  Numonius  Vala,  rode 
off  with  his  squadrons  in  the  vain  hope  of  escaping 
by  thus  abandoning  his  comrades.  Unable  to  keep 
together,  or  force  their  way  across  the  woods  and 
swamps,  the  horsemen  were  overpowered  in  detail, 
and  slaughtered  to  the  last  man.  The  Roman  in- 
fantry still  held  together  and  resisted,  but  more 
through  the  instinct  of  discipline  and  bravery  than 
from  any  hope  of  success  or  escape.  Varus,  after 
being  severely  wounded  in  a charge  of  the  Germans 
against  his  part  of  the  column,  committed  suicide  to 
avoid  falling  into  the  hands  of  those  whom  he  had 
exasperated  by  his  oppressions.  One  of  the  lieuten- 
ant generals  of  the  army  fell  fighting;  the  other  sur- 
rendered to  the  enemy.  But  mercy  to  a fallen  foe 
had  never  been  a Roman  virtue,  and  those  among 
her  legions  who  now  laid  down  their  arms  in  hope 
of  quarter,  drank  deep  of  the  cup  of  suffering,  which 
Rome  had  held  to  the  lips  of  many  a brave  but  unfor- 
tunate enemy.  The  infuriated  Germans  slaughtered 
their  oppressors  with  deliberate  ferocity,  and  those 
prisoners  who  were  not  hewn  to  pieces  on  the  spot 
were  only  preserved  to  perish  by  a more  cruel  death 
in  cold  blood. 

201.  The  bulk  of  the  Roman  army  fought  steadily 
and  stubbornly,  frequently  repelling  the  masses  of  the 
assailants,  but  gradually  losing  the  compactness  of 
their  array,  and  becoming  weaker  and  weaker  beneath 
the  incessant  shower  of  darts  and  the  reiterated  as- 


OVER  THE  ROMAN  LEGIONS. 


209 


saults  of  the  vigorous  and  unencumbered  Germans.  At 
last,  in  a series  of  desperate  attacks,  the  column  was 
pierced  through  and  through,  two  of  the  eagles  cap- 
tured, and  the  Eoman  host,  which  on  the  y ester 
morning  had  marched  forth  in  such  pride  and  might, 
now  broken  up  into  confused  fragments,  either  fell 
fighting  beneath  the  overpowering  numbers  of  the 
enemy,  or  perished  in  the  swamps  and  woocis  in  una- 
vailing eiforts  at  flight.  Few,  very  few,  ever  saw 
again  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  One  body  of  brave 
veterans,  arraying  themselves  in  a ring  on  a little 
mound,  beat  off  every  charge  of  the  Germans,  and 
prolonged  their  honorable  resistance  to  the  close  of 
that  dreadful  day.  The  traces  of  a feeble  attempt 
at  forming  a ditch  and  mound  attested  in  after  years 
the  spot  where  the  last  of  the  Romans  passed  their 
night  of  suffering  and  despair.  But  on  the  morrow, 
this  remnant  also,  worn  out  with  hunger,  wounds, 
and  toil,  was  charged  by  the  victorious  Germans, 
and  either  massacred  on  the  spot,  or  offered  up  in 
fearful  rites  at  the  altars  of  the  deities  of  the  old 
mythology  of  the  North. 

202.  A gorge  in  the  mountain  ridge,  through 
which  runs  the  modern  road  between  Paderborn  and 
Pyrmont,  leads  from  the  spot  where  the  heat  of  the 
battle  raged  to  the  Extersteine,  a cluster  of  bold  and 
grotesque  rocks  of  sandstone,  near  which  is  a small 
sheet  of  water,  overshadowed  by  a grove  of  aged 
trees.  According  to  local  tradition,  this  was  one  of 
the  sacred  groves  of  the  ancient  Germans,  and  it  was 


210 


VICTORY  OF  ARMINIUS 


here  that  the  Roman  captives  were  slain  in  sacrifice 
by  the  victorious  warriors  of  Arminius.* 

203.  Never  was  victory  more  decisive,  never  was 
the  liberation  of  an  oppressed  people  more  instanta- 
neous and  complete.  Throughout  Germany  the 
Roman  garrisons  were  assailed  and  cut  off;  and^ 
within  a few  weeks  after  Varus  had  fallen,  the  Ger- 
man soil  was  freed  from  the  foot  of  an  invader. 

204.  At  Rome  the  tidings  of  the  battle  were  re- 
ceived with  an  agony  of  terror,  the  reports  of  which 
we  should  deem  exaggerated,  did  they  not  come  from 
Roman  historians  themselves.  They  not  only  tell 
emphatically  how  great  was  the  awe  which  the  Ro- 
mans felt  of  the  prowess  of  the  Germans,  if  their  va- 
rious tribes  could  be  brought  to  unite  lor  a common 
purpose,!  but  also  they  reveal  how  weakened  and 
debased  the  population  of  Italy  had  become.  Dion 
Cassius  says  (lib.  Ivi.,  sec.  23),  ‘‘Then  Augustus,  when 
he  heard  the  calamity  of  Varus,  rent  his  gar- 
ment, and  was  in  great  affliction  for  the  troops  he  had 
lost,  and  for  terror  respecting  the  Germans  and  the 

* “ Lucis  propinquis  barbarae  arse,  apud  quas  tribunes 
ac  primorum  ordinum  centuriones  mactaverant.”— Taci- 
tus, An?i.,  lib.  i.,  c.  61. 

+ It  is  clear  that  the  Romans  followed  the  policy  of  fo- 
menting- dissensions  and  wars  of  the  Germans  among- 
themselves.  See  the  thirty-third  section  of  the  “Germa- 
nia” of  Tacitus,  where  ha  mentions  the  destruction  of 
the  Bructeri  by  the  neig-hboring-  tribes:  “Favorequodam 
erga  nosdeorum : nam  ne  spectaculo  quidem  proelii  invi- 
dere:  super  lx.  millia  non  armis  telisque  Romanis,  sed 
quod  magnificentius  est,  obleotationi  oculisque  cecider^ 
unt.  Maneat  quaeso,  duretque  gentibus,  si  non  amor 
nostri.  af  certe  odium  sui:  quando  urgentibus  imperii 
fatis,  nihil  jam  praastare  fortuna  majus  potest  quam  hosn 
tium  discordiam.” 


OVER  THE  ROMAN  LEGIONS. 


211 


Gauls.  Aud  his  chief  alarm  was,  that  he  expected 
them  to  push  on  against  Italy  and  Rome ; and  there 
remained  no  Roman  youth  fit  for  military  duty  that 
were  worth  speaking  of,  and  the  allied  populations, 
that  were  at  all  serviceable,  had  been  wasted  away. 
Yet  he  prepared  for  the  emergency  as  well  as  his 
means  allowed;  and  when  none  of  the  citizens  of 
military  age  were  willing  to  enlist,  he  made  them 
cast  lots,  and  punished  by  confiscation  of  goods  and 
disfranchisement  every  fifth  man  among  those  under 
thirty-five,  and  every  tenth  man  of  those  above  that 
age.  At  last,  when  he  found  that  not  even  thus 
could  he  make  many  come  forward,  he  put  some  of 
them  to  death.  So  he  made  a conscription  of  dis- 
charged veterans  and  of  emancipated  slaves,  and,  col- 
lecting as  large  a force  as  he  could,  sent  it,  under 
Tiberius,  with  all  speed  into  Germany.” 

205.  Dion  mentions,  also,  a number  of  terrific  por- 
tents that  were  believed  to  have  occurred  at  the  time, 
and  the  narration  of  which  is  not  immaterial,  as  it 
shows  the  state  of  the  public  mind,  when  such  things 
were  so  believed  in  and  so  interpreted.  The  summit 
of  the  Alps  were  said  to  have  fallen,  and  three  col- 
umns of  fire  to  have  blazed  up  from  them.  In  the 
Campus  Martius,  the  temple  of  the  war-god,  from 
whom  the  founder  of  Rome  had  sprung,  was  struck  by 
thunderbolt.  The  nightly  heavens  glowed  several 
times,  as  if  on  fire.  Many  comets  blazed  forth  to- 
gether ; and  fiery  meteors,  shaped  like  spears,  had  shot 
from  the  northern  quarter  of  the  sky  down  into  the 
Roman  camps.  It  was  said,  too,- that  a statue  of  Victory 


212 


VICTORY  OF  ABMINIUS 


which  had  stood  at  a place  on  the  frontier,  pointing 
the  way  toward  Germany,  had  of  its  own  accord, 
turned  round,  and  now  pointed  to  Italy.  These  and 
other  prodigies  were  believed  by  the  multitude  to 
accompany  the  slaughter  of  Varus’s  legions,  and  to 
manifest  the  anger  of  the  gods  against  Rome.  Au- 
gustus himself  was  not  free  from  superstition  ; hut  on 
this  occasion  no  supernatural  terrors  were  needed  to 
increase  the  alarm  and  grief  that  he  felt,  and  which 
made  him  even  months  after  the  news  of  the 
battle  had  arrived,  often  heat  his  head  against  the 
wall,  and  exclaim,  “Quintilius  Yarns,  give  me  hack 
my  legions.”  We  learn  this  from  his  biographer 
Suetonius ; and,  indeed,  every  ancient  writer  who  al- 
ludes to  the  overthrow  of  Varus  attests  the  impor- 
tance of  the  blow  against  the  Roman  power,  and  the 
bitterness  with  which  it  was  felt.* 

206.  The  Germans  did  not  pursue  their  victory 
beyond  their  own  territory  ; but  that  victory  secured 
at  once  and  forever  the  independence  of  the  Teutonic 
race.  Rome  sent,  indeed,  her  legions  again  into 
Germany,  to  parade  a temporary  superiority,  but  all 
hopes  of  permanent  conquests  were  abandoned  by 
Augustus  and  his  successors 

207.  The  blow  which  Arminius  had  struck  never 
was  forgotten.  Roman  fear  disguised  itself  under 
the  specious  title  of  moderation,  and  the  Rhine  be- 
came the  acknowledged  boundary  of  the  two  nations 

* Florus  expresses  its  effect  most  pithily:  “Hac  clade 
factum  est  utimperiumquodiniitore  oceani  non  steterat, 
in  ripa  Rheni  fluminis  stai’et,”  iv^,  12. 


ABMINIUS. 


213 


until  the  fifth  century  of  our  era,  when  the  Germans 
become  the  assailants,  and  carved  with  their  con- 
quering swords  the  provinces  of  imperial  Kome  into 
the  kingdoms  of  modern  Europe. 


Arminius.  ( 

208.  I have  said  above  that  the  great  Cheruscan  is 
more  truly  one  of  our  national  heroes  than  Caractacus  is. 
It  may  be  added  that  an  Englishman  is  entitled  to 
claim  a closer  degree  of  relationship  with  Arminius 
than  can  be  claimed  by  any  German  of  modern  Ger- 
many. The  proof  of  this  depends  on  the  proof  of 
four  facts:  first,  that  the  Cheruscans  were  Old  Sax- 
ons, or  Saxons  of  the  interior  of  Germany ; secondly, 
that  the  Anglo-Saxons,  or  Saxons  of  the  coast  of  Ger- 
many, were  more  closely  akin  than  other  German 
tribes  were  to  the  Cheruscan  Saxons ; thirdly,  that 
the  Old  Saxons  were  almost  exterminated  by  Charle- 
magne ; fourthly,  that  the  Anglo-Saxons  are  our  im- 
mediate ancestors.  The  last  of  these  may  be  assumed 
as  an  axiom  in  English  history.  The  proofs  of  the 
other  three  are  partly  philological  and  partly  his- 
torical. I have  not  space  to  go  into  them  here,  but 
they  will  be  found  in  the  early  chapters  of  the  great 
work  of  my  friend.  Dr.  Robert  Gordon  Latham,  on 
the  “English  Language,”  and  in  the  notes  to  his 
forthcoming  editions  of  the  “Germania  of  Tacitus.” 
It  may  be,  however,  here  remarked,  that  the  present 
Saxons  of  Germany  are  of  the  High  Germanic  divis- 


214 


ABMINIUS, 


ion  of  the  German  race,  whereas  both  the  Anglo-Sax- 
ons and  Old  Saxons  were  of  the  Low  Germanic. 

209.  Being  thus  the  nearest  heirs  of  the  glory  of 
Arminius,  we  may  fairly  devote  more  attention  to 
his  career  than,  in  such  a work  as  the  present,  could 
be  allowed  to  any  individual  leader ; and  it  is  inter- 
esting to  trace  how  far  his  fame  survived  during  the 
Middle  Ages,  both  among  the  Germans  of  the  conti- 
nent and  among  ourselves. 

210.  It  seems  probable  with  the  jealousy  with 
which  Maroboduus,  the  king  of  the  Suevi  and  Mar- 
comanni,  regarded  Arminius.  and  which  ultimately 
broke  out  into  open  hostilities  between  those  German 
tribes  and  the  Cherusci,  prevented  Arminius  from 
leading  the  confederate  Germans  to  attack  Italy  af- 
ter his  first  victory.  Perhaps  he  may  have  had  the 
rare  moderation  of  being  content  with  the  liberation 
of  his  country,  without  seeking  to  retaliate  on  her 
former  oppressors.  When  Tiberius  marched  into 
Germany  in  the  year  10,  Arminius  was  too  cautious 
to  attack  him  on  ground  favorable  to  the  legions,  and 
Tiberius  was  too  skillful  to  entangle  his  troops  in  the 
difiicult  parts  of  the  country.  His  march  and  coun- 
termarch were  as  unresisted  as  they  were  unproduc- 
tive. A few  years  later,  when  a dangerous  revolt  of 
the  Eoman  legions  near  the  frontier  caused  their 
generals  to  find  them  active  employment  by  leading 
them  into  the  interior  of  Germany,  we  find  Armin- 
ius again  active  in  his  country’s  defense.  The  old 
quarrel  between  him  and  his  father-in-law,  Segestes, 
had  broken  out  afresh.  Segestes  now  called  in  the  aid 


AUMimUB. 


215 


of  the  Roman  general,  Germanicus,  to  whom  he  sur- 
rendered himself ; and  by  his  contrivance,  his  daugh- 
ter Thusnelda,  the  wife  of  Arminius,  also  came  into 
the  hands  of  the  Romans,  being  far  advanced  in 
pregnancy.  She  showed,  as  Tacitus  relates,*  more  of 
the  spirit  of  her  husband  than  of  her  father,  a spirit 
that  could  not  be  subdued  into  tears  or  supplica- 
tions. She  was  sent  to  Ravenna,  and  there  gave 
birth  to  a son,  whose  life  we  know,  from  an  illusion 
in  Tacitus,  to  have  been  eventful  and  unhappy  ; 
but  the  part  of  the  great  historian’s  work  which 
narrated  his  fate  has  perished,  and  we  only  know 
from  another  quarter  that  the  son  of  Arminius  was, 
at  the  age  of  four  years,  led  captive  in  a triumphal 
pageant  along  the  streets  of  Rome. 

21 1 . The  high  spirit  of  Arminius  was  goaded  almost 
into  phrensy  by  these  bereavements.  The  fate  of  his 
wife,  thus  torn  from  him,  and  of  his  babe  doomed  to 
bondage  even  before  its  birth,  inflamed  the  eloquent 
invectives  with  which  he  roused  his  countrymen 
against  the  home- traitors,  and  against  their  invaders, 
who  thus  made  war  upon  women  and  children. 
Germanicus  had  marched  his  army  to  the  place  where 
Varus  had  perished,  and  had  there  paid  funeral 
honors  to  the  ghastly  relics  of  his  predecessor’s 
legions  that  he  found  heaped  around  him.f  Arminius 
lured  him  to  advance  a little  farther  into  the  coun- 

* “Ann.”  i.,  57. 

t In  the  Museum  of  Rhenish  Antiquities  at  Bonn  there 
is  a Roman  sepulchral  monument,  the  inscription  on 
which  records  that  it  was  erected  to  the  memory  of  M. 
Ccelius,  who  fell  “ Bello  Variano.'* 


216 


ABM1N1U8. 


try,  and^  then  assailed  him,  and  fought  a battle 
which,  by  the  Roman  accounts,  was  a drawn  one. 
The  effect  of  it  was  to  make  Germanicus  resolve  on 
retreating  to  the  Rhine.  He  himself,  with  part  of 
his  troops,  embarked  in  some  vessels  on  the 
Ems,  and  returned  by  that  river,  and  then  by 
sea ; but  part  of  his  forces  were  intrusted  to  a Roman 
general  named  Csecina,  to  lead  them  back  by  land  to 
the  Rhine.  Arminius  followed  this  division  on  its 
march,  and  fought  several  battles  with  it,  in  which 
he  inflicted  heavy  loss  on  the  Romans,  captured  the 
greater  part  of  their  baggage,  and  would  have  d^ 
stroyed  them  completely,  had  not  his  skilllul  sys- 
tem of  operation  been  finally  thwarted  by  the  haste 
of  Inguiomerus,  a confederate  German  chief,  who  in- 
sisted on  assaulting  the  Romans  in  their  camp  in- 
stead of  waiting  till  they  were  entangled  in  the 
difficulties  of  the  country,  and  assailing  their  col- 
umns on  the  march. 

212.  In  the  following  year  the  Romans  were  in- 
active, but  in  the  year  afterward  Germanicus  led  a 
fresh  invasion.  He  placed  his  army  on  shipboard, 
and  sailed  to  the  mouth  of  the  Ems,  where  he  dis- 
embarked, and  marched  to  the  Weser,  where  he  en- 
camped, probably  in  the  neighborhood  of  Minden. 
Arminius  had  collected  his  army  on  the  other  side  of 
the  river;  and  a scene  occurred,  which  is  power- 
fully told  by  Tacitus,  and  which  is  the  subject  of  a 
beautiful  poem  by  Praed.  It  has  been  already  men- 
tioned that  the  brother  of  Arminius,  like  himself, 
had  been  trained  up  while  young  to  serve  in  the 


AEMINIU8, 


217 


Roman  armies;  but,  unlike  Arminius,  he  not  only 
refused  to  quit  the  Roman  service  for  that  of  his 
country,  but  fought  against  his  country  with  the 
legions  of  Germanicus.  He  had  assumed  the  Roman 
name  of  Flavius,  and  had  gained  considerable  dis- 
tinction in  the  Roman  service,  in  which  he  had  lost 
an  eye  from  a wound  in  battle.  When  the  Roman 
outposts  approached  the  River  Weser,  Arminius 
called  out  to  them  from  the  opposite  bank,  and  ex- 
pressed a wish  to  see  his  brother.  Flavius  stepped 
forward,  and  Arminius  ordered  his  own  followers  to 
retire,  aud  requested  that  the  archers  should  be  re- 
moved from  the  Roman  bank  of  the  river.  This  was 
done ; and  the  brothers,  who  apparently  had  not 
seen  each  other  for  some  years,  began  a conversation 
from  the  opposite  sides  of  the  stream,  in  which 
Arminius  questioned  his  brother  respecting  the  loss 
of  his  eye,  and  what  battle  it  had  been  lost  in,  and 
what  reward  he  had  received  for  his  wound.  Flavius 
told  him  how  the  eye  was  lost,  and  mentioned  the 
increased  pay  that  he  had  on  account  of  its  loss,  and 
showed  the  collar  and  other  military  decorations  that 
had  been  given  him.  Arminius  mocked  at  these  as 
badges  of  slavery ; and  then  each  began  to  try  to  win 
the  other  over, Flavius  boasting  the  power  of  Rome? 
and  her  generosity  to  the  submissive ; Arminius 
appealing  to  him  in  the  name  of  their  country’s  gods, 
of  the  mother  that  had  borne  them  and  by  the  holy 
names  of  fatherland  and  freedom,  not  to  prefer  being 
the  betrayer  to  being  the  champion  of  his  country. 
They  soon  proceeded  to  mutual  taunts  and  menaces, 


218 


ABMINIUS. 


and  Flavius  called  aloud  for  his  horse  and  his  arms, 
that  he  might  dash  across  the  river  and  attack  his 
brother  ; nor  would  he  have  been  checked  from  doing 
so,  had  not  the  Roman  general  Stertinius  run  up  to 
him  and  forcibly  detained  him  Arminius  stood  on 
the  other  bank,  threatening  the  renegade,  and  defy- 
ing him  to  battle. 

213.  I shall  not  be  thought  to  need  apology  for 
quoting  here  the  stanzas  in  which  Praed  has  de- 
scribed this  scene — a scene  among  the  most  affecting, 
as  well  as  the  most  striking,  that  history  supplies. 
It  makes  us  reflect  on  the  desolate  position  of 
Arminius,  with  his  wife  and  child  captives  in  the 
enemy’s  hands,  and  with  his  brother  a renegade 
in  arms  against  him.  The  great  liberator  of  our 
German  race  was  there,  with  every  source  of  human 
happiness  denied  him  except  the  consciousness  of 
doing  his  duty  to  his  country. 

314  Back,  back ! he  fears  not  foaming  flood 
Who  fears  not  steel-clad  line: 

No  warrior  thou  of  German  blood, 

No  brother  thou  of  mine. 

Go,  earn  Rome's  chain  to  load  thy  neck, 

Her  gems  to  deck  thy  hilt; 

And  blazon  honor’s  hapless  wreck 
With  all  the  gauds  of  guilt. 

But  wouldst  thou  have  me  share  the  prey? 

By  all  that  1 have  done. 

The  Varian  bones  that  day  by  day 
Lie  whitening  in  the  sun, 

' The  legion’s  trampled  panoply, 

The  eagle’s  shatter’d  wing— 

I would  not  be  for  earth  or  sky 
So  scorn’d  and  mean  a thing, 


ARMIN1U8. 


219 


Ho,  call  me  here  the  wizard,  boy, 

Of  dark  and  subtle  skill. 

To  agonize  but  not  destroy, 

To  torture,  not  to  kill. 

When  swords  are  out,  and  shrieks  and  shout 
Leave  little  room  for  prayer. 

No  fetter  on  man’s  arm  or  heart 
Hangs  half  so  heavy  there. 

I curse  him  by  the  gifts  the  land 
Hath  won  from  him  and  Rome, 

The  riving  axe,  the  wasting  brand. 

Rent  forest,  blazing  home. 

I curse  him  by  our  country’s  gods. 

The  terrible,  the  dark. 

The  breakers  of  the  Roman  rods. 

The  smiters  of  the  bark. 

Oh,  misery  that  such  a ban 
On  such  a blow  should  be  1 
Why  comes  he  not  in  battle’s  van 
His  country’s  chief  to  be? 

To  stand  a comrade  by  my  side. 

The  sharer  of  my  fame. 

And  worthy  of  a brother’  pride 
And  of  a brother’s  name  ? 

But  it  is  past ! where  heroes  press 
And  cowards  bend  the  knee, 

Arminius  is  not  brotherless. 

His  brethren  are  the  free. 

They  come  around : one  hour,  and  light 
Will  fade  from  turf  and  tide. 

Then  onward,  onward  to  the  fight. 

With  darkness  for  our  guide. 

To-night,  to-night,  when  we  shall  meet 
In  combat  face  to  face, 

Then  only  would  Arminius  greet 
The  renegrade’s  embrace, 


220 


ABMINIUS. 


The  canker  of  Rome’s  guilt  shall  be 
Upon  his  dying  name; 

And  as  he  lived  in  slavery, 

So  shall  he  fall  in  shame. 

215.  On  the  day  after  the  Romans  had  reached  the 
Weser,  Germanicus  led  his  army  across  that  river, 
and  a partial  encounter  took  place,  in  which  Arminius 
was  successful.  But  on  the  succeeding  day  a general 
action  was  fought,  in  which  Arminius  was  severely 
wounded,  and  the  German  infantry  routed  with 
heavy  loss.  The  horsemen  of  the  two  armies  en- 
countered, without  either  party  gaining  the  advan- 
tage. But  the  Roman  army  remained  master  of  the 
ground,  and  claimed  a complete  victory.  Germani- 
cus erected  a trophy  in  the  field,  with  a vaunting  in- 
scription, that  the  nations  between  the  Rhine  and 
the  Elbe  had  been  thoroughly  conquered  by  his  army. 
But  that  army  speedily  made  a final  retreat  to  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine ; nor  was  the  efiect  of  their 
campaign  more  durable  than  their  trophy.  The  sar- 
casm with  which  Tacitus  speaks  of  certain  other 
triumphs  of  Roman  generals  over  Germans  may  apply 
to  the  pageant  which  Germanicus  celebrated  on  his 
return  to  Rome  from  his  command  of  the  Roman 
army  of  the  Rhine.  The  Germans  were  “ triumphati 
potius  quam  victiJ^ 

216.  After  the  Romans  had  abandoned  their  at- 
tempts on  Germany,  we  find  Arminius  engaged  in 
hostilities  with  Maroboduus,  the  king  of  the  Suevi 
and  Marcomanni,  who  was  endeavoring  to  bring  the 
other  German  tribes  into  a state  of  dependency  on 


AEMINIUS, 


221 


him.  Arminius  was  at  the  head  of  the  Germans  who 
took  up  arms  against  this  home  invader  of  their 
liberties.  After  some  minor  engagements,  a pitched 
battle  was  fought  between  the  two  confederacies,  A. 
D.  19,  in  which  the  loss  on  each  side  was  equal,  but 
Maroboduus  confessed  the  ascendency  of  his  antag- 
onist by  avoiding  a renewal  of  the  engagement,  and 
by  imploring  the  intervention  of  the  Romans  in  his 
defense.  The  younger  Drusus  then  commanded  the 
Roman  legions  in  the  province  of  Illyricum,  and  by 
his  mediation  a peace  was  concluded  between  Ar- 
minius and  Maroboduus,  by  the  terms  of  which  it  is 
evident  that  the  latter  must  have  renounced  his  am- 
bitious schemes  against  the  freedom  of  the  other 
German  tribes. 

217.  Arminius  did  not  long  survive  this  second  war 
of  independence,  which  he  successfully  waged  for  his 
country.  He  was  assassinated  in  the  thirty-seventh 
year  of  his  age  by  some  of  his  own  kinsmen,  who 
conspired  against  him.  Tacitus  says  that  this  hap- 
pened while  he  was  engaged  in  a civil  war,  which 
had  been  caused  by  his  attempt  to  make  himself  king 
over  his  countrymen.  It  is  far  more  probable  (as 
one  of  the  best  biographers*  has  observed)  that  Taci- 
tus misunderstood  an  attempt  of  Arminius  to  extend 
his  influence  as  elective  war-chieftain  of  the  Cherusci, 
and  other  tribes,  for  an  attempt  to  obtain  the  royal 
dignity.  When  we  remember  that  his  father-in-law 
and  his  brother  were  renegades,  we  can  well  under- 

* Dr.  Platte,  in  “Biographical  Dictionary,  ’ commenced 
by  the  Society  for  the  Diffusion  of  Useful  Knowledge. 


222 


ABMINIUS. 


stand  that  a party  among  his  kinsmen  may  have  been 
bitterly  hostile  to  him,  and  have  opposed  his  au- 
thority with  the  tribe  by  open  violence,  and,  when 
that  seemed  ineffectual,  by  secret  assassination. 

218.  Arminius  left  a name  which  the  historians  of 
the  nation  against  which  he  combated  so  long  and  so 
gloriously  have  delighted  to  honor.  It  is  from  the 
most  indisputable  source,  from  the  lips  of  enemies 
that  we  know  his  exploits.*  His  countrymen  made 
history,  but  did  not  write  it.  But  his  memory  lived 
among  them  in  the  lays  of  their  bards,  who  recorded 
The  deeds  he  did,  the  fields  he  won, 

The  freedom  he  restored. 

Tacitus,  writing  years  after  the  death  of  Arminius 
says  of  him,  “ Canitur  adhuc  barbaras  apud  gentes.’ 
As  time  passed  on,  the  gratitude  of  ancient  Germany 
to  her  great  deliverer  sjrew  into  adoration,  and  divine 
honors  were  paid  for  centuries  to  Arminius  by  every 
tribe  of  the  Low  Germanic  division  of  the  Teutonic 
races.  The  Irmin-sul,  or  the  column  of  Herman, 
near  Eresburgh,  the  modern  Stadtberg,  was  the 
chosen  object  of  worship  to  the  descendants  of  the 
Cherusci,  the  Old  Saxons,  and  in  defense  of  which 
they  fought  most  desperately  against  Charlemagne 
and  his  Christianized  Franks.  “ Irmin,  in  the  cloudy 
Olympus  of  Teutonic  belief,  appears  as  a king  and  a 
warrior ; and  the  pillar,  the  ‘ Irmin-sul,’  bearing  the 
statue,  and  considered  as  the  symbol  of  the  deity,  was 
the  Palladium  of  the  Saxon  nation  until  the  temple 

* See  Tacitus,  “Ann.,”  lib.  ii.,  sec.  88;  Velleius  Pater- 
culus, lib.  ii.,  sec.  118. 


ABMJNim. 


223 


of  Eresburgh  was  destroyed  by  Charlemagne,  and  the 
column  itself  transferred  to  the  monastery  of  Corbey, 
where  perhaps  a portion  of  the  rude  rock  idol  yet  re- 
mains, covered  by  the  ornaments  of  the  Gothic  era.”* 
Traces  of  the  worship  of  Arminius  are  to  be  found 
among  our  Anglo-Saxan  ancestors,  after  their  settle- 
ment in  this  island.  One  of  the  four  great  highways 
was  held  to  be  under  the  protection  of  the  deity,  and 
was  called  the  “ Irmin  street.”  The  name  Arminius 
is,  of  course,  the  mere  Latinized  form  of  ‘‘  Herman,” 
the  name  by  which  the  hero  and  the  deity  were 
known  by  every  man  of  Low  German  blood  on  either 
side  of  the  German  Sea.  It  means,  etymologically, 
the  “ War-man,”  the  “man  of  hosts.”  No  other  ex- 
planation of  the  worship  of  the  “Irmin-sul,”  and  of 
the  name  of  the  “ Irmin  street,”  is  so  satisfactory  as 
that  which  connects  them  with  the  deified  Arminius. 
We  know  for  certain  of  the  existence  of  other  columns 
of  an  analogous  character.  Thus  there  was  the  Ko- 
landseule  in  North  Germany  ; there  was  a Thor-seule 
in  Sweden,  and  (what  is  more  important)  there  was 
an  Athelstan-seule  in  Saxon  England.! 

219.  There  is  at  the  present  moment  a song  re- 
specting the  Irmin-sul  current  in  the  bishopric  of 
Minden,  one  version  of  which  might  seem  only  to 
refer  to  Charlemagne  having  pulled  down  the  Irmin- 
sul. 

* Palgrave  on  the  “ English  Commonwealth,”  vol.  il., 
p.  140. 

+ See  Lappenburg’s  “Anglo-Saxons,”  p.  376.  For  nearly 
all  the  philological  and  ethnographical  facts  respecting 
Arminius,  1 am  indebted  to  my  friend,  Dr.  R.  G.  Latham. 


224 


ABMINim, 


Herman,  sla  dermen, 

Sla  pipen,  sla  trummen, 

De  Kaiser  will  kummeu 
Met  hamer  un  stangen, 

Will  Herman  uphangen. 

But  there  is  another  version,  which  probably  is  the 
oldest,  and  which  clearly  refers  to  the  great  Armin- 
ius. 

Un  Herman  slang  dermen, 

Slang  pipen,  slang  trnmmen; 

De  fursten  sind  kammen 
Met  all  eren-mannen 
Hebt  Varus  uphangen.* 

220.  About  ten  centuries  and  a lialf  after  the  de- 
molition of  the  Irmin-sul,  and  nearly  eighteen  after 
the  death  of  Arminius,  the  modern  Germans  con- 
ceived the  idea  of  rendering  tardy  homage  to  their 
great  hero ; and  accordingly,  some  eight  or  ten  years 
ago,  a general  subscription  was  organized  in  Germany 
for  the  purpose  of  erecting  on  the  Osning — a conical 
mountain,  which  forms  the  highest  summit  of  the 
Teutoberger  Wald,  and  is  eighteen  hundred  feet  above 
the  level  of  the  sea — a colossal  bronze  statue  of  Ar- 
minius. The  statue  was  designed  by  Bandel.  The 
hero  was  to  stand  uplifting  a sword  in  his  right  hand, 
and  looking  toward  the  Rhine.  The  height  of  the 
statue  was  to  be  eighty  feet  from  the  base  to  the 
point  of  the  sword,  and  was  to  stand  on  a circular 
Gothic  temple  ninety  feet  high,  and  supported  by  oak 
trees  as  columns.  The  mountain,  where  it  was  to  be 
erected,  is  wild  and  stern,  and  overlooks  the  scene  of 

* See  Grimm,  “Deutsche  My thologie,” 329. 


ARMINIUS. 


225 


the  battle.  It  was  calculated  that  the  statue  would 
be  clearly  visible  at  a distance  of  sixty  miles.  The 
temple  is  nearly  finished,  and  the  statue  itself  has 
been  cast  at  the  copper  works  at  Lemgo.  But  there, 
through  want  of  funds  to  set  it  up,  it  has  lain  for 
some  years,  in  disjointed  fragments,  exposed  to  the 
mutilating  homage  of  relic-seeking  travelers.  The 
idea  of  honoring  a hero,  who  belongs  to  all  Germany, 
is  not  one  which  the  present  rulers  of  that  divided 
country  have  any  wish  to  encourage ; and  the  statue 
may  long  continue  to  lie  there,  and  present  too  true 
a type  of  the  condition  of  Germany  herself.* 

221.  Surely  this  is  an  occasion  in  which  English- 
men might  well  prove,  by  acts  as  well  as  words,  that 
we  also  rank  Arminius  among  our  heroes. 

222.  I have  quoted  the  noble  stanzas  of  one  of  our 
modern  English  poets  on  Arminius,  and  I will  con- 
clude this  memoir  with  one  of  the  odes  of  the  great 
poet  of  modern  Germany,  Klopstock,  on  the  victory 
to  which  we  owe  our  freedom,  and  Arminius  mainly 
owes  his  fame.  Klopstock  calls  it  the  “ Battle  of 
Winfeld.”  The  epithet  of  “ sister  of  Cannae  ” shows 
that  Klopstock  followed  some  chronologers,  according 
to  whom  Varus  was  defeated  on  the  anniversary  of 
the  day  on  which  Paulus  and  Varro  were  defeated  by 
Hannibal. 

On  the  subject  of  this  statue,  I must  repeat  an  ac- 
knowledgment of  my  obligations  to  my  friend,  Mr.  Henry 
Pearson. 


226 


ARMINIU8. 


SONG  OF  TRIUMPH  AFTER  THE  VICTORY  OF  HERR- 
MAN,  THE  DELIVERER  OF  GERMANY  FROM 
THE  ROMANS. 

FROM  KLOPSTOCK’S  “ HERRMAN  UND  DIE  PURSTEN.** 

Supposed  to  be  sung  by  a chorus  of  Bards, 

A CHORUS. 

Sister  of  Cannee!*  Winfeld’s+  fight! 

W e saw  thee  with  thy  streaming,  bloody  hair, 

With  fiery  eye,  bright  with  the  world’s  despair. 

Sweep  by  Walhalla’s  bards  from  out  our  sight. 

Herrman  outspake : “ Now  Victory  or  Death  T* 

The  Romans  . . . “Victory!” 

And  onward  rushed  their  eagles  with  the  cry, 

So  ended  the  first  day. 

“ Victory  or  Death ! ” began 

Then,  first,  the  Roman  chief;  and  Herrman  spake 
Not,  but  home-struck;  the  eagles  fluttered—brake. 

So  sped  the  second  day. 

TWO  CHORUSES. 

And  the  third  came  . . . the  cry  was  “Flight  or  Death  1” 
Flight  left  they  not  for  them  who’d  make  them  slaves— 
Men  who  stab  children!  flight  for  them ! ...  no!  graves! 
“ ’Twas  their  last  day.” 

TWO  BARDS. 

Yet  spared  they  messengers;  they  came  to  Rome— 

How  drooped  the  plume— the  lance  was  left  to  trail 
Down  in  the  dust  behind— their  cheek  was  pale— 

So  came  the  messengers  to  Rome. 

* The  battle  of  Cannae,  B.  C.  216— Hannibal’s  victory 
over  the  Romans. 

t Winfeld— the  probable  site  of  the  Herrmanschladt;^* 
see  supra. 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS, 


227 


High  in  his  hall  the  imperator  sat- 
Octavianus  C^sar  Augustus  sat. 

They  filled  up  wine-cups,  wine-cups  filled  they  up 
For  him  the  highest — wine-cups  filled  they  up 
For  him  the  highest,  Jove  of  all  their  state. 

The  flutes  of  Lydia  hushed  before  their  voice, 

Before  the  messengers— the  “ Highest  ” sprung— 

The  god*  against  the  marble  pillars,  wrung  ( 

By  the  dread  words,  striking  his  brow,  and  thrice 
Cried  he  aloud  in  anguish,  “ Varus!  Varus! 

Give  back  my  legions,  Varus  I ” 

And  now  tne  worid-wide  conquerors  shrunk  and  feared 
For  fatherland  and  home. 

The  lance  to  raise;  and  ’mongst  those  false  to  Rome 

The  death-lot  rolled, + and  still  they  shrunk  and  feared; 

“ For  she  her  face  hath  turned 

The  victor  goddess,”  cried  those  cowards— (for  aye 

Be  it !)— “ from  Rome  and  Romans,  and  her  day 

Is  done” — and  still  be  mourned. 

And  cried  aloud  in  anguish,  “Varus!  Varus! 

Give  back  my  legions,  Varus ! ” $ 


Synopsis  of  Events  between  Arminius’s  Vic- 
tory OVER  Varus  and  the  Battle  of 
Chalons. 

A.  D.  43.  The  Romans  commence  the  conquest  of 
Britain,  Claudius  being  then  Emperor  of  Rome.  The 
population  of  this  island  was  then  Celtic.  In  about 
forty  years  all  the  tribes  south  of  the  Clyde  were 
subdued,  and  their  land  made  a Roman  province. 

* Augustus  was  worshipped  as  a deity  in  his  lifetime. 

+ See  supra  p.  139, 

$ I have  taken  this  translation  from  an  anonymous 
writer  in  Frazer  two  years  ago. 


228 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


58-60.  Successful  campaigns  of  the  Roman  general 
Corhulo  against  the  Parthians. 

64.  First  persecution  of  the  Christians  at  Rome 
under  Nero. 

68-70.  Civil  wars  in  the  Roman  world.  The 
Emperors  Nero,  Galba,  0th o,  and  Vitellius  cut  off 
successively  hy  violent  deaths.  Vespasian  becomes 
emperor. 

70.  Jerusalem  destroyed  by  the  Romans  under 
Titus. 

83.  Futile  attack  of  Domitian  on  the  Germans. 

86.  Beginning  of  the  wars  between  the  Romans 
and  the  Dacians. 

98-117.  Trajan  Emperor  of  Rome.  Under  him  the 
empire  acquires  its  greatest  territorial  extent  by  his 
conquests  in  Dacia  and  in  the  East.  His  successor, 
Hadrian,  abandons  the  provinces  beyond  the  Euphra- 
tes which  Trajan  had  conquered. 

138-180.  Era  of  the  Antonines. 

167-176.  A long  and  desperate  war  between  Rome 
and  a great  confederacy  of  the  German  nations. 
Marcus  Antoninus  at  last  succeeds  in  repelling 
them. 

192-197.  Civil  wars  throughout  the  Roman  world. 
Severus  becomes  emperor.  He  relaxes  the  discip- 
line of  the  soldiers.  After  his  death  in  211,  the 
series  of  military  insurrections,  civil  wars,  and  mur- 
ders of  emperors  recommences. 

226.  Artaxerxes  (Ardisheer)  overthrows  the  Par- 
thian, and  restores  the  Persian  kingdom  in  Asia. 
He  attacks  the  Roman  possessions  in  the  East. 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENIS. 


229 


250.  The  Goths  invade  the  Roman  provinces. 
The  Emperor  Decius  is  defeated  and  slain  hy  them. 

253-260.  The  Franks  and  Alemanni  invade  Gaul, 
Spain,  and  Africa.  The  Goths  attack  Asia  Minor 
and  Greece.  The  Persians  conquer  Armenia.  Their 
king,  Sapor,  defeats  the  Roman  Emperor  Valerian, 
and  takes  him  prisoner.  General  distress  of  the 
Roman  empire. 

268-283.  The  Emperors  Claudius,  Aurelian,  Taci- 
tus, Prohus,  and  Cams  defeat  the  various  enemies  of 
Rome,  and  restore  order  in  the  Roman  state. 

285.  Diocletian  divides  and  reorganizes  the  Ro- 
man empire.  After  his  abdication  in  305  a fresh 
series  of  civil  vrars  and  confusion  ensues.  Constan- 
tine, the  first  Christian  emperor,  reunites  the  empire 
in  324. 

330.  Constantine  makes  Constantinople  the  seat 
of  empire  instead  of  Rome. 

363.  The  Emperor  Julian  is  killed  in  action  against 
the  Persians. 

364-375.  The  empire  is  again  divided,  Valentinian 
being  Emperor  of  the  West  and  Valens  of  the  East. 
Valentinian  repulses  the  Alemanni,  and  other  Ger- 
man invaders  from  Gaul.  Splendor  of  the  Gothic 
kingdom  under  Hermanric,  north  of  the  Danube. 

375-395.  The  Huns  attack  the  Goths,  who  implore 
the  protection  of  the  Roman  Emperor  of  the  East. 
The  Goths  are  allowed  to  pass  the  Danube,  and  to 
settle  in  the  Roman  provinces.  A war  soon  breaks 
out  between  them  and  the  Romans,  and  the  Emperor 
Valens  and  his  army  are  destroyed  by  them.  They 


230 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


ravage  the  Roman  territories.  The  Emperor  Theo- 
dosius reduces  them  to  submission.  They  retain 
settlements  in  Thrace  and  Asia  Minor. 

395.  Final  division  of  the  Roman  empire  between 
Arcadius  and  Honorius,  the  two  sons  of  Theodosius. 
The  Goths  revolt,  and  under  Alaric  attack  various 
parts  of  both  the  Roman  empires. 

410.  Alaric  takes  the  city  of  Rome. 

412.  The  Goths  march  into  Gaul,  and  in  414  into 
Spain,  which  had  been  invaded  by  hosts  of  Vandals, 
Suevi,  Alani,  and  other  Germanic  nations.  Britain 
is  formerly  abandoned  by  the  Roman  empire  of  the 
West. 

428.  Genseric,  king  of  the  Vandals,  conquers  the 
Roman  province  of  North  Africa. 

441.  The  Huns  attack  the  Eastern  empire. 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS, 


231 


CHAPTER^  VI. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  CHALONS,  A.  D.  451. 

The  discomfiture  of  the  mighty  attempt  of  Attila  to 
found  a new  anti  Christian  dynasty  upon  the  wreck  of  the 
temporal  power  of  Home,  at  the  end  of  the  term  of  twelve 
hundred  years  to  which  its  duration  had  been  limited  by  the 
forebodings  of  the  heathen.— Herbert. 

224.  A broad  expanse  of  plains,  the  Campi  Cata- 
lannici  of  the  ancients,  spreads  far  and  wide  around 
the  city  of  Chalons,  in  the  northeast  of  France.  The 
long  rows  of  poplars,  through  which  the  River 
Marne  winds  its  way,  and  a few  thinly-scattered  vil- 
lages, are  almost  the  only  objects  that  vary  the 
monotonous  aspect  of  the  greater  part  of  this  region. 
But  about  five  miles  from  Chalons,  near  the  little 
hamlets  of  Chape  and  Cuperly,  the  ground  is  in- 
dented and  heaped  up  in  ranges  of  grassy  mounds 
and  trenches,  which  attest  the  work  of  man’s  hands 
in  ages  past,  and  which,  to  the  practiced  eye,  demon- 
strates that  this  quiet  spot  has  once  been  the  forti- 
fied position  of  a huge  military  host. 

225.  Local  tradition  gives  to  these  ancient  earth- 
works the  name  of  Attila’s  Camp.  Nor  is  there  any 
reason  to  question  the  correctness  of  the  title,  or  to 


232 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS, 


doubt  that  behind  these  very  ramparts  it  was  that 
1400  years  ago  the  most  powerful  heathen  king  that 
ever  ruled  in  Europe  mustered  the  remnants  of  his 
vast  army,  which  had  striven  on  these  plains  against 
the  Christian  soldiery  of  Thoulouse  and  Eome. 
Here  it  was  that  Attila  prepared  to  resist  to  the 
death  his  victors  in  the  field ; and  here  he  heaped 
up  the  treasures  of  his^camp  in  one  vast  pile,  which 
was  to  be  his  funeral  pyre  should  his  camp  be  stormed. 
It  was  here  that  the  Gothic  and  Italian  forces  watched, 
but  dared  not  assail  their  enemy  in  his  despair,  after 
that  great  and  terrible  day  of  battle,  when 
•‘The  sound 

Of  conflict  was  o’erpast,  the  shout  of  all 
"Whom  earth  could  send  from  her  remotest  bounds, 
Heathen  or  faithful:  from  thy  hundred  mouths, 

That  feed  the  Caspian  with  Riphean  snows, 

Huge  Volga!  from  famed  Hypanis,  which  once 
Cradled  the  Hun;  from  all  the  countless  realms 
Between  Imaus  and  that  utmost  strand 
Where  columns  of  Herculean  rock  confront 
The  blown  Atlantic;  Roman,  Goth,  and  Hun, 

And  Scythian  strength  of  chivalry,  that  tread 
The  cold  Codanian  shore,  or  what  far  lands 
Inhospitable  drink  Cimmerian  floods, 

Franks,  Saxons,  Suevic,  and  Sarmatian  chiefs. 

And  who  from  green  Armorica  or  Spain 
Flocked  to  the  work  of  death.”* 

226.  The  victory  which  the  Roman  general,  Aetius, 
with  his  Gothic  allies,  had  then  gained  over  the 
Huns,  was  the  last  victory  of  imperial  Rome.  But 
among  the  long  Fasti  of  her  triumphs,  few  can  be 
found  that,  for  their  importance  and  ultimate  benefit 
* Herbert’s  “Attila,”  book  i.,  line  13. 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS, 


233 


to  mankind,  are  comparable  with  this  expiring  effort 
of  her  arms.  It  did  not,  indeed,  open  to  her  any  new 
career  of  conquest — it  did  not  consolidate  the  relics 
of  her  power — it  did  not  turn  the  rapid  ebb  of  her 
fortunes.  The  mission  of  imperial  Rome  was,  in 
truth,  already  accomplished.  She  had  received  and 
transmitted  through  her  once  ample  dominion  the 
civilization  of  Greece.  She  had  broken  up  the  bar- 
riers of  narrow  nationalities  among  the  various  states 
and  tribes  that  dwelt  around  the  coasts  of  the  Med- 
iterranean. She  had  fused  these  and  many  other 
races  into  one  organized  empire,  bound  together  by  a 
community  of  laws,  of  government,  and  institutions. 
Under  the  shelter  of  her  full  power  the  True  Faith 
had  arisen  in  the  earth,  and  during  the  years  of  her 
decline  it  had  been  nourished  to  maturity,  it  had 
overspread  all  the  provinces  that  ever  obeyed  her 
sway.f  For  no  beneficial  purpose  to  mankind  could 
the  dominion  of  the  seven-hilled  city  have  been  re- 
stored or  prolonged.  But  it  was  all-important  to 
mankind  what  nations  should  divide  among  them 
Rome’s  rich  inheritance  of  empire.  Whether  the 
Germanic  and  Gothic  warriors  should  form  states 
and  kingdoms  out  of  the  fragments  of  her  dominions, 
and  become  the  free  members  of  the  commonwealth 
of  Christian  Europe ; or  whether  pagan  savages,  from 
the  wilds  of  Central  Asia,  should  crush  the  relics  of 
classic  civilization  and  the  early  institutions  of  the 
Christianized  Germans  in  one  hopeless  chaos  of  l)ar- 

t See  the  Introduction  to  Ranke’s  “ History  of  the 
Popes.” 


234 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS,  , 


baric  conquest.  The  Christian  Visigoths  of  King 
Theodoric  fought  and  triumphed  at  Ch^lon  side  by 
side  with  the  legions  of  Aetius.  Their  joint  victory 
over  the  Hunnish  host  not  only  rescued  for  a time 
from  destruction  the  old  age  of  Rome,  but  preserved 
for  centuries  of  power  and  glory  the  Germanic  ele- 
ment in  the  civilization  of  modern  Europe. 

227.  In  order  to  estimate  the  full  importance  to 
mankind  of  the  battle  of  Chalons,  we  must  keep 
steadily  in  mind  who  and  what  the  Germans  were, 
and  the  important  distinctions  between  them  and 
the  numerous  other  races  that  assailed  the  Roman 
empire ; and  it  is  to  be  understood  that  the  Gothic 
and  Scandinavian  nations  are  included  in  the  German 
race.  Now,  “ in  two  remarkable  traits,  the  Germans 
differed  from  the  Sarmatic  as  well  as  from  the  Slavic 
nations,  and,  indeed,  from  all  those  other  races  to 
whom  the  Greeks  and  Romans  gave  the  designation 
of  barbarians.  I allude  to  their  personal  freedom 
and  regard  for  the  rights  of  men ; secondly,  to  the 
respect  paid  by  them  to  the  female  sex,  and  the  chas- 
tity for  which  the  latter  were  celebrated  among  the 
people  of  the  North.  These  were  the  foundations  of 
that  probity  of  character,  self-respect,  and  purity  of 
manners  which  may  be  traced  among  the  Germans 
and  Goths  even  during  pagan  times,  and  which,  when 
their  sentiments  were  enlightened  by  Christianity, 
brought  out  those  splendid  traits  of  character  which 
distinguish  the  age  of  chivalry  and  romance.’^^^ 

* See  Prichard’s  “ Researches  into  the  Physical  History 
of  Man,”  vol.  iii.,p.  433. 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS. 


235 


What  the  intermixture  of  the  German  stock  with 
the  classic,  at  the  fall  of  the  Western  empire,  has 
done  for  mankind,  may  he  best  felt  by  watching, 
with  Arnold,  over  how  large  a portion  of  the  earth 
the  influence  of  the  German  element  is  now  ex- 
tended. 

228.  “ It  affects,  more  or  less,  the  whole  west  of 
of  Europe,  from  the  head  of  the  Gulf  of  Bothnia  to 
the  most  southern  promontory  of  Sicily,  from  the 
Oder  and  the  Adriatic  to  the  Hebrides  and  to  Lisbon. 
It  is  true  that  the  language  spoken  over  a large  por- 
tion of  this  space  is  not  predominantly  German  ; but 
even  in  France,  and  Italy,  and  Spain,  the  influence 
of  the  Franks,  Burgundians,  Visigoths,  Ostrogoths, 
and  Lombards,  while  it  has  colored  even  the  lan- 
guage, has  in  blood  and  institutions  left  its  mark 
legibly  and  indelibly.  Germany,  the  Low  Countries, 
Switzerland  for  the  most  part,  Denmark,  Norway, 
and  Sweden,  and  our  own  islands,  are  all  in  lan- 
guage, in  blood,  and  in  institutions,  Germans  most 
decidedly.  But  all  South  America  is  peopled  with 
Spaniards  and  Portuguese ; all  North  America  and 
all  Australia,  with  Englishmen.  I say  nothing  of 
the  prospects  and  influence  of  the  German  race  in 
Africa  and  India : it  is  enough  to  say  that  half  of 
Europe,  and  all  America  and  Australia,  are  German, 
more  or  less  completely,  in  race,  in  language,  or  in 
institutions,  or  in  all.”^' 

229.  By  the  middle  of  the  fifth  century,  Germanic 
nations  had  settled  themselves  in  many  of  the  fairest 

* Arnold’s  “ Lectures  on  Modern  History,”  p.  35. 


236 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS, 


regions  of  the  Roman  empire,  had  imposed  their 
yoke  on  the  provincials,  and  had  undergone,  to  a 
considerable  extent,  that  moral  conquest  which  the 
axts  and  refinements  of  the  vanquished  in  arms  have 
so  often  achieved  over  the  rough  victor.  The  Visi- 
goths held  the  north  of  Spain,  and  Gaul  south  of  the 
Loire.  Franks,  Alemanni,  Alans,  and  Burgundians 
had  established  themselves  in  other  Gallic  provinces, 
and  the  Suevi  were  masters  of  a large  southern  por- 
tion of  the  Spanish  peninsula.  A king  of  the  Van- 
dals reigned  in  North  Africa;  and  the  Ostrogoths 
had  firmly  planted  themselves  in  the  provinces  north 
of  Italy.  Of  these  powers  and  principalities,  that  of 
the  Visigoths,  under  their  king  Theodoric,  son  of 
Alaric,  was  by  far  the  first  in  power  and  in  civiliza- 
tion. 

230.  The  pressure  of  the  Huns  upon  Europe  had 
first  been  felt  in  the  fourth  century  of  our  era.  They 
had  long  been  formidable  to  the  Chinese  empire,  but 
the  ascendancy  in  arms  which  another  nomadic  tribe 
of  Central  Asia,  the  Sienpi,  gained  over  them,  drove 
the  Huns  from  their  Chinese  conquest  westward; 
and  this  movement  once  being  communicated  to  the 
whole  chain  of  barbaric  nations  that  dwelt  north- 
ward of  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Roman  empire,  tribe 
after  tribe  of  savage  warriors  broke  in  upon  the  bar- 
riers of  civilized  Europe,  “ Velut  unda  supervenit 
undam.”  The  Huns  crossed  the  Tanais  into  Europe 
in  375,  and  rapidly  reduced  to  subjection  the  Alans, 
the  Ostrogoths,  and  other  tribes  that  were  then  dwell- 
ing along  the  course  of  the  Danube.  The  armies  of 


BATTLE  OF- CHALONS. 


237 


the  Roman  emperor  that  tried  to  check  their  progress 
were  cut^^to  pieces  by  them,  and  Pannonia  and  other 
provinces  south  of  the  Danube  were  speedily  occu- 
pied by  the  victorious  cavalry  of  these  new  invaders. 
Not  merely  the  degenerate  Romans,  but  the  bold  and 
hardy  warriors  of  Germany  and  Scandinavia,  were 
appalled  at  the  number,  the  ferocity,  the  ghastly  ap- 
pearance and  the  lightning-like  rapidity  of  the  Huns. 
Strange  and  loath  some  legends  were  coined  and 
credited,  which  attributed  their  origin  to  the  union 
of 

‘‘Secret,  black,  and  midnight  hags,** 

with  the  evil  spirits  of  the  wilderness. 

231.  Tribe  after  tribe,  and  city  after  city,  fell  be- 
fore them.  Then  came  a pause  in  their  career  of 
conquest  in  southwestern  Europe,  caused  probably 
by  dissensions  among  their  chiefs,  and  also  by  their 
arms  being  employed  in  attacks  upon  the  Scandi- 
navian nations.  But  when  Attila  (or  Atzel,  as  he  is 
called  in  the  Hungarian  language)  became  their 
ruler,  the  torrent  of  their  arms  was  directed  with 
augmented  terrors  upon  the  west  and  the  south,  and 
their  myriads  marched  beneath  tha  guidance  of  one 
master-mind  to  the  overthrow  both  of  the  new  and 
the  old  powers  of  the  earth. 

232.  Recent  events  have  thrown  such  a strong  in- 
^terest  over  every  thing  connected  with  the  Hun- 
garian name,  that  even  the  terrible  renown  of  Attila 
now  impresses  us  the  more  vividly  through  our 
sympathizing  admiration  of  the  exploits  of  those  who 
claim  to  be  descended  from  his  warriors,  and  “ am- 


238 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS. 


bitiously  insert  the  name  of  Attila  among  their 
native  kings.”  The  authenticity  of  this  martial 
genealogy  is  denied  by  some  writers  and  questioned 
by  more.  But  it  is  at  least  certain  that  the  Magyars 
of  Arpad,  who  are  the  immediate  ancestors  of  the 
bulk  of  the  modern  Hungarians,  and  who  conquered 
the  country  which  bears  the  name  of  Hnngary  in 
A.D.  889,  were  of  the  same  stock  of  mankind  as  were 
the  Huns  of  Attila,  even  if  they  did  not  belong  to  the 
same  subdivision  of  that  stock.  Nor  is  there  any 
improbability  in  the  tradition  that  after  Attila’s 
death  many  of  his  warriors  remained  in  Hungary, 
and  that  their  descendants  afterward  joined  the 
Huns  ofArpad  in  their  career  of  conquest.  It  is  cer- 
tain that  Attila  made  Hungary  the  seat  of  his  em- 
pire. It  seems  also  susceptible  of  clear  proof  that 
the  territory  was  then  called  Hungvar  and  Attila’s 
soldiers  Hungvari.  Both  the  Huns  of  Attila  and 
those  of  Arpad  came  from  the  family  of  nomadic 
nations  whose  primitive  regions  were  those  vast 
wildernesses  of  High  Asia  which  are  included  between 
the  Altaic  and  the  Himalayan  mountain  chains.  The 
inroads  of  these  tribes  upon  the  lower  regions  of  Asia 
and  into  Europe  have  caused  many  of  the  most  re- 
markable revolutions  in  the  history  of  the  world. 
There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  swarms  of  these 
nations  made  their  way  into  distant  parts  of  the 
earth,  at  periods  long  before  the  date  of  the  Scythian 
invasion  of  Asia,  which  is  the  earliest  inroad  of  the 
nomadic  race  that  history  records.  The  first,  as  far 
as  we  can  conjecture,  in  respect  to  the  time  of  their 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS, 


239 


descent,  were  the  Finnish  and  Ugrian  tribes,  who 
appear  to  have  come  down  from  the  Altaic  border  of 
High  Asia  toward  the  northwest,  in  which  direction 
they  advance  to  the  Uralian  Mountains.  There  they 
established  themselves ; and  that  mountain  chain, 
with  its  valleys  and  pasture  lands,  became  to  them  a 
new  country,  whence  they  sent  out  colonies  on  every 
side ; but  the  Ugrian  colony,  which,  und^r  Arpad, 
occupied  Hungary,  and  became  the  Ancestors  of  the 
bulk  of  the  present  Hungarian  nation,  did  not  quit 
their  settlements  on  the  Uralian  Mountains  till  a 
very  late  period,  and  not  until  four  centuries  after 
the  time  when  Attila  led  from  the  primary  seats  of 
the  nomadic  races  in  High  Asia  the  host  with  which 
he  advanced  into  the  heart  of  France.*  That  host 
was  Turkish,  but  closely  allied  in  oiigin,  language, 
and  habits  with  the  Finno-Ugrian  settlers  on  the 
Ural. 

233.  AttilaA  fame  has  not  eome  down  to  us  through 
the  partial  and  suspicious  medium  of  chroniclers  and 
poets  of  his  own  race.  It  is  not  from  Hunnish 
authorities  that  we  learn  the  extent  of  his  might : 
it  is  from  his  enemies,  from  the  literature  and  the  le- 
gends of  the  nations  whom  he  afdicted  with  his  arms, 
that  we  draw  the  unquestionable  evidence  of  his 
greatness.  Besides  the  express  narratives  of  Byzan- 
tine, Latin,  and  Gothic  writers,  we  have  the  strongest 
proof  of  the  stern  reality  of  Attila’s  conquest  in  the 
extent  to  which  he  and  his  Huns  have  been  the 

* See  Prichard’s  ‘‘  Researches  into  the  Physical  History 
of  Mankind.” 


240 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS. 


themes  of  the  earliest  German  and  Scandinavian 
lays.  Wild  as  many  of  those  legends  are,  they  bear 
concurrent  and  certain  testimony  to  the  avre  with 
which  the  memory  of  Attila  was  regarded  by  the 
bold  warriors  who  composed  and  delighted  in  them. 
Attila’s  exploits,  and  the  wonders  of  his  unearthly 
steed  and  magic  sword,  repeatedly  occur  in  the  Sagas 
of  Norway  and  Iceland ; and  the  celebrated  Nie- 
belungen  Lied,  the  most  ancient  of  Germanic  poetry, 
is  full  of  them.  There  Etsel,  or  Attila,  is  described 
as  the  wearer  of  twelve  mighty  crowns,  and  as 
promising  to  his  bride  the  lands  of  thirty  kings, 
whom  his  irresistible  sword  had  subdued.  He  is,  in 
fact,  the  hero  of  the  latter  part  of  this  remarkable 
poem ; and  it  is  at  his  capital  city,  Etsel enburgh^ 
which  evidently  corresponds  to  the  modern  Buda, 
that  much  of  its  action  takes  place. 

234.  When  we  turn  from  the  legendary  to  the 
historic  Attila,  we  see  clearly  that  he  was  not  one  of 
the  vulgar  herd  of  barbaric  conquerors.  Consum- 
mate military  skill  may  be  traced  in  his  campaigns ; 
and  he  relied  far  less  on  the  brute  force  of  armies  for 
the  aggrandizement  of  his  empire,  than  on  the  un- 
bounded influence  over  the  affections  of  friends  and 
the  fears  of  foes  which  his  genius  enabled  him  to  ac- 
quire. Austerely  sober  in  his  private  life — severely 
just  on  the  judgment  seat — conspicuous  among  a 
nation  of  warriors  for  hardihood,  strength,  and  skill 
in  every  martial  exercise — grave  and  deliberate  in 
counsel,  but  rapid  and  remorseless  in  execution,  he 
gave  safety  and  security  to  all  who  were  under  his 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS, 


241 


dominion^  while  he  waged  a warfare  of  extermination 
against  all  who  opposed  or  sought  to  escape  from  it. 
He  watched  the  national  passions,  the  prejudices,  the 
creeds,  and  the  superstitions  of  the  varied  nations 
over  which  he  ruled,  and  of  those  which  he  sought 
to  reduce  beneath  his  sway:  all  these  feelings  he  had 
the  skill  to  turn  to  his  own  account.  His  own 
warriors  believed  him  to  he  the  inspired  favorite  of 
their  deities,  and  followed  him  with  fanatic  zeal ; 
his  enemies  looked  on  him  as  the  pre-appointed 
minister  of  heaven’s  wrath  against  themselves ; and 
though  they  believed  not  in  his  creed,  their  own 
made  them  tremble  before  him. 

235.  In  one  of  his  early  campaigns  he  appeared 
before  his  troops  with  an  ancient  iron  sword  in  his 
grasp,  which  he  told  them  was  the  god  of  war  whom 
their  ancestors  had  worshiped.  It  is  certain  that  the 
nomadic  tribes  of  Northern  Asia,  whom  Herodotus 
described  under  the  name  of  Scythians,  from  the 
earliest  times  worshiped  as  their  god  a bare  sword. 
That  sword-god  was  supposed,  in  Attila’s  time,  to 
have  disappeared  from  earth  ; but  the  Hunnish  king 
now  claimed  to  have  received  It  by  special  revelation. 
It  was  said  that  a herdsman,  who  was  tracking  in 
the  desert  a wounded  heifer  by  the  drops  of  blood, 
found  the  mysterious  sword  standing  fixed  in  the 
ground,  as  if  it  had  darted  down  from  heaven.  The 
herdsman  bore  it  to  Attila,  who  henceforth  was 
believed  by  the  Huns  to  wield  the  Spirit  of  Death  in 
jbattle,  and  their  seers  prophesied  that  that  sword  was 


242 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS, 


to  destroy  the  world.  A Roman,*  who  was  on  an  em- 
bassy to  the  Himnish  camp,  recorded  in  his  memoirs 
Attila’s  acquisition  of  this  supernatural  weapon,  and 
the  immense  influence  over  the  minds  of  the  barbaric 
tribes  which  its  possession  gave  him.  In  the  title 
which  he  assumed  we  shall  see  the  skill  with  which 
he  availed  himself  of  the  legends  and  creeds  of  other 
nations  as  well  as  of  his  own.  He  designated  himself 
u ^ttila,  Descendant  of  the  Great  Nimrod.  Nurtured 
in  Engaddi.  By  the  Grace  of  God,  King  of  the  Huns, 
the  Goths,  the  Danes,  and  the  Medes.  The  Dread  of 
the  World.’’ 

236.  Herbert  states  tliat  Attila  is  represented  on 
an  old  medallion  with  a Teraphim,  or  a head,  on  his 
breast ; and  the  same  writer  adds,  “We  know,  from 
the  ‘Hamartigenea’  of  Prudentius,  that  Nimrod,  with 
a snaky-haired  head,  was  the  object  of  adoration  of 
the  heretical  followers  of  Marcion  ; and  the  same 
head  was  the  palladium  set  up  by  Antiochus  Epiph- 
anes  over  the  gates  of  Antioch,  though  it  has  been 
called  the  visage  of  Charon.  The  memory  of  Nimrod 
was  certainly  regarded  with  mystic  veneration  by 
many  ; and  by  asserting  himself  to  be  the  heir  of 
that  mighty  hunter  before  the  Lord,  he  vindicated 
to  himself  at  least  the  whole  Babylonian  kingdom. 

237.  “ The  singular  assertion  in  his  style,  that  he 
was  nurtured  in  Engaddi,  where  he  certainly  had 
never  been,  will  be  more  easily  understood  on  refer- 
ence to  the  twelfth  chapter  of  the  Book  of  Revela- 
tions, concerning  the  woman  clothed  with  the  sun, 

♦ Priscus  apud  Jornandem.  ^ 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS. 


24s 


who  was  to  bring  forth  in  the  wilderness — Vhere 
she  hath  a place  prepared  of  God’ — a man-child,  who 
was  to  contend  with  the  dragon  having  seven  heads 
and  ten  horns,  and  rule  all  nations  with  a rod  of 
iron.  This  prophecy  was  at  that  time  understood 
universally  by  the  sincere  Christians  to  refer  to  the 
birth  of  Constantine,  who  was  to  overwhqlm  the 
paganism  of  the  city  on  the  seven  hills,  and  it  is  still 
so  explained  ; hut  it  is  evident  that  the  heathens 
must  have  looked  on  it  in  a different  light,  and  have 
regarded  it  as  a foretelling  of  the  birth  of  that  Great 
One  who  should  master  the  temporal  power  of  Rome. 
The  assertion,  therefore,  that  he  was  nurtured  in 
Engaddi,  is  a claim  to  be  looked  upon  as  that  man- 
child  who  was  to  be  brought  forth  in  a place  pre- 
pared of  God  in  the  wilderness.  Engaddi  means  a 
place  of  palms  and  vines  in  the  desert ; it  was  hard 
by  Zoar,  the  city  of  refuge,  which  was  saved  in  the 
Vale  of  Siddim,  or  Demons,  when  the  rest  were 
destroyed  by  fire  and  brimstone  from  the  Lord  in 
heaven,  and  might,  therefore,  be  especially  called  a 
place  prepared  of  God  in  the  wilderness.” 

238.  It  is  obvious  enough  why  he  styled  himself 
“ By  the  Grace  of  God,  King  of  the  Huns  and  Goths ; ” 
and  it  seems  far  from  difficult  to  see  why  he  added 
the  names  of  the  Medes  and  Danes.  His  armies  had 
been  engaged  in  warfare  against  the  Persian  king- 
dom of  the  Sassanidse,  and  it  is  certain*  that  he  med- 
itated the  invasion  and  overthrow  of  the  Medo- 
Persian  power.  Probably  some  of  the  northern 
* See  the  narrative  of  Priscus, 


244 


BATTLE  OF  CHALOm, 


provinces  of  that  kingdom  had  been  compelled  io 
pay  him  tribute ; and  this  would  account  for  his  styb 
ing  himself  King  of  the  Medes,  they  being  his 
remotest  subjects  to  the  south.  From  a similar 
cause,  he  may  have  called  himself  King  of  the  Danes, 
as  his  power  may  well  have  extended  northward  as 
far  as  the  nearest  of  the  Scandinavian  nations,  and 
this  mention  of  Medes  and  Danes  as  his  subjects 
would  serve  at  once  to  indicate  the  vast  extent  of 
his  dominion.* 

239.  The  immense  territory  north  of  the  Danube 
and  Black  Sea,  and  eastward  of  Caucasus,  over  which 
Attila  ruled,  first  in  conjunction  with  his  brother 
Bleda,  and  afterward  alone,  can  not  be  very 
accurately  defined,  but  it  must  have  comprised 
within  it,  besides  the  Huns,  many  nations  of  Slavic, 
Gothic,  Teutonic,  and  Finnish  origin.  South  also  of 
the  Danube,  the  country,  from  the  River  Sau  as  far 
as  Novi  in  Thrace,  was  a Hunnish  province.  Such 
was  the  empire  of  the  Huns  in  A.  D.  445  ; a memora- 
ble year,  in  which  Attila  founded  Buda  on  the  Dan- 
ube as  his  capital  city,  and  ridded  himself  of  his 
brother  by  a crime  which  seems  to  have  been 
prompted  not  only  by  selfish  ambition,  but  also  by  a 
desire  of  turning  to  his  purpose  the  legends  and 
forebodings  which  then  were  universally  spread 
throughout  the  Roman  empire,  and  must  have  been 
well  known  to  the  watchful  and  ruthless  Hun. 

* In  the  “ Niebelungen  Lied,”  the  old  poet  who  describes 
the  reception  of  the  heroine  Chrimhild  by  Attila  [Estel], 
says  that  Attila’s  dominions  were  so  vast,  that  among;  his 
subject-warriors  there  were  Russian.  Greek,  Wallachian, 
Polish,  and  even  Danish  Knights^ 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS, 


245 


240.  The  year  445  of  our  era  completed  the  twelfth 
century  from  the  foundation  of  Rome,  according  to 
the  best  chronologers.  It  had  always  been  believed 
among  the  Romans  that  the  twelve  vultures,  which 
were  said  to  have  appeared  to  Romulus  when  he 
founded  the  city,  signified  the  time  during  which 
the  Roman  power  should  endure.  The  twelye  vul- 
tures denoted  twelve  centuries.  This  interpretation 
of  the  vision  of  the  birds  of  destiny  was  current 
among  leading  Romans,  even  when  there  were  yet 
many  of  the  twelve  centuries  to  run,  and  while  the 
imperial  city  was  at  the  zenith  of  its  power.  But  as 
the  allotted  time  grew  nearer  and  nearer  to  its  con- 
clusion, and  as  Rome  grew  weaker  and  weaker  be- 
neath the  blows  of  barbaric  invaders,  the  terrible 
omen  was  more  and  more  talked  and  thought  of ; 
and  in  Attila’s  time,  men  watched  for  the  momen- 
tary extinction  of  the  Roman  state  with  the  last 
beat  of  the  last  vulture’s  wing.  Moreover,  among 
the  numerous  legends  connected  with  the  founda- 
tion of  the  city,  and  the  fratricidal  death  of  Remus, 
there  was  one  most  terrible  one,  which  told  that 
Romulus  did  not  put  his  brother  to  death  in  accident 
or  in  hasty  quarrel,  but  that 

“ He  slew  his  gallant  twin 
With  inexpiable  sin,’* 

deliberately,  and  in  compliance  with  the  warnings 
of  supernatural  powers.  The  shedding  of  a brother’s 
blood  was  believed  to  have  been  the  price  at  which 
the  founder  of  Rome  had  purchased  from  destiny 
her  twelve  centuries  of  existence.* 

* See  a curious  justification  of  Attila  for  murdering 


246 


BATTLE  OF  CHALOJSIS. 


241.  We  may  imagine,  therefore,  with  what  terror 
in  this,  the^  twelve  hundredth  year  after  the  founda- 
tion of  Rome,  the  inhabitants  of  the  Roman  empire 
must  have  heard  the  tidings  that  the  royal  brethren, 
Attila  and  Bleda,  had  founded  a new  capital  on  the 
Danube,  which  was  designed  to  rule  over  the 
ancient  capital  on  the  Tiber;  and  that  Attila,  like 
Romulus,  had  consecrated  the  foundations  of  his 
new  city  by  murdering  his  brother ; so  that  for  the 
new  cycle  of  centuries  then  about  to  commence,  do- 
minion had  been  bought  from  the  gloomy  spirits  of 
destiny  in  favor  of  the  Hun  by  a sacrifice  of  equal 
awe  and  value  with  that  which  had  formerly  obtained 
it  for  the  Roman. 

242.  It  is  to  be  remembered  that  not  only  the  pa- 
gans, but  also  the  Christians  of  that  age,  knew  and 
believed  in  these  legends  and  omens,  however  they 
might  differ  as  to  the  nature  of  the  superhuman 
agency  by  which  such  mysteries  had  been  made 
known  to  mankind.  And  we  may  observe,  with 
Herbert,  a modern  learned  dignitary  of  our  church, 
how  remarkably  this  augury  was  fulfilled ; for  “ if  to 
the  twelve  centuries  denoted  by  the  twelve  vultures 
that  appeared  to  Romulus,  we  add  for  the  six  birds 
that  appeared  to  Remus  six  lustra,  or  periods  of  five 
years  each,  by  which  the  Romans  were  wont  to  num- 
ber their  time,  it  brings  us  precisely  to  the  year  476, 
in  which  the  Roman  empire  was  finally  extinguished 
by  Odoacer.’’ 

his  brother,  by  a zealous  Hung'arian  advocate,  in  a note 
to  Fray’s  “ Annales  Hunnorum,”  p.  117.  The  example 
of  Romulus  is  the  main  authority  quoted. 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS. 


247 


243.  An  attempt  to  assassinate  Attila,  made,  or 

supposed  to  have  been  made,  at  the  instigation  of 
Theodoric  the  younger,  the  Emperor  of  Constanti- 
nople, drew  the  Hunnish  armies,  in  445,  upon  the 
Eastern  empire,  and  delayed  for  a time  the  destined 
blow  against  Rome.  Probably  a more  important 
cause  of  delay  was  the  revolt  of  some  of  the  Hnnnish 
tribes  to  the  North  of  the  Black  Sea  against  Attila, 
which  broke  out  about  this  period,  and  is  curiously 
mentioned  by  the  Byzantine  writers.  Attila  quelled 
this  revolt,  and  having  thus  consolidated  his  power, 
and  having  punished  the  presumption  of  the  Eastern 
Roman  emperor  by  fearful  ravages  of  his  fairest 
province^  Attila,  in  450  D.,  prepared  to  set  his 

vast  forces  in  motion  for  the  conquest  of  Western 
Europe.  He  sought  unsuccessfully  by  diplomatic 
intrigues  to  detach  the  King  of  Visigoths  from  his 
alliance  with  Rome,  and  he  resolved  first  to  crush  the 
power  of  Theodoric,  and  then  to  advance  with  over- 
whelming power  to  trample  out  the  last  sparks  of 
the  doomed  Roman  empire. 

244.  A strange  invitation  from  a Roman  princess 
gave  him  a pretext  for  the  war,  and  threw  an  air  of 
chivalric  enterprise  over  his  invasion.  Honoria,  sis- 
ter of  Valentinian  III.,  the  Emperor  of  the  West,  had 
sent  to  Attila  to  offer  him  her  hand  and  her  sup- 
posed right  to  share  in  the  imperial  power.  This 
had  been  discovered  by  the  Romans,  and  Honoria 
had  been  forthwith  closely  imprisoned.  Attila  now 
pretended  to  take  up  arms  in  behalf  of  his  self-prom- 
ised bride,  and  proclaimed  that  he  was  about  to 


248 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS, 


march  to  Home  to  redress  Honoria’s  wrongs.  Am- 
bition and  spite  against  her  brother  must  have  been 
the  sole  motives  that  led  the  lady  to  woo  the  royal 
Hun ; for  Attila’s  face  and  person  had  all  the  natural 
ugliness  of  his  race,  and  the  description  given  of  him 
by  a Byzantine  embassador  must  have  been  well 
known  in  the  imperial  courts.  Herbert  has  well 
versified  the  portrait  drawn  by  Prisons  of  the  great 
enemy  of  both  Byzantium  and  Rome : 

“ Terrific  was  his  semblance,  in  no  mould 
Of  beautiful  proportion  cast;  his  limbs 
Nothing*  exalted,  but  with  sinews  braced 
Of  Chalybaean  temper,  agile,  lithe. 

And  swifter  than  the  roe;  his  ample  chest 
Was  overbrow’d  by  a gigantic  head. 

With  eyes  keen,  deeply  sunk,  and  small,  that  glean’d 
Strangely  in  wrath  as  though  some  spirit  unclean 
Within  that  corporal  tenement  install’d 
Look’d  from  its  windows,  but  with  temper’d  fire 
Beam’d  mildly  on  the  unresisting.  Thin 
His  beard  and  hoary;  his  flat  nostrils  crown’d 
A cicatrized,  swart  visage ; but,  withal. 

That  questionable  shape  such  glory  wore 
That  mortals  quail’d  beneath  him.” 

245.  Two  chiefs  of  the  Franks,  who  were  then  set- 
tled on  the  Lower  Rhine,  were  at  this  period  en- 
gaged in  a feud  with  each  other,  and  while  one  of 
them  appealed  to  the  Romans  for  aid,  the  other  in- 
voked the  assistance  and  protection  of  the  Huns. 
Attila  thus  obtained  an  ally  whose  co-operation  se- 
cured for  him  the  passage  of  the  Rhine,  and  it  was 
this  circumstance  which  caused  him  to  take  a north- 
ward route  from  Hungary  for  his  attack  upon  Gaul. 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS. 


249 


The  muster  of  the  Hunnish  hosts  was  swollen  by 
warriors  of  every  tribe  that  they  had  subjugated  ; 
nor  is  there  any  reason  to  suspect  the  old  chroniclers 
of  willful  exaggeration  in  estimating  Attila’s  army 
at  seven  hundred  thousand  strong.  Having  crossed 
the  Rhine  probably  a litile  below  Coblentz,  he  de- 
feated the  King  of  the  Burgundians,  who  endeavored 
to  bar  his  progress.  He  then  divided  his  vast  forces 
into  two  armies,  one  of  which  marched  northwest 
upon  Tongres  and  Arras,  and  the  other  cities  of  that 
part  of  France,  while  the  main  body,  under  Attila 
himself,  advanced  up  the  Moselle,  and  destroyed 
Besanyon,  and  other  towns  in  the  country  of  the 
Burgundians.  One  of  the  latest  and  best  biographers 
of  Attila*  well  observes,  that,  “having  thus  con- 
quered the  eastern  part  of  France,  Attila  prepared 
for  an  invasion  of  the  West  Gothic  territories  beyond 
the  Loire.  He  marched  upon  Orleans,  where  he  in- 
tended to  force  the  passage  of  that  river,  and  only  a 
little  attention  is  requisite  to  enable  us  to  perceive 
that  he  proceeded  on  a systematic  plan : he  had  his 
right  wing  on  the  north  for  the  protection  of  his 
Frank  allies  ; his  left  wing  on  the  south  for  the  pur- 
pose of  preventing  the  Burgundians  from  rallying, 
and  of  menacing  the  passes  of  the  Alps  from  Italy  ; 
and  he  led  his  centre  toward  the  chief  object  of  the 
campaign — the  conquest  of  Orleans,  and  an  easy  pass- 
age into  the  West  Gothic  dominion.  The  whole  plan 
is  very  like  that  of  the  allied  powers  in  1814,  with 

* Biographical  Dictionary  commenced  by  the  Useful 
Knowledge  Society  in  1844. 


250 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS, 


this  difference,  that  their  left  wing  entered  France 
through  the  defiles  of  the  jura,  in  the  direction  ol 
Lyons,  and  that  the  military  object  of  the  campaign 
was  the  capture  of  Paris.^’ 

246.  It  was  not  till  the  year  451  that  the  Huns 
commenced  the  Siege  of  Orleans ; and  during  theii 
campaign  in  Eastern  Gaul,  the  Eoman  general  Aetius 
had  strenuously  exerted  himself  in  collecting  and  or- 
ganizing such  an  army  as  might,  when  united  to  the 
soldiery  of  the  Visigoths,  be  fit  to  face  the  Huns  in 
the  field.  He  enlisted  every  subject  of  the  Roman 
empire  whom  patriotism,  courage,  or  compulsion 
could  collect  beneath  the  standards  ; and  round  these 
troops,  which  assumed  the  once  proud  title  of  the 
legions  of  Rome,  he  arrayed  the  large  forces  of  bar- 
baric auxiliaries,  whom  pay,  persuasion,  or  the  gen- 
eral hate  and  dread  of  the  Huns  brought  to  the  camp 
of  the  last  of  the  Roman  generals.  King  Theodoric 
exerted  himself  with  equal  energy.  Orleans  resisted 
her  besiegers  bravely  as  in  after  times.  The  passage 
of  the  Loire  was  skillfully  defended  against  [the 
Huns  ; and  Aetius  and  Theodoric,  after  much  maneuv- 
ering and  difficulty,  effected  a junction  of  their  armies 
to  the  south  of  that  important  river. 

247.  On  the  advance  of  the  allies  upon  Orleans, 
Attila  instantly  broke  up  the  siege  of  that  city,  and 
retreated  toward  the  Marne.  He  did  not  choose  to 
risk  a decisive  battle  with  only  the  central  corps  ol 
his  army  against  the  combined  power  of  his  enemies, 
and  he  therefore  fell  back  upon  his  base  of  operations, 
calling  in  his  wings  from  Arras  and  Besan9on,  and 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS. 


251 


concentrating  the  whole  of  the  Hunnish  forces  on  the 
vast  plains  of  Chalons-sur-Marne.  A glance  at  the 
map  will  show  how  scientifically  this  place  was  chos- 
en by  the  Hunnish  general  as  the  point  for  his  scat- 
tered forces  to  converge  upon ; and  the  nature  of  the 
ground  was  eminently  favorable  for  the  operations  of 
cavalry,  the  arm  in  which  Attila’s  strength  pecu- 
liarly lay. 

248.  It  was  during  the  retreat  from  Orleans  that  a 
Christian  hermit  is  reported  to  have  approached  the 
Hunnish  king,  and  said  to  him,  “ Thou  art  the 
Scourge  of  God  for  the  chastisement  of  the  Christians.’’ 
Attila  instantly  assumed  this  new  title  of  terror, 
which  thenceforth  became  the  appellation  by  which 
he  was  most  widely  and  most  fearfully  known. 

249.  The  confederate  armies  of  Romans  and  Visi- 
goths at  last  met  their  great  adversary  face  to  face  on 
the  ample  battle-ground  of  the  Chalons  plains.  Ae- 
tius  commanded  on  the  right  of  the  allies ; King  Theo- 
doric  on  the  left ; and  Sangipan,  king  of  the  Alans, 
whose  fidelity  was  suspected,  was  placed  purposely  in 
the  centre,.and  in  the  very  front  of  the  battle.  Attila 
commanded  his  centre  in  person,  at  the  head  of  his 
own  countrymen,  while  the  Ostrogoths,  the  Gepida?, 
and  the  other  subject  allies  of  the  Huns  were  drawn 
up  on  the  wings.  Some  maneuvering  appears  to 
have  occurred  before  the  engagement,  in  which  Ae- 
tius  had  the  advantage,  inasmuch  as  he  succeeded  in 
occupying  a sloping  hill,  which  commanded  the  left 
flank  of  the  Huns.  Attila  saw  the  importance  of  the 


252 


BATTLE  OF  CHALONS. 


position  taken  by  Aetius  on  the  high  ground,  and 
eonimenced  the  battle  by  a furious  attack  on  this 
part  of  the  Eoman  line,  in  which  he  seems  to  have 
detached  some  of  his  best  troops  from  his  centre  to 
aid  his  left.  The  Romans,  having  the  advantage  of 
the  ground,  repulsed  the  Huns,  and  while  the  allies 
gained  this  advantage  on  their  right,  their  left,  under 
King  Theodoric,  assailed  the  Ostrogoths,  who  formed 
the  right  of  Attila’s  army.  The  gallant  king  was 
himself  struck  down  by  a javelin,  as  he  rode  onward 
at  the  head  of  his  men ; and  his  own  cavalry,  charg- 
ing over  him,  trampled  him  to  death  in  the  confusion. 
But  the  Visigoths,  infuriated,  not  dispirited,  by  their 
monarch’s  fall,  routed  the  enemies  opposed  to  them, 
and  then  wheeled  upon  the  flank  of  the  Hunnish 
centre,  which  had  been  engaged  in  a sanguinary  and 
indecisive  contest  with  the  Alans. 

250.  In  this  peril  Attila  made  his  centre  fall  back 
upon  his  camp ; and  when  the^shelter  of  its  entrench- 
ments and  wagons  had  once  been  gained,  the  Hun- 
nish archers  repulsed,  without  difficulty,  the  charges 
of  the  vengeful  Gothic  cavalry.  Aetius  had  not 
pressed  the  advantage  which  he  gained  on  his  side 
of  the  field,  and  when  night  fell  over  the  wild  scene 
of  havoc,  Attila’s  left  was  still  undefeated,  but  his 
right  had  been  routed,  and  his  centre  forced  back 
upon  his  camp. 

251.  Expecting  an  assault  on  the  morrow,  Attila 
stationed  his  best  archers  in  front  of  the  cars  and 
wagons,  which  were  drawn  up  as  a fortification 
along  his  lines,  and  made  every  preparation  for  a 


BATTLE  OF  CHALOISIB. 


253 


desperate  resistance.  But  the  “Scourge  of  Grod’^  re- 
solved that  no  man  should  boast  of  the  honor  of  hav- 
ing either  captured  or  slain  him,  and  he  caused  to  be 
raised  in  the  centre  of  his  encampment  a huge  pyra- 
mid of  the  wooden  saddles  of  his  cavalry ; round  it 
he  heaped  the  spoils  and  the  wealth  that  he  had 
won ; on  it  stationed  his  wives  who  had  accompanied 
him  in  the  campaign;  and  on  the  summit  Attila 
placed  himself,  ready  to  perish  in  the  flames,  and  balk 
the  victorious  foe  of  their  choicest  booty,  should  they 
succeed  in  storming  his  defenses. 

252.  But  when  the  morning  broke  and  revealed 
the  extent  of  the  carnage  with  which  the  plains 
were  heaped  for  miles,  the  successful  allies  saw  also 
and  respected  the  resolute  attitude  of  their  antagon- 
ist. Neither  were  any  measures  taken  to  blockade 
him  in  his  camp,  and  so  to  extort  by  famine  that  sub- 
mission which  it  was  too  plainly  perilous  to  enforce 
with  the  sword.  Attila  was  allowed  to  march  back 
the  remnants  of  his  army  without  molestation,  and 
even  with  the  semblance  of  success. 

253.  It  is  probable  that  the  crafty  Aetius  was  un- 
willing to  be  too  victorious.  He  dreaded  the  glory 
which  his  allies  the  Visigoths  had  acquired,  and 
feared  that  Rome  might  And  a second  Alaric  in 
Prince  Thorismund,  who  had  signalized  himself  in 
the  battle,  and  had  been  chosen  on  the  field  to  suc- 
ceed his  father  Theodoric.  He  persuaded  the  young 
king  to  return  at  once  to  his  capital,  and  thus  re- 
lieved himself  at  the  same  time  of  the  presence  of  a 


254 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS, 


dangerous  friend,  as  well  as  of  a formidable  though 
beaten  foe. 

254.  Attila’s  attacks  on  the  Western  empire  were 
soon  renewed,  but  never  with  such  peril  to  the  civil- 
ized world  as  had  menaced  it  before  his  defeat  at 
Chalons  ; and  on  his  death  two  years  after  that  bat- 
tle, the  vast  empire  which  his  genius  had  founded 
was  soon  dissevered  by  the  successful  revolts  of  the 
subject  nations.  The  name  of  the  Huns  ceased  for 
some  centuries  to  inspire  terror  in  Western  Europe, 
and  their  ascendency  passed  away  with  the  life  of 
the  great  king  by  whom  it  had  been  so  fearfully 
augmented.* 


Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle 
OF  Chalons,  A.  D.  451,  and  the  Battle 
OF  Tours,  A.  D.  732. 

A.  D.  476.  The  Roman  empire  of  the  West  extin- 
guished by  Odoacer. 

481.  Establishment  of  the  French  monarchy  in 
Gaul  by  Clovis. 

455-582.  The  Saxons,  Angles,  and  Frisians  con- 
quer Britain,  except  the  northern  parts  and  the  dis- 
tricts along  the  west  coast.  The  German  conquerors 
found  eight  independent  kingdoms. 

If  I seem  to  have  given  fewer  of  the  details  of  the 
battle  itself  than  its  importance  would  warrant,  my  ex- 
cuse must  be,  that  Gibbon  has  enriched  our  language  with 
a description  of  it,  too  long  for  quotation  and  too  splen- 
did for  rivalry.  I have  not,  however,  taken  altogether  the 
same  view  of  it  that  he  has.  The  notes  to  Mr.  Herbert’s 
poem  of  “ Attila”  bring  together  nearly  all  the  authorities 
on  the  subject 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


255 


533-568.  The  generals  of  Justinian,  the  Emperor 
of  Constantinople,  conquer  Italy  and  North  Africa ; 
and  these  countries  are  for  a short  time  annexed  to 
the  Roman  empire  of  the  East. 

568-570.  The  Lombards  conquer  great  part  of 
Italy. 

570-627.  The  wars  between  the  emperors  of  Con-  • 
stantinople  and  the  kings  of  Persia  are  actively 
continued. 

622.  The  Mohammedan  era  of  the  Hegira.  Mo- 
hammed is  driven  from  Mecca,  and  is  received  as 
prince  of  Medina. 

629-632.  Mohammed  conquers  Arabia. 

632-651.  The  Mohammedan  Arabs  invade  and 
conquer  Persia. 

632-709.  They  attack  the  Roman  empire  of  the 
East.  They  conquer  Syria,  Egypt,  and  Africa. 

709-713.  They,  cross  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar,  and 
invade  and  conquer  Spain. 


256 


BATTLE  OF  TOURS. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  TOURS,  A.  D.  732. 

The  events  that  rescued  our  ancestors  of  Britain  and 
neighbors  of  Gaul  from  the  civil  and  religious  yoke  of 
the  Koran.— Gibbon, 

255.  The  broad  tract  of  champaign  country  which 
intervenes  between  the  cities  of  Poictiers  and  Tours 
is  principally  composed  of  a succession  of  rich  pasture 
lands,  which  are  traversed  and  fertilized  by  the  Cher, 
the  Creuse,  the  Vienne,  the  Claine,  the  Indre,  and 
other  tributaries  of  the  River  Loire.  Here  and  there 
the  ground  swells  into  picturesque  eminences,  and 
occasionally  a belt  of  forest  land,  a brown  heath,  or  a 
clustering  series  of  vineyards  breaks  the  monotony 
of  the  widespread  meadows  ; but  the  general  charac- 
ter of  the  land  is  that  of  a grassy  plain,  and  it  seems 
naturally  adapted  for  the  evolutions  of  numerous 
armies,  especially  of  those  vast  bodies  of  cavalry 
which  principally  decided  the  fate  of  nations  during 
the  centuries  that  followed  the  downfall  of  Rome, 
and  preceded  the  consolidation  of  the  modern  Euro- 
pean powers. 

256.  This  region  has  been  signalized  by  more  than 
one  memorable  conflict ; but  it  is  principally  inter- 


BATTLE  OF  TOUES. 


257 


esting  to  the  historian  by  having  been  the  scene  of 
the  great  victory  won  by  Charles  Martel  over  the 
Saracens,  A.  D.  732,  which  gave  a decisive  cheek  to 
the  career  of  Arab  conquest  in  Western  Europe,  res- 
cued Christendom  from  Islam,  preserved  the  relics 
of  ancient  and  the  germs  of  modern  civilization,  and 
re-established  the  old  superiority  of  the  Indo-Euro- 
pean over  the  Semitic  family  of  mankind. 

257.  Sismondi  and  Michelet  have  underrated  the 
enduring  interest  of  this  great  Appeal  of  Battle  be- 
tween the  champions  of  the  Crescent  and  the  Cross. 
But,  if  French  writers  ha\  e slighted  the  exploits  of 
their  national  hero,  the  Saracenic  trophies  of  Charles 
Martel  have  had  full  justice  done  to  them  by  English 
and  German  historians.  Gibbon  devotes  several  pages 
of  his  great  work*  to  the  narrative  of  the  battle  of 
Tours,  and  to  the  consideration  of  the  consequences 
which  probably  would  have  resulted  if  Abderrah- 
man’s  enterprise  had  not  been  crushed  by  the  Frank- 
ish chief,  Schlegelf  speaks  of  this  mighty  victory  ” 
in  terms  of  fervent  gratitude,  and  tells  how  “ the  arm 
of  Charles  Martel  saved  and  delivered  the  Christian 
nations  of  the  West  from  the  deadly  grasp  of  all-de- 
stroying Islam and  EankeJ  points  out,  as  “ one  of 

* Vol.  vii.,  p.  17,  etseg.  Gibbon’s  sneering  remark,  that 
if  the  Saracen  conquests  had  not  then  been  checked, 
“perhaps  the  interpretation  of  tne  Koran  would  now  be 
taught  in  the  schools  of  Oxford,  and  her  pulpits  might 
demonstrate  to  a circumcised  people  the  sanctity  and 
truth  of  the  revelation  of  Mohammed,”  has  almost  an  air 
of  regret. 

t “ Philosophy  of  History,”  p.  331. 

% “History  of  the  Reformation  in  Germany,”  vol.  i.,p,  5. 


259 


BATTLE  OF  TOURS. 


the  most  important  epochs  in  the  history  of  the 
world,  the  commencement  of  the  eighth  century, 
when  on  the  one  side  Mohammedanism  threatened 
to  overspread  Italy  and  Gaul,  and  on  the  other  the 
ancient  idolatry  of  Saxony  and  Friesland  once  more 
forced  its  way  across  the  Khine.  In  this  peril  of 
Christian  institutions,  a youthful  prince  of  Germanic 
race,  Karl  Martell,  arose  as  their  champion,  main- 
tained them  with  all  the  energy  which  the  necessity 
for  self-defense  calls  forth,  and  finally  extended  them 
into  new  regions.” 

258.  Arnold*  ranks  the  victory  of  Charles  Martel 
even  higher  than  the  victory  of  Arminius,  “ among 
those  signal  deliverances  which  have  affected  for 
centuries  the  happiness  of  mankind.”  In  fact,  the 
more  we  test  its  importance,  the  higher  we  shall  be 
led  to  estimate  it ; and,  though  all  authentic  details 
which  we  possess  of  its  circumstances  and  its  heroes 
are  but  meagre,  we  can  trace  enough  of  its  general 
character  to  make  us  watch  with  deep  interest  this 
encounter  between  the  rival  conquerors  of  the  decay- 
ing Roman  empire.  That  old  classic  world,  the  his- 
tory of  which  occupies  so  large  a portion  of  our  early 
studies,  lay,  in  the  eighth  century  of  our  era,  utterly 
exanimate  and  overthrown.  On  the  north  the  Ger- 
man, on  the  south  the  Arab,  was  rending  away  its 
provinces.  At  last  the  spoilers  encountered  one  an- 
other, each  striving  for  the  full  mastery  of  the  prey. 
Their  conflict  brought  back  upon  the  memory  of 

* “ History  of  the  latter  Roman  Commonwealth/’  vol. 
ii.,p.  317. 


BATTLE  OF  TOURS. 


259 


Gibbon  tbe  old  Homeric  simile,  where  the  strife  of 
Hector  and  Patroclus  over  the  dead  body  of  Cebriones 
is  compared  to  the  combat  of  two  lions,  that  in  their 
hate  and  hunger  fight  together  on  the  mountain  tops 
over  the  carcass  of  a slaughtered  stag ; and  the  re- 
luctant yielding  of  the  Saracen  power  to  the  superior 
might  of  the  Northern  warriors  might  not  inaptly 
recall  those  other  lines  of  the  same  book  of  the  Iliad, 
where  the  downfall  of  Patroclus  beneath  Hector  is 
likened  to  the  forced  yielding  of  the  panting  and  ex- 
hausted wild  boar,  that  had  long  and  furiously 
fought  with  a superior  beast  of  prey  for  the  posses- 
sion of  the  scanty  fountain  among  the  rocks  at  which 
each  burned  to  drink.* 

259.  Although  three  centuries  had  passed  away 
since  the  Germanic  conquerors  of  Rome  had  crossed 
the  Rhine,  never  to  repass  that  frontier  stream,  no 
settled  system  of  institutions  or  government,  no  amal- 
gamation of  the  various  races  into  one  people,  no 
uniformity  of  language  or  habits,  had  been  estab- 
lished in  the  country  at  the  time  when  Charles  Mar- 
tel was  called  to  repel  the  menacing  tide  of  Saracenic 
invasion  from  the  south.  Gaul  was  not  yet  France. 

fa)?,  Sr]pLv9ijTr)U, 

opeo?  Kopv<f>r}(n  Trepi  KTap.ivr]<:  e\d<f)Oio, 

*AfX(f>(o  ireivdovT€,  p.i\a  <j>poviovT€  p.dxea9ov> 

II.,  n'.  756. 

*n?  S'  oT€  avy  aKdp.avTa  Aewv  ejSti^craTO  x^Pf^V* 

Tw  t’  op€o?  Kopv(j>r}(Tt  fJieya  <f>pov€ovTe  fjidx€<T9ov, 
lUSaKO^  dp.(f>'  bKiyrjq'  ede'Aouo-t  5e  Tnip.ev  dp.^oy 
HoAAa  Si  t’  d<j9p.aivovTa  \i<av  iSdp.a<j<re 

II.,  7t'.  323. 


9 


260 


BATTLE  OF  TOURS. 


In  that,  as  in  other  provinces  of  the  Roman  empire 
of  the  West,  the  dominion  of  the  Csesars  had  been 
shattered  as  early  as  the  fifth  century,  and  barbaric 
kingdoms  and  principalities  had  promptly  arisen  on 
the  ruins  of  the  Roman  power.  But  few  of  these  had 
any  permanency,  and  none  of  them  consolidated  the 
rest,  or  any  considerable  number  of  the  rest,  into  one 
coherent  and  organized  civil  and  political  society. 
The  great  bulk  of  the  population  still  consisted  of 
the  conquered  provincials,  that  is  to  say,  of  Roman- 
ized Celts,  of  a Gallic  race  which  had  long  been  un- 
der the  dominion  of  the  Caesars,  and  had  acquired, 
together  with  no  slight  infusion  of  Roman  blood,  the 
language,  the  literature,  the  laws,  and  the  civiliza- 
tion of  Latium.  Among  these,  and  dominant  over 
them,  roved  or  dwelt  the  German  victors  ; some  re- 
taining nearly  all  the  rude  independence  of  their 
primitive  national  character,  others  softened  and 
disciplined  by  the  aspect  and  contact  of  the  manners 
and  institutions  of  civilized  life ; for  it  is  to  be  borne 
in  mind  that  the  Roman  empire  in  the  West  was  not 
crushed  by  any  sudden  avalanche  or  barbaric  inva- 
sion. The  German  conquerors  came  across  the 
Rhine,  not  in  enormous  hosts,  but  in  bands  of  a few 
thousand  warriors  at  a time.  The  conquest  of  a 
province  was  the  result  of  an  infinite  series  of  partial 
local  invasions,  carried  on  by  little  armies  of  this 
description.  The  victorious  warriors  either  retired 
with  their  booty,  or  fixed  themselves  in  the  invaded 
district,  taking  care  to  keep  sufficiently  concentrated 
for  military  purposes  and  ever  ready  for  some  fresh 


BATTLE  OF  TOURS. 


261 


foray,  either  against  a rival  Teutonic  band,  or  some 
hitherto  unassailed  city  of  the  provincials.  Gradu- 
ally, however,  the  conquerors  acquired  a desire  for 
permanent  landed  possessions.  They  lost  somewhat 
of  the  restless  thirst  for  novelty  and  adventure.which 
had  first  made  them  throng  beneath  the  banner  of 
the  boldest  captains  of  their  tribe,  and  leave  their 
native  forests  for  a roving  military  life  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine.  They  were  converted  to  the 
Christian  faith,  and  gave  up  with  their  old  creed 
much  of  the  coarse  ferocity  which  must  have  been 
fostered  in  the  spirits  of  the  ancient  warriors  of  the 
North  by  mythology  which  promised,  as  the  reward 
of  the  brave  on  earth,  an  eternal  cycle  of  fighting 
and  drunkenness  in  heaven. 

260.  But,  although  their  conversion  and  other  civ- 
ilizing infiuences  operated  powerfully  upon  the  Ger- 
mans in  Gaul,  and  although  the  Franks  (who  were 
originally  a confederation  of  the  Teutonic  tribes  that 
dwelt  between  the  Rhine,  the  Maine,  and  the  Weser) 
established  a decisive  superiority  over  the  other  con- 
querors of  the  province,  as  well  as  over  the  conquered 
provincials,  the  country  long  remained  a chaos  of  un- 
combined and  shifting  elements.  The  early  princes 
of  the  Merovingian  dynasty  were  generally  occupied 
in  wars  against  other  princes  of  their  house,  occa- 
sioned by  the  frequent  subdivisions  of  the  Frank 
monarchy ; and  the  ablest  and  best  of  them  had 
found  all  their  energies  tasked  to  the  utmost  to  de- 
fend the  barrier  of  the  Rhine  against  the  pagan  Ger- 


262 


BATTLE  OF  TOURS, 


mans  who  strove  to  pass  that  river  and  gather  their 
share  of  the  spoils  of  the  empire. 

261.  The  conquests  which  the  Saracens  effected 
over  the  southern  and  eastern  provinces  of  Rome  were 
far  more  rapid  than  those  achieved  by  the  Germans 
in  the  north,  and  the  new  organizations  of  society 
which  the  Moslems  introduced  were  summarily  and 
uniformly  enforced.  Exactly  a century  passed  be- 
tween the  death  of  Mohammed  and  the  date  of  the 
battle  of  Tours.  During  that  century  the  followers 
of  the  Prophet  had  torn  away  half  the  Roman  em- 
pire; and  besides  their  conquests  over  Persia,  the 
Saracens  had  overrun  Syria,  Egypt,  Africa,  and 
Spain,  in  an  uncheckered  and  apparently  irresisti- 
ble career  of  victory.  Nor,  at  the  commencement  of 
the  eighth  century  of  our  era,  was  the  Mohammedan 
world  divided  against  itself,  as  it  subsequently  be- 
came. All  these  vast  regions  obeyed  the  caliph; 
throughout  them  all,  from  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Oxus, 
the  name  of  Mohammed  was  invoked  in  prayer,  and 
the  Koran  revered  as  the  book  of  the  law. 

262.  It  was  under  one  of  their  ablest  and  most  re- 
nowned commanders,  with  a veteran  army,  and  with 
every  apparent  advantage  of  time,  place,  and  circum- 
stance, that  the  Arabs  made  their  great  effort  at  the 
conquest  of  Eufbpe  north  of  the  Pyrenees.  The  vic- 
torious Moslem  soldiery  in  Spain, 

“ A countless  multitude; 

Syrian,  Moor,  Saracen,  Greek  renegade, 

Persian,  and  Copt,  and  Tartar,  in  one  bond 
Of  erring  faith  conjoined— strong  in  the  youth 
And  heat  of  zeal— a dreadful  brotherhood,  ’ 


BATTLE  OF  TO  UBS. 


263 


were  eager  for  the  plunder  of  more  Christian  cities 
and  shrines,  and  full  of  fanatic  confidence  in  the  in- 
vincibility of  their  arms. 

Nor  were  the  chiefs 

Of  victory  less  assured,  by  long-  success 
Elate,  and  proud  of  that  overwhelming-  strength 
Which,  surely  they  believed,  as  it  had  rolled 
Thus  far  uncheck’d,  would  roll  victorious  on, 

Till  like  the  Orient,  the  subjected  West 
Should  bow  in  reverence  at  Mahommed’s  name; 
And  pilgrims  from  remotest  Arctic  shores 
Tread  with  religious  feet  the  burning  sands 
Of  Araby  and  Mecca’s  stony  soil. 

Southey’s  Roderick. 

263.  It  is  not  only  by  the  modern  Christian  poet, 
but  by  the  old  Arabian  chroniclers  also,  that  these 
feelings  of  ambition  and  arrogance  are  attributed  to 
the  Moslems  who  had  overthrown  the  Visigoth 
power  in  Spain.  And  their  eager  expectations  of 
new  wars  were  excited  to  the  utmost  on  the  reap- 
pointment by  the  caliph  of  Abderrahman  Ibn  Ab- 
dillah  Alghafeki  to  the  government  of  that  country, 
A.  D.  729,  which  restored  them  a general  who  had 
signalized  his  skill  and  prowess  during  the  conquests 
of  Africa  and  Spain,  whose  ready  valor  and  gener- 
osity had  made  him  the  idol  of  the  troops,  who  had 
already  been  engaged  in  several  expeditions  into 
Gaul,  so  as  to  be  well  acquainted  with  the  national 
character  and  tactics  of  the  Franks,  and  who  was 
known  to  thirst,  like  a good  Moslem,  for  revenge  for 
the  slaughter  of  some  detachments  of  the  True  Be- 
lievers, which  had  been  cut  off  on  the  north  of  the 
Pyrenees. 


264 


BATTLE  OF  TOURS, 


264.  In  addition  to  his  cardinal  military  virtues, 
Abderrahman  is  described  by  the  Arab  writers  as  a 
model  of  integrity  and  justice.  The  first  two  years 
of  his  second  administration  in  Spain  were  occupied 
in  severe  reforms  of  the  abuses  which  under  his  pre- 
decessors had  crept  into  the  system  of  government, 
and  in  extensive  preparations  for  his  intended  con- 
quest in  Gaul.  Besides  the  troops  which  he  collected 
from  his  province,  he  obtained  from  Africa  a large 
body  of  chosen  Berber  cavalry,  officered  by  Arabs  of 
proved  skill  and  valor ; and  in  the  summer  of  732, 
he  crossed  the  Pyrenees  at  the  head  of  an  army 
which  some  Arab  writers  rate  at  eighty  thousand 
strong,  while  some  of  the  Christian  chroniclers  swell 
its  numbers  to  many  hundreds  of  thousands  more. 
Probably  the  Arab  account  diminishes,  but  of  the 
two  keeps  nearer  to  the  truth.  It  was  from  this  for- 
midable host,  after  Eudes,  the  Count  of  Aquitaine, 
had  vainly  striven  to  check  it,  after  many  strong 
cities  had  fallen  before  it,  and  half  the  land  had 
been  overrun,  that  Gaul  and  Christendom  were  at 
last  rescued  by  the  strong  arm  of  Prince  Charles ^ 
who  acquired  a surname,*  like  that  of  the  war-god 
of  his  forefathers’  creed,  from  the  might  with  which 
he  broke  and  shattered  his  enemies  in  the  battle. 

265.  The  Merovingian  kings  had  sunk  into  abso- 
lute insignificance,  and  had  become  mere  puppets  of 
royalty  before  the  eighth  century.  Charles  Martel, 
like  his  father,  Pepin  Heristal,  was  Duke  of  the  Aus- 

Martel— The  Hammer.  See  the  Scandinavian  Sagas 
for  an  account  of  the  favorite  weapon  of  Thor. 


BATTLE  OF  TOURS. 


265 


trasian  Franks,  the  bravest  and  most  thoroughly 
Germanic  part  of  the  nation,  and  exercised,  in  the 
name  of  the  titular  king,  what  little  paramount 
authority  the  turbulent  minor  rulers  oi  districts  and 
towns  could  be  persuaded  or  compelled  to  acknowl- 
edge. Engaged  with  his  national  competitors  in  per- 
petual conflicts  for  power,  and  in  more  serious  strug- 
gles for  safety  against  the  fierce*  tribes  of  the  uncon- 
verted Frisians,  Bavarians,  Saxons,  and  Thuringians, 
who  at  that  epoch  assailed  with  peculiar  ferocity,  the 
Christianized  Germans  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ehine, 
Charles  Martel  added  experienced  skill  to  his  natu- 
ral courage,  and  he  had  also  formed  a militia  of  vet- 
erans among  the  Franks.  Hallam  has  thrown  out  a 
doubt  whether,  in  our  admiration  of  his  victory  at 
Tours,  we  do  not  judge  a little  too  much  by  the 
event,  and  whether  there  was  not  rashness  in  his 
risking  the  fate  of  France  on  the  result  of  a general 
battle  with  the  invaders.  But  when  we  remember 
that  Charles  had  no  standing  army,  and  the  inde- 
pendent spirit  of  the  Frank  w arriors  who  followed 
his  standard,  it  seems  most  probable  that  it  was  not 
in  his  power  to  adopt  the  cautious  policy  of  watch- 
ing the  invaders,  and  wearing  out  their  strength  by 
delay.  So  dreadful  and  so  widespread  were  the  rav- 
ages of  the  Saracenic  light  cavalry  throughout  Gaul, 
that  it  must  have  been  impossible  to  restrain  for  any 
length  of  time  the  indignant  ardor  of  the  Franks. 
And,  even  if  Charles  could  have  persuaded  his  men 
to  look  tamely  on  while  the  Arabs  stormed  more 
towns  and  desolated  more  districts,  he  could  not 


266 


BATTLE  OF  TOURS. 


have  kept  an  army  together  w^hen  the  usual  period 
of  a military  expedition  had  expired.  If,  indeed, 
the  Arab  account  of  the  disorganization  of  the  Mos- 
lem forces  be  correct,  the  battle  was  as  well  timed  on 
the  part  of  Charles,  as  it  was,  beyond  all  question, 
well  fought. 

266.  The  monkish  chroniclers,  from  whom  we  are 
obliged  to  glean  a Narrative  of  this  memorable  cam- 
paign, bear  full  evidence  to  the  terror  which  the 
Saracen  invasion  inspired,  and  to  the  agony  of  that 
great  struggle.  The  Saracens,  say  they,  and  their 
king,  who  was  called  Abdirames,  came  out  of  Spain, 
with  all  their  wives,  and  their  children,  and  their 
substance,  in  such  great  multitudes  that  no  man 
could  reckon  or  estimate  them.  They  brought  with 
them  all  their  armor,  and  whatever  they  had,  as  if 
they  were  thenceforth  always  to  dwell  in  France.* 

267.  Then  Abderrahman,  seeing  the  land  filled 
with  the  multitude  of  his  army,  pierces  through  the 
mountains,  tramples  over  rough  and  level  ground, 
plunders  far  into  the  country  of  the  Franks,  and 
smites  all  with  the  sword,  insomuch  that  when 
Eudo  came  to  battle  with  him  at  the  Kiver  Garonne, 
and  fled  before  him,  God  alone  knows  the  number  of 
the  slain.  Then  Abderrahman  pursued  after  Count 
Eudo,  and  while  he  strives  to  spoil  and  burn  the  holy 

* “Lors  issirent  d’Espaigne  li  Sarrazins,  et  un  leur  Roi 
qui  avoit  nom  Abdirames,  et  ont  leur  fames  et  leur  enfans 
et  toute  leur  substance  en  si  grand  plente  que  nus  ne  le 
prevoit  nombrer  ne  estimer:  tout  leur  harnois  et  quan- 
ques  il  avoient  amenement  avec  entz,  aussi  comme  si  ils 
deussent  toujours  mes  habiter  en  France." 


BATTLE  OF  TOURS. 


267 


shrine  at  Tours,  he  encounters  the  chief  of  the  Aus- 
trasian  Franks,  Charles,  a man  of  war  from  his  youth 
up,  to  whom  Eudo  had  sent  warning.  There  for 
nearly  seven  days  they  strive  intensely,  and  at  last 
they  set  themselves  in  battle  array,  and  the  nations 
of  the  North  standing  firm  as  a wall,  and  impenetra- 
ble as  a zone  of  ice,  utterly  slays  the  Arabs  with  the 
edge  of  the  sword.”  * 

268.  The  European  writers  all  concur  in  speaking 
of  the  fall  of  Abderrahman  as  one  of  the  principal 
causes  of  *the  defeat  of  the  Arabs  ; who,  according  to 
one  writer,  after  finding  that  their  leader  was  slain, 
dispersed  in  the  night,  to  the  agreeable  surprise  of 
the  Christians,  who  expected  the  next  morning  to 
see  them  issue  from  their  tents  and  renew  the  com- 
bat. One  monkish  chronicler  puts  the  loss  of  the 
Arabs  at  375,000  men,  while  he  says  that  only  1,007 
Christians  fell : a disparity  of  loss  which  he  feels 
bound  to  account  for  by  a special  interposition  of 
Providence.  I have  translated  above  some  of  the 
most  spirited  passages  of  these  writers  ; but  it  is  im- 
possible to  collects  from  them  anything  like  a full 
or  authentic  description  of  the  great  battle  itself,  or 
of  the  operations  which  preceded  and  followed  it. 

269.  Though,  however,  we  may  have  cause  to  re- 
gret the  meagreness  and  doubtful  character  of  these 
narratives,  we  have  the  great  advantage  of  being  able 
to  compare  the  accounts  given  of  Abderrahman’s  ex- 
pedition by  the  national  writers  of  each' side.  This 

* Tunc  Abdirrahman,  multitudine  sui  exercitiis  reple- 
tam  prospiciens  terrain,  etc  —Script.  Gest.  Franc,.,  p.  785, 


268 


BATTLE  OF  TOURS. 


is  a benefit  which  the  inquirer  into  antiquity  so  sel- 
dom can  obtain,  that  the  fact  of  possessing  it,  in  the 
case  of  the  battle  of  Tours,  makes  us  think  the  his- 
torical- testimony  respecting  that  great  event  more 
certain  and  satisfactory  than  is  the  case  in  many 
other  instances,  where  we  possess  abundant  details 
respecting  military  exploits,  but  where  those  details 
come  to  us  from  the  annalist  of  one  nation  only,  and 
where  we  have,  consequently,  no  safeguard  against 
the  exaggerations,  the  distortions,  and  the  fictions 
which  national  vanity  has  so  often  put  forth  in  the 
garb  and  under  the  title  of  history.  The  Arabian 
writers  who  recorded  the  conquests  and  wars  of  their 
countrymen  in  Spain  have  narrated  also  the  expedi- 
tion into  Gaul  of  their  great  emir,  and  his  defeat  and 
death  near  Tours,  in  battle  with  the  host  of  the 
Franks  under  King  Caldus,  the  name  into  which 
they  metamorphose  Charles  Martel  * 

270.  They  tell  us  how  there  was  war  between  the 
count  of  the  Frankish  frontier  and  the  Moslems,  and 
how  the  count  gathered  together  all  his  people,  and 
fought  for  a time  with  doubtful  success.  “But,”  say 
the  Arabian  chroniclers,  “ Abderrahman  drove  them 
back ; and  the  men  of  Abderrahman  were  puffed  up 
in  spirit  by  their  repeated  successes,  and  they  were 
full  of  trust  in- the  valor  and  the  practice  of  war  of 

* The  Arabian  chronicles  were  compiled  and  translated 
into  Spanish  by  Don  Jose  Antonio  Conde,  in  his  “ Historia 
de  la  Dominacion  de  los  Arabos  en  Espana,  ' published  at 
Madrid  in  1820.  Conde’s  plan,  which  I have  endeavored 
to  follow,  was  to  preserve  both  the  style  and  spirit  of  his 
Oriental  authorities,  so  that  we  find  in  his  pages  ag-enuine 
Saracenic  narrative  of  the  wars  in  Western  Europe  be- 
tween the  Mohammedans  and  the  Christians. 


BATTLE  OF  TOURS. 


2G9 


their  emir.  So  the  Moslems  smote  their  enemies, 
and  passed  the  Eiver  Garonne,  and  laid  waste  the 
country,  and  took  captives  without  number.  And 
that  army  went  through  all  places  like  a desolating 
storm.  Prosperity  made  these  warriors  insatiable. 
At  the  passage  of  the  river,  Abderrahman  overthrew 
the  count,  and  the  count  retired  into  his  stronghold, 
but  the  Moslems  fought  against  it,  and  entered  it  by 
force  and  slew  the  count;  for  everything  gave  way 
to  their  cimeters,  which  were  the  robbers  of  lives. 
All  the  nations  of  the  Franks  trembled  at  that  terri- 
ble army,  and  they  betook  them  to  their  king  Caldus, 
and  told  him  of  the  havoc  made  by  the  Moslem  horse- 
men, and  how  they  rode  at  their  will  through  all  the 
land  of  Narbonne,  Toulouse,  and  Bordeaux,  and  they 
told  the  king  of  the  death  of  their  count.  Then  the 
king  bade  them  to  be  of  good  cheer,  and  offered  to  aid 
them.  And  in  the  114th  year*  he  mounted  his 
horse,  and  he  took  with  him  a host  that  could  not 
be  numbered,  and  went  against  the  Moslems.  And 
he  came  upon  them  at  the  great  city  of  Tours.  And 
Abderrahman  and  other  prudent  cavaliers  saw  the 
disorder  of  the  Moslem  troops,  who  were  loaded  with 
spoil ; but  they  did  not  venture  to  displease  the 
soldiers  by  ordering  them  to  abandon  every 
thing  except  their  arms  and  war-horses.  And 
Abderrahman  trusted  in  the  valor  of  his  soldiers,  and 
in  the  good  fortune  which  had  ever  attended  him.  But 
(the  Arab  writer  remarks)  such  defect  of  discipline  al- 
ways is  fatal  to  armies.  So  Abderrahman  and  his  host 
* Of  the  Hegira. 


270 


BATTLE  OF  TO  UBS. 


attacked  Tours  to  gain  still  more  spoil,  and  they 
fought  against  it  so  fiercely  that  they  stormed 
the  city  almost  before  the  eyes  of  the  army  that  came 
to  save  it ; and  the  fury  and  the  cruelty  of  the  Mos- 
lems toward  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  was  like  the 
cruelty  and  fury  of  raging  tigers.  It  was  manifest,” 
adds  the  Arab,  “ that  God’s  chastisement  was  sure  to 
follow  such  excesses ; and  Fortune  thereupon  turned 
her  back  upon  the  Moslems. 

271.  “Near  the  River  Owar,*  the  two  great  hosts  of 
the  two  languages  and  the  two  creeds  were  set  in  array 
against  each  other.  The  hearts  of  Abderrahman,  his 
captains,  and  his  men,  were  filled  with  wrath  and 
pride,  and  they  were  the  first  to  begin  the  fight.  The 
Moslem  horsemen  dashed  fierce  and  frequent  for- 
ward against  the  battalions  of  the  Franks,  who  re- 
sisted manfully,  and  many  fell  dead  on  either  side. 
Until  the  going  down  of  the  sun.  Night  parted  the 
two  armies ; but  in  the  gray  of  the  morning  the 
Moslems  returned  to  the  battle.  Their  cavaliers 
had  soon  hewn  their  way  into  the  centre  of  the 
Christian  host.  But  many  of  the  Moslems  were 
fearful  for  the  safety  of  the  spoil  which  they  had 
stored  in  their  tents,  and  a false  cry  arose  in  their 
ranks  that  some  of  the  enemy  were  plundering  the 
camp;  whereupon  several  squadron  of  the  Moslem 
horsemen  rode  on  to  protect  their  tents.  But  it 
seemed  as  if  they  fled ; and  all  the  host  was  troubled. 
And  while  Abderrahman  strove  to  check  their  tu- 
mult, and  to  lead  them  back  to  battle,  the  warriors 

* Probably  the  Loire. 


BATTLE  OF  TOURS. 


271 


of  the  Franks  came  around  him,  and  he  was  pierced 
through  with  many  spears,  so  that  he  died.  Then 
all  the  host  fled  before  the  enemy,  and  many  died  in 
the  flight.  This  deadly  defeat  of  the  Moslems,  and 
the  loss  of  the  great  leader  and  good  cavalier  Abder- 
rahman,  took  place  in  the  hundred  and  fifteenth 
year.’’ 

272.  It  would  be  difficult  to  expect  from  an  adver- 
sary a more  explicit  confession  of  having  been  thor- 
oughly vanquished  than  the  Arabs  here  accord  to  the 
Europeans.  The  points  on  which  their  narrative 
differs  from  those  of  the  Christians — as  to  how  many 
days  the  conflict  lasted,  whether  the  assailed  city 
was  actually  rescued  or  not,  and  the  like — are  of 
little  moment  compared  with  the  admitted  great 
fact  that  their  was  a decisive  trial  of  strength  be- 
tween Frank  and  Saracen,  in  which  the  former  con- 
quered. The  enduring  importance  of  the  battle  of  Tours 
in  the  eyes  of  the  Moslems  is  attested  not  only  by  the 
expressions  of  “the  deadly  battle”  and  “the  disgraceful 
overthrow”  which  their  writers  constantly  employ 
when  referring  to  it,  but  also  by  the  fact  that  no 
more  serious  attempts  at  conquests  beyond  the  Py- 
renees were  made  by  the  Saracens.  Charles  Martel, 
and  his  son  and  grandson  were  left  at  leisure  to 
consolidate  and  extend  their  power.  The  new  Chris- 
tian Roman  empire  of  the  West,  which  the  genius  of 
Charlemagne  founded,  and  throughout  which  his 
iron  will  imposed  peace  on  the  old  anarchy  of 
creeds  and  races,  did  not  indeed  retain  its  integrity 
after  its  great  ruler’s  death.  Fresh  troubles  came 


272 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


over  Europe;  but  Christendom,  though  disunited 
was  safe.  The  progress  of  civilization,  and  the  de- 
velopment of  the  nationalities  and  governments  of 
modern  Europe,  from  that  time  forth  went  forward 
in  not  uninterrupted,  but  ultimately  certain  career. 


Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of 
Tours,  A.  D.  732,  and  the  battle  of 
Hastings,  A.  D.  1066. 

A.  D.  768-814.  Reign  of  Charlemagne.  This  mon- 
arch has  justly  been  termed  the  principal  regenerator 
of  Western  Europe,  after  the  destruction  of  the  Ro- 
man Empire.  The  early  death  of  his  brother  Car- 
loman  left  him  sole  master  of  the  dominion  of  the 
Franks,  which  by  a succession  or  victorious  wars,  he 
enlarged  into  the  new  empire  of  the  West.  He  con- 
quered the  Lombards,  and  re-established  the  pope  at 
Rome,  who,  in  return,  acknowledged  Charles  as  suz- 
erain of  Italy.  And  in  the  year  800,  Leo  III.,  in  the 
name  of  the  Roman  people,  solemnly  crowned 
Charlemagne  at  Rome  as  emperor  of  the  Roman  em- 
pire of  the  West.  In  Spain,  Charlemagne  ruled  the 
country  between  the  Pyrenees  and  the  Ebro ; but 
his  most  important  conquests  were  effected  on  the 
eastern  side  of  his  original  kingdom,  over  the  Scla- 
vonians  of  Bohemia,  the  Avars  of  Pannonia,  and  over 
the  previously  uncivilized  German  tribes,  who  had 
remained  in  their  fatherland.  The  old  Saxons  were 
his  most  obstinate  antagonists,  and  his  wars  with 
them  lasted  for  thirty  years.  Under  him  the  great- 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


273 


er  part  of  Germany  was  compulsorily  civilized  and 
converted  from,  paganism  to  Christianity.  His  em- 
pire extended  eastward  as  far  as  the  Elbe,  the  Saale, 
the  Bohemian  mountains,  and  a line  drawn  from 
thence  crossing  the  Danube  above  Vienna,  and  pro- 
longed to  the  Gulf  of  Istria.* 

Throughout  this  vast  assemblage  of  provinces, 
Charlemagne  established  an  organized  and  firm  gov- 
ernment. But  it  is  not  as  a mere  conqueror  that  he 
demands  admiration.  “In  a life  restlessly  active,  we 
see  him  reforming  the  coinage  and  establishing 
the  legal  divisions  of  money  ; gathering  about  him 
the  learned  of  every  country ; founding  schools  and 
collecting  libraries ; interfering,  with  the  air  of  a 
king,  in  religious  controversies ; attempting  for  the 
sake  of  commerce,  the  magnificent  enterprise  of  unit- , 
ing  the  Rhine  and  the  Danube  and  meditating  to 
mold  the  discordant  code  of  Roman  and  barbarian 
laws  into  a uniform  system.”! 

814-888.  Repeated  partitions  of  the  empire  and 
civil  wars  between  Charlemagne’s  descendants.  Ul- 
timately the  kingdom  of  France  is  finally  separated 
from  Germany  and  Italy.  In  962,  Otho  the  Great  of 
Germany  revives  the  imperial  dignity. 

827.  Egbert,  king  of  Wessex,  acquires  the  supre- 
macy over  the  other  Anglo-Saxon  kingdoms. 

832.  The  first  Danish  squadron  attacks  part  of 
the  English  coast.  The  Danes,  or  Northmen,  had 
begun  their  ravages  in  France  a few  years  earlier. 

* Hallam  s “ Middle  Ages.” 
t Hallam,  ut  supra. 


274 


SYNOPSIS  OF  FVEN7S. 


For  two  centuries  Scandinavia  sends  out  fleet  after 
fleet  of  sea-rovers,  who  desolate  all  the  western 
kingdoms  of  Europe,  and  in  many  cases  effect  perma- 
nent conquests. 

871-900.  Reign  of  Alfred  in  England.  After  a 
long  and  varied  struggle,  he  rescues  England  from 
the  Danish  invaders. 

911.  The  French  king  cedes  Neustria  to  Hrolf  the 
Northman,  Hrolf  (or  Duke  Rollo,  as  he  thenceforth 
was  termed)  and  his  army  of  Scandinavian  warriors 
become  the  ruling  class  of  the  population  of  the  prov- 
ince, which  is  called  after  them,  Normandy. 

1016.  Four  knights  from  Normandy,  who  had  been 
on  a pilgrimage  to  the  Holy  Land,  while  returning 
through  Italy,  head  the  people  of  Salerno  in  repelling 
an  attack  of  a band  of  Saracen  corsairs.  In  the  next 
year  many  adventurers  from  Normandy  settle  in 
Italy,  where  they  conquer  Apulia  (1040),  and  after- 
ward (1060)  Sicily. 

1017.  Canute,  king  of  Denmark,  becomes  king  of 
England.  On  the  death  of  the  last  of  his  sons,  in 
1041,  the  Saxon  line  is  restored,  and  Edward  the  Con- 
fessor (who  had  been  bred  in  the  court  of  the  Duke 
of  Normandy)  is  called  by  the  English  to  the  throne 
of  this  island,  as  the  representative  of  the  house  of 
Cerdic. 

1035.  Duke  Robert  of  Normandy  dies  on  a return 
from  a pilgrimage  to  the  Holy  Land,  and  his  son 
William  (afterward  the  conqueror  of  England)  suc- 
ceeds to  the  dukedom  of  Normandy. 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


275 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS,  A.  D.  1060. 

Eis  VOS  la  Bataille  assemblee, 

Dune  encore  est  grant  renomee. 

Roman  de  Rou^  13183. 

273.  Arietta’s  pretty  feet  twinkling  in  tlie  brook 
made  her  the  mother  of  William  the  Conqueror. 
Had  she  not  thus  fascinated  Duke  Robert,  the  Lib- 
eral of  Normandy,  Harold  would  not  have  fallen  at 
Hastings,  no  Anglo-Norman  dynasty  could  have 
arisen,  no  British  empire.  The  reflection  is  Sir  Fran- 
cis Palgrave’s ; * and  it  is  emphatically  true.  If  any 
one  should  write  a history  of  “Decisive  loves  that 
nave  materially  influenced  the  drama  of  the  world  in 
all  its  subsequent  scenes,”  the  daughter  of  the  tanner 
of  Falaise  would  deserve  a conspicuous  place  in  his 
pages.  But  it  is  her  son,  the  victor  of  Hastings,  who  is 
now  the  object  of  our  attention  ; and  no  one  who  ap- 
preciates the  influence  of  England  and  her  empire 
upon  the  destinies  of  the  world  will  ever  rank  that 
victory  as  one  of  secondary  importance. 

274.  It  is  true  that  in  the  last  century  some  writers 
of  eminence  on  our  history  and  laws  mentioned  the 

* “ History  of  Normandy  and  England,*’  vol.  i.,  p.  526. 


276 


4 TTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


Norman  Conquest  in  terms  from  which  it  might  he 
supposed  that  the  battle  of  Hastings  led  to  little  more 
than  the  substitution  of  one  royal  family  on  the 
throne  of  this  country,  and  to  the  garbling  and 
changing  of  some  of  our  laws  through  the  ‘^cunning 
of  the  Norman  lawyers.”  But,  at  least  since  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  work  of  Augustin  Thierry  on  the 
Norman  conquest,  these  forensic  fallacies  have  been 
exploded.  Thierry  made  his  readers  keenly  appre- 
ciate the  magnitude  of  that  political  and  social  catas- 
trophe. He  depicted  in  vivid  colors  the  atrocious 
cruelties  of  the  conquerors,  and  the  sweeping  and  en- 
during innovations  that  they  wrought,  involving  the 
overthrow  of  the  ancient  constitution,  as  well  as  of 
the  last  of  the  Saxon  kings.  In  his  pages  we  see  new 
tribunals  and  tenures  superseding  the  old  ones,  new 
divisions  of  race  and  class  introduced,  whole  districts 
devastated  to  gratify  the  vengeance  or  the  caprice 
of  the  new  tyrant,  the  greater  part  of  the  lands  of  the 
English  confiscated  and  divided  among  aliens,  the 
very  name  of  Englishman  turned  into  a reproach, 
the  English  language  rejected  as  servile  and  barbar- 
ous, and  all  the  high  places  in  church  and  state  for 
upward  of  a century  filled  exclusively  by  men  of 
foreign  race. 

275.  No  less  true  than  eloquent  is  Thierry’s  sum- 
ming up  of  the  social  effects  of  the  Norman  Conquest 
on  the  generation  that  witnessed  it,  and  on  many  of 
their  successors.  He  tells  his  reader  that  if  he  would 
form  a just  idea  of  England  conquered  by  William 
of  Normandy,  he  must  figure  to  himself— not  a mere 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


277 


change  of  political  rule — not  the  trium];)h  of  one  can- 
didate over  another  candidate — of  the  man  of  one 
party  over  the  man  of  another  party,  hut  the  intru- 
sion of  one  people  into  the  bosom  of  another  people — 
the  violent  placing  of  one  society  over  another  society 
which  it  came  to  destroy,  and  the  scattered  fragments 
of  which  it  retained  only  as  personal  property,  or  (to 
use  the  words  of  an  old  act)  as  ‘ the  clothing  of  the 
soil ; ’ he  must  not  picture  to  himself,  on  the  one 
hand,  William,  a king  and  a despot — on  the  other, 
subjects  of  William’s,  high  and  low,  rich  and  poor, 
all  inhabiting  England,  and  consequently  all  Eng- 
lish ; he  must  imagine  two  nations,  of  one  of  which 
William  is  a member  and  the  chief— two  nations 
which  (if  the  term  must  be  used)  were  both  subject 
to  William,  but  as  applied  to  which  the  word  has 
quite  different  senses,  meaning,  in  the  one  case, 
subordinate — in  the  other,  subjugated.  He  must  con- 
sider that  there  are  two  countries,  two  soils,  included 
in  the  same  geographical  circumference — that  of  the 
Normans,  rich  and  free  ; that  of  the  Saxons,  poor  and 
serving,  vexed  by  rent  and  toilage : the  former  full  of 
spacious  mansions,  and  walled  and  moated  castles ; 
the  latter  scattered  over  with  huts  and  straw,  and 
ruined  hovels : that  peopled  with  the  happy  and  the 
idle — with  men  oi  the  army  and  of  the  court — with 
knights  and  nobles  ; this  with  men  of  pain  and  labor 
— with  farmers  and  artisans : on  the  one  side,  luxury 
and  insolence ; on  the  other,  misery  and  envy — not 
the  envy  of  the  poor  at  the  sight  of  opulence  they 


278 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


can  not  reach,  but  the  envy  of  the  despoiled  when  in 
presence  of  the  despoilers.” 

276.  Perhaps  the  effect  ot  Thierry’s  work  has  been 
to  cast  into  the  shade  the  ultimate  good  effects  on 
England  of  the  Norman  Conquest.  Yet  these  are  as 
undeniable  as  are  the  miseries  which  that  conquest 
inflicted  on  our  Saxon  ancestors  from  the  time  of  the 
battle  of  Hastings  to  the  time  of  the  signing  of  the 
Great  Charter  at  Eunnymede.  That  last  is  the  true 
epoch  of  English  nationality  ; it  is  the  epoch  when 
Anglo-Norman  and  Anglo-Saxon  ceased  to  keep  aloof 
from  each  other — the  one  in  haughty  scorn,  the  other 
in  sullen  abhorrence ; and  when  all  the  free  men  of 
the  land,  whether  barons,  knights,  yeoman,  or  burgh- 
ers, combined  to  lay  the  foundations  of  English  free- 
dom. 

277.  Our  Norman  barons  were  the  chiefs  of  that 
primary  constitutional  movement ; those  “ iron  bar- 
ons,” whom  Chatham  has  so  nobly  eulogized.  This 
alone  should  make  England  remember  her  obliga- 
tions to  the  Norman  Conquest,  which  planted  far  and 
wide,  as  a dominant  class  in  her  land,  a martial  nobil- 
ity of  the  bravest  and  most  energetic  race  that  ever 
existed. 

278.  It  may  sound  paradoxical,  but  it  is  in  reality 
no  exaggeration  to  say,  with  Guizot,*  that  England’s 
liberties  are  owing  to  her  having  been  conquered  by 
the  Normans.  It  is  true  that  the  Saxon  institutions 
were  the  primitive  cradle  of  English  liberty,  but  by 
their  own  intrinsic  force  they  could  never  have  found- 

* “ Essais  sur  f Histoire  de  France/'  p.  273  et  seq 


MTTLE  of  HASTINGS. 


279 


ed  the  enduring  free  English  Constitution.  It  saw 
the  Conquest  that  infused  into  them  a new  virtue, 
and  the  political  liberties  of  England  arose  from  the 
situation  in  which  the  Anglo-Saxon  and  the  Anglo- 
Norman  populations  and  laws  found  themselves 
placed  relatively  to  each  other  in  this  island.  The 
state  of  England  under  her  last  Anglo-Saxon  kings 
closely  resembled  the  state  of  France  under  the  last 
Carlovingian  and  the  first  Capetian  princes.  The 
crown  was  feeble,  and  the  great  nobles  were  strong 
and  turbulent ; and  although  there  was  more  national 
unity  in  Saxon  England  than  in  France — although 
the  English  local  free  institutions  had  more  reality 
and  energy  than  was  the  case  with  any  thing  analo- 
gous to  them  on  the  Continent  in  the  eleventh  cen- 
tury, still  the  probability  is  that  the  Saxon  system  of 
polity,  if  left  to  itself,  would  have  fallen  into  utter 
confusion,  out  of  which  would  have  arisen,  first,  an 
aristocratic  hierarchy,  like  that  which  arose  in 
France ; next,  an  absolute  monarchy ; and,  finally, 
a Series  of  anarchical  revolutions,  such  as  we  now  be- 
hold around,  but  not  among  us.* 

279.  The  latest  conquerors  of  this  island  were  also 
the  bravest  and  the  best.  I do  not  except  even  the 
Romans.  And,  in  spite  of  our  sympathies  with  Har- 
old and  Hereward,  and  our  abhorrence  of  the  founder 
of  the  New  Forest  and  the  desolator  of  Yorkshire,  wc 
must  confess  the  superiority  of  the  Norriians  to  the 
Anglo-Saxons  and  Anglo-Danes,  whom  they  met 
here  in  1066,  as  well  as  to  the  degenerate  Frank 
♦ See  Guizot,  ut  supra. 


280 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


noblesse,  and  the  crushed  and  servile  Eomanesque 
provincials,  and  from  whom,  in  912,  they  had  wrested 
the  district  in  the  north  of  Gaul,  which  still  bears  the 
name  of  Normandy. 

280.  It  was  not  merely  by  extreme  valor  and 
ready  subordination  to  military  discipline  that  the 
Normans  were  pre-eminent  among  all  the  conquering 
races  of  the  Gothic  stock,  but  also  by  an  instinctive 
faculty  of  appreciating  and  adopting  the  superior 
civilizations  which  they  encountered.  Thus  Duke 
Eollo  and  his  Scandinavian  warriors  readily  embraced 
the  creed,  the  language,  the  laws,  and  the  arts,  which 
France,  in  those  troubled  and  evil  times  with  which 
the  Capetian  dynasty  commenced,  still  inherited  from 
imperial  Eome  and  imperial  Charlemagne.  “ Ils 
adopterent  les  usages,  les  devoirs,  les  subordination 
que  les  capitulaires  des  empereurs  et  les  rois  avoient 
institues.  Mais  ce  qu’ils  apporterent  dans  kapplica- 
tion  de  ces  lois,  ce  fut  Tesprit  de  vie,  I’esprit  de 
liberte,  I’habitude  de  la  subordination  militaire,  et 
rintelligence  d’un  4tat  politique  qui  concillat  la 
surete  de  tous  aveo  I’independance  de  chacun.”*  So, 
also,^  in  all  chivalric  feelings,  in  enthusiastic  religious 
zeal,  in  almost  idolatrous  respect  to  females  of  gentle 
birth,  in  generous  fondness  for  the  nascent  poetry  of 
the  time,  in  a keen  intellectual  relish  for  subtle 
thought  and  disputation,  in  a taste  for  architectural 
magnificence,  and  all  courtly  refinement  and  pagean- 
try. The  Normans  were  the  Paladins  of  the  world. 
Their  brilliant  qualities  were  sullied  by  many  darker 

* Sismondi,  “ Histoire  de  Franoftis,”  vol.  iii.,  p.  174. 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


281 


traits  of  pride,  of  merciless  cruelty,  and  of  brutal 
contempt  for  the  industry,  the  rights,  and  the  feelings 
of  all  whom  they  considered  the  lower  classes  of 
mankind. 

281.  Their  gradual  blending  with  the  Saxons 
softened  these  harsh  and  evil  points  of  their  national 
character,  and  in  return  they  fired  the  duller  Saxon 
mass  with  a new  spirit  of  animation  and  power.  As 
Campbell  boldly  expressed  it,  “ They  high-mettled  the 
blood  of  our  vems.'^  Small  had  been  the  figure  which 
England  made  in  the  world  before  the  coming  over  of 
the  Normans  and  without  them  she  never  would 
have  emerged  from  insignificance.  The  authority  of 
Gibbon  may  be  taken  as  decisive  when  he  pronounces 
that  “assuredly  England  was  a gainer  by  the  Con- 
quest.” And  we  may  proudly  adopt  the  comment  of 
the  Frenchman  Rapin,  who,  writing  of  the  battle  of 
Hastings  more  than  a century  ago,  speaks  of  the  revo- 
lution effected  by  it  as  “ the  first  step  by  which  Eng- 
land is  arrived  to  the  height  of  grandeur  and  glory 
we  behold  it  in  at  present.  ’* 

282.  The  interest  of  this  eventful  struggle,  by 
which  William  of  Normandy  became  king  of  Eng- 
land, is  materially  enhanced  by  the  high  personal 
character  of  the  competitors  for  our  crown.  They 
were  three  in  number.  One  was  a foreign  prince 
from  the  north ; one  was  a foreign  prince  from  the 
south ; and  one  was  a native  hero  of  the  land.  Harald 
Hardrada,  the  strongest  and  the  most  chivalric  of  the 

Rapin.  “ Hist.  England,”  p.  164.  See  also,  on  this  point, 
Sharon  Turner,  vol  iv.,  p.  73. 


282 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


kings  of  Norway,*  was  the  first ; Duke  William  of 
Normandy  was  the  second ; and  the  Saxon  Harold, 
the  son  of  Earl  Godwin,  was  the  third.  Never  was 
a nobler  prize  sought  by  nobler  champions,  or  striven 
for  more  gallantly.  The  Saxon  triumphed  over  the 
Norwegian,  and  tho  Norman  triumphed  over  the 
Saxon ; but  Norse  valor  was  never  more  conspicuous 
than  when  Harald  Hardrada  and  his  host  fought  and 
fell  at  Stamford  Bridge ; nor  did  Saxons  ever  face 
their  foes  more  bravely  than  our  Harold  and  his  men 
on  the  fatal  day  of  Hastings. 

283.  During  the  reign  of  King  Edward  the  Con- 
fessor over  this  land,  the  claims  of  the  Norwegian 
king  to  our  crown  were  little  thought  of ; and  though 
Hardrada^s  predecessor.  King  Magnus  of  Norway,  had 
on  one  occasion  asserted  that,  by  virtue  of  a compact 
with  our  former  king,  Hardicanute,  he  was  entitled 
to  the  English  throne,  no  serious  attempt  had  been 
made  to  enforce  his  pretensions.  But  the  rivalry  of 
the  Saxon  Harold  and  the  Norman  William  was  fore- 
seen and  bewailed  by  the  Confessor,  who  was  believed 
to  have  predicted  on  his  death  -bed  the  calamities  that 
were  impending  over  England.  Duke  William  was 
King  Edward’s  kinsman.  Harold  was  the  head  of 
the  most  powerful  noble  house,  next  to  the  royal 
blood,  in  England;  and,  personally,  he  was  the 
bravest  and  most  popular  chieftain  in  the  land.  King 
Edward  was  childless,  and  the  nearest  collateral  heir 
was  a puny  unpromising  boy.  England  had  suffered 
too  severely,  during  royal  minorities,  to  make  the 

1 See  in  Snorre  the  Saga  of  Haraldi  Hardrada. 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


283 


accession  of  Edgar  Atheling  desirable  ; and  long  be- 
fore King  Edward’s  death,  Earl  Harold  was  the 
destined  king  of  the  nation’s  choice,  though  the 
favor  of  the  Confessor  was  believed  to  lead  toward  the 
Norman  duke. 

284.  A little  time  before  the  death  of  King  Edward, 
Harold  was  in  Normandy.  The  causes  of  the  voyage 
of  the  Saxon  earl  to  the  Continent  are  doubtful ; but 
the  fact  of  his  having  been,  in  1065,  at  the  ducal 
court,  and  in  the  power  of  his  rival,  is  indisputable. 
William  made  skillful  and  unscrupulous  use  of  the 
opportunity.  Though  Harold  was  treated  with  out- 
ward courtesy  and  friendship,  he  was  made  fully 
aware  that  his  liberty  and  life  depended  on  his  com- 
pliance with  the  duke’s  requests.  William  said  to 
him,  in  apparent  confidence  and  cordiality,  “ When 
King  Edward  and  I once  lived  like  brothers  under 
the  same  roof,  he  promised  that  if  ever  he  became 
King  of  England,  he  would  make  me  heir  to  his 
throne.  Harold,  I wish  that  thou  wouldst  assist  me 
to  realize  this  promise.”  Harold  replied  with  ex- 
pressions of  assent ; and  further  agreed,  at  William’s 
request,  to  marry  William’s  daughter,  Adela,  and  to 
send  over  his  own  sister  to  be  married  to  one  of 
William’s  barons.  The  crafty  Norman  was  not  con- 
tent with  this  extorted  promise ; he  determined  to 
bind  Harold  by  a more  solemn  pledge,  the  breach  of 
which  would  be  a weight  on  the  spirit  of  the  gallant 
Saxon,  and  a discouragement  to  others  from  adopting 
his  cause.  Before  a full  assembly  of  the  Norman 
barons,  Harold  was  required  to  do  homage  to  Duke 


284 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


William,  as  the  heir  apparent  of  the  English  crown. 
Kneeling  down,  Harold  placed  his  hands  between 
those  of  the  duke,  and  repeated  the  solemn  form  by 
which  he  acknowledged  the  duke  as  his  lord,  and 
promised  to  him  fealty  and  true  service.  But 
William  exacted  more.  He  had  caused  all  the  bones 
and  relics  of  saints,  that  were  preserved  in  the  Nor- 
man monasteries  and  churches,  to  be  collected  into  a 
chest,  which  was  placed  in  the  council-room,  covered 
over  with  a cloth  of  gold.  On  the  chest  of  relics, 
which  were  thus  concealed,  was  laid  a missal.  The 
duke  then  solemnly  addressed  his  titular  guest  and 
real  captive,  and  said  to  him,  “ Harold,  I require 
thee,  before  this  noble  assembly,  to  confirm  by  oath 
the  promises  which  thou  hast  made  me,  to  assist  me 
in  obtaining  the  crown  of  England  after  King  Ed- 
ward’s death,  to  marry  my  daughter  Adela,  and  to 
send  me  thy  sister,  that  I may  give  her  in  marriage 
to  one  of  my  barons.”  Harold,  once  more  taken  by 
surprise,  and  not  able  to  deny  his  former  words,  ap- 
proached the  missal,  and  laid  his  hand  on  it,  not 
knowing  that  the  chest  of  relics  was  beneath.  The 
old  Norman  chronicler,  who  describes  the  scene  most 
minutely,*  says,  when  Harold  placed  his  hand  on  it, 
the  hand  trembled,  and  the  fiesh  quivered ; but  he 
swore,  and  promised  upon  his  oath  to  take  Ele 
[Adela]  to  wife,  and  to  deliver  up  England  to  the 
duke  and  thereunto  to  do  all  in  his  power,  according 
to  his  might  and  wit,  after  the  death  of  Edward,  if 

* Wace,  “Roman  de  Ron.”  I have  nearly  followed  his 
words. 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


285 


he  himself  should  live;  so  help  him  God.  Many 
cried,  “ God  grant  it !”  and  when  Harold  rose  from 
his  knees,  the  duke  made  him  stand  close  to  the  chest, 
and  took  off  the  pall  that  had  covered  it,  and  showed 
Harold  upon  what  holy  relics  he  had  sworn ; and 
Harold  was  sorely  alarmed  at  the  sight. 

285.  Harold  was  soon  after  permitted  to  return  to 
England ; and,  after  a short  interval,  during  which 
he  distinguished  himself  by  the  wisdom  and  hu- 
manity with  which  he  pacified  some  formidable 
tumults  of  the  Anglo-Danes  in  Northumbria,  he 
found  himself  called  on  to  decide  whether  he  would 
keep  the  oath  which  the  Norman  had  obtained  from 
him,  or  mount  the  vacant  throne  of  England  in  com- 
pliance with  the  nation’s  choice.  King  Edward  the 
Confessor  died  on  the  5th  of  January,  1066,  and  on 
the  following  day  an  assembly  of  the  thanes  and  pre- 
lates present  in  London,  and  of  the  citizens  of  the 
metropolis,  declared  that  Harold  should  be  their 
king.  It  was  reported  that  the  dying  Edward  had 
nominated  him  as  his  successor.  But  the  sense 
which  his  countrymen  entertained  of  his  pre-eminent 
merit  was  the  true  foundation  of  his  title  to  the 
crown.  Harold  resolved  to  disregard  the  oath  which 
he  made  in  Normandy  as  violent  and  void,  and  on 
the  7th  day  of  that  January  he  was  anointed  King 
of  England,  and  received  from  the  archbishop’s  hands 
the  golden  crown  and  sceptre  of  England,  and  also 
an  ancient  national  symbol,  a weighty  battle-ax.  He 
had  truly  deep  and  speedy  need  of  this  significant 
part  of  the  insignia  of  Saxon  royalty. 


286 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


286.  A messenger  from  Normandy  soon  arrived  to 
remind  Harold  of  the  oath  which  he  had  sworn  to 
the  duke  “ with  his  mouth,  and  his  hand  upon 
good  and  holy  relics.”  “ It  is  true,”  replied  the 
Saxon  king,  “ that  I took  an  oath  to  William  ; hut  I 
took  it  under  constraint : I promised  what  did  not 
belong  to  me — what  I could  not  in  any  way  hold : 
my  royalty  is  not  my  own  ; I could  not  lay  it  down 
against  the  will  of  the  country,  nor  can  I,  against  the 
will  of  the  country,  take  a foreign  wife.  As  for  my 
sister,  whom  the  duke  claims  that  he  may  marry  her 
to  one  of  his  chiefs,  she  has  died  within  the  year; 
would  he  have  me  send  her  corpse  ?” 

287.  William  sent  another  message,  which  met 
with  a similar  answer ; and  then  the  duke  published 
far  and  wide  through  Christendom  what  he  termed 
the  perjury  and  had  faith  of  his  rival,  and  proclaimed 
his.  intention  of  asserting  his  rights  by  the  sword  be- 
fore the  year  should  expire,  and  of  pursuing  and 
punishing  the  perjurer  even  in  those  places  where  he 
thought  he  stood  most  strongly  and  most  securely. 

288.  Before,  however,  he  commenced  hostilities, 
William,  with  deep-laid  policy,  submitted  his  claims 
to  the  decision  of  the  pope.  Harold  refused  to  ac- 
knowledge this  tribunal,  or  to  answer  before  an 
Italian  priest  for  his  title  as  an  English  king.  After 
a formal  examination  of  William’s  complaint  by  the 
pope  and  the  cardinals,  it  was  solemnly  adjudged  at 
Rome  that  England  belonged  to  the  Norman  duke ; 
and  a banner  was  sent  to  William  from  the  Holy 
See,  which  the  pope  himself  had  consecrated  and 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


287 


blessed  for  the  invasion  of  this  island.  The  clergy 
throughout  the  Continent  were  now  assiduous  and 
energetic  in  preaching  up  William’s  enterprise  as  un- 
dertaken in  the  cause  of  God.  Besides  these  spiritual 
arms  (the  effect  of  which  in  the  eleventh  century 
must  not  be  measured  by  the  philosophy  or  the  in- 
differentism  of  the  nineteenth),  the  Norman  duke  ap- 
plied all  the  energies  of  his  mind  and  body,  all  the 
resources  of  his  duchy,  and  all  the  influence  he 
possessed  among  vassals  or  allies,  to  the  collection  of 

the  most  remarkable  and  formidable  armament 
which  the  Western  nations  had  witnessed.”*  All 
the  adventurous  spirits  of  Christendom  flocked  to 
the  holy  banner,  under  which  Duke  William,  the 
most  renowned  knight  and  sagest  general  of  the  age, 
promised  to  lead  them  to  glory  and  wealth  in  the 
fair  domains  of  England.  His  army  was  filled  with 
the  chivalry  of  Continental  Europe,  all  eager  to  save 
their  souls  by  fighting  at  the  pope’s  bidding,  eager 
to  signalize  their  valor  in  so  great  an  enterprise,  and 
eager  also  for  the  pay  and  the  plunder  which  William 
liberally  promised.  But  the  Normans  themselves 
were  the  pith  and  the  flower  of  the  army,  and  Wil- 
liam himself  was  the  strongest,  the  sagest,  and  the 
fiercest  spirit  of  them  all. 

289.  Throughout  the  spring  and  summer  of  1066, 
all  the  sea-ports  of  Normandy,  Picardy,  and  Brittany 
rang  with  the  busy  sound  of  preparation.  On  the 
opposite  side  of  the  Channel  King  Harold  collected 

* Sir  James  Mackintosh’s  “ History  of  England,”  vol.  i., 
p.  97. 


288 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


the  army  and  the  fleet  with  which  he  hoped  to  crush 
the  southern  invaders.  But  the  unexpected  attack 
of  King  Harald  Hardrada  of  Norway  upon  another 
part  of  England  disconcerted  the  skillful  measures 
which  the  Saxon  had  taken  against  the  menacing 
armada  of  Duke  William.  ^ 

290.  Harold’s  renegade  brother,  Earl  Tostig,  had 
excited  the  Norse  king  to  this  enterprise,  the  import- 
ance of  which  has  naturally  been  eclipsed  by  the 
superior  interest  attached  to  the  victorious  expedi- 
tion of  Duke  William,  but  which  was  on  a scale  of 
grandeur  which  the  Scandinavian  ports  had  rarely, 
if  ever,  before  witnessed.  Hardrada’s  fleet  consisted 
of  two  hundred  war  ships  and  three  hundred  other 
vessels,  and  all  the  best  warriors  of  Norway  were  in 
his  host.  He  sailed  first  to  the  Orkneys,  where  many 
of  the  islanders  joined  him,  and  then  to  Yorkshire. 
After  a severe  conflict  near  York,  he  completely 
routed  Earls  Edwin  and  Morcar,  the  governors  of 
Northumbria.  The  city  of  York  opened  its  gates, 
and  all  the  country,  from  the  Tyne  to  the  Humber, 
submitted  to  him.  The  tidings  of  the  defeat  of  Ed- 
win and  Morcar  compelled  Harold  to  leave  his  posi- 
tion on  the  southern  coast,  and  move  instantly  against 
the  Norwegians.  By  a remarkably  rapid  march  he 
reached  Yorkshire  in  four  days,  and  took  the  Norse 
king  and  his  confederates  by  surprise.  Nevertheless, 
the  battle  which  ensued,  and  which  was  fought  near 
Stamford  Bridge,  was  desperate,  and  was  long  doubt- 
ful. Unable  to  break  the  ranks  of  the  Norwegian 
phalanx  by  force,  Harold  at  length  tempted  them  to 


BATILE  OF  HASTINGS 


289 


quit  their  close  order  by  a pretended  flight.  Then 
the  English  columns  burst  in  among  them,  and  a 
carnage  ensued,  the  extent  of  which  may  be  judged 
of  by  the  exhaustion  and  inactivity  of  Norway  for  a 
quarter  of  a century  afterwards.  King  Harald  Hard- 
rada,  aud  all  the  flower  of  his  nobility,  perished  on 
the  25th  of  September,  1066,  at  Stamford  Bridge,  a 
battle  which  was  a Flodden  to  Norway. 

291.  Harold’s  victory  was  splendid;  but  he  had 
bought  it  dearly  by  the  fall  of  many  of  his  best  offi- 
cers and  men,  and  still  more  dearly  by  the  opportu- 
nity which  Duke  William  had  gained  of  effecting  an 
unopposed  landing  on  the  Sussex  coast.  The  whole 
of  William’s  shipping  had  assembled  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Dive,  a little  river  between  the  Seine  and  the 
Orne,  as  early  as  the  middle  of  August.  The  army 
which  he  had  collected  amounted  to  fifty  thousand 
knights,  and  ten  thousand  soldiers  of  inferior  degree. 
Many  of  the  knights  were  mounted,  but  many  must 
have  served  on  foot,  as  it  is  hardly  possible  to  believe 
that  William  could  have  found  transports  for  the 
conveyance  of  fifty  thousand  war-horses  across  the 
Channel.  For  a long  time  the  winds  were  adverse, 
and  the  duke  employed  the  interval  that  passed  be- 
fore he  could  set  sail  in  completing  the  organization 
and  in  improving  the  discipline  of  his  army,  which 
he  seems  to  have  brought  into  the  same  state  of  per- 
fection as  was  seven  centuries  and  a half  afterward 
the  boast  ot  another  army  assembled  on  the  same 
coast,  and  which  Napoleon  designed  (but  providenti- 
ally in  vain)  for  a similar  descent  upon  England. 


290 


BATTLE  OF  BASTINGS. 


292.  It  was  not  till  the  approach  of  the  equinox 
that  the  wind  veered  from  the  northeast  to  the  west, 
and  gave  the  Normans  an  opportunity  of  quitting 
the  weary  shores  of  the  Dive.  They  eagerly  embark- 
ed, and  set  sail,  hut  the  wind  soon  freshened  to  a gale, 
and  drove  them  along  the  French  coast  to  St.  Valery, 
where  the  greater  part  of  them  found  shelter ; but 
many  of  their  vessels  were  wrecked,  and  the  whole 
coast  of  Normandy  was  strewn  with  the  bodies  of  the 
drowned.  William’s  army  began  to  grow  discour- 
aged and  averse  to  the  enterprise,  which  the  very 
elements  thus  seemed  to  fight  against ; though,  in 
reality,  the  northeast  wind,  which  had  cooped  them 
so  long  at  the  mouth  of  the  Dive,  and  the  western 
gale  which  had  forced  them  into  St.  Valery,  were 
the  best  possible  friends  to  the  invaders.  They  pre- 
vented the  Normans  from  crossing  the  Channel  until 
the  Saxon  king  and  his  army  of  defense  had  been 
called  away  from  the  Sussex  coast  to  encounter  Har- 
ald  Hardrada  in  Yorkshire  ; and  also  until  a formid- 
able English  fleet,  which  by  King  Harold’s  orders 
had  been  cruising  in  the  Channel  to  intercept  the 
Normans,  had  been  obliged  to  disperse  temporarily 
for  the  purpose  of  refitting  and  taking  in  fresh  stores 
of  provisions. 

293.  Duke  William  used  every  expedient  to  rean- 
imate the  drooping  spirits  of  his  men  at  St.  Valery ; 
and  at  last  he  caused  the  body  of  the  patron  saint  of 
the  place  to  be  exhumed  and  carried  in  solemn  pro- 
cession, while  the  whole  assemblage  of  soldiers,  mar- 
iners, and  appurtenant  priests  implored  the  saint’s 


BATTLE  OF  BASTINGS. 


^91 


intercession  for  a change  of  wind.  That  very  night 
the  wind  veered,  and  enabled  the  mediaeval  Agamem- 
non to  quit  his  Aulis. 

294.  With  full  sails,  and  a following  southern 
breeze,  the  Norman  Armada  left  the  French  shores 
and  steered  for  England.  The  invaders  crossed  an 
undefended  sea,  and  found  an  undefended  coast.  It 
was  in  Pevensey  Bay,  in  Sussex,  at  Bulverhithe,  be- 
tween the  castle  of  Pevensey  and  Hastings,  that  the 
last  conquerors  of  this  island  landed  on  the  29th  of 
September,  1066. 

295.  Harold  was  at  York,  rejoicing  over  his  recent 
victory,  which  had  delivered  England  from  her 
ancient  "Scandinavian  foes,  and  resettling  the  govern- 
ment of  the  counties  which  Harald  Hardrada  had 
overrun,  when  the  tidings  reached  him  that  Duke 
William  of  Normandy  and  his  host  had  landed  on 
the  Sussex  shore.  Harold  instantly  hurried  south- 
ward to  meet  this  long-expected  enemy.  The  severe 
loss  which  his  army  had  sustained  in  the  battle  with 
the  Norwegians  must  have  made  it  impossible  for 
many  of  his  veteran  troops  to  accompany  him  in  his 
forced  march  to  London,  and  thence  to  Sussex.  He 
halted  at  the  capital  only  six  days,  and  during  that 
time  gave  orders  for  collecting  forces  from  the  south- 
ern and  midland  counties,  and  also  directed  his  fleet 
to  reassemble  off  the  Sussex  coast.  Harold  was  well 
received  in  London,  and  his  summons  to  arms  was 
promptly  obeyed  by  citizen,  by  thane,  by  sokman, 
and  by  ceorl,  for  he  had  shown  himself  during  his 
brief  reign,  a just  and  wise  king,  affable  to  all  men, 

lu 


292 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


active  for  the  good  of  his  country,  and  (in  the  words 
of  the  old  historian)  sparing  himself  from  no  fatigue 
by  land  or  by  sea  * He  might  have  gathered  a 
much  more  numerous  army  than  that  of  William ; 
but  his  recent  victory  had  made  him  over-confident, 
and  he  was  irritated  by  the  reports  of  the  country 
being  ravaged  by  the  invaders.  As  soon,  therefore, 
as  he  had  collected  a small  army  in  London,  he 
marched  oif  toward  the  coast,  pressing  forward  as 
rapidly  as  his  men  could  traverse  Surrey  and  Sussex, 
in  the  hope  of  taking  the  Normans  unawares,  as  he 
had  recently,  by  a similar  forced  march,  succeeded 
in  surprising  the  Norwegians.  But  he  had  now  to 
deal  with  a foe  equally  brave  with  Harald  Hardrada, 
and  far  more  skillful  and  wary. 

296.  The  old  Norman  chroniclers  describe  the 
preparations  of  William  on  his  landing  with  a graph- 
ic vigor,  which  would  be  wholly  lost  by  transfusing 
their  racy  Norman  couplets  and  terse  Latin  prose 
into  the  current  style  of  modern  history.  It  is  best 
to  follow  them  closely,  though  at  the  expense  of  much 
quaintness  and  occasional  uncouthness  of  expression. 
They  tell  us  how.  Duke  William’s  own  ship  was  the 
first  of  the  Norman  fleet.  It  was  called  the  Mora, 
and  was  the  gift  of  his  duchess,  Matilda.  On  the 
head  of  the  ship,  in  the  front,  which  mariners  call 
the  prow,  there  was  a brazen  child  bearing  an  arrow 
with  a bended  bow.  His  face  was  turned  toward 
England,  and  thither  he  looked,  as  though  he  was 

* See  Roger  de  Hoveden  and  William  of  Malmesbury, 
cited  in  Thierry,  book  iii 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


293 


about  to  slioot.  Til e breeze  became  soft  and  sweet,  and 
the  sea  was  smooth  for  their  landing.  The  ships  ran 
on  dry  land,  and  each  ranged  by  the  other’s  side. 
There  you  might  see  the  good  sailors,  the  sergeants, 
and  squires  sally  forth  and  unload  the  ships;  cast 
the  anchors,  haul  the  ropes,  bear  out  shields  and  sad- 
dles, and  land  the  war-horses  and  the  palfreys.  The 
archers  came  forth,  and  touched  land  the  first,  each 
with  his  bow  strung,  and  with  his  quiver  full  of 
arrows  slung  at  his  side.  All  were  shaven  and 
shorn;  and  all  clad  in  short  garments,  ready  to 
attack,  to  shoot,  to  wheel  about  and  skirmish.  All 
stood  well  equipped,  and  of  good  courage  for  the 
fight ; and  they  scoured  the  whole  shore,  but  found 
not  an  armed  man  there.  After  the  archers  had 
thus  gone  forth,  the  knights  landed  all  armed,  with 
their  hauberks  on,  their  shields  slung  at  their  necks, 
and  their  helmets  laced.  They  formed  together  on 
the  shore,  each  armed,  and  mounted  on  his  war- 
horse;  all  had  their  swords  girded  on,  and  rode  for- 
ward into  the  country  with  their  lances  raised. 
Then  the  carpenters  landed,  who  had  great  axes  in 
their  hands,  ani  planes  and  adzes  hung  at  their 
sides.  They  took  counsel  together,  and  sought  for  a 
good  spot  to  place  a castle  on.  They  had  brought 
with  them  in  the  fleet  three  wooden  castles  from 
Normandy  in  pieces,  all  ready  for  framing  together 
and  they  took  the  materials  of  one  of  these  out  of 
the  ships,  all  shaped  and  pierced  to  receive  the  pins 
which  they  had  brought  cut  and  ready  in  large  bar- 
rels ; and  before  evening  had  set  in,  they  had  finish- 


294 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


ed  a good  fort  on  the  English  ground,  and  there  they 
placed  their  stores.  All  then  ate  and  drank  enough, 
and  were  right  glad  that  they  were  ashore. 

297.  When  Duke  William  himself  landed,  as  he 
stepped  on  the  shore,  he  slipped,  and  fell  forward 
upon  his  two  hands.  Forthwith  all  raised  a loud 
cry  of  distress.  “ An  evil  sign,”  said  they,  “ is  here.” 
But  he  cried  out  lustily,  “See,  my  lords,  by  the  splen- 
dor of  God,*  I have  taken  possession  of  England 
with  both  my  hands.  It  is  now  mine,  and  what  is 
mine  is  yours.” 

298.  The  next  day  they  marched  along  the  sea- 
shore to  Hastings.  Near  that  place  the  duke  forti- 
fied a camp,  and  set  up  the  two  other  wooden  cas- 
tles. The  foragers,  and  those  who  looked  out  for 
booty,  seized  all  the  clothing  and  provisions  they 
could  find,  lest  what  had  been  brought  by  the  ships 
should  fail  them.  And  the  English  were  to  be  seen 
fleeing  before  them,  driving  off  their  cattle,  and  quit- 
ting their  houses.  Many  took  shelter  in  burying- 
places,  and  even  there  they  were  in  grievous  alarm. 

299.  Besides  the  marauders  from  the  Norman 
camp,  strong  bodies  of  cavalry  were  detached  by 
William  into  the  country,  and  these,  when  Harold 
and  his  army  made  their  rapid  march  from  London 
southward,  fell  back  in  good  order  upon  the  main 
body  of  the  Normans,  and  reported  that  the  Saxon 
king  was  rushing  on  like  a madman.  But  Harold, 
when  he  found  that  his  hopes  of  surprising  his  ad- 


William’s  customary  oath. 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


295 


versary  were  vain,  changed  his  tactics,  and  halted 
about  seven  miles  from  the  Norman  lines.  He  sent 
some  spies,  who  spoke  the  French  language,  to  ex- 
amine the  number  and  preparations  of  the  enemy, 
who,  on  their  return,  related  with  astonishment  that 
there  were  more  priests  in  William’s  camp  than 
there  were  fighting  men  in  the  English  army.  They 
had  mistaken  for  priests  all  the  Norman  soldiers  who 
had  short  hair  and  shaven  chins,  for  the  English  lay- 
men were  then  accustomed  to  wear  long  hair  and 
mustachios.  Harold,  who  knew  the  Norman  usages 
smiled  at  their  words,  and  said,  “ Those  whom  you 
have  seen  in  such  numbers  are  not  priests,  but  stout 
soldiers,  as  they  will  soon  make  us  feel.” 

300.  Harold’s  army  was  far  inferior  in  number  to 
that  of  the  Normans,  and  some  of  his  captains  ad- 
vised him  to  retreat  upon  London,  and  lay  waste  the 
country,  so  as  to  starve  down  the  strength  of  the  in- 
vaders. The  policy  thus  recommended  was  unques- 
tionably the  wisest,  for  the  Saxon  fieet  had  now  re- 
assembled, and  intercepted  all  William’s  communica- 
tions with  Normandy ; and  as  soon  as  his  stores  of 
provisions  were  exhausted,  he  must  have  moved  for- 
ward upon  London,  where  Harold,  at  the  head  of  the 
full  military  strength  of  the  kingdom,  could  have 
defied  his  assault,  and  probably  might  have  witnessed 
his  rival’s  destruction  by  famine  and  disease,  without 
having  to  strike  a single  blow.  But  Harold’s  blood 
was  up,  and  his  kindly  heart  could  not  endure  to  in- 
fiict  on  his  South  Saxon  subjects  even  the  temporary 
misery  of  wasting  the  country.  “ He  would  not  burn 


296 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


houses  and  villages,  neither  would  he  take  away  the 
substance  of  his  people.” 

301.  Harold^s  brothers,  Gurth  and  Leofwine,  were 
with  him  in  the  camp,  and  Gurth  endeavored  to  per- 
suade' him  to  absent  himself  from  the  battle.  The 
incident  shows  how  well  devised  had  been  William’s 
scheme  of  binding  Harold  by  the  oath  on  the  holy 
relics.  “ My  brother,”  said  the  young  Saxon  prince, 

thou  canst  not  deny  that  either  by  force  or  free  will 
thou  hast  made  Duke  William  an  oath  on  the  bodies 
of  saints.  Why  then  risk  thyself  in  the  battle  with 
a perjury  upon  thee?  To  us,  who  have  sworn  noth- 
ing, this  is  a holy  and  a just  war,  for  we  are  fighting 
for  our  country.  Leave  us  then  alone  to  fight  this  bat- 
tle, and  he  who  has  the  right  will  win.”  Harold  replied 
that  he  would  not  look  on  while  others  risked  their 
lives  for  him.  Men  would  hold  him  a coward,  and 
blame  him  for  sending  his  best  friends  where  he 
dared  not  go  himself.  He  resolved,  therefore,  to  fight, 
and  to  fight  in  person ; but  he  was  still  too  good  a 
general  to  be  the  assailant  in  the  action ; and  he 
posted  his  army  with  great  skill  along  a ridge  of  ris- 
ing ground, which  opened  southward,  and  was  covered 
on  the  back  by  an  extensive  wood.  He  strengthened 
his  position  by  a palisade  of  stakes  and  osier  hurdles, 
and  there  he  said  he  would  defend  himself  against 
whoever  should  seek  him. 

302.  The  ruins  of  Battle  Abbey  at  this  hour  attest 
the  place  where  Harold’s  army  was  posted ; and  the 
high  alter  of  the  abbey  stood  on  the  very  spot  where 
Harold’s  own  standard  was  planted  during  the  fight, 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS 


297 


and  where  the  carnage  was  the  thickest.  Immedi- 
ately after  his  victory,  William  vowed  to  build  an 
abbey  on  the  site ; and  a fair  and  stately  pile  soon 
rose  there,  where  for  many  ages  the  monks  prayed 
and  said  masses  for  the  souls  of  those  who  were  slain 
in  the  battle,  whence  the  abbey  took  its  name.  Be- 
fore that  time  the  place  was  called  Senlac.  Little  of 
the  ancient  edifice  now  remains ; but  it  is  easy  to 
trace  in  the  park  and  the  neighborhood  the  scenes  of 
the  chief  incidents  in  the  action ; and  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  deny  the  generalship  shown  by  Harold  in 
stationing  his  men  especially  when  we  bear  in  mind 
that  he  was  deficient  in  cavalry,  the  arm  in  which 
his  adversary’s  main  strength  consisted. 

303.  William’s  only  chance  of  safety  lay  in  bring- 
ing on  a general  engagement;  and  he  joyfully  ad- 
vanced his  army  from  their  camp  on  the  hill  over 
Hastings,  nearer  to  the  Saxon  position.  But  he  neg- 
lected no  means  of  weakening  his  opponent,  and  re- 
newed his  summonses  and  demands  on  Harold  with 
an  ostentatious  air  of  sanctity  and  moderation. 

304.  “A  monk,  named  Hugues  Maigrot,  came  in 
William’s  name  to  call  upon  th6  Saxon  king  to  do 
one  of  three  things — either  to  resign  his  royalty  in 
favor  of  William,  or  to  refer  it  to  the  arbitration  of 
the  pope  to  decide  which  of  the  two  ought  to  be 
king,  or  to  let  it  be  determined  by  the  issue  of  a sin- 
gle combat.  Harold  abruptly  replied,  ‘ I will  not  re- 
sign my  title,  I will  not  refer  it  to  the  pope,  nor  will 
I accept  the  single  combat.’  He  was  far  from  being 
deficient  in  bravery ; but  he  was  no  more  at  liberty 


208 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


to  stake  the  crown  which  he  had  received  from  a 
whole  people  in  the  chance  of  a duel,  than  to  deposit 
it  in  the  hands  of  an  Italian  priest.  William,  not  at 
all  ruffled  by  the  Saxon’s  refusal,  but  steadily  pur- 
suing the  course  of  his  calculated  measures,  sent  the 
Norman  monk  again,  after  giving  him  these  instruc- 
tions : ‘ Go  and  tell  Harold  that  if  he  will  keep  his 

former  compact  with  me,  I will  leave  to  him  all  the 
country  which  is  beyond  the  Humber,  and  will  give 
his  brother  Gurth  all  the  lands  which  Godwin  held. 
If  he  still  persist  in  refusing  my  olfers,  then  thou 
shalt  tell  him,  before  all  his  people,  that  he  is  a per- 
jurer and  a liar;  that  he  and  all  who  shall  support 
him  are  excommunicated  by  the  mouth  of  the  pope, 
and  that  the  bull  to  that  effect  is  in  my  hands.’ 

305.  “Hugues  Maigrot  delivered  this  message  in  a 
solemn  tone  ; and  the  Norman  chronicle  says  that  at 
the  word  excommunication,  the  English  chiefs  looked 
at  one  another  as  if  some  great  danger  were  impend- 
ing. One  of  them  then  spoke  as  follows  : ‘We  must 
fight,  whatever  may  be  the  danger  to  us ; for  what 
we  have  to  consider  is  not  whether  we  shall  accept 
and  receive  a new  lord,  as  if  our  king  were  dead ; 
the  case  is  quite  otherwise.  The  Norman  has  given 
our  lands  to'  his  captains,  to  his  knights,  to  all  his 
people,  the  greater  part  of  whom  have  already  done 
homage  to  him  for  them : they  will  all  look  for  their 
gift  if  their  duke  become  our  king  ; and  he  himself 
is  bound  to  deliver  up  to  them  our  goods,  our  wives, 
and  our  daughters ; all  is  promised  to  them  before- 
hand. They  come,  not  only  to  ruin  us,  but  to  ruin 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


299 


our  descendants  also,  and  to  take  from  us  the  coun- 
try of  our  ancestors.  And  what  shall  we  do — 
whither  shall  we  go,  when  we  have  no  longer  a 
country  ?’  The  English  promised,  hy  a unanimous 
oath,  to  make  neither  peace,  nor  truce,  nor  treaty 
with  the  invader,  hut  to  die,  or  drive  away  the  Nor- 
mans*.” 

306.  The  13th  of  October  was  occupied  in  these 
negotiations,  and  at  night  the  duke  announced  to 
his  men  the  next  day  would  he  the  day  of  battle. 
That  night  is  said  to  ^have  been  passed  by  the  two 
armies  in  very  different  manners.  The  Saxon  sol- 
diers spent  it  in  joviality,  singing  their  national 
songs,  and  draining  huge  horns  of  ale  and  wine  around 
their  camp-fires.  The  Normans,  when  they  had 
looked  to  their  arms  and  horses,  confessed  themselves 
to  the  priests  with  whom  their  camp  was  thronged, 
and  received  the  sacrament  by  thousands  at  a time. 

On  Saturday,  the  14th  of  October,  was  fought  the 
great  battle. 

307.  It  is  not  difficult  to  compose  a narrative  of  its 
principal  incidents  from  the  historical  information 
which  we  possess,  especially  if  aided  by  an  examina- 
tion of  the  ground.  But  it  is  far  better  to  adopt  the 
spirit-stirring  words  of  the  old  chroniclers,  who  wrote 
while  the  recollections  of  the  battle  were  yet  fresh, 
and  while  the  feelings  and  prejudices  of  the  combat- 
ants yet  glowed  in  the  bosoms  of  living  men.  Robert 
Wace,  the  Norman  poet,  who  presented  his  “ Roman 
de  Rou  ” to  our  Henry  II.,  is  the  most  picturesque 

* Thierry. 


300 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


and  animated  of  the  old  writers,  and  from  him  we 
can  obtain  a more  vivid  and  full  description  of  the 
conflict  than  even  the  most  brilliant  romance-writer 
of  the  present  time  can  supply.  We  have  also  an  an- 
tique memorial  of  the  battle  more  to  be  relied  on 
than  either  chronicler  or  poet  (and  which  conflrms 
Wace’s  narrative  remarkably)  in  the  celebrated  Bay- 
eux  tapestry  which  represents  the  principal  scenes 
of  Duke  William’s  expedition,  and  of  the  circum- 
stances connected  with  it,  in  minute,  though  occa- 
sionally grotesque  details,  and  which  was  undoubt- 
edly the  production  of  the  same  age  in  which  the  bat- 
tle took  place,  whether  we  admit  or  reject  the  legend 
that  Queen  Matilda  and  the  ladies  of  her  court 
wrought  it  with  their  own  hands  in  honor  of  the 
royal  conqueror. 

308.  Let  us  therefore  suffer  the  old  Norman  chron- 
icler to  transport  our  imaginations  to  the  fair  Sussex 
scenery  northwest  of  Hastings,  as  it  appeared  on  the 
morning  of  the  fourteenth  of  October,  seven  hundred 
and  eighty-five  years  ago.  The  Norman  host  is  pour- 
ing forth  from  its  tents,  and  each  troop  and  each 
company  is  forming  fast  under  the  banner  of  its 
leader.  The  masses  have  been  sung,  which  were 
finished  betimes  in  the  morning ; the  barons  have  all 
assembled  round  Duke  William ; and  the  duke  has 
ordered  that  the  army  shall  be  formed  in  three  divi- 
sions, so  as  to  make  the  attack  upon  the  Saxon  posi- 
tion in  three  places.  The  duke  stood  on  a hill  where 
he  could  best  see  his  men ; the  barons  surrounded 
him,  and  he  spoke  to  them  proudly.  He  told  them 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


301 


how  he  trusted  them,  and  how  all  that  he  gained 
should  be  theirs,  and  how  sure  he  lelt  of  conquest, 
for  in  all  the  world  there  was  not  so  brave  an  army, 
or  such  good  men  and  true  as  were  then  forming 
, around  him.  Then  they  cheered  him  in  turn,  and 
cried  out,  “ ‘ You  will  not  see  one  coward ; none  here 
will  fear  to  die  for  love  of  you,  if  need  be.’  And  he 
answered  them,  ‘ I thank  you  well.  For  God’s  sake, 
spare  not ; strike  hard  at  the  beginning ; stay  not  to 
take  spoil ; all  the  booty  shall  be  in  common,.and  there 
will  be  plenty  for  every  one.  There  will  be  no  safety 
in  asking  quarter  or  in  flight;  the  English  will 
never  love  or  spare  a Norman.  Felons  they  were,  and 
felons  they  are  ; false  they  were,  and  false  they  will 
be.  Show  no  weakness  toward  them,  for  they  will 
have  no  pity  on  you  : neither  the  coward  for  running 
well,  nor  the  bold  man  for  smiting  well,  will  be  the 
better  liked  by  the  English,  nor  will  any  be  the  more 
spared  on  either  account.  You  may  fly  to  the  sea, 
but  you  can  fly  no  farther ; you  will  And  neither 
ships  nor  bridge  there ; there  will  be  no  sailors  to 
receive  you ; and  the  English  will  overtake  you  there, 
and  slay  you  in  your  shame.  More  of  you  will  die 
in  flight  than  in  battle.  Then,  as  flight  will  not  se- 
cure you,  flght,  and  you  will  conquer.  I have  no 
doubt  of  the  victory : we  are  come  for  glory ; the 
victory  is  in  our  hands,  and  we  may  make  sure  of 
obtaining  it  if  we  so  please.’  As  the  duke  was  speak- 
ing thus  and  would  yet  have  spoken  more,  William 
Fitz  Osber  rode  up  with  his  horse  all  coated  with 


302 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


iron : ‘ Sire,’  said  he,  'we  tarry  here  too  long ; let  us 
all  arm  ourselves.  Allans ! allons!  ’ 

309.  “ Then  all  went  to  their  tents,  and  armed 
themselves  as  they  best  might ; and  the  duke  was 
very  busy,  giving  every  one  his  orders  ; and  he  was 
courteous  to  all  the  vassals,  giving  away  many  arms 
and  horses  to  them.  When  he  prepared  to  arm  him- 
self, he  called  first  for  his  good  hauberk,  and  a man 
brought  it  on  his  arm,  and  placed  it  before  him,  but 
in  putting  his  head  in,  to  get  it  on,  he  unawares 
turned  it  the  wrong  way,  with  the  back  part  in  front. 
He  soon  changed  it ; but  when  he  saw  those  who 
stood  by  were  sorely  alarmed,  he  said,  ‘ I have  seen 
many  a man  who,  if  such  a thing  had  happened  to 
him,  would  not  have  borne  arms,  or  entered  the  field 
the  same  day ; but  I never  believed  in  omens,  and  I 
never  will.  I trust  in  God,  for  he  does  in  all  things 
his  pleasure,  and  ordains  what  is  to  come  to  pass  ac- 
cording to  his  will.  I have  never  liked  fortune-tell- 
ers, nor  believed  in  diviners ; but  I commend  myself 
to  Our  Lady.  Let  not  this  mischance  give  you  trou- 
ble. The  hauberk  which  was  turned  wrong,  and 
then  set  right  by  me,  signifies  that  a change  will 
arise  out  of  the  matter  which  we  are  now  stirring. 
You  shall  see  the  name  of  the  duke  changed  into 
king.  Yea,  a king  shall  I be,  who  hitherto  have 
been  but  duke.’  Then  he  crossed  himself,  and 
straightway  took  his  hauberk,  stooped  his  hgad,  and 
put  it  on  aright ; and  laced  his  helmet,  and  girt  on 
his  sword,  which  a varlet  brought  him.  Then  the 
duke  called  for  his  good  horse — a better  could  not  be 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


303 


found.  It  had  been  sent  him  by  a king  of  Spain,  out 
of  very  great  friendship.  Neither  arms  nor  the  press 
of  fighting  men  did  it  fear,  if  its  lord  spurred  it  on. 
Walter  Giffard  brought  it.  The  duke  stretched  out 
his  hand,  took  the  reins,  put  foot  in  stirrup,  and 
mounted;  and  the  good  horse  pawed,  pranced,  reared 
himself  up,  and  curveted.  The  Viscount  of  Toarz 
saw  how  the  duke  bore  himself  in  arms,  and  said  to 
his  people  that  were  around  him,  ‘ Never  have  I seen 
a man  so  fairly  armed,  nor  one  who  rode  so  gallantly, 
or  bore  his  arms,  or  became  his  hauberk  so  well ; 
neither  any  one  who  bore  his  lance  so  gracefully,  or 
sat  his  horse  and  managed  him  so  nobly.  There  is 
no  such  knight  under  heaven  ! a fair  count  he  is,  a 
fair  king  he  will  be.  Let  him  fight,  and  he  shall  over- 
come ; shame  be  to  the  man  who  shall  fail  him.’ 

310.  “ Then  the  duke  called  for  the  standard  which 
the  pope  had  sent  him,  and  he  who  bore  it  having 
unfolded  it.  the  duke  took  it  and  called  to  Raol  de 
Conches.  ‘ Bear  my  standard,’  said  he,  ‘for  I would 
not  but  do  you  right ; by  right  and  by  ancestry  your 
line  are  standard-bearers  of  Normandy,  and  vei^  good 
knights  have  they  all  been.’  But  Raol  said  that  he 
would  serve  the  duke  that  day  in  other  guise,  and 
would  fight  the  English  with  his  hand  as  long  as  life 
should  last.  Then  the  duke  bade  Gal  tier  Giflfart 
bear  the  standard.  But  he  was  old  and  white-headed, 
and  bade  the  duke  give  the  standard  to  some  younger 
and  stronger  man  to  carry.  Then  the  duke  said 
fiercely,  ‘ By  the  splendor  of  God,  my  lords,  I think 
you  mean  to  betray  and  fail  me  in  this  great  need.’ 


304 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


‘ Sire/  said  Giffart,  ‘ not  so  ! we  have  done  no  treason 
nor  do  I refuse  from  any  felony  toward  you ; but  I 
have  to  lead  a great  chivalry,  both  hired  men  and  the 
men  of  my  fief.  Never  had  I such  good  means  of 
serving  you  as  I now  have ; and  if  God  please,  I will 
serve  you ; if  need  be,  I will  die  for  you,  and  will 
give  my  own  heart  for  yours.’ 

311.  “‘By  my  faith,’  quoth  the  duke,  ‘ I always 
loved  thee,  and  now  I love  thee  more ; if  I survive 
this  day,  thou  shalt  be  the  better  for  it  all  thy  days.’ 
Then  he  called  out  a knight,  whom  he  had  heard 
much  praised,  Tosteins  Fitz-Kou  le  Blanc  by  name, 
whose  abode  was  at  Bec-en-Caux.  To  him  he  deliv- 
ered the  standard;  and  Tosteins  took  it  right  cheer- 
fully, and  bowed  low  to  him  in  thanks,  and  bore  it 
gallantly,  and  with  good  heart.  His  kindred  still 
have  quittance  of  all  service  for  their  inheritance  on 
this  account,  and  their  heirs  are  entitled  so  to  hold 
their  inheritance  forever. 

312.  “ William  sat  on  his  war-horse,  and  called  out 
Eogier,  whom  they  call  De  Montgomeri.  ‘ 1 rely 
much  dn  you,’  said  he ; ‘ lead  your  men  thitherward, 
and  attack  them  from  that  side.  William,  the  son 
of  Osber,  the  seneschal,  a right  good  vassal,  shall  go 
with  you  and  help  in  the  attack,  and  you  shall  have 
the  men  of  Boilogne  and  Poix,  and  all  my  soldiers. 
Alain  Fergert  and  Ameri  shall  attack  on  the  other 
side;  they  shall  lead  the  Poitevins  and  the  Bretons, 
and  all  the  barons  of  Maine ; and  I,  with  my  own 
great  men,  my  friends  and  kindred,  will  fight  in  the 
middle  throng,  .v  liere  the  battle  shall  be  the  hottest. 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


305 


313.  “ The  barons,  and  knights,  and  men  at-arms 
were  all  now  armed ; the  foot-soldiers  were  well 
equipped,  each  bearing  buw  and  sword;  on  their 
heads  were  caps,  and  to  their  feet  were  bound  busk- 
ins. Some  had  good  hides  which  they  had  bound 
round  their  bodies ; and  many  were  clad  in  frocks, 
and  had  quivers  and  bows  hung  to  their  girdles. 
The  knights  had  hauberks  and  swords,  boots  of  steel 
and  shining  helmets ; shields  at  their  necks,  and  in 
their  hands  lances.  And  all  had  their  cognizances, 
so  that  each  might  know  his  fellow,  and  Norman 
might  not  strike  Norman,  nor  Frenchman  kill  his 
countryman  by  mistake.  Those  on  foot  led  the  way, 
with  serried  ranks,  bearing  their  bows.  The  knights 
rode  next,  supporting  the  archers  from  behind.  Thus 
both  horse  and  foot  kept  their  course  and  order  of 
march  as  they  began,  in  close  ranks  at  a gentle  pace, 
that  the  one  might  not  pass  or  separate  from  the 
other.  All  went  firmly  and  compactly,  bearing 
themselves  gallantly. 

314.  “ Harold  had  summoned  his  men,  earls,  bar- 
ons, and  vavassors,  from  the  castles  and  the  cities, 
from  the  ports,  the  villages,  and  boroughs.  The 
peasants  were  also  called  together  from  the  villages, 
bearing  such  arms  as  they  found ; clubs  and  great 
picks,  iron  forks  and  stakes.  The  English  had  in- 
closed the  place  where  Harold  was  with  his  friends 
and  the  barons  of  the  country  whom  he  had  sum- 
moned and  called  together. 

315.  “Those  of  London  had  come  at  once,  and 
those  of  Kent,  of  Hertfort,  and  of  Essesse ; those  of 


306 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


Suree  and  Susesse,  of  St.  Edmund  and  Sufoc;  of 
Norwis  and  Norfoc ; of  Cantorbierre  and  Stanfort; 
Bedefort  and  Hundetone.  The  men  of  Northanton 
also  came : and  those  of  Enrowic  and  Bokinkeham, 
of  Bed  and  Notinkeham,  Lindesie  and  Nichole. 
There  came  also  from  the  west  all  who  heard  the 
summons  ; and  very  many  were  to  be  seen  coming 
from  Salebiere  and  Dorset,  from  Bat  and  from  Sum- 
erset.  Many  came,  too,  from  about  Glocestre,  and 
many  from  Wirecestre,  from  Wincestre,  Hontesire, 
and  Brichesire ; and  many  more  from  other  counties 
that  we  have  not  named,  and  can  not,  indeed,  re- 
count. All  who  could  bear  arms,  and  had  learned 
the  news  of  the  duke’s  arrival,  came  to  defend  the 
land.  But  none  came  from  beyond  Humbre,  for  they 
had  other  business  upon  their  hands,  the  Danes  and 
Tosti  having  much  damaged  and  weakened  them. 

316.  “ Harold  knew  that  the  Normans  would  come 
and  attack  him  hand  to  hand,  so  he  had  early  in- 
closed the  field  in  which  he  placed  his  men.  He’ 
made  them  arm  early,  and  range  themselves  for  the 
battle,  he  himself  having  put  on  arms  and  equip- 
ments that  became  such  a lord.  The  duke,  he  said, 
ought  to  seek  him,  as  he  wanted  to  conquer  En- 
gland ; and  it  became  him  to  abide  the  attack  who 
had  to  defend  the  land  He  commanded  the  people, 
and  counseled  his  barons  to  keep  themselves  all  to- 
gether, and  defend  themselves  in  a body ; for  if  they 
once  separated,  they  would  with  difficulty  recover 
themselves.  ‘ The  Normans,’  said  he,  ‘ are  good  vas- 
sals, valiant  on  foot  and  on  horseback ; good  knights 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


307 


are  they  on  horseback,  and  well  used  to  battle ; all  is 
lost  if  they  once  penetrate  our  ranks.  They  have 
brought  long  lances  and  swords,  but  you  have  pointed 
lances  and  keen-edged  bills;  and  I do  not  expect 
that  their  arms  can  stand  against  yours.  Cleave 
whenever  you  can  ; it  will  be  ill  dooe  if  you  spare 
aught.^ 

317.  “The  English  had  built  up  a fence  before 
them  with  their  shields,  and  with  ash  and  other 
wood,  and  had  well  joined  and  wattled  in  the  whole 
work,  so  as  not  to  leave  even  a crevice ; and  thus 
they  had  a barricade  in  their  front,  through  which 
any  Norman  who  would  attack  them  must  first  pass. 
Being  covered  in  this  way  by  their  shields  and  barri- 
cades, their  aim  was  to  defend  themselves ; and  if 
they  had  remained  steady  for  that  purpose,  they 
would  not  have  been  conquered  that  day  ; for  every 
Norman  who  made  his  way  in,  lost  his  life  in  dis- 
honor, either  by  hatchet  or  bill,  by  club  or  other 
weapon.  They  wore  short  and  close  hauberks,  and 
helmets  that  hung  over  their  garments.  King  Harold 
issued  orders,  and  made  proclamation  round,  that  all 
should  be  ranged  with  their  faces  toward  the  enemy, 
and  that  no  one  should  move  from  where  he  was,  so 
that  whoever  came  might  find  them  ready  ; and  that 
whatever  any  one,  be  he  Norman  or  other,  should  do, 
each  should  do  his  best  to  defend  his  own  place. 
Then  he  ordered  the  men  of  Kent  to  go  where  the 
Normans  were  likely  to  make  the  attack  ; for  they 
say  that  the  men  of  Kent  are  entitled  to  strike  first ; 
ftnd.  that  whenever  the  king  goes  to  battle,  the  first 


308 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


blow  belongs  to  them.  The  right  of  the  men  of  Lon- 
don is  to  guard  the  king’s  body,  to  place  themselves 
around  him,  and  to  guard  his  standard ; and  they 
were  accordingly  placed  by  the  standard  to  watch 
and  defend  it. 

318.  “ When  Harold  had  made  all  ready^and  given 
his  orders,  he  came  into  the  midst  of  the  English, 
and  dismounted  by  the  side  of  the  standard  ; Leof- 
win  and  G-urth,  his  brothers,  were  with  him;  and 
around  him  he  had  barons  enough,  as  he  stood  by  his 
standard,  which  was,  in  truth,  a noble  one,  sparkling 
with  gold  and  precious  stones.  After  the  victory 
William  sent  it  to  the  pope,  to  prove  and  commemo- 
rate his  great  conquest  and  glory.  The  English  stood 
in  close  ranks,  ready  and  eager  for  the  fight ; and 
they,  moreover,  made  a fosse,  which  went  across  the 
field,  guarding  one  side  of  their  ainiy. 

319.  “Meanwhile  the  Normans  appeared  advanc- 
ing over  the  ridge  of  a rising  ground,  and  the  first 
division  of  their  troops  moved  onward  along  the 
hill  and  across  a valley.  And  presently  another  di- 
vision, still  larger,  came  in  sight,  close  following  up- 
on the  first,  and  they  were  led  toward  another  part 
of  the  field,  forming  together  as  the  first  body  had 
done.  And  while  Harold  saw  and  examined  them, 
and  was  pointing  them  outtoGurth,  a fresh  company 
came  in  sight,  covering  all  the  plain ; and  in  the 
midst  of  them  was  raised  the  standard  that  came 
from  Rome.  Near  it  was  the  duke,  and  the  best  men 
and  greatest  strength  of  the  army  were  there.  The 
good  knights,  the  good  vassals  and  brave  warriors 


BATILE  OF  HASTINGS. 


309 


were  there ; and  there  were  gathered  together  the 
gentle  barons,  the  good  archers,  and  the  men-at-arms, 
whose  duty  it  was  to  guard  the  duke,  and  range 
themselves  around  him.  The  youths  and  common 
herd  of  the  camp,  whose  business  was  not  to  join  in 
the  battle,  but  to  take  care  of  the  harness  and  stores, 
moved  off  toward  a rising  ground.  The  priest  and  the 
clerks  also  ascended  a hill,  there  to  offer  up  prayers 
to  God^  and  watch  the  event  of  the  battle. 

320.  “The  English  stood  firm  on  foot  in  close  ranks, 
and  carried  themselves  right  boldly.  Each  man  had 
his  hauberk  on,  with  his  sword  girt,  and  his  shield 
at  his  neck.  Great  hatchets  were  also  slung  at  their 
necks,  with  which  they  expected  to  strike  heavy 
blows. 

321.  “The  Normans  brought  on  the  three  divisions 
of  their  army  to  attack  at  different  places.  They 
set  out  in  three  companies,  and  in  three  companies 
did  they  fight.  The  first  and  second  had  come  up, 
and  then  advanced  the  third,  which  was  the  great- 
est ; with  that  came  the  duke  with  his  own  men, 
and  all  moved  boldly  forward. 

322.  “As  soon  as  the  two  armies  were  in  full  view  of 
each  other,  great  noise  and  tumult  arose.  You  might 
hear  the  sound  of  many  trumpets,  of  bugles,  and  of 
horns ; and  then  you  might  see  men  ranging  them- 
selves in  line,  lifting  their  shields,  raising  their  lan- 
ces, bending  their  bows,  handling  their  arrows,  ready 
for  assault  and  defense. 

323.  “The  English  stood  steady  to  their  post,  the 
N ormans  still  moved  on ; and  when  they  drew  near, 


310 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


the  English  were  to  be  seen  stirring  to  and  fro ; were 
going  and  coming ; troops  ranging  themselves  in  or- 
der; some  with  their  color  rising,  others  turning 
pale ; some  making  ready  their  arms,  others  raising 
their  shields ; the  brave  man  rousing  himself  to 
fight,  the  coward  trembling  at  the  approach  of 
danger. 

324.  “Then  Taillefer,  who  sang  right  well,  rode, 
mounted  on  a swift  horse,  before  the  duke,  singing 
of  Charlemagne  and  of  Koland,  of  Oliver,  and  the 
peers  who  died  in  Roncesvalles.  And  when  they 
drew  nigh  to  the  English,  ‘A  boon,  sire  !’  cried  Tail- 
lefer ; ‘I  have  long  served  you,  and  you  owe  me  fot 
all  such  service.  To-day,  so  please  you,  you  shall 
repay  it.  I ask  as  my  guerdon,  and  beseech  you  for 
it  earnestly,  that  you  will  allow  me  to  strike  the 
first  blow  in  the  battle !’  And  the  duke  answered, 
‘I  grant  it.’  Then  Taillefer  put  his  horse  to  a gallop 
charging  before  all  the  rest,  and  struck  an  Englishman 
dead,  driving  his  lance  below  the  breast  into  his 
body,  and  stretching  him  upon  the , ground.  Then 
he  drew  his  sword  and  struck  another,  crying  out, 
‘Come  on,  come  on!  What  do  ye,  sirs?  lay  on,  lay 
on ! At  the  second  blow  he  struck,  the  English 
pushed  forward,  and  surrounded,  and  slew  him. 
Forthwith  arose  the  noise  and  cry  of  war,  and  on 
either  side  the  people  put  themselves  in  motion. 

325.  “The  Normans  moved  on  to  the  assault,  and 
the  English  defended  themselves  well.  Some  were 
striking,  others  urging  onward ; all  were  bold,  and 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


311 


cast  aside  fear.  And  now,  behold,  that  battle  was 
gathered  whereof  the  fame  is  yet  mighty. 

326.  ‘’Loud  and  far  resounded  the  bray  ofthe  horns ; 
and  the  shocks  of  the  lances,  the  mighty  strokes  of 
maces,  and  the  quick  clashing  of  swords.  One  while 
the  Englishmen  rushed  on,  another  while  they  fell 
back  ; one  while  the  men  from  over  sea  charged  on- 
ward, and  again  at  other  times  retreated.  The  Nor- 
mans shouted  Dex  Aie,  the  English  people  Out.  Then 
came  the  cunning  maneuvers,  the  rude  shocks  and 
strokes  of  the  lance  and  blows  of  the  sword,  among 
the  sergeants  and  soldiers,  both  English  and 
Norman. 

327.  “When  the  English  fall  the  Normans  shout. 
Each  side  taunts  and  defies  the  other,  yet  neither 
knoweth  what  the  other  saith ; and  the  Normans 
say  the  English  bark,  because  they  understand  not 
their  speech. 

328  “Some  wax  strong,  others  weak : the  brave 
exult,  but  the  cowards  tremble,  as  men  who  are  sore 
dismayed.  The  Normans  press  on  the  assault,  and  the 
English  defend  their  post  well : they  pierce  the  hau- 
berks, and  cleave  the  shields,  receive  and  return 
mighty  blows.  Again,  some  press  forward,  others 
yield  ; and  thus,  in  various  ways,  the  struggle  pro- 
ceeds. In  the  plain  was  a fosse,  which  the  Normans 
had  now  behind  them,  having  passed  it  in  the  fight 
without  regarding  it.  But  the  English  charged  and 
drove  the  Normans  before  them  till  they  made  them 
fall  back  upon  this  fosse,  overthrowing  into  it  horses 
and  men.  Many  were  to  be  seen  falling  therein, 


312 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


rolling  one  over  the  other,  with  their  faces  to  the 
earth,  and  unable  to  rise.  Many  of  the  English,  also, 
whom  the  Normans  drew  down  along  with  them, 
died  there.  At  no  time  during  the  day’s  battle  did 
so  many  Normans  die  as  perished  in  that  fosse.  So 
those  said  who  saw  the  dead. 

329.  “The  varlets  who  were  set  to  guard  the  har- 
ness began  to  abandon  it  as  they  saw  the  loss  of 
the  Frenchmen,  when  thrown  back  upon  the 
fosse  without  power  to  recover  themselves.  Being 
greatly  alarmed  at  seeing  the  difficulty  in  restoring 
order,  they  began  to  quit  the  harness,  and  sought 
around,not  knowing  where  to  find  shelter.  Then  Duke 
William’s  brother,  Odo,  the  good  priest,  the  Bishop 
of  Bayeux,  galloped  up,  and  said  to  them,  ‘Stand 
fast ! stand  fast!  be  quiet  and  move  not!  fear  noth- 
ing ; for,  if  God  please,  we  shall  conquer  yet.’  So 
they  took  courage,  and  rested  where  they  were ; and 
Odo  returned  galloping  back  to  where  the  battle  was 
most  fierce,  and  was  of  great  service  on  that  day. 
He  had  put  a hauberk  on  over  a white  aube,  wide 
in  the  body,  with  the  sleeve  tight,  and  sat  on  a 
white  horse,  so  that  all  might  recognize  him.  In 
his  hand  he  held  a mace,  and  wherever  he  saw  most 
need  he  held  up  and  stationed  the  knights,  and 
often  urged  them  on  to  assault  and  strike  the 
enemy. 

330.  “From  nine  o’clock  in  the  morning,  when  the 
combat  began,  till  three  o’clock  came,  the  battle  was 
up  and  down,  this  way  and  that,  and  no  one  knew 
who  would  conquer  and  win  the  land.  Both  sides 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


313 


stood  so  firm  and  fought  so  well,  that  no  one  could 
guess  which  would  prevail.  The  Norman  archers 
with  their  bows  shot  quickly  upon  the  English  ; 
but  they  covered  themselves  with  their  shields,  so 
that  the  arrows  could  not  reach  their  bodies,  nor  do 
any  mischief,  how  true  soever  was  their  aim,  or  how 
ever  well  they  shot.  Then  the  Normans  determined 
to  shoot  their  arrows  upward  into  the  air,  so  that  they 
might  fall  on  their  enemies’  heads,  and  strike  their 
faces.  The  archers  adopted  this  scheme,  and  shot  up 
into  the  air  toward  the  English  ; and  the  arrows,  in 
falling,  struck  their  heads  and  faces,  and  put  out 
the  eyes  of  many  ; and  all  feared  to  open  their  eyes, 
or  leave  their  faces  unguarded. 

331.  ‘‘The  arrows  now  flew  thicker  than  rain  be- 
fore the  wind  : fast  sped  the  shafts  that  the  English 
call  ‘wibetes.’  Then  it  was  that  an  arrow,  that  had 
thus  shot  upward,  struck  Harold  above  his  right  eye, 
and  put  it  out.  In  his  agony  he  drew  the  arrow  and 
threw  it  away,  breaking  it  with  his  hands ; and  the 
pain  to  his  head  was  so  great  that  he  leaned  upon 
his  shield.  So  the  English  were  wont  to  say,  and 
still  say  to  the  French,  that  the  arrow  was  well  shot 
which  was  so  sent  up  against  their  king,  and  that  the 
archer  won  them  great  glory  who  thus  put  out  Har- 
old’s eye. 

332.  “The  Normans  saw  that  the  English  defended 
themselves  well,  and  were  so  strong  in  their  position 
that  they  could  do  little  against  them.  So  they  con- 
sulted together  privily,  and  arranged  to  draw  off,  and 
pretend  to  flee,  till  the  English  should  pursue  and  scat- 


314 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


ter  themselves  over  the  field  ; for  they  saw  that  if  they 
could  once  get  their  enemies  to  break  their  ranks,  they 
might  be  attacked  and  discomfited  much  more  easily. 
As  they  had  said,  so  they  did.  The  Normans  by  little 
and  little  fled,  the  English  following  them.  As  the 
one  fell  back,  the  other  pressed  after ; and  when  the 
Frenchmen  retreated,  the  English  thought  and  cried 
out  that  the  men  of  France  fled,  and  would  never 
return. 

333.  “Thus  they  were  deceived  by  the  pretended 
flight,  and  great  mischief  thereby  befell  them  ; for  if 
they  had  not  moved  from  their  position,  it  is  not 
likely  that  they  would  have  been  conquered  at  all ; 
but,  like  fools,  they  broke  the  lines  and  pursued. 

334.  “The  Normans  were  to  be  seen  following  up 
their  stratagem,  retreating  slowly  so  as  to  draw  the 
English  farther  on.  As  they  still  flee,  the  English 
pursue ; they  push  out  their  lances  and  stretch  forth 
their  hatchets,  following  the  Normans  as  they  go, 
rejoicing  in  the  success  of  their  scheme,  and  scatter- 
ing themselves  over  the  plain.  And  the  English 
meantime  jeered  and  insulted  their  foes  with  words. 
‘Cowards,'  they  cried,  ‘you  came  hither  in  an  evil  hour 
wanting  our  lands,  and  seeking  to  seize  our  property, 
fools  that  ye  were  to  come ! Normandy  is  too  far  off, 
and  you  will  not  easily  reach  it.  It  is  of  little  use 
to  run  back ; unless  you  can  cross  the  sea  at  a leap, 
or  can  drink  it  dry,  your  sons  and  daughters  are 
lost  to  you.’ 

335.  “The  Normans  bore  it  all ; but,  in  fact,  they 
knew  not  what  the  English  said : their  language 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


315 


seemed  like  the  baying  of  dogs,  which  they  could  not 
understand.  At  length  they  stopped  and  turned 
round,  determined  to'  recover  their  ranks ; and  the 
barons  might  be  heard  crying  dex  aie  ! for  a halt. 
Then  the  Normans  assumed  the  former  position, 
turning  their  faces  toward  the  enemy  ; and  their  men 
were  to  be  seen  facing  round  and  rushing  onward  to 
a fresh  melee ^ the  one  party  assaulting  the  other ; this 
man  striking,  another  pressing  onward.  One  hits, 
another  misses;  one  flies,  another  pursues;  one  is 
aiming  a stroke,  while  another  discharges  his  blow. 
Norman  strives  with  Englishman  again,  and  aims 
his  blows  afresh.  One  flies,  another  pursues  swiftly : 
the  combatants  are  many,  the  plain  wide,  the  battle 
and  the  melee  fierce.  On  every  hand  they  fight  hard, 
the  blows  are  heavy,  and  the  struggle  becomes  fierce. 

336.  ^‘The  Normans  were  playing  their  part  well, 
when  an  English  knight  came  rushing  up,  having  in 
his  company  a hundred  men,  furnished  with  various 
arms.  He  wielded  a northern  hatchet  with  a blade 
a foot  long,  and  was  well  armed  after  his  manner, 
being  tall,  bold,  and  of  noble  carriage.  In  the  front 
of  the  battle,  where  the  Normans  thronged  most,  he 
came  bounding  on  swifter  than  the  stag,  many  Nor- 
mans falling  before  him  and  his  company.  He  rushed 
straight  upon  a Norman  who  was  armed  and  riding 
on  a war-horse,  and  tried  with  his  hatchet  of  steel  to 
cleave  his  helmet ; but  the  blow  miscarried,  and  the 
sharp  blade  glanced  down  before  the  saddle-bow, 
driving  through  the  horse’s  neck  down  to  the  ground, 
so  that  both  horse  and  master  fell  together  to  the 


316 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


earth.  I know  not  whether  the  Englishman  struck 
another  blow  ; but  the  Normans  who  saw  the  stroke 
were  astonished,  and  about  to  abandon  the  assault, 
when  Roger  de  Montgomeri  came  galloping  up,  with 
his  lance  set,  and  heeding  not  the  long-handled  ax 
which  the  Englishman  wielded  aloft,  struck  him 
down,  and  left  him  stretched  on  the  ground.  Then 
Roger  cried  out,  ‘Frenchmen,  strike!  the  day  is 
ours  1’  And  again  a fierce  melee  was  to  be  seen,  with 
many  a blow  of  lance  and  sword  ; the  English  still 
defending  themselves,  killing  the  horses  and  cleav- 
ing the  shields. 

337.  “There  was  a French  soldier  of  noble  mien, 
who  sat  his  horse  gallantly.  He  spied  two  English- 
men who  were  also  carrying  themselves  boldly. 
They  were  both  men  of  great  worth,  and  had  become 
companions  in  arms  and  fought  together , the  one  pro- 
tecting the  other.  They  bore  two  long  and  broad 
bills,  and  did  great  mischief  to  the  Normans,  killing 
both  horses  and  men.  The  French  soldier  looked  at 
them  and  their  bills,  and  was  sore  alarmed,  for  he 
was  afraid  of  losing  his  good  horse,  the  best  that  he 
had,  and  would  willingly  have  turned  to  some  other 
quarter,  if  it  would  not  have  looked  like  cowardice. 
He  soon,  however,  recovered  his  courage,  and,  spur- 
ring his  horse,  gave  him  the  bridle,  and  galloped 
swiftly  forward.  Fearing  the  two  bills,  he  raised  his 
shield,  and  struck  one  of  the  Englishmen  with  his 
lance  on  the  breast,  so  that  the  iron  passed  out  at  his 
back.  At  the  moment  that  he  fell,  the  lance  broke, 
and  the  Frenchman  seized  the  mace  that  hung  at  his 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS 


317 


right  side,  and  struck  the  other  Englishman  a blow 
that  completely  fractured  his  skull. 

338.  “On  the  other  side  was  an  Englishman  who 
much  annoyed  the  Erench,  continually  assaulting 
them  with  a keen-edged  hatchet.  He  had  a helmet 
made  of  wood,  which  he  had  fastened  down  to  his 
coat,  and  laced  round  his  neck,  so  that  no  blows 
could  reach  his  head.  The  ravage  he  was  making  was 
seen  by  a gallant  Norman  knight,  who  rode  a horse 
that  neither  fire  nor  water  could  stop  in  his  career, 
when  its  master  urged  it  on.  The  knight  spurred, 
and  his  horse  carried  him  on  well  till  he  charged 
the  Englishman,  striking  him  over  the  helmet,  so 
that  it  fell  down  over  his  eyes ; and  as  he  stretched 
out  his  hand  to  raise  it  and  uncover  his  face,  the 
Norman  cut  off  his  right  hand,  so  that  his  hatchet 
fell  to  the  ground.  Another  Norman  sprang  foward 
and  eagerly  seized  the  prize  with  both  hands,  but  he 
kept  it  little  space,  and  paid  dearly  for  it,  for  as  he 
stooped  to  pick  up  the  hatchet,  an  Englishman  with 
his  long-handled  ax  struck  him  over  the  back,  break- 
ing all  his  bones,  so  that  his  entrails  and  lungs  gushed 
forth.  The  knight  of  the  good  horse  meantime  re- 
turned without  injury ; but  On  his  way  he  met 
another  Englishman,  and  bore  him  down  under  his 
horse,  wounding  him  grievously  and  trampling  him 
altogether  under  foot. 

339  “And  now  might  be  heard  the  loud  clang  and 
cry  of  battle,  and  the  clashing  of  lances.  The  Eng- 
lish stood  firm  in  their  barricades,  and  shivered  the 
lances,  beating  them  into  pieces  with  their  bills  and 


318 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


maces.  The  Normans  drew  their  swords  and  hewed 
down  the  barricades,  and  the  English,  in  great  trou- 
ble, fell  hack  upon  their  standard,  where  were  col- 
lected the  maimed  and  wounded. 

340.  “ There  were  many  knights  of  Chauz  who 
jousted  and  made  attacks.  The  English  knew  not 
how  to  joust,  or  hear  arms  on  horseback,  hut  fought 
with  hatchets  and  hills.  A man,  when  he  wanted  to 
strike  with  one  of  their  hatchets,  was  obliged  to  hold 
it  with  both  his  hands,  and  could  not  at  the  same 
time,  as  it  seems  to  me,  both  cover  himself  and  strike 
with  any  freedom. 

341.  “ The  English  fell  hack  toward  the  standard, 
which  was  upon  a rising  ground,  and  the  Normans 
followed  them  across  the  valley,  attacking  them  on 
foot  and  horseback.  Then  Hue  de  Mortemer,  with 
the  Sires  D’Auviler,  D’Onehac,  and  Saint  Cler,  rode 
up  and  charged,  overthrowing  many. 

342.  “ Robert  Fitz  Erneis  fixed  his  lance,  took  his 
shield,  and,  galloping  toward  the  standard,  with  his 
keen-edged  sword  struck  an  Englishman  who  was  in 
front,  killed  him,  and  then  drawing  back  his  sword, 
attacked  many  others,  and  pushed  straight  for  the 
standard,  trying  to  beat  it-  down ; but  the  English 
surrounded  it,  and  killed  him  with  their  bills.  He 
was  found  on  the  spot,  when  they  afterward  sought 
for  him,  dead,  and  lying  at  the  standard’s  foot. 

343. ‘‘Duke  William  pressed  close  upon  the  English 
with  his  lance,  striving  hard  to  reach  the  standard 
with  the  great  troop  he  led,  and  seeking  earnestly  for 
Harold,  on  whose  account  the  whole  war  was.  The 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


319 


Normans  follow  their  lord,  and  press  around  him ; 
they  ply  their  blows  upon  the  English  ; and  these 
defend  themselves  stoutly,  striving  hard  with  their 
enemies,  returning  blow  for  blow. 

344.  “ One  of  them  was  a man  of  great  strength,  a 
wrestler,  who  did  great  mischief  to  the  Normans 
with  his  hatchet ; all  feared  him,  for  he  struck  down 
a great  many  Normans.  The  duke  spurred  on  his 
horse,  and  aimed  a blow  at  him,  but  he  stooped,  and 
so  escaped  the  stroke  ; then  jumping  on  one  side,  he 
lifted  his  hatchet  aloft,  and  as  the  duke  bent  to  avoid 
the  blow,  the  Englishman  boldly  struck  him  on  the 
head,  and  beat  in  his  helmet  though  without  doing 
much  injury.  He  was  very  near  falling,  however ; 
but,  bearing  on  his  stirrups,  he  recovered  himself  im- 
mediately ; and  when  he  thought  to  have  revenged 
himself  upon  the  churl  by  killing  him,  he  had  es- 
caped, dreading  the  duke’s  blow.  He  ran  back  in 
among  the  English,  but  he  was  not  safe  even  there  ; 
for  the  Normans,  seeing  him,  pursued  and  caught 
him,  and  having  pierced  him  through  and  through 
with  their  lances,  left  him  dead  on  the  ground. 

345. “Where  the  throng  of  the  battle  was  greatest, 
the  men  of  Kent  and  Essex  fought  wondrously  well, 
and  made  the  Normans  again  retreat,  biit  without 
doing  them  much  injury.  And  when  the  duke  saw 
his  men  fall  back,  and  the  English  triumphing  over 
them,  his  spirit  rose  high,  and  he  seized  his  shield 
and  his  lance,  which  a vassal  handed  to  him,  and 
took  his  post  by  his  standard. 

346.  “Then  those  who  kept  close  guard  by  him, 


320 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


and  rode  where  he  rode,  being  about  a thousand 
armed  men,  came  and  rushed  with  closed  ranks  upon 
the  English  ; and  with  the  weight  of  their  good  horses, 
and  the  blows  the  knights  gave,  broke  the  press  of 
the  enemy,  and  scattered  the  crowd  before  them,  the 
good  duke  leading  them  on  in  front.  Many  pursued 
and  many  fled ; many  were  the  Englishmen  who  fell 
around,  and  were  trampled  under  the  horses,  crawl- 
ing upon  the  earth,  and  not  able  to  rise.  Many  of 
the  richest  and  noblest  men  fell  in  the  rout,  but  still 
the  English  rallied  in  places,  smote  down  those  whom 
they  reached,  and  maintained  the  combat  the  best 
they  could,  beating  down  the  men  and  killing  the 
horses.  One  Englishman  watched  the  duke,  and 
plotted  to  kill  him ; he  would  have  struck  him  with 
his  lance,  but  he  could  not,  for  the  duke  struck  him 
first,  and  felled  him  to  the  earth. 

347.  “ Loud  was  now  the  clamor,  and  great  the 
slaughter;  many  a soul  then  quitted  the  body  it  in- 
habited. The  living  marched  over  the  heap  of  dead, 
and  each  side  was  weary  of  striking.  He  charged  on 
who  could,  and  he  who  could  no  longer  strike  still 
pushed  forward.  The  strong  struggled  with  the 
strong  ; some  failed,  others  triumphed ; the  cowards 
fell  back,  the  brave  pressed  on;  and  sad  was  his  fate 
who  fell  in  the  midst,  for  he  had  little  chance  of  ris- 
ing again  ; and  many  in  truth  fell  who  never  rose  at 
all,  being  crushed  under  the  throng. 

348.  And  now  the  Normans  had  pressed  on  so  far, 
that  at  last  they  had  reached  the  standard.  There 
Harold  had  remained,  defending  himself  to  the  ut- 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS, 


321 


most ; but  he  was  sorely  wounded  in  his  eye  by  the 
arrow,  and  suffered  grievous  pain  from  the  blow.  An 
armed  man  came  in  the  throng  of  the  battle,  and 
struck  him  on  the  ventaille  of  his  helmet,  and  beat 
him  to  the  ground ; and  as  he  sought  to  recover  him- 
self, a knight  beat  him  down  again,  striking  him  on 
the  thick  of  his  thigh,  down  to  the  bone. 

349.  “ Gurth  saw  the  English  falling  around,  and 
that  there  was  no  remedy.  He  saw  his  race  hasten- 
ing to  ruin,  and  despaired  of  any  aid  ; he  would  have 
fled,  but  could  not,  for  the  throng  continually  in- 
creased. And  the  duke  pushed  on  till  he  reached 
him,  and  struck  him  with  great  force.  Whether  he 
died  of  that  blow  I know  not,  but  it  was  said  that  he 
fell  uuder  it,  and  rose  no  more. 

350.  “ The  standard  was  beaten  down,  the  golden 
standard  was  taken,  and  Harold  and  the  best  of  his 
friends  were  slain ; but  there  was  so  much  eagerness, 
and  throng  of  so  many  around,  seeking  to  kill  him, 
that  I know  not  who  it  was  that  slew  him. 

351.  “ The  English  were  in  great  trouble  at  having 
lost  their  king,  and  at  the  duke’s  having  conquered 
and  beat  down  the  standard ; but  they  still  fought 
on,  and  defended  themselves  long,  and  in  fact  till  the 
day  drew  to  a close.  Then  it  clearly  appeared  to  all 
that  the  standard  was  lost,  and  the  news  had  spread 
throughout  the  army  that  Harold,  for  certain,  was 
dead ; and  all  saw  that  there  was  no  longer  any  hope, 
so  they  left  the  field,  and  those  fled  who  could. 

352.  “ William  fought  well ; many  an  assault 
did  he  lead,  many  a blow  did  he  give,  and  many  re- 


322 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


ceive,  and  many  fell  dead  under  his  hand.  Two  horses 
were  killed  under  him,  and  he  took  a third  when 
necessary,  so  that  he  fell  not  to  the  ground,  and  lost 
not  a drop  of  blood.  But  whatever  any  one  did,  and 
whoever  lived  or  died,  this  is  certain,  that  William 
conquered,  and  that  many  of  the  English  fled  from 
the  field,  and  many  died  on  the  spot.  Then  he  re- 
turned thanks  to  God,  and  in  his  pride  ordered  his 
standard  to  be  brought  and  set  up  on  high,  where  the 
English  standard  had  stood ; and  that  was  the  signal 
of  his  having  conquered,  and  beaten  down  the  stand- 
ard. And  he  ordered  his  tent  to  be  raised  on  the 
spot  among  the  dead,  and  had  his  meat  brought 
thither,  and  his  supper  prepared  there. 

353.  “ Then  he  took  off  his  armor ; and  the  barons 
and  knights,  pages  and  squires  came,  when  he  had 
unstrung  his  shield  ; and  they  took  the  helmet  from 
his  head,  and  the  hauberk  from  his  back,  and  saw 
the  heavy  blows  upon  his  shield,  and  how  his  helmet 
w^as  dinted  in.  And  all  greatly  wondered,  and  said, 
‘'Such  a baron  (ber)  never  bestrode  war-horse,  nor 
dealt  such  blows,  nor  did  such  feats  of  arms  ; neither 
has  there  been  on  earth  such  a knight  since  Rollant 
and  Oliver.^ 

354.  “ Thus  they  lauded  and  extolled  him  greatly, 
and  rejoiced  in  what  they  saw,  but  grieving  also  for 
their  friends  who  were  slain  in  the  battle.  And  the 
duke  stood  meanwhile  among  them,  of  noble  stature 
and  mien,  and  rendered  thanks  to  the  King  of  glory, 
through  whom  he  had  the-  victory ; and  thanked  the 
knights  around  him,  mourning  also  frequently  for 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


323 


the  dead.  And  he  ate  and  drank  among  the  dead, 
and  made  his  bed  that  night  upon  the  field. 

355.  ‘‘  The  morrow  was  Sunday ; and  those  who 
had  slept  upon  the  field  of  battle,  keeping  watch 
around,  and  suffering  great  fatigue,  bestirred  them- 
selves at  break  of  day,  and  sought  out  and  buried 
such  of  the  bodies  of  their  dead  friends  as  they  might 
find.  The  noble  ladies  of  the  land  also  came,  some 
to  seek  their  husbands,  others  their  fathers,  sons,  or 
brothers.  They  bore  the  bodies  to  their  villages,  and 
interred  them  at  the  churches  ; and  the  clerks  and 
priests  of  the  country  were  ready,  and  at  the  request 
of  their  friends,  took  the  bodies  that  were  found,  and 
prepared  graves  and  lay  them  therein. 

356.  “ King  Harold  was  carried  and  buried  at  Var- 
ham ; but  I know  not  who  it  was  that  bore  him 
thither,  neither  do  I know  who  buried  him.  Many 
remained  on  the  field,  and  many  had  fied  in  the 
night.’^ 

357.  Such  is  the  Norman  account  of  the  battle  of 
Hastings,*  which  does  full  justice  to  the  valor  of  the 
Saxons  as  well  as  to  the  skill  and  bravery  of  the  vic- 
tors. It  is  indeed  evident  that  the  loss  of  the  battle 
by  the  English  was  owing  to  the  wound  which  Har- 
old received  in  the  afternoon,  and  which  must  have 
incapacitated  him  from  effective  command.  When 

* In  the  preceding-  pages  I have  woven  together  the 
“purpureos  pannos”  of  the  old  chronicler.  In  so  doing, 
I have  largely  availed  myself  of  Mr  Edgar  Taylor’s  ver- 
sion of  that  part  of  the  “ Roman  deRou  ” which  describes 
the  conquest.  By  giving  engravings  from  the  Bayeux 
Tapestry  and  by  his  excellent  notes,  Mr.  Taylor  has  added 
much  to  the  value  and  interest  of  his  volume. 

11 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINQB, 


we  remember  that  he  had  himself  just  won  the  bat- 
tle of  Stamford  Bridge  over  Harald  Hardrada  by  the 
maneuver  of  a feigned  flight,  it  is  impossible  to  sup- 
pose that  he  could  be  deceived  by  the  same  stratagem 
on  the  part  of  the  Normans  at  Hastings.  But  his 
men,  when  deprived  of  his  control,  would  very  natu- 
rally be  led  by  their  inconsiderate  ardor  into  the  pur- 
suit that  proved  so  fatal  to  them.  All  the  narratives 
of  the  battle,  however  much  they  vary  as  to  the  pre- 
cise time  and  manner  of  Harold’s  fall,  eulogize  the 
generalship  and  the  personal  prowess  which  he  dis- 
played, until  the  fatal  arrow  struck  him.  The  skill 
with  which  he  had  posted  his  army  was  proved  both 
by  the  slaughter  which  it  cost  the  Normans  to  force 
the  position,  and  also  by  the  desperate  rally  which 
some  of  the  Saxons  made  after  the  battle  in  the  for- 
est in  the  rear,. in  which  they  cut  off  a large  number 
of  the  pursuing  Normans.  This  circumstance  is  par- 
ticularly mentioned  by  William  of  Poictiers,  the  Con- 
queror’s own  chaplain.  Indeed,  if  Harold,  or  either 
of  his  brothers,  had  survived,  the^  remains  of  the 
English  army  might  have  formed  again  in  the  wood, 
and  could  at  least  have  effected  an  orderly  retreat, 
and  prolonged  the  war.  But  both  Gurth,  and  Leof- 
wine,  and  all  the  bravest  Thanes  of  Southern  England 
lay  dead  on  Senlac,  around  their  fallen  king  and  the 
fallen  standard  of  their  country.  The  exact  number 
that  perished  on  the  Saxon  side  is  unknown  ; but  we 
read  that  on  the  side  of  the  victors,  out  of  sixty 
thousand  men  who  had  been  engaged,  no  less  than  a 
fourth  perished.  So  well  had  the  English  billmeii 


BATTLE  OF  HASTINGS. 


325 


plyed  the  ghastly  blow,”  and  so  sternly  had  the 
Saxon  battle- ax  cloven  Norman  casque  and  mail.* 
The  old  historian  Daniel  justly  as  well  as  forcibly  re- 
marks,! “ Thus  was  tried,  by  the  great  assize  of 
God’s  judgment  in  battle,  the  right  of  power  between 
the  English  and  Norman  nations ; a battle  the  most 
memorable  of  all  others  ; and,  however  miserably  lost, 
yet  most  nobly  fought  on  the  part  of  England.” 

358.  Many  a pathetic  legend  was  told  in  after 
years  respecting  the  discovery  and  the  burial  of  the 
corpse  of  our  last  Saxon  king.  The  main  circum- 
stances, though  they  seem  to  vary,  are  perhaps  recon- 
cilable.J  Two  of  the  monks  ot  Waltham  Abbey, 
which  Harold  had  founded  a little  time  before  his 
election  to  the  throne,  had  accompanied  him  to  the 
battle.  On  the  morning  after  the  slaughter,  they 
begged  and  gained  permission  of  the  Conqueror  to 
search  for  the  body  of  their  benefactor.  The  Norman 
soldiery  and  camp-followers  had  stripped  and  gashed 
the  slain,  and  the  two  monks  vainly  strove  to  recog- 
nize from  among  the  mutilated  and  gory  heaps  around 
them  the  features  of  their  former  king.  They  sent 
for  Harold’s  mistress,  Edith,  surnamed  “ the  Fair,” 
and  “ the  swan- necked,”  to  aid  them.  The  eye  of 
love  proved  keener  than  the  eye  of  gratitude,  and  the 
Saxon  lady  even  in  that  Aceldama  knew  her  Harold. 

* The  Conqueror’s  Chaplain  calls  the  Saxon  battle-axes 
“saevissimae  secures.” 
t As  cited  in  the  “ Pictorial  History.” 

$ See  them  collected  in  Ling-ard,  i.,  453,  et  seq . Thierry, 
i.,  299;  Sharon  Turner,  i.,  83;  and  Histoire  de  Normandie, 
par  Lieg-uet,  p.  242. 


326 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


359.  The  king’s  mother  now  sought  the  victorious 
Norman,  and  begged  the  dead  body  other  son.  But 
William  at  first  answered  in  his  wrath  and  the  hard- 
ness of  his  heart,  that  a man  who  had  been  false  to 
his  word  and  his  religion  should  have  no  other  sepul- 
chre than  the  sand  of  the  shore.  He  added  with  a 
sneer,  “ Harold  mounted  guard  on  the  coast  while  he 
was  alive,  he  may  continue  his  guard  now  he  is 
dead.”  The  taunt  was  an  unintentional  eulogy ; arid 
a grave  washed  by  the  spray  of  the  Sussex  waves 
would  have  been  the  noblest  burial-place  for  the  mar- 
tyr of  Saxon  freedom.  But  Harold’s  mother  was  ur' 
gent  in  her  lamentations  and  her  prayers ; the  Con- 
queror relented : like  Achilles,  he  gave  up  the  dead 
body  of  his  fallen  foe  to  a parent’s  supplications,  and 
the  remains  of  King  Harold  were  deposited  with 
regal  honors  in  Waltham  Abbey. 

360.  On  Christmas  day  in  the  same  year,  William 
the  Conqueror  was  crowned  at  London  King  of  Eng- 
land. 


Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of 
Hastings,  A.D.  1066,  and  Joan  of  Aec’s 
Victory  at  Orleans,  A.  D.  1429. 

A.  D.  1066-1087.  Keign  of  William  the  Conqueror. 
Frequent  risings  of  the  English  against  him,  which 
are  quelled  with  merciless  rigor. 

1096.  The  first  Crusade. 

1112.  Commencement  of  the  disputes  about  in- 
vestitures between  the  emperors  and  the  popes. 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


327 


1140.  Foundation  of  the  city  of  Lubec,  whence 
originated  the  Hanseatic  League.  Commencement 
of  the  feuds  in  Italy  between  the  Guelfs  and  the 
Ghibellines. 

1146.  The  second  Crusade. 

1154.  Henry  II.  becomes  King  of  England.  Under 
him  Thomas  ^ Becket  is  made  Archbishop  of  Canter- 
bury : the  first  instance  of  any  man  of  the  Saxon 
race  being  raised  to  high  office  in  Church  or  State 
since  the  Conquest. 

1170.  Strongbow,  earl  of  Pembroke,  lands  with 
an  English  army  in  Ireland. 

1189.  Richard  Coeur  de  Lion  becomes  King  of 
England.  He  and  King  Philip  Augustus  of  France 
join  in  the  third  Crusade. 

1199-1204.  On  the  death  of  King  Richard,  his 
brother  John  claims  and  makes  himself  master  of 
England  and  Normandy,  and  the  other  large  con- 
tinental possessions  of  the  early  Plantagenet  princes. 
Philip  Angustus  asserts  the  cause  of  Prince  Arthur, 
John’s  nephew,  against  him.  Arthur  is  murdered, 
but  the  French  king  continues  the  war  against  John, 
and  conquers  from  him  Normandy,  Brittany,  Anjou, 
Maine,  Touraine,  and  Poictiers. 

1215.  The  barons,  the  freeholders,  the  citizens, 
and  the  yeomen  of  England  rise  against  the  tyranny 
of  John  and  his  foreign  favorites.  They  compel  him 
to  sign  Magna  Charta.  This  is  the  commencement 
of  our  nationality : for  our  history  from  this  time 
forth  is  the  history  of  a national  life,  then  complete 
and  still  in  being.  All  English  history  before  this 


328 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


period  is  a mere  history  of  elements  of  their  collisions, 
and  of  the  processes  of  their  fusion.  For  upward  of 
a century  after  the  Conquest,  Anglo-Norman  and 
Anglo-Saxon  had  kept  aloof  from  each  other : the 
one  in  haughty  scorn,  the  other  in  sullen  abhorrence. 
They  were  two  peoples,  though  living  in  the  same 
land.  It  is  not  until  the  thirteenth  century,  the 
period  of  the  reigns  of  John  and  his  son  and  grand- 
son, that  we  can  perceive  the  existence  of  any  feeling 
of  common  nationality  among  them.  But  in  study- 
ing the  history  of  these  reigns,  we  read  of  the  old 
dissensions  no  longer.  The  Saxon  no  more  appears 
in  civil  war  against  the  Norman,  the  Norman  no 
longer  scorns  the  language  of  the  Saxon,  or  refuses  to 
bear  together  with  him  the  name  of  Englishman. 
No  part  of  the  community  think  themselves  foreign- 
ers to  another  part.  They  feel  that  they  are  all  one 
people,  and  they  have  learned  to  unite  their  efforts 
for  the  common  purpose  of  protecting  the  rights  and 
promoting  the  welfare  of  all.  The  fortunate  loss  of 
the  Duchy  of  Normandy  in  John’s  reign  greatly  pro- 
moted these  new  feelings.  Thenceforth  our  barons’ 
only  homes  were  in  England.  One  language  had,  in 
the  reign  of  Henry  III.,  became  the  language  of  the 
land,  and  that,  also,  had  then  assumed  the  form  in 
which  we  still  possess  it.  One  law,  in  the  eye  of 
which  all  freemen  are  equal  without  distinction  of 
race,  was  modeled,  and  steadily  enforced,  and  still 
continues  to  form  the  ground- work  of  our  judicial 
system.* 

’••‘‘Creasy’s  Text-book  of  the  Constitution,”  p.  4 


OF  FVEN78. 


329 


1273.  Rodolph  of  Hapsburg  chosen  Emperor  of  Ger- 
many. 

1283.  Edward  I.  conquers  Wales. 

1346.  Edward  III.  invades  France,  and  gains  the 
battle  of  Cressy. 

1356.  Battle  of  Poictiers. 

1360.  Treaty  of  Bretigny  between  England  and 
France.  By  it  Edward  III.  renounces  his  pretensions 
to  the  French  crown.  The  treaty  is  ill  kept,  and  in- 
decisive hostilities  continue  between  the  forces  of  the 
two  countries. 

1414.  Henry  V.  of  England  claims  the  crown  of 
France,  and  resolves  to  invade  and  conquer  that 
kingdom.  At  this  time  France  was  in  the  most  de- 
plorable state  of  weakness  and  suffering,  from  the 
factions  that  raged  among  her  nobility,  and  from  the 
cruel  oppressions  which  the  rival  nobles  practiced  on 
the  mass  of  the  community.  “ The  people  were  ex- 
hausted by  taxes,  civil  wars  and  military  executions  ; 
and  they  had  fallen  into  that  worst  of  all  states  of 
mind,  when  the  independence  of  one’s  country  is 
thought  no  longer  a paramount  and  sacred  object. 

‘ What  can  the  English  do  to  us  worse  than  the  thing 
we  suffer  at  the  hands  of  oui  own  princes  ?’  was  a 
common  exclamation  among  the  poor  people  of 
France.”* 

1415.  Henry  invades  France,  takes  Harfleur,  and 
wins  the  great  battle  of  Agincourt. 

1417-1419.  Henry  conquers  Normandy.  The 
French  Dauphin  assassinates  the  Duke  of  Burgundy, 

* “Pictorial  Hist,  of  England,”  vol.  i ,p.  28. 


330 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


the  most  powerful  of  the  French  nobles,  at  Mon- 
tereau.  The  successor  of  the  murdered  duke  be- 
comes the  active  ally  of  the  English. 

1420.  The  treaty  of  Troyes  is  concluded  between 
Henry  V.  of  England  and  Charles  VI.  of  France,  and 
Philip,  duke  of  Burgundy.  By  this  treaty  it  was 
stipulated  that  Henry  should  marry  the  Princess 
Catharino  of  France ; that  King  Charles,  during  his 
lifetime,  should  keep  the  title  and  dignity  of  King 
of  France,  but  that  Henry  should  succeed  him,  and 
should  at  once  be  intrusted  with  the  administration 
of  the  government,  and  that  the  French  crown  should 
descend  to  Henry’s  heirs ; that  France  and  England 
should  forever  be  united  under  one  king,  but  should 
still  retain  their  several  usages,  customs,  and 
privileges ; that  all  the  princes,  peers,  vassals,  and 
communities  of  France  should  swear  allegiance  to 
Henry  as  their  future  king,  and  should  pay  him 
present  obedience  as  regent.  That  Henry  should 
unite  his  arms  to  those  of  King  Charles  and  the 
Duke  of  Burgundy,  in  order  to  subdue  the  adherents 
of  Charles,  the  pretended  dauphin ; and  that  these 
three  princes  should  make  no  peace  or  truce  with  the 
dauphin  but  by  the  common  consent  of  all  three. 

1421.  Henry  V.  gains  several  victories  over  the 
French,  who  refuse  to  acknowledge  the  treaty  of 
Troyes.  His  son,  afterward  Henry  VI.,  is  born. 

1422.  Henry  V.  and  Charles  VI.  of  France  die. 
Henry  VI.  is  proclaimed  at  Paris  King  of  England 
and  France.  The  followers  of  the  French  dauphin 
proclaim  him  Charles  VII.,  king  of  France.  The 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


331 


Duke  of  Bedford,  the  English  regent  in  France,  de- 
feats the  army  of  the  dauphin  at  Crevant. 

1424.  The  duke  of  Bedford  gains  the  great  victory 
of  V^neuil  over  the  French  partisans  of  the  dauphin 
and  their  Scotch  auxiliaries. 

1428.  The  English  begin  the  siege  of  Orleans. 


332 


JOAN  OF  ABC^S  VICTORY 


CHAPTER  IX. 

JOAN  OF  ABC’s  VICTOKY  OVER  THE  ENGLISH  AT 
ORLEANS,  A.  D.  1429. 

The  eyes  of  all  Europe  were  turned  toward  this  scene, 
where  it  was  reasonably  supposed  the  French  were  to  make 
their  last  stand  for  maintaining  the  independence  of  their 
monarchy  and  the  rights  of  their  sovereign.— Hume. 

361.  When,  after  their  victory  at  Salamis,  the  gen- 
erals of  the  various  Greek  states  voted  the  prizes  for 
distinguished  individual  merit,  each  assigned  the 
first  place  of  excellence  to  himself,  but  they  all  con- 
curred in  giving  their  second  votes  to  Themistocles."^ 
This  was  looked  on  as  a decisive  proof  that  Themis- 
tocles  ought  to  be  ranked  first  of  all.  If  we  were  to 
endeavor,  by  a similar  test,  to  ascertain  which  Euro- 
pean nation  had  contributed  the  most  to  the  progress 
of  European  civilization,  we  should  find  Italy,  Ger- 
many, England,  and  Spain  each  claiming  the  first 
degree,  but  each  also  naming  France  as  clearly  next 
in  merit.  It  is  impossible  to  deny  her  paramount 
importance  in  history.  Besides  the  formidable  part 
that  she  has  for  nearly  three  centuries  played,  as  the 
Bellona  of  the  European  commonwealth  of  states. 


^ Plutarch,  V it.  Them.  17. 


AT  ORLEANS. 


333 


her  influence  during  all  this  period  over  the  arts,  the 
literature,  the  manners,  and  the  feelings  of  mankind, 
has  been  such  as  to  make  the  crisis  of  her  earlier  for- 
tunes a point  of  world-wide  interest ; and  it  may  be 
asserted,  without  exaggeration,  that  the  future  career 
of  every  nation  was  involved  in  the  result  of  the 
struggle  by  which  the  unconscious  heroine  of 
France,  in  the  beginning  of  the  fifteenth  century, 
rescued  her  country  from  becoming  a second  Ireland 
under  the  yoke  of  the  triumphant  English. 

362.  Seldom  has  the  extinction  of  a nation’s  inde- 
pendence appeared  more  inevitable  than  was  the 
case  in  France  when  the  English  invaders  completed 
their  lines  round  Orleans,  four  hundred  and  twenty- 
two  years  ago.  A series  of  dreadful  defeats  had 
thinned  the  chivalry  of  France,  and  daunted  the 
spirits  of  her  soldiers.  A foreign  king  had  been  pro- 
claimed in  her  capital ; and  foreign  armies  of  the 
bravest  veterans,  and  led  by  the  ablest  captains  the 
known  in  the  world,  occupied  the  fairest  portions  of 
her  territory.  Worse  to  her,  even,  than  the  fierce- 
ness and  the  strength  of  her  foes,  were  the  factions, 
the  vices,  and  the  crimes  of  her  own  children.  Her 
native  prince  was  a dissolute  trifler,  stained  with  the 
assassination  of  the  most  powerful  noble  of  the  land, 
whose  son,  in  revenge,  had  leagued  himself  with  the 
enemy.  Many  more  of  her  nobility,  many  of  her 
prelates,  her  magistrates,  and  rulers,  had  sworn 
fealty  to  the  English  king.  The  condition  of  the 
peasantry  amid  the  general  prevalence  of  anarchy 
and  brigandage,  which  were  added  to  the  customary 


334 


JOAN  OF  ABCS  VICTORY 


devastations  of  contending  armies,  was  wretched  be- 
yond the  power  of  language  to  describe.  The  sense 
of  terror  and  wretchedness  seemed  to  have  extended 
itself  even  to  the  brute  creation. 

363.  “ In  sooth,  the  estate  of  France  was  then  most 
miserable.  There  appeared  nothing  but  a hortible 
face,  confusion,  poverty,  desolation,  solitarinesse,  and 
feare.  The  lean  and  bare  laborers  in  the  country  did 
terrifie  even  theeves  themselves,  who  had  nothing 
left  them  to  spoile  but  the  carkasses  of  these  poore 
miserable  creatures,  wandering  up  and  down  like 
ghostes  drawne  out  of  their  graves.  The  least  farmes 
and  hamlets  were  fortified  by  these  robbers,  English, 
Bourguegnons,  and  French,  every  one  striving  to  do 
his  worst : all  men-of-war  were  well  agreed  to  spoile 
the  countryman  and  merchant.  Even  the  cattell, 
accustomed  to  the  larnme  hell,  the  signe  of  the  enemy's 
approach^  would  run  home  of  themselves  without  any 
guide  hy  this  accustomed  misery,"  * 

364.  In  the  autuinn  of  1428,  the  English,  who  were 
already  masters  of  all  France  north  of  the  Loire,  pre- 
pared their  forces  for  the  conquest  of  the  southern 
provinces,  which  yet  adhered  to  the  cause  of  the  dau- 
phin. The  city  of  Orleans,  on  the  banks  of  that 
river,  was  looked  upon  as  the  last  stronghold  of  the 
French  national  party.  If  the  English  could  once 
obtain  possession  of  it,  their  victorious  progress 
through  the  residue  of  the  kingdom  seemed  free  from 
any  serious  obstacle.  Accordingly,' the  Earl  of  Salis- 

* De  serres,  quoted  in  the  Notes  to  Southey’s  “Joan  of 
Arc.’’ 


AT  ORLEANS. 


335 


bury,  one  of  the  bravest  and  most  experienced  of  the 
English  generals,  who  had  been  trained  under  Henry 
V.,  marched  to  the  attack  of  the  all-important  city  ; 
and,  after  reducing  several  places  of  inferior  conse- 
quence in  the  neighborhood,  appeared  with  his  army 
before  its  walls  on  the  12th  of  October,  1428. 

365.  The  city  of  Orleans  itself  was  on  the  north 
side  of  the  Loire,  but  its  suburbs  extended  far  on  the 
southern  side,  and  a strong  bridge  connected  them 
with  the  town.  A fortification,  which  in  modern 
military  phrase  would  be  termed  a tete-du-pont,  de- 
fended the  bridge  head  on  the  southern  side,  and  two 
towers,  called  the  Tourelles,  were  built  on  the  bridge 
itself,  at  little  distance  from  the  tete-du-pont.  In- 
deed, the  solid  masonry  of  the  bridge  terminated  at 
the  Tourelles ; and  the  communication  thence  with 
the  tete-du-pont  and  the  southern  shore  was  by 
means  of  a draw-bridge.  The  Tourelles  and  the 
tete-du-pont  formed  together  a strong  fortified  post^ 
capable  of  containing  a garrison  of  considerable 
strength  ; and  so  long  as  this  was  in  possession  of  the 
Orleannais,  they  could  communicate  freely  with  the 
southern  provinces,  the  inhabitants  of  which,  like 
the  Orleannais  themselves,  supported  the  cause  of 
their  dauphin  against  the  foreigners.  Lord  Salisbury 
rightly  judged  the  capture  of  the  Tourelles  to  be  the 
most  material  step  toward  the  reduction  of  the  city 
itself.  Accordingly,  he  directed  his  principal  opera- 
tions against  this  post,  and  after  some  severe  repulses, 
he  carried  the  Tourelles  by  storm  on  the  23d  of 
October.  The  French,  however,  broke  down  the 


336 


JOAN  OF  ARC^S  VICTORY 


arches  of  the  bridge  that  were  nearest  to  the  north 
bank,  and  thus  rendered  a direct  assault  from  the 
Tour  ell  es  upon  the  city  impossible.  But  the  posses- 
sion of  this  post  enabled  the  English  to  distress  the 
town  greatly  by  a battery  of  cannon  which  they 
planted  there,  and  which  commanded  some  of  the 
principal  streets. 

366.  It  has  been  observed  by  Hume  that  this  is  the 
first  siege  in  which  any  important  use  appears  to  have 
been  made  of  artillery.  And  yet  at  Orleans  both  besieg- 
ers and  besieged  seem  to  have  employed  their  cannons 
merely  as  instruments  of  destruction  against  their  ene- 
my’s men^  and  not  to  have  trusted  to  them  as  engines 
of  demolition  against  their  enemy’s  walls  and  works. 
The  efficacy  of  cannon  in  breaching  solid  masonry 
was  taught  Europe  by  the  Turks  a few  years  after- 
ward, at  the  memorable' siege  of  Constantinople.*  In 
our  French  wars,  as  in  the  wars  of  the  classic  nations, 
famine  was  looked  on  as  the  surest  weapon  to  com- 
pel the  submission  of  a well- walled  town ; and  the 
great  object  of  the  besiegers  was  to  effect  a complete 
circumvallation.  The  great  ambit  of  the  walls  ot 
Orleans,  and  the  facilities  which  the  river  gave  for 
obtaining  succors  and  supplies,  rendered  the  capture 
of  the  town  by  this  process  a matter  of  great  diffi- 
culty. Nevertheless,  Lord  Salisbury,  and  Lord  Sul- 
folk,  who  succeeded  him  in  command  of  the  English 
after  his  death  by  a cannon  ball,  carried  on  the  neces- 
sary works  with  great  skill  and  resolution.  Six 

* The  occasional  employment  of  artillery  against  slight 
defenses,  as  at  Jargeau  in  1429,  is  no^real  exception. 


AT  OBLEANS, 


337 


strongly-fortified  posts,  called  bastilles,  were  formed 
at  certain  intervals  round  the  town,  and  the  purpose 
of  the  English  engineers  was  to  draw  strong  lines  be- 
tween them.  During  the  winter,  little  progress  was 
made  with  the  intrench ments,  but  when  the  spring 
of  1429  came,  the  English  resumed  their  work  with 
activity ; the  communications  between  the  city  and 
the  country  became  more  difficult,  and  the  approach 
of  want  began  already  to  l)e  felt  in  Orleans. 

367.  The  besieging  force  also  fared  hardly  for  stores 
and  provisions,  until  relieved  by  the  effects  of  a 
brilliant  victory  which  Sir  John  Fastolfe,  one  of  the 
best  English  generals,  gained  at  Rouvrai,  near  Or- 
leans, a few  days  after  Ash  Wednesday,  1429.  With 
only  sixteen  hundred  fighting  men.  Sir  John  com- 
pletely defeated  an  army  of  French  and  Scots,  four 
thousand  strong,  which  had  been  collected  for  the 
purpose  of  aiding  the  Orleannais  and  harassing  the 
besieger.  After  this  encounter,  which  seemed  deci- 
sively to  confirm  the  superiority  of  the  English  in 
battle  over  their  adversaries,  Fastolfe  escorted  large 
supplies  of  stores  and  food  to  Suffolk’s  camp,  and  the 
spirits  of  the  English  rose  to  the  highest  pitch  at  the 
prospect  of  the  speedy  capture  of  the  city  before 
them,  and  the  consequent  subjection  of  all  France 
beneath  their  arms. 

368.  The  Orleannais  now,  in  their  distress,  offered 
to  surrender  the  city  into  the  hands  of  the  Duke  of 
Burgundy,  who,  though  the  ally  of  the  English,  was 
yet  one  of  their  native  princes.  The  Regent  Bedford 
refused  these  terms,  ajid  the  speedy  submission  of 


338 


JOAN  OF  ARC^S  VICTORY 


the  city  to  the  English  seemed  inevitable.  The 
Dauphin  Charles,  who  was  now  at  Chinon  with  his 
remnant  of  a court,  despaired  of  continuing  any 
longer  the  struggle  for  his  crown,  and  was  only  pre- 
vented from  abandoning  the  country  by  the  more 
masculine  spirits  of  his  mistress  and  his  queen.  Yet 
neither  they,  nor  the  boldest  of  Charles’s  captains, 
could  have  shown  him  where  to  find  resources  for 
prolonging  the  war ; and  least  of  all  could  any  hu- 
man skill  have  predicted  the  quarter  whence  rescue 
was  to  come  to  Orleans  and  to  France. 

369.  In  the  village  of  Domremy,  on  the  borders  of 
Lorraine,  there  was  a poor  peasant  of  the  name  of 
Jacques  d’Arc,  respected  in  his  station  of  life,  and 
who  had  reared  a family  in  virtuous  habits  and  in 
the  practice  of  the  strictest  devotion.  His  eldest 
daughter  was  named  by  her  parents  Jeannette,  but 
she  was  called  Jeanne  by  the  French,  which  was 
Latinized  into  Johanna,  and  Anglicized  into  Joan.* 

370.  At  the  time  when  Joan  first  attracted  atten- 
tion, she  was  about  eighteen  years  of  age.  She  was 
naturally  of  a susceptible  disposition,  which  diligent 
attention  to  the  legends  of  saints  and  tales  of  fairies, 
aided  by  the  dreamy  loneliness  of  her  life  while  tend- 
ing her  father’s  flocks,!  had  made  peculiarly  prone 
to  enthusiastic  fervor.  At  the  same  time,  she  was 
eminent  for  piety  and  purity  of  soul,  and  for  her 

* “ Respondit  quod  in  parti  bus  suis  vocabatur  Johan- 
neta,  et  postquam  venit  inFranciamvocataest  Johanna.” 
Proces  de  Jeanne  d'Arc,  i.,  p.  46. 

t Southey,  in  one  of  the  speeches  which  he  puts  in  the 


AT  ORLEANS. 


339 


compassionate  gentleness  to  the  sick  and  the  dis- 
tressed. 

371.  The  district  where  she  dwelt  had  escaped 
comparatively  free  from  the  ravages  of  war,  hut  the 
approach  of  roving  bands  of  Burgundian  or  English 
troops  frequently  spread  terror  through  Domremy 
Once  the  village  had  been  plundered  by  some  of  these 
marauders,  and  Joan  and  her  family  had  been  driven 
from  their  home,  and  forced  to  seek  refuge  for  a time 
at  Neufchateau.  The  peasantry  in  Domremy  were 
principally  attached  to  the  house  of  Orleans  and  the 
dauphin,  and  all  the  miseries  which  France  endured 
were  there  imputed  to  the  Burgundian  faction  and 
their  allies,  the  English,  who  were  seeking  to  enslave 
unhappy  France. 

mouth  of  Joan  of  Arc,  has  made  her  beautifully  describe 
the  effect  on  her  mind  of  the  scenery  in  which  she  dwelt: 
“Here  in  solitude  and  peace 
My  soul  was  nursed,  amid  the  loveliestscenes 
Of  unpoluted  nature.  Sweet  it  was, 

As  the  white  mists  of  morning  roll’d  away, 

To  see  the  mountain’s  wooded  heights  appear 
Dark  in  the  early  dawn,  and  mark  its  slope 
With  gorse-flowers  glowing,  as  the  rising  sun 
On  the  golden  ripeness  pour’d  a deepening  light 
Pleasant  at  noon  beside  the  vocal  brook 
To  lay  me  down,  and  watcb  the  floating  clouds. 

And  shape  to  Fancy’s  wild  similitudes 
Their  ever-varying  forms;  and  oh!  how  sweet, 

To  drive  my  flock  at  evening  to  the  fold. 

And  hasten  to  our  little  hut,  and  hear 

The  voice  of  kindness  bid  me  welcome  home.* 

The  only  foundation  for  the  story  told  by  the  Burgun- 
dian partisan  Monstrelet,  and  adopted  by  Hume,  of  Joan 
having  been  brought  up  as  a servant  is  the  circumstance 
of  her  having  been  once,  with  the  rest  of  her  family, 
obliged  to  take  refuge  in  an  auberge  in  Neufchateau  for 
fifteen  days,  when  a party  of  Burgundian  cavalry  made 
an  incursion  into  Domremy.  (See  the  “Quarterly  Re- 
view,” No.  138.) 


340 


JOAN  OF  ARC'S  VICTORY 


37‘2.  Thus,  from  infancy  to  girlhood,  Joan  had 
lieard  continually  of  the  woes  of  the  war,  and  had 
herself  witnessed  some  of  the  wretchedness  that  it 
caused.  A feeling  of  intense  patriotism  grew  in  her 
with  her  growth.  The  deliverance  of  France  from 
the  English  was  the  subject  6f  her  reveries  by  day 
and  dreams  by  night.  Blended  with  these  aspira- 
tions were  the  recollections  of  the  miraculous  inter- 
positions of  Heaven  in  favor  of  the  oppressed,  which 
she  had  learned  from  the  legends  of  her  Church.  Her 
faith  was  undoubting  ; her  prayers  were  fervent. 

She  feared  no  danger,  for  she  felt  no  sin,’^  and  at 
length  she  believed  herself  to  have  received  the 
supernatural  inspiration  hich  she  sought 

373.  According  to  her  own  narrative,  delivered  by 
her  to  her  merciless  inquisitors  in  time  of  her  captiv- 
ity and  approaching  death,  she  was  about  thirteen 
years  old  when  her  revelations  commenced.  Her 
own  words  describe  them  best.*  “At  the  age  ol 
thirteen,  a voice  from  God  came  to  her  to  help  her 
in  ruling  herself,  and  that  the  voice  came  to  her 
about  the  hour  of  noon,  in  summer  time,  while  she 
was  in  her  father’s  garden.  And  she  had  fasted  the 
day  before.  And  she  heard  the  voice  on  her  right,  in 
the  direction  of  the  church  ; and  when  she  heard  the 
voice,  she  saw  also  a bright  light.”  Afterward  St. 
Michael,  and  St.  Margaret,  and  St.  Catharine  appeared 
to  her.  They  were  always  in  a halo  of  glory ; she 
could  see  that  their  heads  were  crowned  with  jew- 
els ; and  she  heard  their  voices,  which  were  sweet 
* “Proces  de  Jeanne  d’Arc,”  vol.i.,  p.  53. 


AT  OELEANS. 


341 


and  mild.  She  did  not  distinguish  their  iirms  oi 
limbs.  She  heard  them  more  frequently  than  she 
saw  them ; and  the  usual  time  when  she  heard  them 
was  when  the  church  hells  were  sounding  for  prayer. 
And  if  she  was  in  the  woods  when  she  heard  them, 
she  could  plainly  distinguish  their  voices  drawing 
near  to  her.  When  she  thought  that  she  discerned 
the  Heavenly  Voices,  she  knelt  down,  and  bowed  her- 
self to  the  ground.  Their  presence  gladdened  her 
even  to  tears;  and  after  they  departed,  she  Avept  be- 
cause they  had  not  taken  her  with  them  back  to  Par- 
adise. They  always  spoke  soothingly  to  her.  They 
told  her  that  France  would  be  saved,  and  that  she 
was  to  save  it.  Such  were  the  visions  and  the  voices 
that  moved  the  spirit  of  the  girl  of  thirteen ; and  as 
she  grew  older,  they  became  more  frequent  and  more 
clear.  At  last  the  tidings  of  the  siege  of  Orleans 
reached  Homipemy.  Joan  heard  her  parents  and 
neighbors  talk  of  the  suiferings  of  its  population,  of 
the  ruin  which  its  capture  would  bring  on  their  law- 
ful sovereign,  and  of  the  distress  of  the  dauphin  and 
his  court.  Joan’s  heart  was  sorely  troubled  at  the 
thought  of  the  fate  of  Orleans  ; and  her  Voices  now 
ordered  her  to  leave  her  home  ; and  warned  her  that 
she  was  the  instrument  chosen  by  Heaven  for  driving 
away  the  English  from  that  city,  and  for  taking  the 
dauphin  to  be  anointed  king  at  Rheims.  At  length 
she  informed  her  parents  of  her  divine  mission,  and 
told  them  that  she  must  go  to  the  Sire  de  Baudri- 
court,  who  commanded  at  Vauconleurs,  and  Avho  was 
the  appointed  person  to  bring  her  into  the  presence 


342 


JOAN  OF  ABC^S  VICTORY 


of  the  king,  whom  she  was  to  save.  Neither  the  an- 
ger nor  the  grief  of  her  parents,  who  said  they  would 
rather  see  her  drowned  than  exposed  to  the  contami- 
nation of  the  camp,  could  move  her  from  her  purpose. 
One  of  her  uncles  consented  to  take  her  to  Vaucou- 
leurs,  where  De  Baudricourt  at  first  thought  her 
mad,  and  derided  her ; but  by  degrees  was  led  to  be- 
lieve, if  not  in  her  inspiration,  at  least  in  her  enthu- 
siasm, and  in  its  possible  utility  to  the  dauphin’s 
cause. 

374.  The  inhabitants  of  Vaucouleurs  were  com- 
pletely won  over  to  her  side  by  the  piety  and  devout- 
ness which  she  displayed,  and  by  her  firm  assurance 
in  the  truth  of  her  mission.  She  told  them  that  it 
was  God’s  will  that  she  should  go  to  the  king,  and 
that  no  one  but  her  could  save  the  kingdom  of  France. 
She  said  that  she  herself  would  rather  remain  with 
her  poor  mother,  and  spin  ; but  the  Lord  had  ordered 
her  forth.  The  fame  of  “ The  Maid,”  as  she  was 
termed,  the  renown  of  her  holiness,  and  of  her  mis- 
sion, spread  far  and  wide.  Baudricourt  sent  her  with 
an  escort  to  Chi  non?  where  Dauphin  Charles  was  dal- 
lying away  his  time.  Her  Voices  had  bidden  her 
assume  the  arms  and  apparel  of  a knight;  and  the 
wealthiest  inhabitants  of  Voucouleurs  had  vied  with 
each  other  in  equipping  her  with  war-horse,  armor, 
and  sword.  On  reaching  Chin  on,  she  was,  after  some 
delay,  admitted  into  the  presence  of  the  dauphin. 
Charles  designedly  dressed  himself  far  less  richly 
than  many  of  his  courtiers  were  appareled,  and  min- 
gled with  them,  when  Joan  was  introduced,  in  order 


AT  ORLEANS. 


343 


to  see  if  the  Holy  Maid  would  address  her  exhorta- 
tions to  the  wrong  person.  But  she  instantly  singled 
him  out,  and  kneeling  before  him,  said,^‘‘  Most  noble 
dauphin,  the  King  of  Heaven  announces  to  you  by 
me  that  you  shall  be  anointed  and  crowned  king  in 
the  city  of  Kheims,  and  that  you  shall  be  his  vice- 
gerent in  France.’’  His  features  may  probably  have 
been  seen  by  her  previously  in  portraits,  or  have  been 
described  to  her  by  others  ; but  she  herself  believed 
that  her  Voices  inspired  her  when  she  addressed  the 
king ; * and  the  report  soon  spread  abroad  that  the 
Holy  Maid  had  found  the  king  by  a miracle ; and 
this,  with  many  other  similar  rumors,  augmented 
the  renown  and  influence  that  she  now  rapidly  ac- 
quired. 

375.  The  state  of  public  feeling  in  France  was  now 
favorable  to  an  enthusiastic  belief  in  a divine  inter- 
position in  favor  of  the  party  that  had  hitherto  been 
unsuccessful  and  oppressed.  The  humiliations  which 
had  befallen  the  French  royal  family  and  nobility 
were  looked  on  as  the  just  judgments  of  God  upon 
them  for  their  vice  and  impiety.  The  misfortunes 
that  had  come  upon  France  as  a nation  were  believed 
to  have  been  drawn  down  by  national  sins.  The  Eng- 
lish, who  had  been  the  instruments  of  Heaven’s 
wrath  against  France,  seemed  now,  by  their  pride  and 
cruelty,  to  be  fitting  objects  of  it  themselves.  France 
in  that  age  was  a profoundly  religious  country. 
There  was  ignorance,  there  was  superstition,  there 
was  bigotry ; but  there  was  Faith — a faith  that  it- 

* “Proces  de  Jeanne  d’Arc,”  vol.  i.,  p 56. 


344 


JOAN  OF  ARaS  VICTORY 


self  worked  true  miracles,  even  while  it  believed  in 
unreal  ones.  At  this  time,  also,  one  of  those  devo- 
tional movements  began  among  the  clergy  in  France, 
which  from  time  to  time  occur  in  national  churches, 
without  it  being  possible  for  the  historian  to  assign 
any  adequate  human  cause  for  their  immediate  date 
or  extension.  Numberless  friars  and  priests  traversed 
the  rural  districts  and  towns  of  France,  preaching  to 
the  people  that  they  must  seek  from  Heaven  a deliv- 
erance from  the  pillages  of  the  soldiery  and  the  inso- 
lence of  the  foreign  oppressors.*  The  idea  of  a Provi- 
dence that  works  only  by  general  laws  was  wholly 
alien  to  the  feelings  of  the  age.  Every  political  event, 
as  well  as  every  natural  phsenomenon,  was  believed 
to  be  the  immediate  result  of  a special  mandate  of 
God.  This  led  to  the  belief  that  His  holy  angels  and 
saints  were  constantly  employed  in  executing  his 
commands  and  mingling  in  the  affairs  of  men.  The 
Church  encouraged  these  feelings,  and  at  the  same 
time  sanctioned  the  concurrent  popular  belief  that 
hosts  of  evil  spirits  were  also  ever  actively  interpos- 
ing in  the  current  of  earthly  events,  with  whom  sor- 
cerers and  wizards  could  league  themselves,  and  there- 
by obtain  the  excercise  of  supernatural  power. 

376.  Thus  all  things  favored  the  influence  which 
Joan  obtained  both  over  friends  and  foes.  The  French 
nation,  as  well  as  the  English  and  the  Burgundians, 
readily  admitted  that  superhuman  beings  inspired 
her ; the  only  question  was  whether  these  beings 
were  g^od  or  evil  angels ; whether  she  brought  with 

^ See  Sismondi.vol.  xiii„p.  114;  Michelet,  vol,v.,  livre  x. 


AT  ORLEANS, 


345 


her  “ airs  from  heaven  or  blasts  from  hell.”  This 
question  seemed  to  her  countrymen  to  be  decisively 
settled  in  her  favor  by  the  austere  sanctity  of  her 
life,  by  the  holiness  of  her  conversation,  but  still 
more  by  her  exemplary  attention  to  all  the  services 
and  rites  of  the  Church.  The  dauphin  at  first  feared 
the  injury  that  might  be  done  to  his  cause  if  he  laid 
himself  open  to  the  charge  of  having  leagued  him- 
self with  a sorceress.  Every  imaginable  test,  there- 
fore, was  resorted  to  in  order  to  set  Joan’s  orthodoxy 
and  purity  beyond  suspicion.  At  last  Charles  and 
his  advisers  felt  safe  in  accepting  her  services  as  those 
of  a true  and  virtuous  Christian  daughter  of  the  Holy 
Church. 

377.  It  is  indeed  probable  that  Charles  himself  and 
some  of  his  counselors  may  have  suspected  Joan  of 
being  a mere  enthusiast,  and  it  is  certain  that  Dunois, 
and  others  of  the  best  generals,  took  considerable 
latitude  in  obeying  or  deviating  from  the  military 
orders  that  she  gave.  But  over  the  mass  of  the  peo- 
ple and  the  soldiery  her  influence  was  unbounded. 
While  Charles  and  his  doctors  of  theology,  and  court 
ladies,  had  been  deliberating  as  to  recognizing  or  dis- 
missing the  Maid,  a considerable  period  had  passed 
away,  during  which  a small  army,  the  last  gleanings, 
as  it  seemed,  of  the  English  sword,  had  been  assem- 
bled at  Blois,  under  Dunois,  La  Hire,  Xaintrailles, 
and  other  chiefs,  who  to  their  natural  valor  were 
now  beginning  to  unite  the  wisdom  that  is  taught  by 
misfortune.  It  was  resolved  to  send  Joan  with  this 
force  and  a convoy  of  provisions  to  Orleans.  The 


346 


JOAN  OF  ARCS  VICTORY 


distress  of  that  city  had  now  become  urgent.  But 
the  communication  with  the  open  country  was  not 
entirely  cut  off:  the  Orleannais  had  heard  of  the 
Holy  Maid  whom  Providence  had  raised  up  for  their 
deliverance,  and  their  messengers  earnestly  implored 
the  dauphin  to  send  her  to  them  without  delay. 

378.  Joan  appeared  at  the  camp  at  Blois,  clad  in  a 
new  suit  of  brilliant  white  armor,  mounted  on  a stately 
black  war-horse,  and  with  a lance  in  her  right  hand, 
which  she  had  learned  to  wield  with  skill  and  grace.* 
Her  head  was  unhelmeted ; so  that  all  could  behold 
her  fair  and  expressive  features,  her  deep-set  and 
earnest  eyes,  and  her  long  black  hair,  which  was 
parted  across  her  forehead,  and  bound  by  a ribbon 
behind  her  back.  She  wore  at  her  side  a small  bat- 
tle-ax, and  the  consecrated  sword,  marked  on  the 
blade  with  five  crosses,  which  had  at  her  bidding 
been  taken  for  her  from  the  shrine  of  St.  Catharine 
at  Fierbois.  A page  carried  her  banner,  which  she 
had  caused  to  be  made  and  embroidered  as  her  Voices 
enjoined.  It  was  white  satin,f  strewn  with  fleurs- 
de-lis;  and  on  it  were  the  words  “ Jhesus  Maria,” 
an4  the  representation  of  the  Saviour  in  his  glory. 
Joan  afterward  generally  bore  her  banner  herself  in 
battle ; she  said  that  though  she  loved  her  sword 
much,  she  loved  her  banner  forty  times  as  much ; 

* See  the  description  of  her  by  Gui  de  Laval,  quoted, 
in  the  note  to  Michelet,  p.  69;  and  seethe  account  of  the 
banner  at  Orleans,  which  is  believed  to  bear  an  authentic 
portrait  of  the  Maid,  in  Murray’s  “Hand-book  for  France,” 
p.  175. 

t “Proces  de  Jeanne  d’Arc,”  vol,  i , p.  238. 


AT  ORLEANS. 


347 


and  she  loved  to  carry  it,  because  it  could  not  kill 
any  one. 

379.  Thus  accoutered,  she  came  to  lead  the  troops  of 
France,  who  looked  with  soldierly  admiration  on  her 
well-proportioned  and  upright  figure,  the  skill  with 
which  she  managed  her  war-horse,  and  the  easy  grace 
with  which  she  handled  her  weapons.  Her  military 
education  had  been  short,  but  she  had  availed  her- 
self of  it  well.  She  had  also  the  good  sense  to  inter- 
fere little  with  the  maneuvers  of  the  troops,  leaving 
these  things  to  Dunois,  and  others  whom  she  had  the 
discernment  to  recognize  as  the  best  officers  in  the 
camp.  Her  tactics  in  action  were  simple  enough.  As 
she  herself  described  it,  “ I used  to  say  to  them,  ‘ Go 
boldly  in  among  the  English,’ and  then  I use  to  go 
boldly  in  myself.”*  Such,  as  she  told  her  inquisitors^ 
was  the  only  spell  she  used,  and  it  was  one  of  power. 
But  while  interfering  little  with  the  military  discip- 
line of  the  troops,  in  all  matters  of  moral  discipline 
she  was  inflexibly  strict.  All  the  abandoned  follow- 
ers of  the  camp  were  driven  away.  She  compelled 
both  generals  and  soldiers  to  attend  regularly  at  con- 
fessional. Her  chaplain  and  other  priests  marched 
with  the  army  under  her  orders ; and  at  every  halt, 
an  altar  was  set  up  and  the  sacrament  administered. 
No  oath  or  foul  language  passed  without  punishment 
or  censure.  Even  the  roughest  and  most  hardened 
veterans  obeyed  her.  They  put  off  for  a time  the 
bestial  coarseness  which  had  grown  on  them  during  a 
life  of  bloodshed  and  rapine;  they  felt  that  111  y 


* Id.  ib. 


348 


JOAN  OF  ARCS  VICTORY 


must  go  forth  in  a new  spirit  to  a new  career,  and 
acknowledged  the  beauty  of  the  holiness  in  which 
the  heaven-sent  Maid  was  leading  them  to  certain 
victory. 

380.  Joan  marched  from  Blois  on  the  25th  of  April 
with  a convoy  of  provisions  for  Orleans,  accomi)anied 
by  Dunois,  La  Hire,  and  the  other  chief  captains  ot 
the  French,  and  on  the  evening  of  the  28th  they 
approached  the  town.  In  the  words  of  the  old 
chronicler  Hall  :*  “ The  Englishmen,  perceiving  that 
thei  within  could  not  long  continue  for  faute  ot 
vitaile  and  ponder,  kepte  not  their  watche  so  dili- 
gently as  thei  were  accustomed,  nor  scoured  now  the 
countrey  environed  as  thei  before  had  ordained. 
Whiche  negligence  the  citizens  shut  in  perceiving, 
sent  worde  thereof  to  the  French  captaines,  which, 
with  Pucelle,  in  the  dedde  tyme  of  the  nighte,  and 
in  a greate  rayne  and  thundere,  with  all  their  vitaile 
and  artillery,  entered  into  the  citie.” 

381.  When  it  was  day,  the  Maid  rode  in  solemn 
procession  through  the  city,  clad  in  complete  armor, 
and  mounted  on  a white  horse.  Dunois  was  by  her 
side,  and  all  the  bravest  knights  of  her  army  and  of 
the  garrison  followed  in  her  train.  The  whole  popu- 
lation thronged  around  her ; and  men,  women,  and 
children  strove  to  touch  her  garments,  or  her  ban- 
ner, or  her  charger.  They  poured  forth  blessings  on 
her,  whom  they  already  considered  their  deliverer. 
In  the  words  used  by  two  of  them  afterward  before 
the  tribunal  which  reversed  the  sentence,  but  could 


* Hall,  f.  137. 


AT  ORLEANS. 


349 


not  restore  the  life  of  the  Virgin- martyr  of  France, 
“the  people  of  Orleans,  when  they  first  saw  her  in 
their  city,  thought  that  it  was  an  angel  from  heaven 
that  had  come  down  to  save  them,”  Joan  spoke 
gently  in  reply  to  their  acclamations  and  addresses. 
She  told  them  to  fear  God,  and  trust  in  Him  for 
safety  from  the  fury  of  their  enemies.  She  first  went 
to  the  principal  church,  where  Te  Deum  was  chanted  ; 
and  then  she  took  up  her  abode  at  the  house  of 
J acques  Bonrgier,  one  of  the  principal  citizens,  and 
whose  wife  was  a matron  of  good  repute.  She  re- 
fused to  attend  a splendid  banquet  which  had  been 
provided  for  her,  and  passed  nearly  all  her  time  in 
prayer. 

382.  When  it  was  known  by  the  English  that  the 
Maid  was  in  Orleans,  their  minds  were  not  less  occu- 
pied about  her  than  were  the  minds  of  those  in  the 
city ; but  it  was  in  a very  different  spirit.  The  Eng- 
lish believed  in  her  supernatural  mission  as  firmly 
as  the  French  did,  but  they  thought  her  a sorceress 
who  had  come  to  overthrow  them  by  her  enchant- 
ments. An  old  prophecy,  which  told  that  a damsel 
from  Lorraine  was  to  save  France,  had  long  been 
current,  and  it  was  known  and  applied  to  Joan  by 
foreigners  as  well  as  by  the  natives.  For  months  the 
English  had  heard  of  the  coming  Maid,  and  the  tales 
of  miracles  which  she  was  said  to  have  wrought  had 
been  listened  to  by  the  rough  yeomen  of  the  English 
camp  with  anxious  curiosity  and  secret  awe.  She 
had  sent  a herald  to  the  English  generals  before  she 
marched  for  Orleans,  and  he  had  summoned  the  Eng- 


350 


JOAN  OF  ABCS  VICTORY 


lish  generals  in  the  name  of  the  Most  High  to  give 
up  to  the  Maid,  who  was  sent  by  Heaven,  the  keys 
of  the  French  cities  which  they  had  wrongfully 
taken;  and  he  also  solemnly  adjured  the  English 
troops,  whether  archers,  or  men  of  the  companies  of 
war,  or  gentlemen,  or  others,  who  were  before  the 
city  of  Orleans,  to  depart  thence  to  their  homes, 
under  peril  of  being  visited  by  the  judgment  of  God. 
On  her  arrival  in  Orleans,  Joan  sent  another  similar 
message ; but  the  English  scoffed  at  her  from  their 
towers,  and  threatened  to  burn  her  heralds.  She  de- 
termined before  she  shed  the  blood  of  the  besiegers, 
to  repeat  the  warning  with  her  own  voice ; and  ac- 
cording, she  mounted  one  of  the  boulevards  of  the 
town,  which  was  within  hearing  of  the  Tourelles, 
and  thence  she  spoke  to  the  English,  and  bade  them 
depart,  otherwise  they  would  meet  with  shame  and 
woe.  Sir  William  Gladsdale  (whom  the  French  call 
Glacidas)  commanded  the  English  post  at  the  Tour- 
elles, and  he  and  another  English  officer  replied  by 
bidding  her  go  home  and  keep  her  cows,  and  by  rib- 
ald jests,  that  brought  tears  of  shame  and  indigna- 
tion into  her  eyes.  But,  though  the  English  leaders 
vaunted  aloud,  the  effect  produced  on  their  army  by 
Joan’s  presence  in  Orleans  was  proved  four  days 
after  her  arrival,  when,  on  the  approach  of  re-enforce- 
ments and  stores  to  the  town,  Joan  and  La  Hire 
marched  out  to  meet  them,  and  escorted  the  long 
train  of  provision  wagons  safely  into  Orleans,  be- 
tween the  bastilles  of  the  English,  who  cowered  be- 
hind their  walls  instead  of  charging  fiercely  and 


AT  ORLEANS, 


351 


fearlessly,  as  had  been  their  wont,  on  any  French 
band  that  dared  to  show  itself  within  reach, 

383.  Thus  far  she  had  prevailed  without  striking  a 
blow ; but  the  time  was  now  come  to  test  her  cour- 
age amid  the  horrors  of  actual  slaughter.  On  the 
afternoon  of  the  day  on  which  she  had  escorted  the 
re-enforcements  into  the  city,  while  she  was  resting 
fatigued  at  home,  Dunois  had  seized  an  advantageous 
opportunity  of  attacking  the  English  bastille  of  St. 
Loup,  and  a fierce  assault  of  the  Orleannais  had  been 
made  on  it,  which  the  English  garrison  of  the  fort 
stubbornly  resisted.  Joan  was  roused  by  a sound 
which  she  believed  to  be  that  of  her  Heavenly 
Voices;  she  called  for  her  arms  and  horse,  and, 
quickly  equipping  herself,  she  mounted  to  ride  olf  to 
where  the  fight  was  raging.  In  her  haste  she  had 
forgotten  her  banner ; she  rode  back,  and,  without 
dismounting,  had  it  given  to  her  from  the  window, 
and  then  she  galloped  to  the  gate  whence  the  sally 
had  been  made.  On  her  way  she  met  some  of  the 
wounded  French  who  had  been  carried  back  from 
the  fight.  “ Ha  !”  she  exclaimed,  “ I never  can  see 
French  blood  fiow  without  my  hair  standing  on 
end.”  She  rode  out  of  the  gate,  and  met  the  tide  of 
her  countrymen,  who  had  been  repulsed  from  the 
English  fort,  and  were  flying  back  to  Orleans  in  con- 
fusion. At  the  sight  of  the  Holy  Maid  and  her  ban- 
ner they  rallied,  and  renewed  the  assault.  Joan 
rode  forward  at  their  head,  waving  her  banner  and 
cheering  them  on.  The  English  quailed  at  what 
they  believed  to  be  the  charge  of  hell ; Saint  Loup 


JOAN  OF  ABC'S  VICTORY 


352 

was  stormed,  and  its  defenders  put  to  the  sword,  ex- 
cept some  few,  whom  Joan  succeeded  in  saving.  All 
her  woman’s  gentleness  returned  when  the  combat 
was  over.  It  was  the  first  time  that  she  had  ever 
seen  a battle-field.  She  wept  at  the  sight  of  so 
many  bleeding  corpses ; and  her  tears  fiowed  doubly 
when  she  refiected  that  they  were  the  bodies  of 
Christian  men  who  had  died  without  confession. 

384.  The  next  day  was  Ascension  day,  and  it  was 
passed  by  Joan  in  prayer.  But  on  the  following 
morrow  it  was  resolved  by  the  chiefs  of  the  garrison 
to  attack  the  English  forts  on  the  south  of  the  river. 
For  this  purpose  they  crossed  the  river  in  boats,  and 
after  some  severe  fighting,  in  which  the  Maid  was 
wounded  in  the  heel,  both  the  English  bastilles  of 
the  Augustins  and  St.  Jean  de  Blanc  were  captured. 
The  Tourelles  were  now  the  only  post  which  the  be- 
siegers held  on  the  south  of  the  river.  But  that 
post  was  formidably  strong,  and  by  its  command  of 
the  bridge,  it  was  the  key  to  the  deliverance  of  Or- 
leans. It  was  known  that  a fresh  English  army  was 
approaching  under  Fastolfe  to  re-enforce  the  besieg- 
ers, and  should  that  army  arrive  while  the  Tourelles 
were  yet  in  the  possession  of  their  comrades,  there 
was  great  peril  of  all  the  advantages  which  the 
French  had  gained  being  nullified,  and  of  the  siege 
being  again  actively  carried  on. 

385.  It  was  resolved,  therefore,  by  the  French  to 
assail  the  Tourelles  at  once,  while  the  enthusiasm 
which  the  presence  and  the  heroic  valor  of  the  Maid 
had  created  was  at  its  height.  But  the  enterprise 


AT  OELEAm 


was  difficult.  The  rampart  of  the  tete-du-i)ont,  or 
landward  bulwark,  of  the  Tourelles  was  steep  and 
high,  and  Sir  John  Gladsdale  occupied  this  all-im- 
portant fort  with  five  hundred  archers  and  men-at- 
arms,  who  were  the  very  flower  of  the  English 
army. 

386.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the  seventh  of  May, 
some  thousands  of  the  best  French  troops  in  Orleans 
heard  mass  and  attended  the  confessional  by  Joan’s 
orders,  and  then  crossing  the  river  in  boats,  as  on 
the  preceding  day,  they  assailed  the  bulwark  of  the 
Tourelles  “ with  light  hearts  and  heavy  hands.”  But 
Gladsdale’s  men,  encouraged  by  their  bold  and  skill- 
ful leader,  made  a resolute  and  able  defense.  The 
Maid  planted  her  banner  on  the  edge  of  the  fosse, 
and  then  springing  down  into  the  ditch,  she  placed 
the  first  ladder  against  the  wall,  and  began  to 
mount.  An  English  archer  sent  an  arrow  at  her, 
which  pierced  her  corslet,  and  wounded  her  severely 
between  the  neck  and  shoulder.  She  fell  bleeding 
from  the  ladder ; and  the  English  were  leaping 
down  from  the  wall  to  capture  her,  but  her  followers 
bore  her  off.  She  was  carried  to  the  rear,  and  laid 
upon  the  grass ; her  armor  was  taken  off,  and  the 
anguish  of  her  wound  and  the  sight  of  her  blood 
made  her  at  first  tremble  and  weep.  But  her  confi- 
dence in  her  celestial  mission  soon  returned:  her 
patron  saints  seemed  to  stand  before  her,  and  reas- 
sure her.  She  sat  up  and  drew  the  arrow  out  with 
her  own  hands.  Some  of  the  soldiers  who  stood  by 
wished  to  stanch  the  blood  by  saying  a charm  over 


354 


JOAN  OF  AEC^S  VICTORY 


the  wound ; but  she  forbade  them,  saying  that  she 
did  not  wish  to  be  cured  by  unhallowed  means.  She 
had  the  wound  dressed  with  a little  oil,  and  then 
bidding  her  confessor  come  to  her,  she  betook  her- 
self to  prayer. 

387.  In  the  mean  while,  the  English  in  the  bulwark 
of  the  Tourelles  had  repulsed  the  oft-renewed  efforts 
of  the  French  to  scale  the  wall.  Dunois,  who  com- 
manded the  assailants,  was  at  last  discouraged,  and 
gave  orders  for  a retreat  to  be  sounded.  Joan  sent 
for  him  and  the  other  generals,  and  implored  them 
not  to  despair,  “ By  my  God,’^  she  said  to  them, 
“ you  shall  soon  enter  in  there.  Do  not  doubt  it. 
When  you  see  my  banner  wave  again  up  to  the  wall, 
to  your  arms  again ! the  fort  is  yours.  For  the  pre- 
sent, rest  a little,  and  take  some  food  and  drink. 

“ They  did  so,”  says  the  old  chronicler  of  the  siege,* 
“ for  they  obeyed  her  marvelously.”  The  faintness 
caused  by  her  wound  had  now  passed  off,  and  she 
headed  the  French  in  another  rush  against  the  bul- 
wark. The  English,  who  had  thought  her  slain, 
were  alarmed  at  her  reappearance,  while  the  French 
pressed  furiously  and  fanatically  forward.  A Bis- 
cayan soldier  was  carrying  Joan’s  banner.  She  had 
told  the  troops  that  directly  the  banner  touched  the 
wall,  they  should  enter.  The  Biscayan  waved  the 
banner  forward  from  the  edge  of  the  fosse,  and 
touched  the  wall  with  it ; and  then  all  the  French 
host  swarmed  madly  up  the  ladders  that  now  were 
raised  in  all  directions  against  the  English  fort.  At 
* “ Journal  du  Siege  d’Orleaus,”  p.  87. 


AT  ORLEANS. 


355 


this  crisis,  the  eiForts  of  the  English  garrison  were 
distracted  by  an  attack  from  another  quarter.  The 
French  troops  who  had  been  left  in  Orleans  had 
placed  some  planks  over  the  broken  arch  of  the 
bridge,  and  advanced  across  them  to  the  assault  of 
the  Tourelles  on  the  northern  side.  Gladsdale  re- 
solved to  withdraw  his  men  from  the  landward  bul- 
wark, and  concentrate  his  whole  force  in  the  Tour- 
elles themselves.  He  was  passing  for  this  purpose 
across  the  draw-bridge  that  connected  the  Tourelles 
and  the  tete-du-pont,  when  Joan,  who  by  this  time 
had  scaled  the  wall  of  the  bulwark,  called  out  to  him, 
“ Surrender ! surrender  to  the  King  of  Heaven ! Ah, 
Glacidas,  you  have  foully  wronged  me  with  your 
words,  but  I have  great  pity  on  your  soul  and  the 
souls  of  your  men.”  The  Englishruan,  disdainful  of 
her  summons,  was  striding  on  across  the  draw-bridge, 
when  a cannon  shot  from  the  town  carried  it  away, 
and  Gladsdale  perished  in  the  water  that  ran  beneath. 
After  his  fall,  the  remnant  of  the  English  abandoned 
all  farther  resistance.  Three  hundred  of  them  had 
been  killed  in  the  battle,  and  two  hundred  were  made 
prisoners. 

388.  The  broken  arch  was  speedily  repaired  by  the 
exulting  Orleannais,  and  Joan  made  her  triumphal 
re-entry  into  the  city  by  the  bridge  that  had  so  long 
been  closed.  Every  church  in  Orleans  rang  out  its 
gratulating  peal;  and  throughout  the  night,  the 
sounds  of  rejoicing  fechoed,  and  the  bonfires  blazed 
up  from  the  city.  But  in  the  lines  and  forts  which 
the  besiegers  yet  retained  on  the  northern  shore,  there 


vz 


JOAN  OF  AJIC\S  VJCTOEY 


was  anxious  watching  of  the  generals,  and  there  was 
desponding  gloom  among  the  soldiery.  Even  Talbot 
now  counseled  retreat.  On  the  following  morning, 
the  Orleannais,  from  their  walls,  saw  the  great  forts 
called  “ London  ” and  “ St.  Lawrence  ” in  flames,  and 
witnessed  their  invaders  busy  in  destroying  the  stores 
and  munitions  which  had  been  relied  on  for  the  de- 
struction of  Orleans.  Slowly  and  sullenly  the  English 
army  retired;  and  not  before  it  had  drawn  up  in 
battle  array  opposite  to  the  city,  as  if  to  challeng(‘ 
the  garrison  to  an  encounter.  The  French  troops 
were  eager  to  go  out  and  attack,  but  Joan  forbade  it. 
The  day  was  Sunday.  “ In  the  name  of  God,”  she 
said,  “ let  them  depart,  and  let  us  return  thanks  to 
God.”  She  led  the  soldiers  and  citizens  forth  from 
Orleans,  but  not  for  the  shedding  of  blood.  They 
passed  in  solemn  procession  round  the  city  walls,  and 
then,  while  their  retiring  enemies  were  yet  in  sight, 
they  knelt  in  thanksgiving  to  God  for  the  deliver- 
ance which  he  had  vouchsafed  them 

389.  Within  three  months  from  the  time  of  her 
first  interview  with  the  dauphin,  Joan  had  fulfllled 
the  first  part  of  her  promise,  the  raising  of  the  siege 
of  Orleans.  Within  three  months  more  she  had  ful- 
filled the  second  part  also,  and  had  stood  with  her 
banner  in  her  hand  by  the  high  altar  at  Kheims, 
while  he  was  anointed  and  crowned  as  King  Charles 
VII.  of  France.  In  the  interval  she  had  taken  Jar- 
geau,  Troyes,  and  other  strong  places,  and  she  had 
defeated  an  English  army  in  a fair  field  at  Patay. 
The  enthusiasm  of  her  countrymen  knew  no  bounds ; 


AT  ORLEANS 


357 


but  the  importance  of  her  services,  and  especially  of 
her  primary  achievement  at  Orleans,  may  perhaps 
be  ])est  proved  by  the  testimony  of  her  enemies. 
There  is  extant  ^ fragment  of  a letter  from  the  Re- 
gent Bedford  to  his  royal  nephew,  Henry  VI.,  in 
which  he  bewails  the  turn  that  the  war  has  taken, 
and  especially  attributes  it  to  the  raising  of  the  siege 
of  Orleans  by  Joan.  Bedford’s  own  words,  which  are 
preserved  in  Rymer,*  are  as  follows : 

390.  “ And  alle  thing  there  prospered  for  you  til 
the  tyme  of  the  Siege  of  Orleans  taken  in  hand  God 
knoweth  by  what  advis. 

“ At  the  whiche  tyme,  after  the  adventure  fallen 
to  the  persone  of  my  cousin  of  Salisbury,  whom  God 
assoille,  there  felle,  by  the  hand  of  God  as  it  seemeth, 
a great  strook  upon  your  peuple  that  was  assembled 
there  in  grete  nombre,  caused  in  grete  partie,  as  y 
trowe,  of  lakke  of  sadde  beleve,  and  of  unlevefulle 
doubte,  that  thei  hadde  of  a deciple  and  lyme  of  the 
Feende,  called  the  Pucelle,  that  used  fals  enchant- 
ments and  sorcerie. 

“ The  whiche  strooke  and  discomfiture  nott  oonly 
lessed  in  grete  partie  the  nombre  of  your  peuple 
there,  but  as  well  withdrewe  the  courage  of  the 
remenant  in  merveillous  wyse,  and  couraiged  your 
adverse  partie  and  ennemys  to  assemble  them  forth- 
with in  grete  nombre.” 

391.  When  Charles  had  been  anointed  King  of 
France,  Joan  believed  that  her  mission  was  accom- 


* Vol.  X.,  p.  408. 


358 


JOAN  OF  ARCS  VICTORY 


plished.  And,  in  truth,  the  deliverance  of  France 
from  the  English,  though  not  completed  for  many 
years  afterward,  was  then  insured.  The  ceremony 
of  a royal  coronation  and  anointment  was  not  in 
those  days  regarded  as  a mere  costly  formality.  It 
was  believed  to  confer  the  sanction  and  the  grace  of 
Heaven  upon  the  prince,  who  had  previously  ruled 
with  mere  human  authority.  Thenceforth  he  was 
the  Lord’s  Anointed.  Moreover,  one  of  the  dilBdcul- 
ties  that  had  previously  lain  in  the  way  of  many 
Frenchmen  when  called  on  to  support  Charles  VII. 
was  now  removed.  He  had  been  publicly  stigma- 
tized, even  by  his  own  parents,  as  no  true  son  of  the 
royal  race  of  France.  The  queen -mother,  the  English 
and  the  partisans  of  Burgundy  called  him  the  “ Pre- 
tender to  the  title  of  Dauphin but  those  who  had 
been  led  to  doubt  his  legitimacy  were  cured  of  their 
skeptici‘5m  by  the  victories  of  the  Holy  Maid,  and  by 
the  fulfillment  of  her  pledges.  They  thought  that 
Heaven  had  now  declared  itself  in  favor  of  Charles  as 
the  true  heir  of  the  crown  of  St.  Louis,  and  the  tales 
about  his  being  spurious  were  thenceforth  regarded 
as  mere  English  calumnies.  With  this  strong  tide 
of  national  feeling  in  his  favor,  with  victorious  gen- 
erals and  soldiers  round  him,  and  a dispirited  and 
divided  enemy  before  him,  he  could  not  fail  to  con- 
quer, though  his  own  imprudence  and  misconduct, 
and  the  stubborn  valor  which  the  English  still  from 
time  to  time  displayed,  prolonged  the  war  in  France 
until  the  civil  war  of  the  Roses  broke  out  in  England, 
.and  left  France  to  peace  and  repose. 


AT  ORLEANS, 


359 


392.  Joan  knelt  before  the  Prench  king  in  the 
cathedral  of  Rheims,  and  shed  tears  of  joy.  She 
said  that  she  had  then  fulfilled  the  work  which  the 
Lord  had  commanded  her.  The  young  girl  now 
asked  for  her  dismissal.  She  wished  to  return  to 
her  peasant  home,  to  tend  her  parents’  flocks  again, 
and  live  at  her  own  will  in  her  native  village.*  She 
had  always  believed  that  her  career  would  be  a short 
one.  But  Charles  and  his  captains  were  loath  to 
lose  the  presence  of  one  who  had  such  an  influence 
upon  the  soldiery  and  the  people.  They  persuaded 
her  to  stay  with  the  army.  She  still  showed  the 
same  bravery~  and  zeal  for  the  cause  of  France.  She 
still  was  as  fervent  as  before  in  her  prayers,  and  as  ex- 
emplary in  all  religious  duties.  She  still  heard  her 
Heavenly  Voices,  but  she  now  no  longer  thought  her- 
self the  appointed  minister  of  Heaven  to  lead  her 
countrymen  to  certain  victory.  Our  admiration  for 
her  courage  and  patriotism  ought  to  be  increased 
a hundred  fold  by  her  conduct  throughout  the  latter 
part  of  her  career,  amid  dangers,  against  which  she 
no  longer  believed  herself  to  be  divinely  secured. 
Indeed,  she  believed  herself  doomed  to  perish  in  a lit- 
tle more  than  a year  ;f  but  she  still  fought  on  as  reso- 
lutely, if  not  as  exultingly  as  ever. 

393.  As  in  the  case  of  Arminius,  tne  interest  at- 
tached to  individual  heroism  and  virtue  makes  us 

* “ Je  voudrais  bien  qu’il  voulut  me  faire  ramener 
aupres  mes  pere  et  mere,  a g;arder  leurs  brebis  et  betail, 
et  faire  ce  que  je  voadrois  faire.” 

+ “Des  le  commencement  elle  avait  dit,  *11  me  faut  em- 
ployer: je  ne  durerai  qu’un  an,  on  guere  glus.’  ’’—Miche- 
let, V.,  p.  101. 


360 


JOAN  OF  ABCS  VICTORY 


trace  the  fate  of  Joan  of  Arc  after  she  had  saved  her 
country.  She  served  vsrell  with  Charles’s  army  in  the 
capture  of  Laon,  Soissons,  Compiegne,  Beauvais,  and 
other  strong  places  ; but  in  a premature  attack  on  Par- 
is, in  September,  1429,  the  French  were  repulsed,  and 
Joan  was  severely  wounded.  In  the  winter  she  was 
again  in  the  field  with  some  of  the  French  troops ; 
and  in  the  following  spring  she  threw  herself  into  the 
fortress  of  Compiegne,  which  she  had  herself  won  for 
the  French  king  in  the  preceding  autumn,  and  which 
was  now  besieged  by  a strong  Burgundian  force. 

394.  She  was  taken  prisoner  in  a sally  from  Com- 
piegne,  on  the  24th  of  May,  and  was  imprisoned  by 
the  Burgundians  first  at  Arras,  and  then  at  a place 
called  Crotoy,  on  the  Flemish  coast,  until  November, 
when,  for  payment  of  a large  sum  of  money,  she  was 
given  up  to  the  English,  and  taken  to  Rouen,  which 
then  was  their  main  stronghold  in  France. 

“Sorrow it  were,  and  shame  to  tell. 

The  butchery  that  there  befell.” 

And  the  revolting  details  of  the  cruelties  practiced 
upon  this  young  girl  maybe  left  to  those  whose  du- 
ty, as  avowed  biographers,  it  is  to  describe  them.* 
She  was  tried  before  an  ecclesiastical  tribunal  on  the 
charge  of  witchcraft,  and  on  the  30th  of  May,  1431, 

* The  whole  of  the  “Proces  de  Condemnation  et  de  Re- 
habilitation de  Jeanne  B'Arc”  has  been  published  in  five 
volumes,  by  the  Societe  de  L’Historie  de  France.  All  the 
passag-es  from  contemporary  chroniclers  and  poets  are 
added;  and  the  most  ample  materials  are  thus  given  for 
acquiring’ full  information  on  a subject  which  is.  to  an 
Englishman,  one  of  painful  interest  There  is  an  admir- 
able essay  on  Joan  of  Arc  in  the  138th  number  of  the 
” Quarterly.” 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


361 


she  was  burned  alive  in  the  market-place  at  Eouen. 

I will  add  but  one  remark  on  the  character  of  the 
truest  heroine  that  the  world  has  ever  seen. 

395.  If  any  person  can  be  found  in  the  present  age 
who  would  join  in  the  scoffs  of  Voltaire  against  the 
Maid  of  Orleans  and  the  Heavenly  Voices  by  which 
she  believed  herself  inspired,  let  him  read  the  life  of 
the  wisest  and  best  man  that  the  heathen  nations  pro- 
duced. Let  him  read  of  the  Heavenly  Voice  by  which 
Socrates  believed  himself  to  be  constantly  attended  ; 
which  cautioned  him  on  his  way  from  the  field  of 
battle  at  Helium,  and  which,  from  his  boyhood  to  the 
time  of  his  death,  visited  him  with  unearthly  warn- 
ings.! Let  the  modern  reader  reflect  upon  this ; and 
then,  unless  he  is  prepared  to  term  Socrates  either 
fool  or  imposter,  let  him  not  dare  to  deride  or  vilify 
Joan  of  Arc. 


Synopsis  of  Events  between  Joan  of  Akc^s 
ViCTOEY  AT  OELEANS,  A.  D.  1429,  AND  THE 
Defeat  of  the  Spanish  Aemada,  A.  D.  1588. 

A.  D.  1452.  Final  expulsion  of  the  English  from 
France. 

1453.  Constantinople  taken,  and  the  Roman  em- 
pire of  the  East  destroyed  by  the  Turkish  Sultan 
Mohammed  IL 

+See  Cicero,  de  Divinatione,  lib.  i.,  sec. 41;  and  see  the 
words  of  Socrates  himself,  in  Plato,  Apol.  Soc. : 'On  /ixo^ 

9el6v  Ti  Kal  SaLfjLovtov  yiyverai.  ’E/xot  fie  tout’  ecTTtu  e/c  Traifib? 
ap$dixevov,  (fnovij  Tt?  yiyyofievrj,  k.  t.  A. 


362 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS, 


1455.  Commencement  of  the  civil  wars  in  England 
between  the  houses  of  York  and  Lancester. 

1479.  Union  of  the  Christian  kingdoms  of  Spain 
under  Ferdinand  and  Isabella. 

1492.  Capture  of  Grenada  by  Ferdinand  and  Isa- 
bella, and  end  of  the  Moorish  dominion  in  Spain. 

1492.  Columbus  discovers  the  New  World. 

1494,  Charles  VIII.  of  France  invades  Italy. 

1497.  Expedition  of  Vasco  di  Gama  to  the  East 
Indies  round  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope. 

1503.  Naples  conquered  from  the  French  by  the 
great  Spanish  general,  Gonsalvo  of  Cordova. 

1508.  League  of  Cambray  by  the  pope,  the  emper- 
or, and  the  King  of  France  against  Venice. 

1509.  Albuquerque  establishes  'the  empire  of  the 
Portuguese  in  the  East  Indies. 

1516.  Death  of  Ferdinand  of  Spain ; he  is  succeeded 
by  his  grandson  Charles,  afterward  the  Emperor 
Charles  V. 

1517.  Dispute  between  Luther  and  Tetzel  respect- 
ing the  sale  of  indulgences,  which  leads  to  the  refor- 
mation. 

1519.  Charles  V.  is  elected  Emperor  of  Germany. 

1520.  Cortez  conquers  Mexico. 

1525.  Francis  First  of  Spain  defeated  and  taken 
prisoner  by  the  imperial  army  at  Pavia. 

1529.  League  of  Smalcald  formed  by  the  Protes- 
tant princes  of  Germany. 

1533.  Henry  VIII.  renounces  the  papal  supremacy. 

1533.  Pizarro  conquers  Peru. 

1556.  Abdication  of  the  Emperor  Charles  V.,  Phil- 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


365 


ip  II.  becomes  King  of  Spain,  and  Ferdinand  I.  Em- 
peror of  Germany. 

1557.  Elizabeth  becomes  Queen  of  England. 

1557.  The  Spaniards  defeat  the  French  at  the  bat- 
tle of  St.  Quentin. 

1571.  Don  John  of  Austria,  at  the  head  of  the 
Spanish  fleet,  aided  by  the  Venetian  and  the  papal 
squadrons,  defeats  the  Turks  at  Lepanto. 

157^.  Massacre  of  the  Protestants  in  France  on  St. 
Bartholomew’s  day. 

1579.  The  Netherlands  revolt  against  Spain. 

1580.  Philip  II.  conquers  Portugal. 


364 


DEFEAT  OF 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  DEFEAT  OF  THE  SPANISH  ARMADA,  A.D  1588. 

In  that  memorable  year,  when  the  dark  cloud  g-athered 
round  our  coasts,  when  Europe  stood  by  in  fearful  sus- 
pense to  behold  what  should  be  the  result  of  that  great 
cast  in  the  game  of  human  politics,  what  the  craft  of 
Rome,  the  power  of  Philip,  the  genius  of  Farnese  couM 
achieve  against  the  island-queen,  with  her  Drakes  and 
Cecils— in  that  agony  of  the  Protestant  faith  and  English 
name. — Haluam,  Const  Hist.,  vol.  i.,  p.  220. 

396.  On  the  afternoon  of  the  19th  of  July,  A.  D‘ 
1588,  a group  of  English  captains  was  collected  at  the 
Bowling  G-reen  on  the  Hoe  at  Plymouth,  whose 
equals  have  never  before  or  since  been  brought  to- 
gether, even  at  that  favorite  mustering  place  of  the 
heroes  of  the  British  navy.  There  was  Sir  Francis 
Drake,  the  first  English  circumnavigator  of  the 
globe,  the  terror  of  every  Spanish  coast  in  the  Old 
World  and  the  New  ; there  was  Sir  John  Hawkins, 
the  rough  veteran  of  many  a daring  voyage  on  the 
African  and  American  seas,  and  of  many  a desperate 
battle ; there  was  Sir  Martin  Frobisher,  one  of  the 
earliest  explorers  of  the  Arctic  seas,  in  search  of  that 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA. 


365 


Northwest  Passage  which  is  still  the  darling  object 
of  England’s  boldest  mariners.  There  was  the  high 
admiral  of  England,  Lord  Howard  of  Effingham, 
prodigal  of  all  things  in  his  country’s  cause,  and  who 
had  recently  had  the  noble  daring  to  refuse  to  dis- 
mantle part  of  the  fleet,  though  the  queen  had  sent 
him  orders  to  do  so,  in  consequence  of  an  exaggerated 
report  that  the  enemy  had  been  driven  back  and 
shattered  by  a storm.  Lord  Howard  (whom  con- 
temporary writers  describe  as  being  of  a wise  and 
noble  courage,  skillful  in  sea  matters,  wary  and 
provident,  and  of  great  esteem  among  the  sailors)  re- 
solved to  risk  his  sovereign’s  anger,  and  to  keep  the 
ships  afloat  at  his  own  charge,  rather  than  that  Eng- 
land should  run  the  peril  of  losing  their  protection. 

397.  Another  of  our  Elizabethan  sea-kings,  Sir 
Walter  Raleigh,  was  at  that  time  commissioned  to 
raise  and  equip  the  land-forces  of  Cornwall ; but  we 
may  well  believe  that  he  must  have  availed  himself 
of  the  opportunity  of  consulting  with  the  lord  ad- 
miral and  the  other  high  officers,  which  was  offered 
by  the  English  fleet  putting  into  Plymouth  ; and  we 
may  look  on  Raleigh  as  one  of  the  group  that  was 
assembled  at  th  e Bowling  Green  on  the  Hoe.  Many 
other  brave  men  and  skillful  mariners,  besides  the 
chiefs  whose  names  have  been  mentioned,  were  there, 
enjoying,  with  true  sailor-like  merriment,  their  tem- 
porary relaxation  from  duty.  In  the  harbor  lay  the 
English  fleet  with  which  they  had  just  returned 
from  a cruise  to  Corunna  in  search  of  information 
respecting  the  real  condition  and  movements  of  the 


366 


DEFEAT  OF 


hostile  Armada.  Lord  Howard  had  ascertained  that 
our  enemies,  though  tempest-tossed,  were  still 
formidably  strong;  and  fearing  that  part  of  their 
fleet  might  make  for  England  in  his  absence,  he  had 
hurried  back  to  the  Devonshire  coast.  He  resumed 
his  station  at  Plymouth,  and  waited  there  for  cer- 
tain tidings  of  the  Spaniard’s  approach. 

398.  A match  at  bowls  was  being  played,  in  which 
Drake  and  other  high  officers  of  the  fleet  were  en- 
gaged, when  a small  armed  vessel  was  seen  runnings 
before  the  wind  into  Plymouth  harbor  with  all  sails 
set.  Her  commander  landed  in  haste,  and  eagerly 
sought  the  place  where  the  English  lord  admiral  and 
his  captains  were  standing.  His  name  was  Fleming ; 
he  was  the  master  of  a Scotch  privateer ; and  he  told 
the  English  officers  that  he  had  that  morning  seen 
the  Spanish  Armada  off  the  Cornish  coast.  At  this 
exciting  information  the  captains  began  to  hurry 
down  to  the  water,  and  there  was  a shouting  for  the 
ships’  boats ; but  Drake  coolly  checked  his  comrades, 
and  insisted  that  the  match  should  be  played  out. 
He  said  that  there  was  plenty  of  time  both  to  win  the 
game  and  beat  the  Spaniards.  The  best  and  bravest 
match  that  ever  was  scored  was  resumed  accordingly. 
Drake  and  his  friends  aimed  their  last  bowls  with 
the  same  steady,  calculating  coolness  with  which 
they  were  about  to  point  their  guns.  The  winning 
cast  was  made ; and  then  they  went  on  board  and 
prepared  for  action  with  their  hearts  as  light  and 
their  nerves  as  firm  as  they  had  been  on  the  Hoe 
Bowling  Green. 


THE  SPANISH  AB3IADA. 


367 


399.  Meanwhile  the  messengers  and  signals  had 
been  dispatched  fast  and  far  through  England,  to 
warn  each  town  and  village  that  the  enemy  had 
come  at  last.  In  every  sea-port  there  was  instant 
making  ready  by  land  and  by  sea ; in  every  shire 
and  every  city  there  was  instant  mustering  of  horse 
and  man.*  But  England’s  best  defense  then,  as  ever, 
was  in  her  fleet ; and  after  warping  laboriously  out 
of  Plymouth  harbor  against  the  wind,  the  lord  ad- 
miral stood  westward  under  eas}^  sail,  keeping  an 
anxious  look-out  for  the  Armada,  the  approach  of 
which  was  soon  announced  by  Cornish  flsher-boats 
and  signals  from  the  Cornish  cliffs. 

400.  The  England  of  our  own  days  is  so  strong,  and 
the  Spain  of  our  own  days  is  so  feeble,  that  it  is  not 
easy,  without  some  reflection  and  care,  to  comprehend 
the  full  extent  of  the  peril  which  England  then  ran 
from  the  power  and  the  ambition  of  Spain,  or  to  appre- 
ciate the  importance  of  that  crisis  in  the  history  of  the 
world.  We  had  then  no  Indian  or  colonial  empire 
save  the  feeble  germs  of  our  North  American  settle- 
ments, which  Raleigh  and  Gilbert  had  recently 
planted.  Scotland  was  a separate  kingdom;  and 
Ireland  was  then  even  a greater  source  of  weakness 
and  a worse  nest  of  rebellion  than  she  has  been  in 
after  times.  Queen  Elizabeth  had  found  at  her 

* In  Macaulay’s  Ballad  on  the  Spanish  Armada,  the 
transmission  of  the  tidings  of  the  Armada’s  approach, 
and  the  arming  of  the  English  nation,  are  magnificently 
described.  The  progress  of  the  fire-signals  is  depicted  in 
lines  which  are  worthy  of  comparison  with  the  ren  o w ned 
passage  in  the  Agamemnon,  which  describes  the  transmis- 
sion of  the  beacon-light  announcing  the  fall  of  Troy  from 
Mount  Ida  to  Argos. 


3(>8 


DEFEA  T OF 


accession  an  encumbered  revenue,  a divided  people, 
and  an  unsuccessful  foreign  war,  in  which  the  last 
remnant  of  our  possessions  in  France  had  been  lost ; 
she  had  also  a formidable  pretender  to  her  crown, 
whose  interests  were  favored  by  all  the  Roman 
Catholic  powers ; and  even  some  of  her  subjects  were 
warped  by  religious  bigotry  to  deny  her  title,  and  to 
look  on  her  as  a heretical  usurper.  It  is  true  that 
during  the  years  of  her  reign  which  had  passed  away 
before  the  attempted  invasion  of  1588,  she  had  re- 
vived the  commercial  prosperity,  the  national  spirit, 
and  the  national  loyalty  of  England.  But  her  re- 
sources to  cope  with  the  colossal  power  of  Philip  II. 
still  seemed  most  scanty ; and  she  had  not  a single 
ibreign  ally,  except  the  Dutch,  who  were  th^selves 
struggling  hard,  and,  as  it  seemed,  hopelessly,  to 
maintain  their  revolt  against  Spain. 

401.  On  the  other  hand,  Philip  II.  was  absolute 
master  of  an  empire  so  superior  to  the  other  states  of 
the  world  in  extent,  in  resources,  and  especially 
military  and  naval  forces,  as  to  make  the  project 
of  enlarging  that  empire  into  a universal  mon- 
archy seem  a perfectly  feasible  scheme ; and  Philip 
had  both  the  ambition  to  form  that  project,  and 
the  resolution  to  devote  all  his  energies  and  all  his 
means  to  its  realization.  Since  the  downfall  of  the 
Roman  empire  no  such  preponderating  power  had 
existed  in  the  world.  During  the  mediaeval  cen- 
turies the  chief  European  kingdoms  were  slowly 
molding  themselves  out  of  the  feudal  chaos;  and 
though  the  wars  with  each  other  were  numerous 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA. 


369 


and  despeiate,  and  several  of  their  respective  kings 
figured  for  a time  as  mighty  conquerors,  none  of 
them  in  those  times  acquired  the  consistency  and 
perfect  organization  w^hich  are  requisite  for  a long- 
sustained  career  of  aggrandizement.  After  the  con- 
solidation of  the  great  kingdoms,  they  for  some  time 
kept  each  other  in  mutual  check.  During  the  first 
half  of  the  sixteenth  century,  the  balancing  system 
was  successfully  practiced  by  European  statesmen. 
But  when  Philip  II.  reigned,  France  had  become  so 
miserably  weak  through  her  civil  wars,  that  he  had 
nothing  to  dread  from  the  rival  state  which  had  so 
long  curbed  his  father,  the  Emperor  Charles  Y.  In 
Germany,  Italy,  and  Poland  he  had  zealous  friends 
and  dependents,  or  weak  and  divided  enemies. 
Against  the  Turks  he  had  gained  great  and  glorious 
successes  ; and  he  might  look  round  the  continent  of 
Europe  without  discerning  a single  antagonist  of 
whom  he  could  stand  in  awe.  Spain,  when  he  ac- 
ceded to  the  throne,  was  at  the ‘zenith  of  her  power. 
The  hardihood  and  spirit  which  the  Aragonese,  the 
Castilians,  and  the  other  nations  of  the  peninsula 
had  acquired  during  centuries  of  free  institutions  and 
successful  war  against  the  Moors,  had  not  yet  become 
obliterated.  Charles  V.  had,  indeed,  destroyed  the  lib- 
erties of  Spain  ; but  that  had  been  done  too  recently 
for  its  full  evil  to  be  felt  in  Philip’s  time.  A people 
can  not  be  debased  in  a single  generation ; and  the 
Spaniards  under  Charles  V.  and  Philip  II.  proved  the 
truth  of  the  remark,  that  no  nation  is  ever  so  formid- 
able to  its  neighbors  for  a time,  as  a nation  which. 


370 


DEFEAT  OF 


after  being  trained  up  in  self-government,  passes 
suddenly  under  a despotic  ruler.  The  energy  ol‘ 
democratic  institutions  survives  for  a few  genera- 
tions. and  to  it  are  superadded  the  decision  and  cer- 
tainty which  are  the  attributes  of  government  when 
all  its  powers  are  directed  by  a single  mind.  It  is 
true  that  this  x)reternatural  vigor  is  short-lived  ; 
national  corruption  and  debasement  gradually  follow 
the  loss  of  the  national  liberties ; but  there  is  an  in- 
terval before  their  workings  are  felt,  and  in  that 
interval  the  most  ambitious  schemes  of  foreign  con- 
quest are  often  successfully  undertaken. 

402.  Philip  had  also  the  advantage  of  finding  him- 
self at  the  head  of  a large  standing  army  in  a perfect 
state  of  discipline  and  equipment,  in  an  age  when, 
except  some  few  insigniticant  corps,  standing  armies 
were  unknown  in  Christendom.  The  renown  of  the 
Spanish  troops  was  justly  high,  and  the  infantry  in 
particular  was  considered  the  best  in  the  world.  His 
fleet,  also,  was  far  more  numerous,  and  better  ap- 
pointed than  that  of  any  other  European  power ; and 
both  his  soldiers  and  his  sailors  had  the  confidence  in 
themselves  and  their  commanders  which  a long  ca- 
reer of  successful  warfare  alone  can  create. 

403.  Besides  the  Spanish  crown,  Philip  succeeded 
to  the  kingdom  of  Naples  and  Sicily,  the  duchy  of 
Milan,  Franche-Compte,  and  the  Netherlands.  In 
Africa  he  possessed  Tunis,  Oran,  theCaj)e  Verde,  and 
the  Canary  Islands;  and  in  Asia,  the  Philippine  and 
Sunda  Islands,  and  a part  of  the  Moluccas.  Beyond 
the  Atlantic  he  was  lord  of  the  most  splendid  por- 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA. 


371 


tions  of  the  New  World,  which  Columbus  found  “for 
Castile  and  Leon.”  The  empires  of  Peru  and  Mexi- 
co, New  Spain,  and  Chili,  with  their  abundant  mines 
of  the  precious  metals,  Hispaniola  and  Cuba,  and 
many  other  of  the  American  islands,  were  provinces 
of  the  sovereign  of  Spain. 

404.  Philip  had,  indeed,  experienced  the  niortitica- 
tion  of  seeing  the  inhabitants  of  the  Netherlands 
revolt  against  his  authority,  nor  could  he  succeed  in 
bringing  back  beneath  the  Spanish  sceptre  all  the 
possessions  which  his  father  had  bequeathed  to  him. 
But  he  had  reconquered  a large  number  of  the  towns 
and  districts  that  originally  took  up  arms  against  him. 
Belgium  was  brought  more  thoroughly  into  implicit 
obedience  to  Spain  than  she  had  been  before  her  in- 
surrection, and  it  was  only  Holland  and  the  six  other 
northern  states  that  still  held  out  against  his  arms. 
The  contest  had  also  formed  a compact  and  veteran 
army  on  Philip’s  side,  which,  under  his  great  gen- 
eral, the  Prince  of  Parma,  had  been  trained  to  act  to- 
gether under  all  difficulties  and  all  vicissitudes  of 
warfare,  and  on  whose  steadiness  and  loyalty  perfect 
reliance  might  be  placed  throughout  any  enterprise, 
however  difficult  and  tedious.  Alexander  Faraese, 
Prince  of  Parma,  captain  general  of  the  Spanish 
armies,  and  governor  of  the  Spanish  possessions  in 
the  Netherlands,  was  beyond  all  comparison  the 
greatest  military  genius  of  his  age.  He  was  also 
highly  distinguished  for  political  wisdom  and  saga- 
city and  for  his  great  administrative  talents.  He 
was  idolized  by  his  troops,  whose  affections  he  knew 


372 


DEFEAT  OF 


how  to  win  without  relaxing  their  discipline  or 
diminishing  his  own  authority.  Pre-eminently  cool 
and  circumspect  in  his  plans,  but  swift  and  ener- 
getic when  the  moment  arrived  for  striking  a decisive 
blow,  neglecting  no  risk  that  caution  could  provide 
against,  conciliating  even  the  populations  of  the  dis- 
tricts which  he  attacked  by  his  scrupulous  good 
faith,  his  moderation,  and  his  address,  Farnese  was 
one  of  the  most  formidable  generals  that  ever  could 
be  placed  at  the  head  of  an  army  designed  not  only 
to  win  battles,  but  to  effect  cor» quests.  Happy  it  is 
for  England  and  the  world  that  this  island  was  saved 
from  becoming  an  arena  for  the  exhibition  of  hisk 
powers. 

405.  Whatever  diminution  the  Spanish  empire 
might  have  sustained  in  the  Netherlands  seemed  to 
be  more  than  compensated  by  the  acquisition  of 
Portugal,  which  Philip  had  completely  conquered  in 
1580.  Not  only  that  ancient  kingdom  itself,  but  all 
the  fruits  of  the  maritime  enterprises  of  the  Portu- 
guese, had  fallen  into  Philip’s  hands.  AlT  the  Portu- 
guese colonies  in  America,  Africa,  and  the  East  In- 
dies acknowledged  the  sovereignty  of  the  King  of 
Spain,  who  thus  not  only  united  the  whole  Iberian 
peninsula  under  his  single  sceptre,  but  had  acquired 
a transmarine  empire  little  inferior  in  wealth  and 
extent  to  that  which  he  had  inherited  at  his  acces- 
sion. The  splendid  victory  which  his  fleet,  in  con- 
junction with  the  papal  and  Venetian  galleys,  had 
gained  at  Lepanto  over  the  Turks,  had  deservedly 
exalted  the  fame  of  the  Spanish  marine  throughout 


THE  SPANISH  AR3IADA, 


373 


Christendom ; and  when  Philip  had  reigned  thirty- 
five  years,  the  vigor  of  his  empire  seemed  unbroken, 
and  the  glory  of  the  Spanish  arms  had  increased, 
and  was  increasing  throughout  the  world. 

406.  The  nation  only  had  been  his  active,  his  per- 
severing, and  his  successful  foe.  England  had  en- 
couraged his  revolted  subjects  in  Flanders  against 
him,  and  given  them  the  aid. in  men  and  money, 
without  which  they  must  soon  have  been  humbled 
in  the  dust.  English  ships  had  plundered  his  colo- 
nies ; had  defied  his  supremacy  in  the  New  World 
as  well  as  the  Old  ; they  had  inflicted  ignominious 
defeats  on  his  squadrons;  they  had  captured  his 
cities,  and  burned  his  arsenals  on  the  very  coasts  of 
Spain.  She  English  had  made  Philip  himself  the 
object  of  personal  insult.  He  was  held  up  to  ridi- 
cule in  their  stage-plays  and  masks,  and  these  scoffs 
at  the  man  had  (as  is  not  unusual  in  such  cases)  ex- 
cited the  anger  of  the  absolute  king  even  more 
vehemently  than  the  injuries  inflicted  on  his  power.* 
Personal  as  well  as  political  revenge  urged  him  to 
attack  England.  Were  she  once  subdued,  the  Dutch 
must  submit;  France  could  not  cope  with  him,  the 
empire  would  not  oppose  him  ; and  universal  do- 
minion seemed  sure  to  be  the  result  of  the  conquest 
of  that  malignant  island. 

407.  There  was  yet  another  and  a stronger  feeling 
which  armed  King  Philip  against  England.  He  was 
one  of  the  sincerest  and  one  of  the  sternest  bigots  of 
his  age.  He  looked  on  himself,  and  was  looked  on  by 

* See  Ranke’s  “ Hist.  Popes,”  vol.  ii.,  p.  170. 


374 


DEFEAT  OF 


others,  as  the  appointed  champion  to  extirpate  heresy 
and  re-establish  the  papal  power  throughout  Europe. 
A powerful  reaction  against  Protestantism  had 
taken  place  since  the  commencement  of  the  second 
half  of  the  sixteenth  century,  and  he  looked  on  him- 
self as  destined  to  complete  it.  The  Reformed 
doctrines  had  been  thoroughly  rooted  out  from  Italy 
and  Spain.  Belgium,  which  had  previously  been 
half  Protestant,  had  been  conquered  both  in  alle- 
giance and  creed  by  Philip,  and  had  become  one  of 
the  most  Catholic  countries  in  the  world.  Half  Ger- 
many had  been  won  back  to  the  old  faith.  In  Savoy, 
in  Switzerland,  and  many  other  countries,  the  pro- 
gress of  the  counter- Reformation  had  been  rapid  and 
decisive.  The  Catholic  league  seemed  victorious  in 
France.  The  papal  court  itself  had  shaken  off  the 
supineness  of  recent  centuries,  and,  at  the  head  of  the 
Jesuits  and  the  other  new  ecclesiastical  orders,  was 
displaying  a vigor  and  a boldness  worthy  of  the  days 
of  Hildebrand,  or  Innocent  III. 

408.  Throughout  Continental  Europe,  the  Protes- 
tants, discomfited  and  dismayed,  looked  to  England 
as  their  protector  and  refuge.  England  was  the  ac- 
knowledged central  point  of  Protestant  power  and 
policy  ; and  to  conquer  England  was  to  stab  Protes- 
tantism to  the  very  heart.  Sixtus  V.,  the  then  reign- 
ing pope,  earnestly  exhorted  Philip  to  this  enterprise. 
And  when  the  tidings  reached  Italy  and  Spain  that 
the  Protestant  Queen  of  England  had  put  to  death 
her  Catholic  prisoner,  Mary  Queen  of  Scots,  the  fury 
of  the  Vatican  and  Escurial  knew  no  bounds.  Eliza- 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA. 


375 


beth  was  denounced  as  the  murderous  heretic  whose 
destruction  was  an  instant  duty.  A formal  treaty 
was  concluded  (in  June,  1587),  by  which  the  pope 
bound  himself  to  contribute  a million  of  scudi  to 
the  expenses  of  the  war ; the  money  to  be  paid  as 
soon  as  the  king  had  actual  possession  of  an  English 
port.  Philip,  on  his  part,  strained  the  resources  of 
his  vast  empire  to  the  utmost.  The  French  Catholic 
chiefs  eagerly  co-operated  with  him.  In  the  sea- 
ports of  the  Mediterranean,  and  along  almost  the 
whole  coast  from  Gibraltar  to  Jutland,  the  prepara- 
tions for  the  great  armament  were  urged  forward 
with  all  the  earnestness  of  religious  zeal  as  well  as 
of  angry  ambition.  “ Thus,”  says  the  German  his- 
torian of  the  popes,*  thus  did  the  united  powers  of 
Italy  and  Spain,  from  which  such  mighty  influences 
had  gone  forth  over  the  whole  world,  now  rouse 
themselves  for  an  attack  upon  England  ! The  king 
had  already  compiled,  from  the  archives  of  Siman- 
cas,  a statement  of  the  claims  which  he  had  to  the 
throne  of  that  country  on  the  extinction  of  the  Stuart 
line  ; the  most  brilliant  prospects,  especially  that  of 
a universal  dominion  of  the  seas,  were  associated  in 
his  mind  with  this  enterprise.  Every  thing  seemed 
to  conspire  to  such  an  end ; the  predominancy  of 
Catholicism  in  Germany,  the  renewed  attack  upon 
the  Huguenots  in  France,  the  attempt  upon  Geneva, 
and  the  enterprise  against  England.  At  the  same 
moment,  a thoroughly  Catholic  prince,  Sigismund 


* Ranke,  vol.  ii.,  p.  173. 


376 


DEFEAT  OF 


III.,  ascended  the  throne  of  Poland,  with  the  prospect 
also  of  future  succession  to  the  throne  of  Sweden, 
But  whenever  any  principle  or  power,  he  it  what  it 
may,  aims  at  unlimited  supremacy  in  Europe,  some 
vigorous  resistance  to  it,  having  its  origin  in  the 
deepest  springs  of  human  natnre,  invariably  arises. 
Philip  II.  had  to  encounter  newly  awakened  powers, 
braced  by  the  vigor  of  youth,  and  elevated  by  a sense 
of  their  future  destiny.  The  intrepid  corsairs,  who 
had  rendered  every  sea  insecure,  now  clustered  round 
the  coasts  of  their  native  island.  The  Protestants 
in  a body — even  the  Puritans,  although  they  had 
been  subjected  to  as  severe  oppressions  as  the  Catho- 
lics— rallied  round  their  queen,  who  now  gave  ad- 
mirable proof  of  her  masculine  courage,  and  her 
princely  talent  of  winning  the  affections,  and  lead- 
ing the  minds,  and  preserving  the  allegiance  of 
men.” 

409.  Ranke  should  have  added  that  the  English 
Catholics  at  this  crisis  proved  themselves  as  loyal  to 
their  queen  and  true  to  their  country  as  were  the 
most  vehement  anti-Catholic  zealots  in  the  island. 
Some  few  traitors  there  were ; but  as  a body,  the 
Englishmen  who  held  the  ancient  faith  stood  the 
trial  of  their  patriotism  nobly.  The  lord  admiral 
himself  was  a Catholic,  and  (to  adopt  the  words  of 
Hallam)  “ then  it  was  that  the  Catholics  in  every 
county  repaired  to  the  standard  of  the  lord  lieuten- 
ant, imploring  that  they  might  not  be  suspected  of 
bartering  the  national  independence  of  their  religion 
itself”  The  Spaniard  found  no  partisans  in  the 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA. 


6t  i 


country  which  he  assailed,  nor  did  England,  self- 
wounded, 

“ Lie  at  the  proud  foot  of  her  enemy.” 

410.  For  upward  of  a year  the  Spanish  prepara- 
tions had  been  actively  and  unremittingly  urged  for- 
ward. Negotiations  were,  during  this  time,  carried  on 
at  Ostend,  in  which  various  f)retexts  were  assigned 
by  the  Spanish  commissioners  for  the  gathering  to- 
gether of  such  huge  masses  of  shipping,  and  such 
equipments  of  troops  in  all  the  sea-ports  which  their 
master  ruled  ; but  Philip  himself  took  little  care  to 
disguise  his  intentions  ; nor  could  Elizabeth  and  her 
able  ministers  doubt  but  that  this  island  was  the 
real  object  of  the  Spanish  armament.  The  peril  that 
was  wisely  foreseen  was  resolutely  provided  for. 
Circular  letters  from  the  queen  were  sent  round  to 
the  lord  lieutenants  of  the  several  counties,  requiring 
them  “ to  call  together  the  best  sort  of  gentlemen 
under  their  lieutenancy,  and  to  declare  unto  them 
these  great  preparations  and  arrogant  threatenings, 
now  burst  forth  in  action  upon  the  seas,  wherein 
every  man’s  particular  state^  in  the  highest  degree, 
could  be  touched  in  respect  of  country,  liberty,  wives, 
children,  lands,  lives,  and  (which  was  specially  to  be 
regarded)  the  profession  of  the  true  and  sincere  re- 
ligion of  Christ.  And  to  lay  before  them  the  infinite 
and  unspeakable  miseries  that  would  fall  out  upon 
any  such  change,  which  miseries  were  evidently  seen 
by  the  fruits  of  that  hard  and  cruel  government 
holden  in  countries  not  far  distant.  We  do  look,” 
said  the  queen,  “ that  the  most  part  of  them  should 


378 


DEFEAT  OF 


have,  upon  this  instant  extraordinary  occasion,  a 
larger  proportion  of  furniture,  both  for  horsemen  and 
footmen,  but  especially  horsemen,  than  hath  been 
certified ; thereby  to  be  in  their  best  strength 
against  any  attempt,  or  to  be  employed  about  our 
own  person,  or  otherwise.  Hereunto  as  we  doubt 
not  but  by  your  good  endeavors  they  will  be  the 
rather  conformable  so  also  we  assure  ourselves  that 
Almighty  God  will  so  bless  these  their  loyal  hearts 
borne  toward  us,  their  loving  sovereign,  and  their 
natural  country,  that  all  the  attempts  of  any  enemy 
whatsoever  shall  he  made  void  and  frustrate,  to  their 
confusion,  your  comfort,  and  to  God’s  high  glory.”* 

411.  Letters  of  a similar  kind  were  also  sent  by  the 
council  to  each  of  the  nobility,  and  to  the  great 
cities.  The  primate  called  on  the  clergy  for  their 
contributions  ; and  by  every  class  of  the  community 
the  appeal  was  responded  to  with  liberal  zeal,  that 
offered  more  even  than  the  queen  required.  The 
boasting;  threats  of  the  Spaniards  had  roused  the 
spirit  of  the  nation,  and  the  whole  people  “ were 
thoroughly  irritated  to  stir  up  their  whole  forces  for 
their  defense  against  such  prognosticated  conquests  ; 
so  that,  in  a very  short  time,  all  her  whole  realm, 
and  every  corner,  were  furnished  with  armed  men, 
on  horseback  and  on  foot;  and  those  continually 
trained,  exercised,  and  put  into  bands,  in  warlike 
manner,  as  in  no  age  ever  was  before  in  this  realm. 
There  was  no  sparing  of  money  to  provide  horse, 
armor,  weapons,  powder,  and  all  necessaries  ; no,  nor 

* Strype,  cited  in  Southey’s  “Naval  History.” 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA, 


379 


want  of  provision  of  pioneers,  carriages,  and  victuals, 
in  every  county  of  the  realm,  without  exception,  to 
attend  upon  the  armies.  And  to  this  general  furni- 
ture every  man  voluntarily  offered,  very  many  their 
services  personally  without  wages,  others  money  for 
armor  and  weapons,  and  to  wage  soldiers : a matter 
strange,  and  never  the  like  heard  of  in  this  realm  or 
elsewhere.  And  this  general  reason  moved  all  men 
to  large  contributions,  that  when  a conquest  was  to 
be  withstood  wherein  all  should  be  lost,  it  was  no 
time  to  spare  a portion.”* 

412.  Our  lion-hearted  queen  showed  herself  worthy 
of  such  a people.  A camp  was  formed  at  Tilbury  ; 
and  there  Elizabeth  rode  through  the  ranks,  en- 
couraging her  captains  and  her  soldiers  by  her 
presence  and  her  words.  One  of  the  speeches  which 
she  addressed  to  them  during  this  crisis  has  been 
preserved  ; and,  though  often  quoted,  it  must  not  be 
omitted  here. 

413.  “ My  loving  people,”  she  said,  “ we  have  been 
persuaded  by  some  that  are  careful  of  our  safety  to 
take  heed  how  we  commit  ourselves  to  armed  multi- 
tudes, for  fear  of  treachery  ; but  I assure  you  I do 
not  desire  to  live  to  distrust  my  faithful  and  loving 
people.  Let  tyrants  fear  ! I have  always  so  behaved 
myself,  that,  under  God,  I have  placed  my  chiefest 
strength  and  safeguard  in  the  loyal  hearts  and  good 
will  of  my  subjects ; and,  therefore,  I am  come 
among  you,  as  you  see,  at  this  time,  not  for  my  re- 

* Copy  of  contemporary  letter  in  the  Harleian  Collec- 
tion, quoted  by  Southey. 


380 


DEFEAT  OF 


creation  and  disport,  but  being  resolved,  in  tbe  midst 
and  heat  of  the  battle,  to  live  or  die  among  you  all, 
to  lay  down  for  my  God,  for  my  kingdom,  and  for  my 
people,  my  honor  and  my  blood  even  in  the  dust.  I 
know  I have  the  body  but  of  a weak  and  feeble  wo- 
man, but  I have  the  heart  and  stomach  of  a king, 
and  of  a King  of  England  too,  and  think  it  foul  scorn 
that  Parma,  or  Spain,  or  any  prince  of  Europe  should 
dare  to  invade  the  borders  of  my  realm,  to  which 
rather  than  any  dishonor  shall  grow  by  me,  I myself 
will  take  up  arms,  I myself  will  be  your  general, 
judge,  and.rew^arder  of  every  one  of  your  virtues  in 
the  field.  I know  already,  for  your  forwardness,  you 
have  deserved  rewards  and  crowns  ; and  we  do  assure 
you,  on  the  word  of  a prince,  they  shall  be  duly  paid 
you.  In  the  mean  time,  my  lieutenant  general  shall 
be  in  my  stead,  than  whom  never  prince  commanded 
a more  noble  or  worthy  subject,  not  doubting  but  by 
your  obedience  to  my  general,  by  your  concord  in  the 
camp,  and  your  valor  in  the  field,  we  shall  shortly 
have  a famous  victory  over  those  enemies  of  my 
God,  of  my  kingdom,  and  of  my  people.” 

414.  Some  of  Elizabeth’s  advisers  recommended 
that  the  whole  care  and  resources  of  the  government 
should  be  devoted  to  the  equipment  of  the  armies, 
and  that  the  enemy,  when  he  attempted  to  land, 
should  be  welcomed  with  a battle  on  the  shore.  But 
the  wiser  counsels  of  Raleigh,  and  others  prevailed, 
who  urged  the  importance  of  fitting  out  a fleet  that 
should  encounter  the  Spaniards  at  sea,  and,  if  possible, 
prevent  them  from  approaching  the  land  at  all.  In 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA, 


381 


Raleigh’s  great  work  on  the  “ History  of  the  World,” 
he  takes  occasion,  when  discussing  some  of  the  events 
of  the  first  Punic  war,  to  give  his  reasonings  on  the 
proper  policy  of  England  when  menaced  with  in- 
vasion. Without  doubt,  we  have  there  the  sub- 
stance of  the  advice  which  he  gave  to  Elizabeth’s 
council;  and  the  remarks  of  such  .a  man  on  such  a 
subject  have  a general  and  enduring  interest,  beyond 
the  immediate  crisis  which  called  them  forth. 
Raleigh  says  “ Surely  I hold  that  the  best  way  is 
to  keep  our  enemies  form  treading  upon  our  ground ; 
wherein  if  we  fail,  then  must  we  seek  to  make  him 
wish  that  he  had  stayed  at  his  own  home.  In  such 
a case,  if  it  should  happen,  our  judgments  are  to 
weigh  many  particular  circumstances,  that  belongs 
not  unto  this  discourse.  But  making  the  question 
general,  the  positive.  Whether  England,  without  the 
help  of  her  fleets  he  able  to  debar  an  enemy  from  land- 
ing I hold  that  it  is  unable  so  to  do,  and  therefore  I 
think  it  most  dangerous  to  make  the  adventure  ; for 
the  encouragement  of  a first  victory  to  an  enemy,  and 
the  discouragement  of  being  beaten  to  the  invaded, 
may  draw  after  it  a most  perilous  consequence. 

415.  “Great  difference  I know  there  is,  and  a diverse 
consideration  to  be  had,  between  such  a country  as 
France  is,  strengthened  with  many  fortified  places, 
and  this  of  ours,  where  our  ramparts  are  but  the 
bodies  of  men.  But  I say  that  an  army  to  be  trans  - 
ported  over  sea,  and  to  be  landed  again  in  an  enemy’s 
country,  and  the  place  left  to  the  choice  of  the  in- 

* “Historieot  the  World,”  p 799-801. 


382 


DEFEAT  OF 


vader,  can  not  be  resisted  on  the  coast  of  England 
without  a fleet  to  impeach  it ; no,  nor  on  the  coast  of 
France,  or  any  other  country,  except  every  creek,  port, 
or  sandy  bay  had  a powerful  army  in  each  of  them 
to  make  opposition.  For  let  the  supposition  be 
granted  that  Kent  is  able  to  furnish  twelve  thousand 
foot,  and  that  those  twelve  thousand  be  layed  in  the 
three  best  landing-places  within  that  country  , to 
wit,  three  thousand  at  Margat,  three  thousand  at 
the  Nesse,  and  six  thousand  at  Foulkstone,  that  is, 
somewhat  equally  distant  from  them  both,  as  also 
that  two  of  these  troops  (unless  some  other  order  be 
thought  more  flt)  be  directed  to  strengthen  the  third, 
when  they  shall  see  the  enemy’s  fleet  to  head  to- 
ward it:  I say,  that  notwithstanding  this  provision, 
if  the  enemy,  setting  sail  from  the  Isle  of  Wight,  in 
the  first  watch  of  the  night,  and  towing  their  long 
boats  at  their  sterns,  shall  arrive  by  dawn  of  day  at 
the  Nesse,  and  thrust  their  army  on  shore  there,  it 
will  be  hard  for  those  three  thousand  that  are  at 
Margat  (twenty-and-four  long  miles  from  thence)  to 
come  time  enough  to  re-enforce  their  fellows  at  the 
Nesse.  Nay,  how  shall  they  at  Foulkstone  be  able 
to  do  it,  who  are  nearer  by  more  than  half  the  way  ? 
seeing  that  the  enemy,  at  his  first  arrival,  will  either 
make  his  entrance  by  force,  with  three  or  four  shot 
of  great  artillery,  and  quickly  put  the  first  three 
thousand  that  are  intrenched  at  the  Nesse  to  run,  or 
else  give  them  so  much  to  do  that  they  shall  be  glad 
to  send  for  help  to  Foulkstone,  and  perhaps  to  Mar- 
gat, whereby  those  places  will  be  left  bare.  Now 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA. 


383 


let  us  suppose  that  all  the  twelve  thousand  Kentish 
soldiers  arrive  at  the  Nesse  ere  the  enemy  can  be 
ready  to  disembarque  his  army,  so  that  he  will  find 
it  unsafe  to  land  in  the  face  of  so  many  prepared  to 
withstand  him,  yet  must  we  believe  that  he  will 
play  the  best  of  his  own  game  (having  liberty  to  go 
which  way  he  list),  and  under  covert  of  the  night 
set  sail  toward  the  east,  where  what  shall  hinder 
him  to  take  ground  either  at  Margat,  the  Downes,  or 
elsewhere,  before  they  at  the  Nesse  can  be  well  aware 
of  his  departure  ? Certainly  there  is  nothing  more 
easy  than  to  do  it.  Yes,  the  like  may  be  said  of 
Weymouth,  Purbeck,  Poole,  and  of  all  landing- 
places  on  the  southwest ; for  there  is  no  man  ignor- 
ant that  ships,  without  putting  themselves  out  of 
breath,  will  easily  outrun  the  souldiers  that  coast 
them.  '‘Les  armees  nc  vole nt  point  en  poste  ‘Armies 

neither  flye  nor  run  post,’  saith  a marshal  of  France. 
And  I know  it  to  be  true,  that  a fleet  of  ships  may 
be  seen  at  sunset,  and  after  it  at  the  Lizard,  yet  by 
the  next  morning  they  may  recover  Portland,  where* 
as  an  army  of  foot  shall  not  be  able  to  march  it  in 
six  dayes.  Again,  when  those  troops  lodged  on  the 
sea-shores  shall  be  forced  to  run  from  place  to  place 
in  vain,  after  a fleet  of  ships,  they  will  at  length  sit 
down  in  the  midway,  and  leave  all  at  adventure. 
But  say  it  was  otherwise,  that  the  invading  enemy 
will  offer  to  land  in  some  such  place  where  there 
shall  be  an  army  of  ours  ready  to  receive  him ; yet  it 
can  not  be  doubted  but  that  when  the  choice  of  all 
our  trained  bands,  and  the  choice  of  our  commanders 


384 


DEFEAT  OF 


and  captains,  shall  be  drawn  together  (as  they  were 
at  Tilbury  in  the  year  1588)  to  attend  the  person  of 
the  prince,  and  for  the  defense  of  the  city  of  London, 
they  that  remain  to  guard  the  coast  can  be  of  no 
such  force  as  to  encounter  an  army  like  unto  that 
wherewith  it  was  intended  that  the  Prince  of  Parma 
should  have  landed  in  England. 

416.  “For  end  of  this  digression,  I hope  that  this 
question  shall  never  come  to  trial:  his  majesty’s 
many  movable  forts  will  forbid  the  experience.  And 
although  the  English  will  no  less  disdain,  than  any 
nation  under  heaven  can  do,  to  be  beaten  upon  their 
own  ground,  or  elsewhere,  by  a foreign  enemy,  yet 
to  entertain  those  that  shall  assail  us,  with  their  own 
beef  in  their  bellies  and  before  they  eat  of  our  Kent- 
ish capons,  I take  it  to  be  the  wisest  way;  to  do 
which  his  majesty,  after  God,  will  employ  his  good 
ships  on  the  sea,  and  not  trust  in  any  intrenchment 
upon  the  shore.” 

417.  The  introduction  of  steam  as  a propelling 
power  at  sea  has  added  ten-fold  weight  to  these 
arguments  of  Raleigh.  On  the  other  hand,  a well- 
constructed  system  of  railways,  especially  of  coast- 
lines, aided  by  the  operation  of  the  electric  tele- 
graph, would  give  facilities  for  concentrating  a de- 
fensive army  to  oppose  an  enemy  on  landing,  and 
for  moving  troops  from  place  to  place  in  observation 
of  the  movements  of  the  hostile  fleet,  such  as  would 
have  astonished  Sir  Walter,  even  more  than  the 
sight  of  vessels  passing  rapidly  to  and  fro  wdthout 
the  aid  of  wind  or  tide.  The  observation  of  the 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA. 


385 


French  marshal,  whom  he  quotes,  is  now  no  longer 
('orrect.  Armies  can  he  made  to  pass  from  place  to 
place  almost  with  the  speed  of  wings,  and  far  more 
rapidly  than  any  post-traveling  that  was  known  in 
the  Elizabethan  or  any  other  age.  Still,  the  pre- 
sence of  a sufiS-cient  armed  force  at  the  right  spot,  at 
the  right  time,  can  never  be  made  a matter  of  cer- 
tainty ; and  even  after  the  changes  that  have  taken 
place,  no  one  can  doubt  but  that  the  policy  of  Ra- 
leigh is  that  which  England  should  ever  seek  to  fol- 
low in  defensive  war.  At  the  time  of  the  Armada-, 
that  policy  certainly  saved  the  country,  if  not  from 
conquest,  at  least  from  deplorable  calamities.  If 
indeed  the  enemy  had  landed,  we  may  be  sure  that 
he  would  have  been  heroically  opposed.  But  history 
shows  us  so  many  examples  of  the  superiority  of  vet- 
eran troops  over  new  levies,  however  numerous  and 
brave,  that,  without  disparaging  our  countrymen’s 
soldierly  merits,  we  may  well  be  thankful  that  no 
trial  of  them  was  then  made  on  English  land.  Es- 
pecially must  we  feel  this  when  we  contrast  the  high 
military  genius  of  the  Prince  of  Parma,  who  would 
have  headed  the  Spaniards,  with  the  imbecility  of 
the  Earl  of  Leicester,  to  whom  the  deplorable  spirit 
of  favoritism,  which  formed  the  great  blemish  on 
Elizabeth’s  character,  had  then  committed  the  chief 
command  of  the  English  armies. 

^ 418.  The  ships  of  the  royal  navy  at  this  time 
amounted  to  no  more  than  thirty -six ; but  the  most 
serviceable  merchant  vessels  were  collected  from  all 
the  ports  of  the  country  ; and  the  citizens  of  London 


386 


DEFEAT  OF 


Bristol,  and  the  other  great  seats  of  commerce  showed 
as  liberal  a zeal  in  equipping  and  manning  vessels, 
as  the  nobility  and  gentry  displayed  in  mustering 
forces  by  land.  The  seafaring  i3opulation  of  the 
coast,  of  every  rank  and  station,  was  animated  by 
the  same  ready  spirit ; and  the  whole  number  of  sea- 
men who  came  forward  to  man  the  English  fleet  was 
17,472.  The  number  of  the  ships  that  were  collected 
was  191,  and  the  total  amount  of  their  tonnage, 
31,985.  There  was  one  ship  in  the  fleet  (the  Tri- 
umph) of  1100  tons,  one  of  1000,  one  of  900,two  of  800, 
three  of  600,  flve  of  500,  five  of  400,  six  of  300,  six  of 
each  250,  twenty  of  200,  and  the  residue  of  inferior, 
burden.  Application  was  made  to  the  Dutch  for  assist- 
ance ; and,  as  Stowe  expressse  it,  “ The  Hollanders 
came  roundly  in,  with  threescore  sail,  brave  ships  of 
war,  fierce  and  full  of  spleen,  not  so  much  for  Eng- 
land’s aid,  as  in  just  occasion  for  their  own  defense: 
these  men  foreseeing  the  greatness  of  the  danger 
that  might  ensue  if  the  Spaniards  should  chance  to 
win  the  day  and  get  the  mastery  over  them ; in  due 
regard  whereof,  their  manly  courage  was  inferior  to 
none.” 

419.  We  have  more  minute  information  of  the 
number  and  equipment  of  the  hostile  forces  than  we 
have  of  our  own.  In  the  first  volume  of  Hakluyt’s 
“ Voyages,”  dedicated  to  Lord  Effingham,  who  com- 
manded against  the  Armada,  there  is  given  (from  the 
contemporary  foreign  writer,  Meteran)  a more  com- 
plete and  detailed  catalogue  than  has  perhaps  ever 
appeared  of  a similar  armament. 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA. 


387 


420.  “ A very  large  and  particular  description  of 
this  navie  was  put  in  print  and  published  by  the 
Spaniards,  wherein  were  set  down  the  number, 
names,  and  burthens  of  the  shippes,  the  number  of 
mariners  and  soldiers  throughout  the  whole  fleete ; 
likewise  the  quantitie  of  their  ordinance,  of  their 
armor,  of  bullets,  of  match,  of  gun-poulder,  of  vict- 
uals, and  of  all  their  navall  furniture  was  in  the  saide 
description  particularized.  Unto  all  these  were 
added  the  names  of  the  governours,  captaines,  noble- 
men, and  gentlemen  voluntaries,  of  whom  there  was 
so  great  a multitude,  that  scarce  was  there  any  fam- 
ily of  accompt,  or  any  one  principall  man  through- 
out all  Spaine,  that  had  not  a brother,  sonne,  or  kins- 
man in  that  fleete ; who  all  of  them  were  in  good 
hope  to  purchase  unto  themselves  in  that  navie  (as 
they  termed  it)  invincible,  endless  glory  and  renown, 
and  to  possess  themselves  of  great  seigniories  and 
riches  in  England  and  in  the  Low  Countreys.  But  be- 
cause the  said  description  was  translated  and  pub- 
lished out  of  Spanish  into  divers  other  languages,  we 
Avill  here  only  make  an  abridgement  or  brief  rehear- 
sal thereof. 

421.  “ Portugall  furnished  and  set  foorth  under  the 
conduct  of  the  Duke  of  Medina  Sidonia,  general  of 
the  fleete,  10  galeons,  2 zabraes,  1300  mariners,  3300 
souldiers,  300  great  pieces,  with  all  requisite  furni- 
ture. 

“ Biscay,  under  the  conduct  of  John  Martines  de 
Ricalde,  admiral  of  the  whole  fleete,  set  forth  10 
galeons,  4 pataches,  700  mariners,  2000  souldiers, 
250  great  pieces,  &c.  13 


DEFEA  T OF 


“ Guipusco,  under  the  conduct  of  Michael  de 
Oquendo,  10  galeons,  4 pataches,  700  mariners,  2000 
souldiers,  310  great  pieces. 

“ Italy,  with  the  Levant  islands,  under  Martine  de 
Vertendona,  10  galeons,  800  mariners,  2000  souldiers, 
310  great  pieces,  &c. 

‘‘Castile,  under  Diego  Flores  de  Valdez,  14 galeons, 
2 pataches,  1700  mariners,  2400  souldiers,  and  380 
great  pieces,  &c. 

“Andaluzia,  under  the  conduct  of  Petro  de  Val- 
dez, 10  galeons,  1 patache,  800  mariners,  2400  soul- 
diers, 280  great  pieces,  &c. 

“ Item,  under  the  conduct  of  John  Lopez  de  Me- 
dina, 23  great  Flemish  hulkes,  with  700  mariners, 
3200  souldiers,  400  great  pieces. 

“ Item,  under  Hugo  de  Moncada,  4 galliasses,  con- 
taining 1200  gally-slaves,  460  mariners,  870  souldiers, 
200  great  pieces,  &c. 

“ Item,  under  Diego  de  Mandrana,  4 gallies  of  Por- 
ugall,  with  888  gally-slaves,  360  mariners,  20  great 
pieces,  and  other  requisite  furniture. 

“Item,  under  Anthonie  de  Mendoza,  22  pataches 
and  zabraes,  with  574  mariners,  488  souldiers,  and 
193  great  pieces. 

“ Besides  the  ships  aforementioned,  there  were  20 
caravels  rowed  with  oares,  being  appointed  to  per- 
forme  necessary  services  under  the  greater  ships,  inso- 
much that  all  the  ships  appertayning  to  this  navie 
amounted  unto  the  summe  of  150,  eche  one  being  suf- 
ficiently provided  of  furniture  and  victuals. 

“ The  number  of  mariners  in  the  saide  fleete  were 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA. 


389 


above  8000,  of  slaves  2088,  of  souldiers  20,000  (besides 
noblemen  and  gentlemen  voluntaries),  of  great  cast 
pieces  2600.  The  foresaid  ships  were  of  an  huge  and 
incredible  capacitie  and  receipt,  for  the  whole  fleete 
was  large  enough  to  containe  the  burthen  of  60,000 
tunnes. 

The  galeons  were  64  in  number,  being  of  an  huge 
bignesse,  and  very  flately  built,  being  of  marveilous 
force  also,  and  so  high  that  they  resembled  great 
castles,  most  fit  to  defend  themselves  and  to  with- 
stand any  assault,  but  in  giving  any  other  ships  the 
encounter  farr  inferiour  unto  the  English  and  Dutch 
ships,  which  can  with  great  dexteritie  wield  and 
turne  themselves  at  all  assayes.  The  upper  worke 
of  the  saide  galeons  was  of  thicknesse  and  strength 
sufficient  to  beare  off  musket-shot.  The  lower  worke 
and  the  timbers  thereof  were  out  of  measures  strong, 
being  framedlof  plankes  and  ribs  foure  or  five  foote  in 
thicknesse,  insomuch  that  no  bullets  could  pierce 
them  but  such  as  were  discharged  hard  at  hand, 
which  afterward  prooved  true,  for  a great  number  of 
bullets  were  founde  to  sticke  fast  within  the  massie 
substance  of  those  thicke  plankes.  Great  and  well- 
pitched  cables  were  twined  about  the  masts  of  their 
shippes,  to  strengthen  them  against  the  battery  of 
shot. 

“ The  galliasses  were  of  such  bignesse  that  they 
contained  within  them  chambers,  chapels,  turrets 
pulpits,  and  other  commodities  of  great  houses.  The 
galliasses  were  rowed  with  great  oares,  there  being 
in  eche  one  of  them  300  slaves  for  the  same  purpose, 


390 


DEFEAT  OF 


and  were  able  to  do  great  service  with  the  force  of 
their  ordinance.  All  these,  together  with  the  residue 
aforenamed,  were  furnished  and  beautified  with 
trumphets,  streamers,  banners,  warlike  ensignes,  and 
other  such  like  ornaments. 

“ Their  pieces  of  brazen  ordinance  were  1600,  and 
of  yron  a 1000. 

“ The  bullets  thereto  belonging  were  120,000. 

“ Item  of  gun-poulder,  5600  quintals.  Of  matche, 
1200  quintals.  Of  muskets  and  kaleivers,  7000.  Of 
haleberts  and  partisans,  10,000. 

Moreover,  they  had  great  stores  of  canons, 
double-canons,  culverings  and  field-pieces  for  land 
services. 

Likewise  they  were  provided  of  all  instruments 
necessary  on  land  to  conveigh  and  transport  their 
furniture  from  place  to  place,  as  namely  of  carts, 
wheeles,  w^agons,  &c.  Also  they  had  spades,  mat- 
tocks, and  baskets  to  set  x>ioners  on  worke.  They 
had  in  like  sort  great  store  of  mules  and  horses,  and 
whatsoever  else  was  requisite  for  a land  armie. 
They  were  so  well  stored  of  biscuit,  that  for  the  space 
of  halfe  a yeere  they  might  allow  each  person  in  the 
whole  fieete  halfe  a quintall  every  moneth,  whereof 
the  whole  summe  amounteth  unto  an  hundreth 
thousand  quintals. 

“ Likewise  of  wine  they  had  147,000  pipes,  suffi- 
cient also  for  halfe  a yeere’s  expedition.  Of  bacon, 
6500  quintals.  Of  cheese,  3000  quintals.  Besides 
fish,  rise,  beanes,  pease,  oile,  vinegar,  &c. 

“ Moreover,  they  had  12,000  pipes  of  fresh  water, 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA. 


391 


and  all  other  necessary  provisions  as  namely  candles, 
lanternes,  lampes,  sailes,  hempe,  oxe-liides,  and  lead, 
to  stop  holes  that  should  be  made  with  the  battery 
of  gunshot.  To  be  short,  they  ^brought  all  things 
expedient,  either  for  a fleete  by  sea,  or  for  an  armie 
by  land. 

This  navie  (as  Diego  Pimentelli  afterward  con- 
fessed) was  esteemed  by  the  king  himselfe  to  containe 
32,000  persons,  and  to  cost  him  every  day  30,000 
du  cates. 

“ There  were  in  the  said  navie  five  terzaes  of  Span- 
iards (which  terzaes  the  Frenchmen  call  regiments), 
under  the  command  of  five  governours,  termed  by  the 
Spaniards  masters  of  the  field,  and  among  the  rest 
there  were  many  olde  and  expert  souldiers  chosen 
out  of  the  garrisons  of  Sicilie,  Naples,  and  Ter9era, 
Their  captaines  or  colonels  were  Diego  Pimentelli, 
Don  Francisco  de  Toledo,  Don  Alon§o  de  Lu9on,  Don 
Nicolas  de  Isla,  Don  Augustin  de  Mexia,  who  had 
eche  of  them  thirty-two  companies  under  their  con 
duct.  Besides  the  which  companies,  there  were 
many  bands  also  of  Castilians  and  Portugals,  every 
one  of  which  had  their  peculiar  governours,  captains, 
officers,  colors,  and  weapons.” 

422.  While  this  huge  armament  was  making  ready 
in  the  southern  ports  of  the  Spanish  dominions,  the 
Duke  of  Parma,  with  almost  incredible  toil  and  skill, 
collected  a squadron  of  war-ships  at  Dunkirk,  and  a 
large  flotilla  of  other  ships  and  of  flat-bottomed  boats 
for  the  transport  to  England  of  the  picked  troops, 
which  were  designed  to  be  the  main  instruments  in 


392 


DEFEAT  OF 


subduing  England.  The  design  of  the  Spaniards 
was  that  the  Armada  should  give  them,  at  least  for 
a time,  the  command  of  the  sea,  and  that  it  should 
join  the  squadron  that  Parma  had  collected  off  Calais 
Then,  escorted  by  an  overpowering  naval  force,  Parma 
and  his  army  were  to  embark  in  their  flotilla,  and 
cross  the  sea  to  England,  where  they  were  to  be 
landed,  together  with  the  troops  which  the  Armada 
brought  from  the  ports  of  Spain.  The  scheme  was 
not  dissimilar  to  one  formed  against  England  a little 
more  than  two  centuries  afterward. 

423.  As  Napoleon,  in  1805,  waited  with  his  army 
and  flotilla  at  Boulogne,  looking  for  Villeneuve  to 
drive  away  the  English  cruisers,  and  secure  him  a 
passage  across  the  Channel,  so  Parma,  in  1588,  waited 
for  Medina  Sidonia  to  drive  away  the  Dutch  and 
English  squadrons  that  watched  his  flotilla,  and  to 
enable  his  veterans  to  cross  the  sea  to  the  land  that 
they  were  to  conquer.  Thanks  to  Providence,  in 
each  case  England’s  enemy  waited  in  vain  ! 

424.  Although  the  numbers  of  sail  which  the 
queen’s  government  and  the  patriotic  zeal  of  volun- 
teers had  collected  for  the  defense  of  England  ex- 
ceeded the  number  of  sail  in  the  Spanish  fleet,  the 
English  ships  were,  collectively,  far  inferior  in  size  to 
their  adversaries,  their  aggregate  tonnage  being  less 
by  half  than  that  of  the  enemy.  In  the  number  of 
guns  and  weight  of  metal,  the  disproportion  was  still 
greater.  The  English  admiral  was  also  obliged  to 
subdivide  his  force ; and  Lord  Henry  Seymour,  with 
forty  of  the  best  Dutch  and  English  ships,  was  em- 


1 HE  SPANISH  ARMADA. 


393 


ployed  in  blockading  the  hostile  ports  in  Flanders, 
and  in  preventing  the  Duke  of  Parma  from  coming 
out  of  Dunkirk. 

425.  The  Invincible  Armada,  as  the  Spaniards 
in  the  pride  of  their  hearts  named  it,  set  sail  from 
the  Tagus  on  the  29th  of  May,  but  near  Corunna  met 
with  a tempest  that  drove  it  into  port  with  severe 
loss.  It  was  the  report  of  the  damage  done  to  the 
enemy  by  this  storm  which  had  caused  the  English 
court  to  suppose  that  there  would  be  no  invasion 
that  year.  But,  as  already  mentioned,  the  English 
admiral  had  sailed  to  Corunna,  and  learned  the  real 
state  of  the  case,  whence  he  had  returned  with  his 
ships  to  Plymouth.  The  Armada  sailed  again  from 
Corunna  on  the  12th  of  July.  The  orders  of  King 
Philip  to  the  Duke  de  Medina  Sidonia  were,  that  he 
should,  on  entering  the  Channel,  keep  near  the  French 
coast,  and,  if  attacked  by  the  English  ships,  avoid  an 
action  and  steer  on  to  Calais  Roads,  where  the  Prince 
of  Parma’s  squadron  was  to  join  him.  The  hope  of 
surprising  and  destroying  the  English  fleet  in  Ply- 
mouth led  the  Spanish  admiral  to  deviate  from  these 
orders  and  to  stand  across  to  the  English  shore  ; but, 
on  finding  that  Lord  Howard  was  coming  out  to  meet 
him,  he  resumed  the  original  plan,  and  determined 
to  bend  his  way  steadily  toward  Calais  and  Dunkirk, 
and  to  keep  merely  on  the  defensive  against  such 
squadrons  of  the  English  as  might  come  up  with 
him. 

426.  It  was  on  Saturday,  the  20th  of  July,  that 
Lord  Effingham  came  in  sight  of  his  formidable  ad- 


394 


DEFEA  T OF 


vei'saries.  The  Armada  was  drawn  up  in  form  of  a 
crescent,  which,  from  horn  to  horn,  measuring  some 
seven  miles.  There  was  a southwest  wind,  and  be- 
fore it  the  vast  vessels  sailed  slowly  on.  The  Eng- 
lish let  them  pass  by ; and  then,  following  in  the 
rear,  commenced  an  attack  on  them.  A running 
fight  now  took  place,  in  which  some  of  the  best  ships 
of  the  Spaniards  were  captured  ; many  more  received 
heavy  damages ; while  the  English  vessels,  which 
took  care  not  to  close  with  their  huge  antagonists, 
but  availed  themselves  of  their  superior  celerity  in 
tacking  and  maneuvering,  suffered  little  comparative 
loss.  Each  day  added  not  only  to  the  spirit,  but  to 
the  number  of  Effingham’s  force.  Raleigh,  Oxford, 
Cumberland,  and  Sheffield  joined  him  ; and  “ the 
gentlemen  of  England  hired  ships  from  all  parts  at 
their  own  charge,  and  with  one  accord  came  flocking 
thither  as  to  a set  field,  where  glory  was  to  be  at- 
tained, and  faithful  service  performed  unto  their 
prince  and  their  country.” 

427.  Raleigh  justly  praises  the  English  admiral 
for  his  skillful  tactics.  Raleigh  says,*  “ Certainly, 
he  that  will  happily  perform  a fight  at  sea  must  be 
skillful  in  making  choice  of  vessels  to  fight  in:  he 
must  believe  that  there  is  more  belonging  to  a good 
man  of  war,  upon  the  waters,  than  great  daring; 
and  must  know,  that  there  is  a great  deal  of  differ- 
ence between  fighting  loose  or  at  large  and  grappling. 
The  guns  of  a slow  ship  pierce  as  well  and  make  as 
great  holes,  as  those  in  a swift.  To  clap  ships  to- 
* “Historie  of  the  World,”  p.  791. 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA. 


395 


gether,  without  consideration,  belongs  rather  to  a 
madman  than  to  a man  of  war ; for  by  such  an  igno- 
rant bravery  was  Peter  Strossie  lost  at  the  Azores, 
when  he  fought  against  the  Marquis  of  Santa  Cruza. 
In  like  sort  had  the  Lord  Charles  Howard,  admiral 
of  England,  been  lost  in  the  year  1588,  if  he  had  not 
been  better  advised  than  a great  many  malignant 
fools  were  that  found  fault  with  his  demeanor.  The 
Spaniards  had  an  army  aboard  them,  and  he  had 
none ; they  had  more  ships  than  he  had,  and  of  higher 
building  and  charging;  so  that,  had  he  entangled 
himself  with  those  great  and  powerful  vessels,  he  had 
greatly  endangered  this  kingdom  of  England;  for 
twenty  men  upon  the  defenses  are  equal  to  a hundred 
that  board  and  enter ; whereas  then,  contrariwise, 
the  Spaniards  had  a hundred,  for  twenty  of  ours,  to 
defend  themselves  withal.  But  our  admiral  knew 
his  advantage,  and  held  it ; which  had  he  not  done, 
he  had  not  been  worthy  to  have  held  his  head.” 

428.  The  Spanish  admiral  also  showed  great  j udgment 
and  firmness  in  following  the  line  of  conduct  that 
had  been  traced  out  for  him ; and  on  the  27th  of 
July,  he  brought  his  fieet  unbroken,  though  sorely 
distressed,  to  anchor  in  Calais  Roads.  But  the  King  of 
Spain  had  calculated  ill  the  number  and  the  activity 
of  the  English  and  Hutch  fieets  ; as  the  old  historian 
expresses  it,  “It  seemeth  that  the  Duke  of  Parma  and 
the  Spaniards  grounded  upon  a vain  and  presui  ip- 
tuous  expectation  that  all  the  ships  of  England  and  of 
the  Low  Countreys  would  at  the  first  sight  of  the 
Spanish  and  Dunkerk  navie  have  betaken  themselues 


396 


DEFEAT  OF 


to  flight,  yeelding  them  sea-room,  and  endeavoring 
only  to  defend  themselues,  their  havens,  and  sea- 
coasts  from  invasion.  Wherefore  their  intent  and 
purpose  was,  that  the  Duke  of  Parma,  in  his  small 
and  flat-bottomed  ships,  should,  as  it  were  under 
the  shadow  and  wings  of  the  Spanish  fleet,  convey 
oner  all  his  troupes,  armor,  and  war-like  provisions, 
and  with  their  forces  so  united,  should  invade  Eng- 
land ; or  while  the  English  fleet  were  busied  in 
tight  against  the  Spanish,  should  enter  upon  any 
part  of  the  coast,  which  he  thought  to  be  most  con- 
venient. Which  invasion  fas  the  captives  afterward 
confessed)  the  Duke  of  Parma  thought  first  to  have 
attempted  by  the  River  of  Thames ; upon  the  bankes 
whereof  having  at  the  first  arrivall  landed  twenty  or 
thirty  thousand  of  his  principall  souldiers,  he  sup- 
posed that  he  might  easily  have  woonne  the  citie  of 
London ; both  because  his  small  shippes  should 
have  followed  and  assisted  his  land  forces,  and  also 
for  that  the  citie  it-selfe  was  but  meanely  fortified 
and  easie  to  ouercome  by  reason  of  the  citizens’  del- 
icacie  and  discontinuance  from  the  warres,  who,  with 
continuall  and  constant  labor,  might  be  vanquished, 
if  they  yielded  not  at  the  first  assault.”* 

429.  But  the  English  and  Dutch  found  ships  and 
mariners  enough  to  keep  the  Armada  itself  in  check, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  block  up  Parma’s  flotilla. 
The  greater  part  of  Seymour’s  squadron  left  its  cruis- 
ing ground  off  Dunkirk  to  join  the  English  admiral 
off  Calais ; but  the  Dutch  manned  about  five  and 

* Hakluyt’s  “ Voyages,”  vol.  i.,  p.  601. 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA, 


397 


thirty  sail  of  good  ships,  with  a strong  force  of 
soldiers  on  hoard,  all  well  seasoned  to  the  sea-ser- 
vice, and  with  these  they  blockaded  the  Flemish 
ports  that  were  in  Parma’s  power.  Still  it  was  re- 
solved by  the  Spanish  admiral  and  the  prince  to  en- 
deavor to  effect  a junction,  which  the  English  sea- 
men were  equally  resolute  to  present ; and  bolder 
measures  on  our  side  now  became  necessary. 

430.  The  Armada  lay  off  Calais,  with  its  largest 
ships  ranged  outside,  “like  strong  castles  fearing  no 
assault,  the  lesser  placed  in  the  middle  ward.'’  The 
English  admiral  could  not  attack  them  in  their  po- 
sition without  great  disadvantage,  but  on  the  niglit 
of  the  29th  he  sent  eight  fire-ships  among  them, 
with  almost  equal  effect  to  that  of  the  fire-ships 
which  the  Greeks  so  often  employed  against  tlu^ 
Turkish  fleets  in  their  late  war  of  independence. 
The  Spaniards  cut  their  cables  and  put  to  sea  in  con- 
fusion. One  of  the  largest  galeasses  ran  foul  of  an- 
other vessel  and  was  stranded.  The  rest  of  the  fieet 
was  scattered  about  on  the  Flemish  coast,  and  when 
the  morning  broke,  it  was  with  difficulty  and  delay 
that  they  obeyed  their  admiral’s  signal  to  rang(‘ 
themselves  round  him  near  Gravelines.  Now  was 
the  golden  opportunity  for  the  English  to  assail  them, 
and  prevent  them  from  ever  letting  loose  Parma’s 
flotilla  against  England,  and  nobly  was  that  oppor- 
tunity used.  Drake  and  Fenner  were  the  first  Eng- 
lish captains  who  attacked  the  unwieldy  leviathans; 
then  came  Fenton,  Southwell,  Burton,  Cross,  Raynor, 
and  then  the  lord  admiral,  with  lord  Thomas  How- 


398 


DEFEAT  OF 


ard  and  Lord  Sheffield.  The  Spaniards  only  thought 
of  forming  and  keeping  close  together,  and  were  driv- 
en by  the  English  past  Dunkirk,  and  far  away . from 
the  Prince  of  Parma,  who,  in  watching  their  defeat 
from  the  coast,  must,  as  Drake  expressed  it,  have 
chafed  like  a bear  robbed  of  her  whelps.  This  was 
indeed  the  last  and  the  decisive  battle  between  the 
two  fleets.  It  is,  perhaps,  best  described  in  the  very 
words  of  the  contemporary  writer,  as  we  may  read 
them  in  Hakluyt.^' 

431.  “Upon  the  29  of  July  in  the  morning,  the 
Spanish  fleet  after  the  forsayd  tumult,  having  ar- 
ranged themselues  againe  into  order,  were,  within 
sight  of  Greveling,  most  bravely  and  furiously  en- 
countered by  the  English,  where  they  once  again  got 
the  wind  of  the  Spaniards,  who  sufiered  themselues 
to  be  deprived  of  the  commodity  of  the  place  in  Ca- 
leis  Koad,  and  of  the  advantage  of  the  wind  neer  un- 
to Dunkerk,  rather  than  they  would  change  their  ar- 
ray or  separate  their  forces  now  conjoyned  and  unit- 
ed together,  standing  only  upon  their  defense. 

432.  “And  albeit  there  were  many  excellent  and 
warlike  ships  in  the  English  fleet,  yet  scarce  were 
there  22  or  23  among  them  all,  which  matched  90  of  the 
Spanish  ships  in  the  bigness, or  could  conveniently  as- 
sault them.  Wherefore  the  English  shippes  using  their 
prerogative  of  nimble  steerage,  whereby  they  could 
turn  and  wield  themselues  with  the  wind  which  way 
they  listed,  came  often  times  near  upon  the  Spaniard 
and  charged  them  so  sore,  that  now  and  then  they 

* Vol,  i„  p.  603. 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA. 


399 


\\^ere  but  a pike’s  length  asunder  ; and  so  continually 
giving  them  one  broad  side- after  another,  they  dis- 
charged all  their  shot,  both  great  and  small,  upon 
them,  spending  one  whole  day,  from  morning  till 
night,  in  that  violent  kind  of  conflict,  untill  such 
time  as  powder  and  bullets  failed  them.  In  regard 
of  which  want  they  thought  it  convenient  not  to 
pursue  the  Spaniards  any  longer,  because  they  had 
many  great  vantages  of  the  English,  namely,  for  the 
extraordinary  bigness  of  their  shipx)es,  and  also  for 
that  they  were  so  neerly  conjoyned,  and  kept  to- 
gether in  so  good  array,  that  they  could  by  no 
meanes  be  fought  withall  one  to  one.  The  English 
thought,  therefore,  that  they  had  right  well  acquit- 
ted themselues  in  chasing  the  Spaniards  first  from 
Caleis,  and  then  from  Dunkerk,  and  by  that  meanes 
to  have  hindered  them  from  joyning  with  the  Duke 
of  Parma  his  forces,  and  getting  the  wind  of  them,  to 
have  driven  them  from  their  own  coasts. 

433.  “The  Spaniards  that  day  sustained  great 
loss  and  damage,  having  many  of  their  shippes  shot 
thorow  and  thorow,  and  they  discharged  likewise 
great  store  of  ordinance  against  the  English  ; who, 
indeed,  sustained  some  hinderance,  but  not  compar- 
able to  the  Spaniard’s  loss  ; for  they  lost  not  any  one 
ship  or  person  of  account ; for  very  diligent  inquisi- 
tion being  made,  the  English  men  all  that  time 
wherein  the  Spanish  navy  say  led  upon  their  seas,  are 
not  found  to  haue  wanted  aboue  one  hundred  of  their 
people ; albeit  Sir  Francis  Drake’sship  was  pierced  with 
shot  aboue  forty  times,  and  his  very  cabben  was  twice 


400 


DEFEAT  OF 


shot  thorow,  and  about  the  conclusion  of  the  fight 
the  bed  of  a certaine  gentleman  lying  weary  there- 
upon, was  taken  quite  from  under  him  with  the 
force  of  a bullet.  Likewise,  as  the  Earle  of  Northum- 
berland and  Sir  Charles  Blunt  were  at  dinner 
upon  a time,  the  bullet  of  a demy-culvering  brake 
thorow  the  middest  of  their  cabben,  touched  their 
feet,  and  strooke  downe  two  of  the  standers-by,  with 
many  such  accidents  befalling  the  English  shippes, 
which  it  were  tedious  to  rehearse.” 

434.  It  reflects  little  credit  on  the  English  govern- 
ment that  the  English  fleet  was  so  deficiently  sup- 
plied with  ammunition  as  to  be  unable  to  complete 
the  destruction  of  the  invaders.  But  enough  was 
done  to  insure  it.  Many  of  the  largest  Spanish  ships 
were  sunk  or  captured  in  the  action  of  this  day.  And 
at  length  the  Spanish  admiral,  despairing  of  success, 
fled  northward  with  a southerly  wind,  in  the  hope  or 
rounding  Scotland,  and  so  returning  to  Spain  with- 
out a farther  encounter  with  the  English  fleet.  Lord 
Effingham  left  a squadron  to  continue  the  blockade 
of  the  Prince  of  Parma’s  armament ; but  that  wise 
general  soon  withdrew  his  troops  to  more  promising 
flelds  of  action.  Meanwhile  the  lord  admiral  him- 
self, and  Drake,  chased  the  vincible  Armada,  as  it 
was  now  termed,  for  some  distance  northward  ; and 
then,  when  they  seemed  to  bend  away  from  the 
Scotch  coast  toward  Norway,  it  was  thought  best,  in 
the  words  of  Drake,  “ to  leave  them  to  those  boister- 
ous and  uncouth  Northern  seas.” 

435.  The  sufferings  and  losses  which  the  unhappy 


THE  SPANISH  ARMADA, 


401 


Spaniards  sustained  in  their  flight  round  Scotland 
and  Ireland  are  well  known.  Of  their  whole  Armada 
only  flfby-three  shattered  vessels  brought  back  their 
beaten  and  wasted  crews  to  the  Spanish  coast  which 
they  had  quitted  in  such  pageantry  and  pride. 

436.  Some  passages  from  the  writings  of  those  who 
took  part  in  the  struggle  have  been  already  quoted, 
and  the  most  spirited  description  of  the  defeat  of  the 
Armada  which  ever  was  penned  may  perhaps  be 
taken  from  the  letter  which  our  brave  Vice-admiral 
Drake  wrote  in  answer  to  some  mendacious  stories, 
by  which  the  Spaniards  strove  to  hide  their  shame. 
Thus  does  he  describe  the  scenes  in  which  he  played 
so  important  a part.* 

437.  “They  were  not  ashamed  to  publish,  in  sun- 
dry languages  in  print,  great  victories  in  words, 
which  they  pretended  to  have  obtained  against  this 
realm,  and  spread  the  same  in  a most  false  sort  over 
all  parts  of  France,  Italy,  and  elsewhere ; when, 
shortly  afterward,  it  was  happily  manifested  in  very 
deed  to  all  nations,  how  their  navy,  which  they 
termed  invincible,  consisting  of  one  hundred  and 
forty  sail  of  ships,  not  only  of  their  own  kingdom, 
but  strengthened  with  the  greatest  argosies,  Portugal 
carracks,  Florentines,  and  large  hulks  of  other  coun- 
tries, were  by  thirty  of  her  majesty ^s  own  ships  of 
war,  and  a few  of  our  own  merchants,  by  the  wise, 
valiant,  and  advantageous  conduct  of  the  Lord 
Charles  Howard,  high  admiral  of  England,  beaten 

* See  Strype,  and  the  notes  to  the  Life  of  Drake,  in  the 
“ Biographia  Britannica,” 


402 


DEFEAT  OF 


and  shuffled  together  even  from  the  Lizard  in  Corn- 
wall, first  to  Portland,  when  they  shamefully  left 
Don  Pedro  de  Valdez  with  his  mighty  ship ; from 
Portland  to  Calais,  where  they  lost  Hugh  de  Mon- 
cado,  with  the  galleys  of  which  he  was  captain ; and 
from  Calais,  driven  with  squibs  from  their  anchors, 
were  chased  out  of  the  sight  of  England,  round  about 
Scotland  and  Ireland;  where,  for  the  sympathy  of 
their  religion,  hoping  to  find  succor  and  assistance, 
a great  part  of  them  were  crushed  against  the  rocks, 
and  those  others  that  landed,  being  very  many  in 
number,  were,  notwithstanding,  broken,  slain,  and 
taken,  and  so  sent  from  village  to  village,  coupled  in 
halters  to  be  shipped  into  England,  where  her  maj- 
esty, of  her  princely  and  invincible  disposition,  dis- 
daining to  put  them  to  death,  and  scorning  either  to 
retain  or  to  entertain  them,  they  were  all  sent  back 
again  to  their  countries,  to  witness  and  recount  the 
worthy  achievement  of  their  invincible  and  dread t til 
navy.  Of  which  the  number  of  soldiers,  the  fearful 
burden  of  their  ships,  the  commanders’  names  ol 
every  squadron,  with  all  others,  their  magazines 
of  prov  ision,  were  put  in  print,  as  an  army  and  navy 
irresistible  and  disdaining  prevention;  with  all 
which  their  great  and  terrible  ostentation,  they  did 
not  in  all  their  sailing  round  about  England  so  much 
as  sink  or  take  one  ship,  barque,  pinnace,  or  cock- 
boat of  ours,  or  even  burn  so  much  as  one  sheep-cote 
on  this  land.” 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVEN2S. 


403 


Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Defeat  of 

THE  Spanish  Armada,  A.  D.  1588,  and  the 

Battle  of  Blenheim,  A.  D.  1704. 

A.  D.  1594.  Henry  IV.  ol*  France  conforms  to  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church,  and  ends  the  civil  wars 
that  had  long  desolated  France. 

1598.  Philip  II.  of  Spain  dies,  leaving  a mined 
navy  and  an  exhausted  kingdom. 

1603.  Death  of  Queen  Elizabeth.  The  Scotch  dy- 
nasty of  the  Stuarts  succeeds  to  the  throne  of  Eng- 
land. 

1619.  Commencement  Of  the  Thirty  Years’  War  in 
Germany. 

1624-1642.  Cardinal  Richelieu  is  minister  of  France. 
He  breaks  the  power  of  the  nobility,  reduces  the 
Huguenots  to  complete  subjection,  and  by  aiding  the 
Protestant  German  princes  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
Thirty  Years’  War,  he  humiliates  France’s  ancient 
rival,  Austria. 

1630.  Gustavus  Adolphus,  King  of  Sweden,  marches 
into  Germany  to  the  assistance  of  the  Protestants, 
who  were  nearly  crushed  by  the  Austrian  armies. 
He  gains  several  great  victories,  and,  after  his  death. 
Sweden,  under  his  statesmen  and  generals,  continues 
to  take  a leading  part  in  the  war.  : 

1640.  Portugal  throws  off  the  Spanish  yoke ; and 
the  house  of  Braganza  begins  to  reign. 

1642.  Commencement  of  the  civil  war  in  England 
between  Charles  I.  and  his  Parliament. 

1648.  The  Thirty  Years’  War  in  Germany  ended 
by  the  treaty  of  Westphalia. 


404 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


1653.  Oliver  Cromwell  Lord  Protector  of  England. 

1660.  Restoration  of  the  Stuarts  to  the  English 
throne. 

1661.  Louis  XIV.  takes  the  administration  of  af- 
fairs in  France  into  his  own  hands. 

1667-1668.  Louis  XIV.  makes  w^ar  on  Spain,  and 
conquers  a large  part  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands. 

1672.  Louis  makes  war  upon  Holland,  and  almost 
overpowers  it.  Charles  II.,  of  England,  is  his  pen- 
sioner, and  England  helps  the  French  in  their  attacks 
upon  Holland  until  1674.  Heroic  resistance  of  the 
Dutch  upon  the  Prince  of  Orange. 

1674.  Louis  conquers  Franche-Comte. 

1679.  Peace  of  Nimegueu. 

1681.  Louis  invades  and  occupies  Alsace. 

1682.  Accession  of  Peter  the  Great  to  the  throne  of 
Russia. 

1685.  Louis  commences  a merciless  persecution  of 
his  Protestant  subjects. 

1688.  The  glorious  Revolution  in  England.  Ex- 
pulsion of  James  II.  William  of  Orange  is  made 
King  of  England.  James  takes  refuge  at  the  French 
court,  and  Louis  undertakes  to  restore  him.  General 
war  in  the  west  of  Europe. 

1697.  Treaty  of  Ryswick.  Charles  XII.  becomes 
King  of  Sweden. 

1700.  Charles  II.,  of  Spain,  dies,  having  bequeathed 
his  dominions  to  Philip  of  Anjou,  Louis  XIV.’s 
grandson.  Defeat  of  the  Russians  at  Narva  by  Charles 
XII. 

1701.  William  III.  forms  a “Grand  Alliance  ” of 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


405 


Austria,  the  Empire,  the  United  Provinces,  England, 
and  other  powers,  against  France. 

1702.  King  William  dies ; hut  his  successor,  Queen 
Anne,  adheres  to  the  Grand  Alliance,  and  war  is 
proclaimed  against  France. 


40G 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM,  A.  D.  1704. 

The  decisive  blow  struck  at  Blenheim,  resounded 
through  every  part  of  Europe:  it  at  once  destroyed  the 
vast  fabric  of  power  which  it  had  taken  Louis XIV.,  aided 
by  the  talents  of  Turenne  and  the  genius  of  Vauban,  so 
long  to  construct  .—Alison. 

438.  Though  more  slowly  moulded  and  less  im- 
posingly vast  than  the  empire  of  Napoleon,  the  power 
which  Louis  XIV.  had  acquired  and  was  acquiring 
at  the  commencement  of  the  eighteenth  century  was 
almost  equally  menacing  to  the  general  liberties  of 
Europe.  If  tested  by  the  amount  of  permanent 
aggrandizement  which  each  procured  for  France,  the 
ambition  of  the  royal  Bourbon  was  more  successful 
than  were  the  enterprises  of  the  imperial  Corsican. 
All  the  provinces  that  Bonaparte  conquered  were 
rent  again  from  France  within  twenty  years  from  the 
date  when  the  very  earliest  of  them  was  acquired. 
France  is  not  stronger  by  a single  city  or  a single 
acre  for  all  the  devastating  wars  of  the  Consulate 
and  the  Empire.  But  she  still  possesses  Franche- 
Comt4,  Alsace,  and  part  of  Flanders.  She  has  still 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEBI, 


407 


the  extended  boundaries  which  Louis  XIV.  gave  her; 
and  the  royal  Spanish  marriages  a few  years  ago 
proved  clearly  how  enduring  has  been  the  political 
influence  which  the  arts  and  arms  of  France’s  “ Grand 
Monarque  ” obtained  for  her  southward  of  the  Py- 
renees. 

* 439.  When  Louis  XIV.  took  the  reins  of  govern- 
ment into  his  own  hands  after  the  death  of  Cardinal 
Mazarin,  there  was  a union  of  ability  with  oppor- 
tunity such  as  France  had  not  seen  since  the  days  of 
Charlemagne.  Moreover,  Louis’s  career  was  no  brief 
one.  For  upward  of  forty  years,  for  a period  nearly 
equal  to  the  duration  of  Charlemagne’s  reign,  Louis 
steadily  followed  an  aggressive  and  a generally  suc- 
cessful policy.  He  passed  a long  youth  and  manhood 
of  triumph  before  the  military  genius  of  Marlbor- 
ough made  him  acquainted  with  humiliation  and  de- 
feat. The  great  Bourbon  lived  too  long.  He  should 
not  have  outstayed  our  two  English  kings,  one  his 
dependent.  James  II.,  the  other  his  antagonist,  Wil- 
liam III.  Had  he  died  when  they  died,  his  reign 
would  be  cited  as  unequaled  in  the  French  annals  for 
its  prosperity.  But  he  lived  on  to  see  his  armies 
beaten,  his  cities  captured,  and  his  kingdom  wasted 
year  after  year  by  disastrous  war.  It  is  as  if  Charle- 
magne had  survived  to  be  defeated  by  the  Northmen, 
and  to  witness  the  misery  and  shame  that  actually 
fell  to  the  lot  of  his  descendants. 

440.  Still,  Louis  XIV.  had  forty  years  of  success  ; 
and  from  the  permanence  of  their  fruits,  we  may 
judge  what  the  results  would  have  been  if  the  last 


408 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


fifteen  years  of  his  reign  had  been  equally  fortunate. 
Had  it  not  been  for  Blenheim,  all  Europe  might  at 
this  day  suffer  under  the  effect  of  French  conquests 
resembling  those  of  Alexander  in  extent,  and  those 
of  the  Romans  in  durability. 

441.  When  Louis  XIV.  began  to  govern,  he  found 
all  the  materials  for  a strong  government  ready  to  his 
hand.  Richelieu  had  completely  tamed  the  turbu- 
lent spirit  of  the  French  nobility,  and  had  subverted 
the  “ imperium  in  imperio  ” of  the  Huguenots.  The 
faction  of  the  Frondeurs  in  Mazarin’s  time  had  had 
the  effect  of  making  the  Parisian  Parliament  utterly 
hateful  and  contemptible  in  the  eyes  of  the  nation. 
The  assemblies  of  the  States -General  were  obsolete. 
The  royal  authority  alone  remained.  The  king  was 
the  state.  Louis  knew  his  position.  He  fearlessly 
avowed  it,  and  he  fearlessly  acted  up  to  it.* 

442.  Not  only  was  his  government  a strong  one, 
but  the  country  which  he  governed  was  strong — 
strong  in  its  geographical  situation,  in  the  compact- 
ness of  its  territory,  in  the  number  and  martial  spirit 
of  its  inhabitants,  and  in  their  complete  and  undi- 
vided nationality.  Louis  had  neither  a Hungary  nor 
an  Ireland  in  his  dominions.  The  civil  war  in  the 
Cevennes  was  caused  solely  by  his  own  persecuting 
intolerance  ; and  that  did  not  occur  till  late  in  his 
reign,. when  old  age  had  made  his  bigotry  more 

* “Quand  Louis  XIV.  dit,  ‘L’Etat,  c’est  mou’  il  n’y  ent 
dans  cette  parole  ni  enflure,  ni  vantere,  mais  la  simple 
enonciationd’ur  fait.”— Michelet,  Historie  Moderne,  voL 
ii.,  p.  106. 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


409 


gloomy,  and  had  given  fanaticism  the  mastery  over 
prudence. 

443.  Like  Napoleon  in  after  times,  Louis  XIV.  saw 
clearly  that  the  great  wants  of  France  were  “ ships, 
colonies,  and  commerce.”  But  Louis  did  more  than 
see  these  wants : by  the  aid  of  his  great  minister, 
Colbert,  he  supplied  them.  One  of  the  surest  proofs 
of  the  genius  of  Louis  was  his  skill  in  finding  out 
genius  in  others,  and  his  promptness  in  calling  it  into 
action.  Under  him,  Louvois  organized,  Turenne, 
Cond6,  Villars,  and  Berwick  led  the  armies  of  France, 
and  Vauban  fortified  her  frontiers.  Throughout  his 
reign  French  diplomacy  was  marked  by  skillfulness 
and  activity,  and  also  by  compreheusive  far-sighted- 
ness, such  as  the  representatives  of  no  other  nation 
possessed.  Guizot’s  testimony  to  the  vigor  that  was 
displayed  through  every  branch  of  Louis  XIV.’s  gov- 
ernment, and  to  the  extent  to  which  France  at  pres- 
ent is  indebted  to  him,  is  remarkable.  He  says  that, 
“ taking  the  public  service  of  every  kind,  the  finances, 
the  departments  of  roads  and  public  works,  the 
military  administration,  and  all  the  establishments 
which  belong  to  every  branch  of  administration, 
there  is  not  one  that  will  not  be  found  to  have  had 
its  origin,  its  development,  or  its  greatest  perfection 
under  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV.”*  And  he  points  out 
to  us  that  “ the  government  of  Louis  XIV.  was  the 
first  that  presented  itself  to  the  eyes  of  Europe  as  a 
power  acting  upon  sure  grounds,  which  had  not  to 
dispute  its  existence  with  inward  enemies,  but  was 

* “ History  of  European  Civilization,”  Lecture  13. 


410 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


at  ease  as  to  its  territory  and  its  people,  and  solely 
occupied  with  the  task  of  administering  government, 
properly  so  called.  All  the  European  governments 
had  been  previously  thrown  into  incessant  wars, 
which  deprived  them  of  all  security  as  well  as  of  all 
leisure,  or  so  pestered  by  internal  parties  or  antag- 
onists that  their  time  was  passed  in  fighting  for  ex- 
istence. The  government  of  Louis  XIV.  was  the 
first  to  appear  as  a busy,  thriving  administration  of 
affairs,  as  a power  at  once  definite  and  progressive, 
which  was  not  afraid  to  innovate,  because  it  could 
reckon  securely  on  the  future.  There  have  been,  in 
fact,  very  few  governments  equally  innovating. 
Compare  it  with  a government  of  the  same  nature, 
the  unmixed  monarchy  of  Philip  II.  in  Spain ; it 
was  more  absolute  than  that  of  Louis  XIV.,  and  yet 
it  was  far  less  regular  and  tranquil.  How  did  Philip 
II.  succeed  in  establishing  absolute  power  in  Spain  ? 
By  stifling  all  activity  in  the  country,  opposing  him- 
self to  every  species  of  amelioration,  and  rendering 
the  state  of  Spain  completely  stagnant.  The  govern- 
ment of  Louis  XIV.,  on  the  contrary,  exhibited 
alacrity  for  all  sorts  of  innovations,  and  showed  itself 
favorable  to  the  progress  of  letters,  arts,  wealth — in 
short,  of  civilization.  This  was  the  veritable  cause 
of  its  preponderance  in  Europe,  which  arose  to  such 
a pitch,  that  it  became  the  type  of  a government  not 
only  to  sovereigns,  but  also  to  nations,  during  the 
seventeenth  century.” 

444.  While  France  was  thus  strong  and  united  in 
herself,  and  ruled  by  a martial,  an  ambitious,  and 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


411 


(with  all  his  faults)  an  enlightened  and  high-spirited 
sovereign,  what  European  power  was  there  fit  to 
cope  with  her  or  keep  her  in  check  ? 

445.  “ As  to  Germany,  the  ambitious  projects  of 
the  German  branch  of  Austria  had  been  entirely  de- 
feated, the  peace  of  the  empire  had  been  restored, 
and  almost  a new  constitution  formed,  or  an  old  re- 
vived, by  the  treatias  of  Westphalia;  nay^  the  impe- 
rial eagle  ivas  not  only  fallen.,  hut  her  wings  were  clip- 
ped.^^  * 

446.  As  to  Spain,  the  Spanish  branch  of  the  Aus- 
trian house  had  sunk  equally  low.  Philip  II.  left 
his  successors  a ruined  monarchy.  He  left  them 
something  worse  ; he  left  them  his  example  and  his 
principles  of  government,  founded  in  ambition,  in 
pride,  in  ignorance,  in  bigotry,  and  all  the  pedantry 
of  state.f 

447.  It  is  not,  therefore,  to  be  wondered  at,  that 
France,  in  the  first  war  of  Louis  XIV.,  despised  the 
opposition  of  both  branches  of  the  once  predominant 

* Bolingbroke,  vol  ii.,  p 378.  Lord Bolingbroke’s  “Let- 
ters on  the  Use  ol  History,”  and  his  “Sketch  of  the  His- 
tory and  State  of  Europe,” abound  with  remarks  on  Louis 
XIV.  and  his  contemporaries,  of  which  the  substance  is 
as  sound  as  the  style  is  beautiful.  Unfortunately,  like  all 
his  other  works,  they  contain  also  a large  proportion  of 
sophistry  and  misrepresentation.  The  best  test  to  use  be- 
fore we  adopt  any  opinion  or  assertion  of  Bolingbroke’s 
is  to  consider  whether  in  writing  it  he  was  thinking  either 
of  Sir  Robert  Walpole  or  of  Revealed  Religion.  When 
either  of  these  objects  of  his  hatred  was  before  his  minds 
he  scrupled  at  no  artifice  or  exaggeration  that  might  serve 
the  purpose  of  his  malignity  On  most  other  occasions 
he  may  be  followed  with  advantage,  as  he  always  may  be 
read  with  pleasure. 

+ Bolingbroke,  vol.  ii.,  p.  *dT8. 


412 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEI3L 


house  of  Austria.  Indeed,  in  Germany,  the  French 
king  acquired  allies  among  the  princes  of  the  empire 
against  the  emperor  himself.  He  had  a still  stronger 
support  in  Austria’s  misgovernment  of  her  own  sub- 
jects. The  words  of  Bolinghroke  on  this  are  remark- 
able, and  some  of  them  sound  as  if  written  within 
the  last  three  years.  Bolinghroke  says,  “ It  was  not 
merely  the  want  of  cordial  co-operation  among  the 
princes  of  the  empire  that  disabled  the  emperor  from 
acting  with  vigor  in  the  cause  of  his  family  then,  nor 
that  has  rendered  the  house  of  Austria  a dead  weight 
upon  all  her  allies  ever  since.  Bigotry,  and  its  insep- 
arable companion,  cruelty,  as  well  as  the  tyranny 
and  avarice  of  the  court  of  Vienna,  created  in  those 
days,  and  has  maintained  in  ours,  almost  a perpetual 
dispersion  of  the  imperial  arms  from  all  effectual  op- 
position to  France.  I mean  to  speak  of  the  trouhles  in 
Hungary.  Whatever  they  became  in  their  progress^  they 
were  caused  originally  hy  the  usurpations  and  persecu- 
tions of  the  emperor ; and  when  the  Hungarians  were 
called  rebels  first.,  they  wei^e  called  so  for  no  other  reason 
than  this,  that  they  would  not  be  slaves,  The  dominion 
of  the  emperor  being  less  supportable  than  that  of  the 
Turks,  this  unhappy  people  opened  a door  to  the  lat- 
ter to  infest  the  empire,  instead  of  making  their 
country  what  it  had  been  before,  a barrier  against 
the  Ottoman  power.  France  became  a sure  though 
secret  ally  of  the  Turks  as  well  as  the  Hungarians, 
and  has  found  her  account  in  it  by  keeping  the  em- 
peror in  perpetual  alarms  on  that  side,  while  she  has 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


413 


ravaged  the  empire  and  the  Low  Countries  on  the 
other.”  “ 

448.  If,  after  having  seen  the  imbecility  of  Ger- 
many and  Spain  against  the  France  of  Louis  XIV., 
we  turn  to  the  two  only  remaining  European  powers 
of  any  importance  at  that  time,  to  England  and  to 
Holland,  we  find  the  position  of  our  own  country  as 
to  European  politics,  from  1660  to  1688,  most  painful 
to  contemplate ; nor  is  our  external  history  during 
the  last  twelve  years  of  the  eighteenth  century  by 
any  means  satisfactory  to  national  pride,  though  it 
is  infinitely  less  shameful  than  that  of  the  preceding 
twenty-eight  years.  From  1660  to  1668,  “ England, 
by  the  return  of  the  Stuarts,  was  reduced  to  a nul- 
lity.” The  words  are  Michelet’s,!  and  though  severe, 
they  are  just.  They  are,  in  fact,  not  severe  enough  ; 
for  when  England,  under  her  restored  dynasty  of  the 
Stuarts,  did  take  any  part  in  European  politics,  her 
conduct,  or  rather  her  king’s  conduct,  was  almost  in- 
variably wicked  and  dishonorable. 

449.  Bolingbroke  rightly  says  that,  previous  to  the 
revolution  of  1688,  during  the  whole  progress  that 
Louis  XIV.  made  toward  acquiring  such  exorbitant 
power  as  gave  him  well-grounded  hopes  of  acquiring 
at  last  to  his  family  the  Spanish  monarchy,  England 
had  been  either  an  idle  spectator  of  what  passed  on 
the  Continent,  or  a faint  and  uncertain  ally  against 
France,  or  a warm  and  sure  ally  on  her  side,  or  a 
partial  mediator  between  her  and  the  powers  confed- 

* Bolingbroke,  vol  ii.,  p.  397. 

t “ Histoire  Moderne,”  vol.  ii.,p.  106. 


414 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM, 


crated  together  in  their  common  defense.  But 
though  the  court  of  England  submitted  to  abet  the 
usurpations  of  France,  and  the  King  of  England 
stooped  to  be  her  pensioner,  the  crime  was  not  na- 
tional. On  the  contrary,  the  nation  cried  out  loudly 
against  it  even  while  it  was  committing.* 

450.  Holland  alone,  of  all  the  European  powers, 
opposed  from  the  very  beginning  a steady  and  uni- 
form resistance  to  the  ambition  and  power  of  the 
French  king.  It  was  against  Holland  that  the  fierc- 
est attacks  of  France  were  made,  and,  though  often 
apparently  on  the  eve  of  complete  success,  they  were 
always  ultimately  baffled  by  the  stubborn  bravery  of 
the  Dutch,  and  the  heroism  of  their  great  leader, 
William  of  Orange.  When  he  became  King  of  Eng- 
land, the  power  of  this  country  was  thrown  decidedly 
into  the  scale  against  France ; but  though  the  con- 
test was  thus  rendered  less  unequal,  though  William 
acted  throughout  “ with  invincible  firmness,  like  a 
l^atriot  and  a hero,”f  France  had  the  general  superi- 
ority in  every  war  and  in  every  treaty ; and  the  com- 
mencement of  the  eighteenth  century  found  the  last 
league  against  her  dissolved,  all  the  forces  of  the  con- 
federates against  her  dispersed,  and  many  disbanded ; 
while  France  continued  armed,  with  her  veteran 
forces  by  sea  and  land  increased,  and  held  in  readi- 
ness to  act  on  all  sides,  whenever  the  opportunity 
should  arise  for  seizing  on  the  great  prizes  which, 
from  the  very  beginning  of  his  reign,  had  never  been 
lost  sight  of  by  her  king. 

* Bolingbroke,  vol.  ii.,  p.  418 
+ Ibid.,  p.  404. 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


415 


451.  This  is  not  the  place  for  any  narrative  of  the 
first  evsssay  which  Louis  XIV.  made  of  his  power  in 
the  war  of  1667 ; of  his  rapid  conquest  of  Flanders 
and  Tranche -Comte ; of  the  treaty  of  Aix-la  Cha- 
pelle,  which  “ was  nothing  more  than  a composition 
between  the  bully  and  the  bullied  of  his  attack 
on  Holland  in  1672 ; of  the  districts  and  barrier 
towns  of  the  Spanish  Netherlands,  which  were 
secured  to  him  by  the  treaty  of  Nimeguen  in  1678 ; 
of  how,  after  this  treaty,  he  ‘‘  continued  to  vex  both 
Spain  and  the  empire,  and  to  extend  his  conquests 
in  the  Low  Countries  and  on  the  Rhine,  both  by  the 
pen  and  the  sword ; how  he  took  Luxembourg  by 
force,  stole  Strasburg,  and  bought  Casal of  how 
the  league  of  Augsburg  was  formed  against  him  in 
1686,  and  the  election  of  William  of  Orange  to  the 
English  throne  in  1688  gave  a new  spirit  to  the  op- 
position which  France  encountered  ; of  the  long  and 
checkered  war  that  followed,  in  which  the  French 
armies  were  generally  victorious  on  the  Continent, 
though  his  fleet  was  beaten  at  La  Hogue,  and  his  de- 
pendent, James  II.,  was  defeated  at  the  Boyne;  or 
of  the  treaty  of  Ryswick,  which  left  France  in  pos- 
session of  Roussillon,  Artois,  and  Strasburg,  which 
gave  Europe  no  security  against  her  claims  on  the 
Spanish  succession,  and  which  Louis  regarded  as  a 
mere  truce,  to  gain  breathing- time  before  a more  de- 
cisive struggle.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the 
ambition  of  Louis  in  these  wars  was  two-fold.  It 
had  its  immediate  and  its  ulterior  objects.  Its  im- 
Ibid.,  p.  399. 


416 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM, 


mediate  object  was  to  conquer  and  annex  to  France 
the  neighboring  provinces  and  towns  that  were  most 
convenient  for  the  increase  of  her  strength  ; but  the 
ulterior  object  of  Louis,  from  the  time  of  his  mar- 
riage to  the  Spanish  Infanta  in  1659,  was  to  acquire 
for  the  house  of  Bourbon  the  whole  empire  of  Spain. 
A formal  renunciation  of  all  right  to  the  Spanish 
succession  had  been  made  at  the  time  of  the  mar- 
riage; but  such  renunciations  were  never  of  any 
practical  effect,  and  many  casuists  and  jurists  of  the 
age  even  held  them  to  be  intrinsically  void.  As  the 
time  passed  on,  and  the  prospect  of  Charles  II.  of 
Spain  dying  without  lineal  heirs  became  more  and 
more  certain,  so  did  the  claims  of  the  house  of  Bour- 
bon to  the  Spanish  crown  after  his  death  become 
matters  of  urgent  interest  to  French  ambition  on 
the  one  hand,  and  to  the  other  powers  of  Europe  ou 
the  other.  At  length  the  unhappy  King  of  Spain 
died.  By  his  will  he  appointed  Philip,  duke  of 
Anjou,  one  of  Louis  XIV. ’s  grandsons,  to  succeed 
him  on  the  throne  of  Spain,  and  strictly  forbade 
any  partition  of  his  dominion.  Louis  well  knew 
that  a general  European  war  would  follow  if  he  ac- 
cepted for  his  house  the  crown  thus  bequeathed. 
But  he  had  been  preparing  for  this  crisis  throughout 
his  reign.  He  sent  his  grandson  into  Spain  as  King 
Philip  V.  of  that  country,  addressing  to  him,  on  his 
departure,  the  memorable  words,  “ There  are  no 
longer  any  Pyrenees.” 

452.  The  empire,  which  now  received  the  grand- 
son of  Louis  as  its  king,  comprised,  besides  Spain 


hA  TTLE  OF  BLENHEIM, 


41 


itself,  the  strongest  part  of  the  Netherlands,  Sar- 
dinia, Sicily,  Naples,  the  principality  of  Milan,  and 
other  possessions  in  Italy,  the  Philippines  and  Man- 
illa Islands  in  Asia,  and  in  the  New  World,  besides 
California  and  Florida,  the  greatest  part  of  Central 
and'of  Southern  America.  Philip  was  well  received 
in  Madrid,  where  he  was  crowned  as  King  Philip  V. 
in  the  beginning  of  1701.  The  distant  portions  of 
his  empire  sent  in  their  adhesion  ; and  the  house  of 
Bourbon,  either  by  its  French  or  Spanish  troops, 
now  had  occupation  both  of  the  kingdom  of  Francis  I., 
and  of  the  fairest  and  amplest  portions  of  the  em- 
pire of  the  great  rival  of  Francis,  Charles  V. 

453.  Loud  was  the  wrath  of  Austria,  whose  princes 
were  the  rival  claimants  of  the  Bourbons  for  the  em- 
pire of  Spain.  The  indignation  of  our  William  III., 
though  not  equally  loud,  was  far  more  deep  and  en- 
ergetic. By  his  exertions,  a league  against  the  house 
of  Bourbon  was  formed  between  England,  Holland, 
and  the  Austrian  emperor,  which  was  subsequently 
joined  by  the  Kings  of  Portugal  and  Prussia,  by  the 
Duke  of  Savoy,  and  by  Denmark.  Indeed,  the  alarm 
throughout  Europe  was  now  general  and  urgent.  It 
was  evident  that  Louis  aimed  at  consolidating  France 
and  the  Spanish  dominions  into  one  preponderating 
empire.  At  the  moment  when  Philip  was  departing 
to  take  possession  of  Spain,  Louis  had  issued  letters- 
patent  in  his  favor  to  the  effect  of  preserving  his 
rights  to  the  throne  of  France.  And  Louis  had  him- 
self obtained  possession  of  the  important  frontier  of 
the  Spanish  Netherlands  with  its  numerous  fortified 


418 


BA  TTLE  OF  BLENHEIM, 


cities,  wliicli  were  given  up  to  liis  troops  under  pre- 
tense of  securing  them  for  the  young  King  of  Sixain. 
Whether  the  formal  union  of  the  two  crowns  was 
likely  to  take  place  speedily  or  not,  it  was  evident 
that  the  resources  of  the  whole  Spanish  monarchy 
were  now  virtually  at  the  French  king’s  disposal. 

454.  The  peril  that  seemed  to  menace  the  empire, 
England,  Holland,  and  the  other  independent  powers 
is  well  summed  up  by  Alison.  “ Spain  had  threat- 
ened the  liberties  of  Europe  in  the  end’  of  the  six- 
teenth century,  France  had  all  hut  overthrown  them 
in  the  close  of  the  seventeenth.  What  hope  was 
there  of  their  being  able  to  make  head  against  them 
both,  united  under  such  a monarch  as  Louis  XIV.?”^ 

455.  Our  knowledge  of  the  decayed  state  into 
which  the  Spanish  power  had  fallen  ought  not  to 
make  us  regard  their  alarms  as  chimerical.  Spain 
possessed  enormous  resources,  and  her  strength  was 
capable  of  being  regenerated  by  a vigorous  ruler. 
We  should  remember  what  Alberoni  effected  even 
after  the  close  of  the  war  of  Succession.  By  what 
that  minister  did  in  a few  years,  we  may  judge  what 
Louis  XIV.  would  have  done  in  restoring  the  mari- 
time and  military  power  of  that  great  country, 
which  nature  had  so  largely  gifted,  and  which  man’s 
misgovernment  has  so  debased. 

456.  The  death  of  King  William,  on  the  8th  of 
March,  1702,  at  first  seemed  likely  to  paralyze  the 
league  against  France;  “for,  notwithstanding  the  ill 
success  with  which  he  made  war  generally,  he  was 

* “ Military  History  of  the  Duke  of  Marlborough,”  p.  '3^ 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


419 


looked  upon  as  the  sole  centre  of  union  that  could 
keep  together  the  great  confederacy  then  forming; 
and  how  much  the  French  feared  from  his  life  had 
appeared  a few  years  before,  in  the  extravagant  and 
indecent  joy  they  expressed  on  a false  report  of  his 
death.  A short  time  showed  how  vain  the  fears  of 
some,  and  the  hopes  of  others  were.”*  Queen  Anne, 
within  three  days  after  her  accession,  went  down  to 
the  House  of  Lords,  and  there  declared  her  resolution 
to  support  the  measures  planned  by  her  predecessor, 
who  had  been  “ the  great  support,  not  only  of  these 
kingdoms,  but  of  all  Europe.”  Anne  was  married 
to  Prince  George  of  Denmark,  and  by  her  accession 
to  the  English  throne  the  confederacy  against  Louis 
obtained  the  aid  of  the  troops  of  Denmark;  but 
Anne’s  strong  attachment  to  one  of  her  female 
friends  led  to  far  more  important  advantages  to  the 
anti-Gallican  confederacy  than  the  acquisition  of 
many  armies,  for  it  gave  them  Marlborough  as 
their  captain  general. 

457  There  are  few  successful  commanders  on 
whom  Fame  has  shone  so  unwillingly  as  upon  John 
Churchill,  duke  of  Marlborough,  prince  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire,  victor  of  Blenheim,  Ramillies,  Oude- 
narde,  and  Malplaquet,  captor  of  Liege,  Bonn,  Lim- 
burg, Landau,  Ghent,  Bruges,  Antwerp,  Oudenarde 
Ostend,  Menin,  Dendermonde,  Ath,  Lille,  Tournay, 
Mons,  Douay,  Aire,  Bethune,  and  Bouchain ; who 
never  fought  a battle  that  he  did  not  win,  and  never 
besieged  a place  that  he  did  not  take.  Marlborough’s 

* Bolingbroke,  vol.  ii.,  p.  445.  . . 


/ 


420 


BATTLE  OF  BLENBEIM. 


own  character  is  the  cause  of  this.  Military  glory 
may,  and  too  often  does,  dazzle  both  contemporaries 
and  posterity,  until  the  crimes  as  well  as  the  vices  of 
heroes  are  forgotten.  But  even  a few  stains  of  per- 
sonal meaness  will  dim  a soldier’s  reputation  irrepara- 
bly ; and  Marlborough^s  faults  were  of  a peculiarly 
base  and  mean  order.  Our  feelings  toward  historical 
personages  are  in  this  respect  like  our  feelings 
toward  private  acquaintances.  There  are  actions  of 
that  shabby  nature,  that,  however  much  they  may 
be  outweighed  by  a man’s  good  deeds  on  a general 
estimate  of  his  character,  we  never  can  feel  any  cor- 
dial liking  for  the  person  who  has  once  been  guilty 
of  them.  Thus,  with  respect  for  the  Duke  of  Marl- 
borough, it  goes  against  our  feelings  to  admire  the 
man  who  owed  his  first  advancement  in  life  to  the 
court  favor  which  he  and  his  family  acquired  through 
his  sister  becoming  one  of  the  mistresses  of  the  Duke 
of  York.  It  is  repulsive  to  know  that  Marlborough 
laid  the  foundation  of  his  wealth  by  being  the  paid 
lover  of  one  of  the  fair  and  frail  favorites  of  Charles 
II.*  His  treachery,  and  his  ingratitude  to  his  patron 
and  benefactor,  James  II.,  stand  out  in  dark  relief 
even  in  that  age  of  thankless  perfidy.  He  was  almpst 
equally  disloyal  to  his  new  master,  King  William; 
and  a more  un-English  act  cannot  be  recorded  than 
Godolphin’s  and  Marlborough’s  betrayal  to  the 

* Marlborough  might  plead  the  example  of  Sylla  in  this. 
Compare  the  anecdote  in  Plutarch  about  Sylla  when 
young,  and  Nicopolis,  kolvti<s  fxkv^  evnopov  6€.yvi/at/cb5,and  the 
anecdote  about  Marlborough  and  the  Duchess  of  C]  ev  e- 
land,  told  by  Lord  Chesterfield,  and  cited  in  Macaulay’s 
“ History,”  vol.  i.,  p.  461. 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


421 


French  court  in  1694  of  the  expedition  then  designed 
against  Brest,  a piece  of  tr^chery  which  caused  some 
hundreds  of  English  soldiers  and  sailors  to  be  help- 
lessly slaughtered  on  the  beach  in  Cameret  Bay. 

458.  It  is,  however,  only  in  his  military  career  that 
we  have  now  to  consider  him  ; and  there  are  very 
few  generals,  of  either  ancient  or  modern  times, 
whose  campaigns  will  bear  a comparison  with  those 
of  l^Iarlborough,  either  for  the  masterly  skill  with 
which  they  were  planned,  or  for  the  bold  yet  prudent 
energy  with  which  each  plan  was  carried  into  execu- 
tion. Marlborough  had  served  while  young  under 
Turenne,  and  had  obtained  the  marked  praise  of 
that  great  tactician.  It  would  be  difficult,  indeed, 
to  name  a single  quality  which  a general  ought  to 
have,  and  with  which  Marlborough  was  not  eminent- 
ly gifted.  What  principally  attracted  the  notice  of 
contemporaries  was  the  imperturbable  evenness  of 
his  spirit.  Voltaire^  says  of  him, 

459.  “ He  had,  to  a degree  above  all  other  generals 
of  his  time,  that  calm  courage  in  the  midst  of  tumult, 
that  serenity  of  soul  in  danger,  which  the  English 
call  a cool  head  [que  les  Anglais  appellent  cold  head, 
tele  froide\  and  it  was  perhaps,  this  quality,  the 
greatest  gift  of  nature  for  command,  which  formerly 
gave  the  English  so  many  advantages  over  the  French 
in  the  plains  of  Cressy,  Poictiers,  and  Agincourt.” 

460.  King  William’s  knowledge  of  Marlborough’s 
high  abilities,  though  he  knew  his  faithlessness 
equally  well,  is  said  to  have  caused  that  sovereign  in 

* “Siecle  de  Louis  Quatorze.” 


422 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


his  last  illness  to  recommend  Marlborough  to  his  suc- 
cessor as  the  httest  person  to  command  her  armies ; 
but  Marlborough’s  favor  with  the  new  queen,  by 
means  of  his  wife,  was  so  high,  that  he  was  certain 
of  obtaining  the  highest  employment ; and  the  war 
against  Louis  opened  to  him  a glorious  theatre  for 
the  display  of  those  military  talents  which  he  had 
previously  only  had  an  opportunity  of  exercising  in  a 
subordinate  character,  and  on  far  less  conspicuous 
scenes. 

461.  He  was  not  only  made  captain  general  of  the 
English  forces  at  home  and  abroad,  but  such  was  the 
authority  of  England  in  the  council  of  the  Grand 
Alliance,  and  Marlborough  was  so  skilled  in  winning 
golden  opinions  from  all  whom  he  met  with,  that,  on 
his  reaching  the  Hague,  he  was  received  with  trans- 
ports of  joy  by  the  Dutch,  and  it  was  agreed  by  the 
heads  of  that  republic,  and  the  minister  of  the  em- 
peror, that  Marlborough  should  have  the  chief  com- 
mand of  all  the  allied  armies. 

462.  It  must,  indeed,  injustice  to  Marlborough,  be 
borne  in  mind,  that  mere  military  skill  was  by  no 
means  all  that  was  required  of  him  in  this  arduous 
and  invidious  station.  Had  it  not  been  for  his  unri- 
valed patience  and  sweetness  of  temper,  and  his  mar- 
velous ability  in  discerning  the  character  of  those 
whom  he  had  to  act  with,  his  intuitive  perception  of 
those  who  were  to  be  thoroughly  trusted,  and  of  those 
who  were  to  be  amused  with  the  mere  semblance  of 
respect  and  confidence ; had  not  Marlborough  pos- 
sessed and  employed,  while  at  the  head  of  the  allied 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


423 


armies,  all  the  qualifications  of  a polished  courtier 
and  a great  statesman,  he  never  would  have  led  the 
allied  armies  to  the  Danube.  The  confederacy  would 
not  have  held  together  for  a single  year.  His  great 
political  adversary,  Bolingbroke,  does  him  ample  jus- 
tice here.  Bolingbroke,  after  referring  to  the  loss 
which  King  William’s  death  seemed  to  infiict  on  the 
cause  of  the  allies,  observes  that,  By  his  death,  the 
Duke  of  Marlborough  was  raised  to  the  head  of  the 
the  army,  and,  indeed,  of  the  confederacy  ; where  he, 
a new,  a private  man,  a subject,  acquired  by  merit 
and  by  management  a more  deciding  influence  than 
high  birth,  confirmed  authority,  and  even  the  crown 
of  Great  Britain  had  given  to  King  William.  Not 
only  all  the  parts  of  that  vast  machine,  the  Grand 
Alliance,  were  kept  more  compact  and  entire,  but  a 
more  rapid  and  vigorous  motion  was  given  to  the 
whole;  and,  instead  of  languishing  and  disastrous 
campaigns,  we  saw  every  scene  of  the  war  full  of 
action.  All  those  wherein  he  appeared,  and  many 
of  those  wherein  he  was  not  then  an  actor,  but  abet- 
tor, however,  of  their  action,  were  crowned  with  the 
most  triumphant  success. 

463.  “ I take  with  pleasure  this  opportunity  of  do- 
ing justice  to  that  great  man,  whose  faults  I knew, 
whose  virtues  I admired ; and  whose  memory  as  the 
greatest  general  and  the  greatest  minister  that  our 
country  or  perhaps  any  other,  has  produced,  I 
honor.”  * 

464.  War  was  formally  declared  by  the  allies 

* Bolingbroke,  vol.  ii.,  p.  445. 


424 


BATTLE  OF  BLEFHEIM. 


against  France  on  the«4th  of  May,  1702.  The  princi- 
pal scenes  of  its  operation  were,  at  first,  Flanders,  the 
Upper  Khine,  and  North  Italy.  Marlborough  headed 
the  allied  troops  in  Flanders  during  the  first  two 
years  of  the  war,  and  took  some  towns  from  the  ene- 
my, but  nothing  decisive  occurred.  Nor  did  any  ac- 
tions of  importance  take  place  during  this  period  be- 
tween the  rival  armies  in  Italy.  But  in  the  centre 
of  that  line  from  north  to  south,  from  the  mouth  of 
the  Scheldt  to  the  mouth  of  the  Po,  along  which  the 
war  was  carried  on,  the  generals  of  Louis  XIV.  ac- 
quired advantages  in  1703  which  threatened  one 
chief  member  of  the  Grand  Alliance  with  utter  de- 
struction. France  had  obtained  the  important 
assistance  of  Bavaria  as  her  confederate  in  the  war. 
The  elector  of  this  powerful  German  state  made  him- 
self master  of  the  strong  fortress  of  Ulm,  and  opened 
a communication  with  the  French  armies  on  the  Up- 
per Rhine.  By  this  junction,  the  troops  of  Louis 
were  enabled  to  assail  the  emperor  in  the  very  heart 
of  Germany.  In  the  autumn  of  the  year  1703,  the 
combined  armies  of  the  elector  and  French  king 
completely  defeated  the  Imperialists  in  Bavaria; 
and  in  the  following  winter  they  made  themselves 
masters  of  the  important  cities  of  Augsburg  and 
Passau.  Meanwhile  the  French  army  of  the  Upper 
Rhine  and  Moselle  had  beaten  the  allied  armies  op- 
posed to  them,  and  taken  Treves  aud  Landau.  At 
the  same  time,  the  discontents  in  Hungary  with 
Austria  again  broke  out  into  open  insurrection,  so  as 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM 


425 


to  distract  the  attention  and  complete  the  terror  of 
the  emperor  and  his  council  at  Vienna. 

465.  Louis  XIV.  ordered  the  next  campaign  to  be 
commenced  by  his  troops  on  a scale  of  grandeur  and 
with  a boldness  of  enterprise  such  as  even  Napoleon’s 
military  schemes  have  seldom  equaled.  On  the  ex- 
treme left  of  the  line  of  the  war,  in  the  Netherlands, 
the  French  armies  were  to  act  only  on  the  detensive. 
The  fortresses  in  the  hands  of  the  French  there  were 
so  many  and  so  strong,  that  no  serious  impression 
seemed  likely  to  be  made  by  the  allies  on  the  French 
frontier  in  that  quarter  during  one  campaign,  and 
that  one  campaign  was  to  give  France  such  triumphs 
elsewhere  as  would  (it  was  hoped)  determine  the 
war.  Large  detachments  were  therefore  to  be  made 
from  the  French  force  in  Flanders,  and  they  were  to 
be  led  by  Marshal  Villeroy  to  the  Moselle  and  Upper 
Rhine.  The  French  army  already  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  those  rivers  was  to  march  under  Marshal 
Tallard  through  the  Black  Forest,  and  join  the 
Elector  of  Bavaria,  and  the  French  troops  that  were 
already  with  the  elector  under  Marshal  Marsin. 
Meanwhile  the  French  army  of  Italy  was  to  advance 
through  the  Tyrol  into  Austria,  and  the  whole  forces 
were  to  combine  between  the  Danube  and  the  Inn. 
A strong  body  of  troops  was  to  be  dispatched  into 
Hungary,  to  assist  and  organize  the  insurgents  in 
that  kingdom ; and  the  French  grand  army  of  the 
Danube  was  then  in  collected  and  irresistible  might 
to  march  upon  Vienna,  and  dictate  terms  of  peace  to 
the  emperor.  High  military  genius  was  shown  in 


426 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEBL 


the  formation  of  this  plan,  but  it  was  met  and  baffled 
by  a genius  higher  still. 

466.  Marlborough  had  watched,  with  the  deepest 
anxiety,  the  progress  of  the  French  arms  on  the 
Khine  and  in  Bavaria,  and  he  saw  the  futility  of  car- 
rying on  a war  of  posts  and  sieges  in  Flanders,  while 
death-blows  to  the  empire  were  being  dealt  on  the 
Danube.  He  resolved,  therefore,  to  let  the  war  in 
Flanders  languish  for  a year,  while  he  moved  with 
all  the  disposable  forces  that  he  could  collect  to  the 
central  scenes  of  decisive  operations.  Such  a march  , 
was  in  itself  difflcult ; but  Marlborough  had,  in  the 
first  instance,  to  overcome  the  still  greater  difficulty 
of  obtaining  the  consent  and  cheerful  co-operation  of 
the  allies,  especially  of  the  Dutch,  whose  frontier  it 
was  proposed  thus  to  deprive  of  the  larger  part  of 
the  force  which  had  hitherto  been  its  protection. 
Fortunately,  among  the  many  slothful,  the  many 
foolish,  the  many  timid,  and  the  not  few  treacherous 
rulers,  statesmen,  and  generals  of  different  nations 
with  whom  he  had  to  deal,  there  were  two  men,  emi- 
nent both  in  ability  and  integrity,  who  entered  fully 
into  Marlborough’s  projects,  and  who,  from  the  sta- 
tions which  they  occupied,  were  enabled  materially 
to  forward  them.  One  of  these  was  the  Dutch  states- 
man Heinsius,  who  had  been  the  cordial  supporter  of 
King  William,  and  who  now,  with  equal  zeal  and 
good  faith,  supported  Marlborough  in  the  councils  of 
the  allies;  the  other  was  the  celebrated  general. 
Prince  Eugene,  whom  the  Austrian  cabinet  had  re- 
called from  the  Italian  frontier  to  take  the  command 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


427 


of  one  of  the  emperor’s  armies  in  Germany.  To  these 
two  great  men,  and  a few  more,  Marlborough  com- 
municated his  plan  freely  and  unreservedly  ; but  to 
the  general  councils  of  his  allies  he  only  disclosed 
part  of  his  daring  scheme.  He  proposed  to  the  Dutch 
that  he  should  march  from  Flanders  to  the  Upper 
Ehine  and  Moselle  with  the  British  troops  and  part 
of  the  foreign  auxiliaries,  and  commence  vigorous  op- 
erations against  the  French  armies  in  that  quarter, 
while  General  Auverquerque,  with  the  Dutch  and 
the  remainder  of  the  auxiliaries,  maintained  a defen- 
sive war  in  the  Netherlands.  Having  with  difficulty 
obtained  the  consent  of  the  Dutch  to  this  portion  of 
his  project,  he  exercised  the  same  diplomatic  zeal, 
with  the  same  success,  in  urging  the  King  of  Prussia, 
and  other  princes  of  the  empire,  to  increase  the  num- 
ber of  the  troops  which  they  supplied,  and  to  post 
them  in  places  convenient  for  his  own  intended  move- 
ments. 

467.  Marlborough  commenced  his  celebrated  march  on 
the  19th  of  May.  The  army  which  he  was  to  lead 
had  been  assembled  by  his  brother.  General  Churchill, 
at  Bedburg,  not  far  from  Maestricht,  on  the  Meuse: 
it  included  sixteen  thousand  English  troops,  and  con- 
sisted of  fifty- one  battalions  of  foot,  and  ninety- two 
squadrons  of  horse.  Marlborough  was  to  collect  and 
join  with  him  on  his  march  the  troops  of  Prussia, Lune- 
burg,  and  Hesse,  quartered  on  the  Ehine,  and  eleven 
Dutch  battalions  that  were  stationed  at  Eothweil.* 
He  had  only  marched  a single  day,  when  the  series 

* Coxe’s  “ Life  of  Marlborough.” 


428 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


of  interruptions,  complaints,  and  requisitions  from 
the  other  leaders  of  the  allies  began,  to  which  he 
seemed  subjected  throughout  his  enterprise,  and 
which  would  have  caused  its  failure  in  the  hands  of 
any  one  not  gifted  with  the  firmness  and  the  exquis- 
ite temper  of  Marlborough.  One  specimen  of  these 
annoyances  and  of  Marlborough’s  mode  of  dealing 
with  them,  may  suffice.  On  his  encamping  at  Kupen 
on  the  20th,  he  received  an  express  from  Auverquer- 
que  pressing  him  to  halt,  because  Villeroy,  who  com- 
manded the  French  army  in  Flanders,  had  quitted 
the  lines  which  he  had  been  occupying,  and  crossed 
the  Meuse  at  Namur  with  thirty-six  battalions  and 
forty-five  squadrons,  and  was  threatening  the  town 
ofHuys.  At  the  same  time  Marlborough  received 
letters  from  the  Margrave  of  Baden  and  Count 
Wratislaw,  who  commanded  the  Imperialist  forces 
at  Stollhoflfen,  near  the  left  bank  of  the  Khine,  stat- 
ing that  Tallard  had  made  a movement,  as  if  intend- 
ing to  cross  the  Rhine,  and  urging  him  to  hasten  his 
march  toward  the  lines  of  Stoll hoffen.  Marlborough 
was  not  diverted  by  these  applications  from  the  pros- 
ecution of  his  grand  design.  Conscious  that  the 
army  of  Villeroy  would  be  too  much  reduced  to  un- 
dertake offensive  operations,  by  the  detachments 
which  had  already  been  made  toward  the  Rhine,  and 
those  which  must  follow  his  own  march,  he  halted 
only  a day  to  quiet  the  alarms  of  Auverquerque.  To 
satisfy  also  the  margrave,  he  ordered  the  troops  of 
Hompesch  and  Bulow  to  draw  toward  Philipsburg, 
though  with  private  injunctions  not  to  proceed  be- 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


429 


yond  a certain  distance.  He  even  exacted  a promise 
to  the  same  effect  from  Count  Wratislaw,  who  at  the 
juncture  arrived  at  the  camp  to  attend  him  during 
the  whole  campaign.* 

468.  Marlborough  reached  the  Rhine  at  Coblentz, 
where  he  crossed  that  river,  and  then  marched  along 
its  left  bank  to  Bronbach  and  Mentz.  His  march, 
though  rapid,  was  admirably  conducted,  so  as  to 
save  the  troops  from  all  unnecessary  fatigue ; ample 
supplies  of  provisions  were  ready,  and  the  most  per- 
fect discipline  was  maintained.  By  degrees  Marl- 
borough obtained  more  re-enforcements  from  the 
Dutch  and  other  confederates,  and  he  also  was  left 
more  at  liberty  by  them  to  follow  his  own  course. 

* Indeed,  before  even  a blow  was  struck,  his  enterprise 
had  paralyzed  the  enemy,  and  had  materially  re- 
lieved Austria  from  the  pressure  of  the  war.  Ville- 
roy,  with  his  detachments  from  the  French  Flemish 
army,  was  completely  bewildered  by  Marlborough’s 
movements ; and,  unable  to  divine  where  it  was  that 
the  English  general  meant  to  strike  his  blow,  wasted 
away  the  early  part  of  the  summer  between  Flanders 
and  the  Moselle  without  effecting  anything.! 

469.  Marshal  Tallard,  who  commanded  forty*  five 
thousand  French  at  Strasburg,  and  who  had  been 
destined  by  Louis  to  march  early  in  the  year  into 
Bavaria,  thought  that  Marlborough’s  march  along 

* Coxe. 

+ “Marshal  Villeroy,”  says  Voltaire,  “who  had  wished 
to  follow  Marlborough  on  his  first  marches,  suddenly  lost 
sight  of  him  altogether,  and  only  learned  where  he  really 
was  on  hearing  of  his  victory  at  Donawert.”  Siecle  de 
Louis  XIV. 


430 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


the  Rhine  was  preliminary  to  an  attack  upon  Alsace ; 
and  the  marshal  therefore  kept  his  forty-five  thous- 
and men  hack  in  order  to  protect  France  in  that 
quarter.  Marlborough  skillfully  encouraged  his  ap- 
prehensions, by  causing  a bridge  to  be  constructed 
across  the  Rhine  at  Philipsburg,  and  by  making  the 
Landgrave  of  Hesse  advance  his  artillery  at  Man- 
heim,  as  if  for  a siege  of  Landau.  Meanwhile  the 
Elector  of  Bavaria  and  Marshal  Marsin,  suspecting 
that  Marlborough^s  design  might  be  what  it  really 
proved  to  be,  forebore  to  press  upon  the  Austrians 
opposed  to  them,  or  to  send  troops  into  Hungary ; 
and  they  kept  back  so  as  to  secure  their  communi- 
cations with  France.  Thus,  when  Marlborough,  at 
the  beginning  of  June,  left  the  Rhine  and  marched 
for  the  Danube,  the  numerous  hostile  armies  were 
uncombined,  and  unable  to  check  him. 

470.  “ With  such  skill  and  science  had  this  enter- 
prise been  concerted,  that  at  the  very  moment  when  it 
assumed  a specific  direction,  the  enemy  was  no  long- 
er enabled  to  render  it  abortive.  As  the  march  was 
now  to  be  bent  toward  the  Danube,  notice  was  given 
for  the  Prussians,  Palatines,  and  Hessians,  who  were 
stationed  on  the  Rhine,  to  order  their  march  so  as 
to  join  the  main  body  in  its  progress.  At  the  same 
time,  directions  were  sent  to  accelerate  the  advance 
of  the  Danish  auxiliaries,  who  were  marching  from 
the  Netherlands.”* 

471.  Crossing  the  River  Neckar,Marlborou^  march- 
ed in  a south-eastern  direction  to  Mundelshene,  where 


* Coxe . 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


431 


he  had  his  first  personal  interview  Avith  Prince 
Eugene,  who  was  destined  to  be  his  colleague  on  so 
many  glorious  fields.  Thence,  through  a difficult 
and  dangerons  country,  Marlborough  continued  his 
march  against  the  Bavarians,  whom  he  encountered 
on  the  2d  of  July  on  the  heights  of  the  Schullenberg, 
near  Donauwert.  Marlborough  stormed  their  in- 
trenched camp,  crossed  the  Danube,  took  several 
strong  places  in  Bavaria,  and  made  himself  completely 
master  of  the  elector’s  dominions,  except*  the  forti- 
fied cities  of  Munich  and  Augsburg.  But  the  elec- 
tor’s army,  though  defeated  at  Donauwert,  was  still 
numerous  and  strong ; and  at  last  Marshal  Tallard, 
when  thoroughly  apprised  of  the  real  nature  of  Marl- 
borough’s movements,  crossed  the  Rhine ; and  be- 
iag  suffered,  through  the  supineness  of  the  Ger- 
man general  at  Stollhofifen,  to  march  without  loss 
through  the  Black  Forest,  he  united  his  powerful 
army  at  Biberbach,  near  Augsburg,  with  that  of  the 
elector  and  the  French  troops  under  Marshal  Marsin, 
who  had  previously  been  co-operating  with  the 
Bavarians. 

472.  On  the  other  hand,  Marlborough  recrossed  the 
Danube,  and  on  the  11th  of  August  united  his  army 
with  the  Imperialist  forces  under  Prince  Eugene. 
The  combined  armies  occupied  a position  near  Hoch- 
stadt,  a little  higher  up  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube 
than  Donauwert,  the  scene  of  Marlborough’s  recent 
victory,  and  almost  exactly  on  the  ground  where 
Marshal  Villars  and  the  elector  had  defeated  an 
Austrian  army  in  the  preceding  year.  The  French 


432 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM, 


marshals  and  the  elector  were  now  in  position  a lit- 
tle farther  to  the  east,  between  Blenheim  and  Lutzin- 
gen,  and  with  the  little  stream  of  the  Nebel  between 
them  and  the  troops  of  Marlborough  and  Eugene. 
The  Gallo-Bavarian  army  consisted  of  about  sixty 
thousand  men,  and  they  had  sixty*  one  pieces  of 
artillery.  The  army  of  the  allies  was  about  fifty-six 
thousand  strong,  with  fifty -two  guns. 

473.  Although  the  French  army  of  Italy  had  been 
unable  to  penetrate  into  Austria,  and  although  the 
masterly  strategy  of  Marlborough  had  hitherto 
warded  off  the  destruction  with  which  the  cause  of 
the  allies  seemed  menaced  at  the  beginning  of  the 
campaign,  the  peril  was  still  most  serious.  It  was 
absolutely  necessary  for  Marlborough  to  attack  the 
enemy  before  Villeroy  should  be  roused  into  actioi^ 
There  was  nothing  to  stop  that  general  and  his  army 
from  marching  into  Franconia,  whence  the  allies 
drew  their  principal  supplies  ; and  besides  thus  dis- 
tressing them,  he  might,  by  marching  on  and  joining 
his  army  to  those  of  Tallard  and  the  elector,  form  a 
mass  which  would  overwhelm  the  force  under  Marl- 
borough and  Eugene.  On  the  other  hand,  the  chances 
of  a battle  seemed  perilous,  and  the  fatal  conse- 
quences of  a defeat  were  certain.  The  disadvantage 
of  the  allies  in  point  of  number  was  not  very  great, 
but  still  it  was  not  to  be  disregarded ; and  the  ad- 
vantage which  the  enemy  seemed  to  have  in  the  com- 
position of  their  troops  was  striking.  Tallard  and 
Marsin  had  forty-five  thousand  Frenchmen  under 
them,  all  veterans  and  all  trained  to  act  together; 


BATTLE  OF  BLEFHEUL 


433 


the  elector’s  own  troops  also  were  good  soldiers. 
Marlborough,  like  Wellington  at  Waterloo,  headed 
an  army,  of  which  the  larger  proportion  consisted 
not  of  English,  but  of  men  of  many  different  nations 
and  many  different  languages.  He  was  also  obliged 
to  be  the  assailant  in  the  action,  and  thus  to  expose 
his  troops  to  comparatively  heavy  loss  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  battle,  while  the  enemy  would 
fight  under  the  protection  of  the  villages  and  lines 
which  they  were  actually  engaged  in  strengthening. 
The  consequences  of  a defeat  of  the  confederated 
army  must  have  broken  up  the  Grand  Alliance,  and 
realized  the  proudest  hopes  of  the  French  king.  Mr. 
Alison,  in  his  admirable  military  history  of  the  Duke 
of  Marlborough,  has  truly  stated  the  effects  which 
would  have  taken  place  if  France  had  been  success- 
ful in  the  war;  and  when  the  position  of  the  confed- 
erates at  the  time  when  Blenheim  was  fought  is  re- 
membered— when  we  recollect  the  exhaustion  of 
Austria,  the  menacing  insurrection  of  Hungary,  the 
feuds  and  jealousies  of  the  German  princes,  the 
strength  and  activity  of  the  Jacobite  party  in  Eng- 
land, and  the  imbecility  of  nearly  all  the  Dutch 
statesmen  of  the  time,  and  the  weakness  of  Holland 
if  deprived  of  her  allies,  we  may  adopt  his  words  in 
speculating  on  what  would  have  ensued  if  France 
had  been  victorious  in  the  battle,  and  “if  a power, 
animated  by  the  ambition,  guided  by  the  fanaticism, 
and  directed  by  the  ability  of  that  of  Louis  XIV., 
had  gained  the  ascendency  in  Europe.  Beyond  all 
question,  universal  despotic  dominion  would  have 


434 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


been  established  over  the  bodies,  a cruel  spiritual 
thraldom  over  the  minds  of  men.  France  and  Spain, 
united  under  Bourbon  princes  and  in  a close  family 
alliance — the  empire  of  Charlemagne  with  that  of 
Charles  V. — the  power  which  revoked  the  Edict  of 
Nantes  and  perpetrated  the  massacre  of  St.  Bartholo- 
mew, with  that  which  banished  the  Moriscoes  and 
established  the  Inquisition,  would  have  proved  irre- 
sistible, and  beyond  example  destructive  to  the  best 
interests  of  mankind. 

474.  “The  Protestants  might  have  been  driven, 
like  the  pagan  heathens  of  old  by  the  son  of  Pepin, 
beyond  the  Elbe ; the  Stuart  race,  and  with  them 
Komish  ascendency,  might  have  been  re-established 
in  England;  the  tire  lighted  by  Latimer  and  Ridley 
might  have  been  extinguished  in  blood,  and  the  en- 
ergy breathed  by  religious  freedom  into  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  race  might  have  expired.  The  destinies  of  the 
world  would  have  been- changed.  Europe,  instead  of 
a variety  of  independent  states,  whose  mutual  hos- 
tility kept  alive  courage,  while  their  national  rivalry 
stimulated  talent,  would  have  sunk  into  the  slumber 
attendant  on  universal  dominion.  The  colonial  em- 
pire of  England  would  have  withered  away  and  per- 
ished, as  that  of  Spain  has  done  in  the  grasp  of  the 
Inquisition.  The  Anglo-Saxon  race  would  have  been 
arrested  in  its  mission  to  overspread  the  earth  and 
subdue  it.  The  centralized  despotism  of  the  Roman 
empire  would  have  been  renewed  on  Continental 
Europe;  the  chains  of  Romish  tyranny,  and  with 
them  the  general  infidelity  of  France  before  the 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


435 


Revolution,  would  have  extinguished  or  perverted 
thought  in  the  British  Islands.”* 

475.  Marlborough’s  words  at  the  council  of  war, 
when  a battle  was  resolved  on,  are  remarkable,  and 
they  deserve  recording.  We  know  them  on  the 
authority  of  his  chaplain,  Mr.  (afterward  Bishop) 
Hare,  who  accompanied  him  throughout  the  cam- 
paign, and  in  whose  journal  the  biographers  of 
Marlborough  have  found  many  of  their  best  ma- 
terials. Marlborough’s  words  to  the  officers  who  re- 
monstrated with  him  on  the  seeming  temerity  of 
attacking  the  enemy  in  their  position  were,  I know 
the  danger,  yet  a battle  is  absolutely  necessary,  and 
I rely  on  the  bravery  and  discipline  of  the  troops, 
which  will  make  amends  for  our  disadvantages.”  In 
the  evening  orders  were  issued  for  a general  engage- 
ment, and  received  by  the  army  with  an  alacrity 
which  justified  his  confidence. 

476.  The  French  and  Bavarians  were  posted  be- 
hind a little  stream  called  the  Nebel,  which  runs 
almost  from  north  to  south  into  the  Danube  im- 
mediately in  front  of  the  village  of  Blenheim.  The 
Nebel  flows  along  a little  valley,  and  the  French  oc- 
cupied the  rising  ground  to  the  west  of  it.  The  vil- 
lage of  Blenheim  was  the  extreme  right  of  their 
position,  and  the  village  of  Lutzingen,  about  three 
miles  north  of  Blenheim,  formed  their  left.  Beyond 
Lutzingen  are  the  rugged  high  grounds  of  the  Godd 
Berg  and  Eich  Berg,  on  the  skirts  of  which  some  de- 
tachments were  posted,  so  as  to  secure  the  Gallo- 

♦ Alison’s  **  Life  of  Marlborough,”  p.  248. 


436 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


Bavarian  position  from  being  turned  on  the  left 
flank.  The  Danube  secured  their  right  flank  : and 
it  was  only  in  front  that  they  could  be  attacked. 
The  villages  of  Blenheim  and  Lutzingen  had  been 
strongly  palisadoed  and  intrenched.  Marshal  Tallard, 
who  held  the  chief  command,  took  his  station  at 
Blenheim;  the  elector  and  Marshal  Marsin  com- 
manded on  the  left.  Tallard  garrisoned  Blenheim 
with  twenty-six  battalions  of  French  infantry  and 
twelve  squadrons  of  French  cavalry.  Marsin  and  the 
elector  had  twenty-two  battalions  of  infantry  and 
thirty-six  squadrons  of  cavalry  in  front  of  the  village 
of  Lutzingen.  The  centre  was  occupied  by  fourteen 
battalions  of  infantry,  including  the  celebrated  Irish 
brigade.  These  were  posted  in  the  little  hamlet  of 
Oberglau,  which  lies  somewhat  nearer  to  Lutzingen 
than  to  Blenheim.  Eighty  squadrons  of  cavalry  and 
seven  battalions  of  foot  were  ranged  between 
Oberglau  and  Blenheim.  Thus  the  French  position 
was  very  strong  at  each  extremity,  but  was  com- 
paratively weak  in  the  centre.  Tallard  seems  to 
have  relied  on  the  swampy  state  of  the  part  of  the 
valley  that  reaches  from  below  Oberglau  to  Blen- 
heim for  preventing  any  serious  attack  on  this  part 
of  his  line. 

477.  The  army  of  the  allies  was  formed  into  two 
great  divisions,  the  largest  being  commanded  by  the 
duke  in  person,  and  being  destined  to  act  against 
Tallard,  while  Prince  Eugene  led  the  other  division 
which  consisted  chiefly  of  cavalry,  and  was  intended 
to  oppose  the  enemy  under  Marsin  and  thie  eleetgr. 


BA  TTLE  OF  BLENHEIM, 


437 


As  they  approached  the  enemy,  Marlborough’s  troops 
formed  the  left  and  the  centre,  while  Eugene’s  formed 
the  right  of  the  entire  army.  Early  in  the  morning 
of  the  13th  of  August,  the  allies  left  their  own  camp 
and  marched  toward  the  enemy.  A thick  haze  cov- 
ered the  ground,  and  it  was  not  until  the  allied 
right  and  centre  had  advanced  nearly  within  cannon 
shot  of  the  enemy  that  Tallard  was  aware  of  their 
approach.  He  made  his  preparations  with  what 
haste  he  could,  and  about  eight  o’clock  a heavy  fire 
of  artillery  was  opened  from  the  French  right  on  the 
advancing  left  wing  of  the  British.  Marlborough 
ordered  up  some  of  his  batteries  to  reply  to  it,  and 
while  the  columns  that  were  to  form  the  allied  left 
and  centre  deployed,  and  took  up  their  proper 
stations  in  the  line,  a warm  cannonade  was  kept  up 
by  the  guns  on  both  sides. 

478.  The  ground  which  Eugene’s  columns  had  to 
traverse  was  peculiarly  difficult,  especially  for  the 
passage  of  the  artillery,  and  it  was  nearly  mid-day 
before  he  could  get  his  troops  into  line  opposite  to 
Lutzingen.  During  this  interval,  Marlborough 
ordered  divine  service  to  be  performed  by  the  chap- 
lains at  the  head  of  each  regiment,  and  then  rode 
along  the  lines,  and  found  both  officers  and  men  in 
the  highest  spirits,  and  waiting  impatiently  for  the 
signal  for  the  attack.  At  length  an  aide-de-camp 
galloped  up  from  the  right  with  the  welcomed  news 
that  Eugene  was  ready.  Marlborough  instantly  sent 
Lord  Cutts,  with  a strong  brigade  of  infantry,  to 
assault  the  village  of  Blenheim,  while  he  himself  led 


438 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


the  main  body  down  the  eastward  slope  of  the  val- 
ley of  the  Nehel,  and  prepared  to  effect  the  x)assage  of 
the  stream. 

479.  The  assault  on  Blenheim,  though  bravely 
made,  was  repulsed  with  severe  loss ; and  Marl- 
borough, finding  how  strongly  that  village  was  gar- 
risoned, desisted  from  any  farther  attempts  to  carry 
it,  and  bent  all  his  energies  to  breaking  the  enemy’s 
line  between  Blenheim  and  Oberglau.  Some  tem- 
porary bridges  had  been  prepared,  and  planks  and 
fascines  had  been  collected  ; and  by  the  aid  of  these, 
and  a little  stone  bridge  which  crossed  the  Nebel, 
near  a hamlet  called  Unterglau,  that  lay  in  the 
centre  of  the  valley,  Marlborough  succeeded  in  get- 
ting several  squadrons  across  the  Nebel  though  it 
was  divided  into  several  branches,  and  the  ground 
between  them  was  soft,  and,  in  places,  little  better 
than  a mere  marsh.  But  the  French  artillery  was 
not  idle.  The  cannon  balls  plunged  incessantly 
among  the  advancing  squadrons  of  the  allies,  and 
bodies  of  French  cavalry  rode  frequently  down  from 
the  western  ridge,  to  charge  them  before  they  had 
time  to  form  on  the  firm  ground.  It  was  only  by 
supporting  his  men  by  fresh  troops,  and  by  bringing 
up  infantry,  who  checked  the  advance  of  the  enemy’s 
horse  by  their  steady  fire,  that  Marlborough  was  able 
to  save  his  army  iu  this  quarter  from  a repulse, 
which,  succeeding  the  failure  of  the  attack  upon 
Blenheim,  would  probably  have  been  fatal  to  the 
allies.  By  degrees,  his  cavalry  struggled  over  the 
blood-stained  streams;  the  infantry  were  also  now 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM, 


439 


brought  across,  so  as  to  keep  in  check  the  French 
troops  who  held  Blenheim,  and  who,  when  no  longer 
assailed  in  front,  had  begun  to  attack  the  allies  on 
their  left  with  considerable  effect. 

480.  Marlborough  had  thus  at  last  succeeded  in 
drawing  up  the  whole  left  ying  of  his  army  beyond 
the  Nebel,  and  was  about  to  press  forward  with  it> 
when  he  was  called  away  to  another  part  of  the  field 
by  a disaster  that  had  befallen  his  centre.  The 
Prince  of  Holstein  Beck  had,  with  eleven  Hanoverian 
battalions,  passed  the  Nebel  opposite  to  Oberglau, 
when  he  was  charged  and  utterly  routed  by  the 
Irish  brigade  which  held  that  village.  The  Irish 
drove  the  Hanoverians  back  with  heavy  slaughter, 
broke  completely  through  the  line  of  the  allies,  and 
nearly  achieved  a success  as  brilliant  as  that  which 
the  same  brigade  afterward  gained  at  Fontenoy.  But 
at  Blenheim  their  ardor  in  pursuit  led  them  too  far. 
Marlborough  came  up  in  person,  and  dashed  in  upon 
the  exposed  flank  of  the  brigade  with  some  squadrons 
of  British  cavalry.  The  Irish  reeled  bacl^  and  as 
they  strove  to  regain  the  height  of  Oberglau,  their 
column  was  raked  through  and  through  by  the  fire 
of  three  battalions  of  the  allies,  which  Marlborough 
had  summoned  up  from  the  reserve.  Marlborough 
having  re-established  the  order  and  communications 
of  the  allies  in  this  quarter,  now,  as  he  returned  to 
his  own  left  wing,  sent  to  learn  how  his  colleague 
fared  against  Marsin  and  the  elector,  and  to  inform 
Eugene  of  his  own  success. 

481.  Eugene  had  hitherto  not  been  equally  fortu- 


440 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM, 


nate.  He  had  made  three  attacks  on  the  enemy 
opposed  to  him,  and  had  been  thrice  driven  back.  It 
was  only  by  his  own  desperate  personal  exertions, 
and  the  remarkable  steadiness  of  the  regiments  of 
Prussian  infantry  which  were  under  him,  that  he 
was  to  save  his  wing  from  being  totally  defeated. 
But  it  was  on  the  southern  part  of  the  battle-field, 
on  the  ground  which  Marlborough  had  won  beyond 
the  Nebel  with  such  difficulty,  that  the  crisis  of  the 
battle  was  to  be  decided. 

482.  Like  Hannibal,  Marlborough  relied  princi- 
pally on  his  cavalry  for  achieving  his  decisive  suc- 
cesses, and  it  was  by  his  cavalry  that  Blenheim,  the 
greatest  of  his  victories,  was  won.  The  battle  had 
lasted  till  five  in  the  afternoon.  Marlborough  had 
now  eight  thousand  horsemen  drawn  up  in  two  lines, 
and  in  the  most  perfect  order  for  a general  attack  on 
the  enemy’s  line  along  the  space  between  Blenheim 
and  Oberglau.  The  infantry  was  drawn  up  in  bat- 
talions in  their  rear,  so  as  to  support  them  if  repulsed, 
and  to  keep  in  check  the  large  masses  of  the  French 
that  still 'Occupied  the  village  of  Blenheim.  Tallaid 
now  interlaced  his  squadrons  of  cavalry  with  battal- 
ions of  infantry  ; and  Marlborough,  by  a correspond- 
ing movement,  brought  several  regiments  of  infantry, 
and  some  pieces  of  artillery,  to  his  front  line  at  in- 
tervals between  the  bodies  of  horse.  A little  after 
five,  Marlborough  commenced  the  decisive  move- 
ment, and  the  allied  cavalry,  strengthened  and  sup- 
ported by  foot  and  guns,  advanced  slowly  from  the 
lower  ground  near  the  Nebel  up  the  slope  to  where 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEIM. 


441 


the  French  cavalry,  ten  thousand  strong,  awaited 
them,  On  riding  over  the  summit  of  the  acclivity, 
the  allies  were  received  with  so  hot  a fire  from  the 
French  artillery  and  small  arms,  that  at  first  the 
cavalry  recoiled,  but  without  abandoning  the  high 
ground.  The  guns'  and  the  infantry  which  they  had 
brought  with  them  maintained  the  contest  with 
spirit  and  effect.  The  French  fire  seemed  to  slacken. 
Marlborough  instantly  ordered  a charge  along  the 
line.  The  allied  cavalry  galloped  forward  at  the 
enemy’s  squadrons,  and  the  hearts  of  the  French 
horsemen  failed  them.  Discharging  their  carbines  at 
an  idle  distance,  they  wheeled  -iound  and  spurred 
from  the  field,  leaving  the  nine  infantry  battalions  of 
their  comrades  to  be  ridden  down  by  the  torrent  of 
the  allied  cavalry.  The  battle  was  now  won.  Tallard 
and  Marsin,  severed  from  each  other,  thought  only 
of  retreat.  Tallard  drew  up  the  squadrons  of  horse 
that  he  had  left,  in  a line  extended  toward  Blenheim, 
and  sent  orders  to  the  infantry  in  that  village  to 
leave  it  and  join  him  without  delay.  But,  long  ere 
his  orders  could  be  obeyed,  the  conquering  squadrons 
of  Marlborough  had  wheeled  to  the  left  and  thun- 
dered down  on  the  feeble  array  of  the  French  mar- 
shal. Part  of  the  force  which  Tallard  had  drawn  up 
for  this  last  effort  was  driven  into  the  Danube  ; part 
fled  with  their  general  to  the  village  of  Sonderheim, 
where  they  were  soon  surrounded  by  the  victorious 
allies,  and  compelled  to  surrender.  Meanwhile, 
Eugene  had  renewed  his  attack  upon  the  Gallo-Bava- 
rian left,  and  Marsin,  finding  his  colleague  utterly 


442 


BATTLE  OF  BLENHEUL 


routed,  and  his  own  right  flank  uncovered,  prepared 
to  retreat.  He  and  the  elector  succeeded  in  with- 
drawing a considerable  part  of  their  troops  in  toler- 
able order,  to  Dillingen ; but  the  large  body  of  French 
who  garrisoned  Blenheim  were  left  exposed  to  cer- 
tain destruction.  Marlborough  speedily  occupied  all 
the  outlets  from  the  village  with  his  victorious  troops, 
and  then,  collecting  his  artillery  round  it,  he  com- 
menced a cannonade  that  speedily  would  have  de- 
stroyed Blenheim  itself  and  all  who  were  in  it.  After 
several  gallant  but  unsuccessful  attempts  to  cut  their 
way  through  the  allies,  the  French  in  Blenheim  were 
at  length  compelled  to  surrender  at  discretion ; and 
twenty-four  battalions  and  twelve  squadrons,  with 
all  their  officers,  laid  down  their  arms,  and  became 
the  cax>tives  of  Marlborough. 

483.  “ Such,’’  says  Voltaire,  “ was  the  celebrated 
battle  which  the  French  call  the  battle  of  Hochstet, 
the  Germans  Plentheim,  and  the  English  Blenheim. 
The  conquerors  had  about  flve  thousand  killed  and 
eight  thousand  wounded,  the  greater  part  being  on 
the  side  of  Prince  Eugene.  The  French  army  was 
almost  entirely  destroyed : of  sixty  thousand  men, 
so  long  victorious,  there  never  reassembled  more  than 
twenty  thousand  effective.  About  twelve  thousand 
killed,  fourteen  thousand  prisoners,  all  the  cannon, 
a prodigious  number  of  colors  and  standards,  all  the 
tents  and  equipages,  the  general  of  the  army,  and  one 
thousand  two  hundred  officers  of  mark  in  the  power 
of  the  conqueror,  signalized  that  day ! ” 

484.  Ulm,  Landau,  Treves,  and  Traerbach  surren- 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS, 


443 


dered  to  the  allies  before  the  close  of  the  year.  Ba- 
varia submitted  to  the  emperor,  and  the  Hungarians 
laid  down  their  arms.  Germany  was  completely  de- 
livered from  France,  and  the  military  ascendency  of 
the  arms  of  the  allies  was  completely  established. 
Throughout  the  rest  of  the  war  Louis  fought  only 
in  defense.  Blenheim  had  dissipated  forever  his  once 
proud  visions  of  almost  universal  conquest. 


Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of 

Blenheim,  A.  D.  1704,  and  the  Battle  of 

PULTOWA,  A.  D.  1709. 

A.  D.  1705.  The  Archduke  Charles  lands  in  Spain 
with  a small  English  army  under  Lord  Peterborough, 
who  takes  Barcelona. 

1706.  Marlborough’s  victory  at  Eamillies. 

1707.  The  English  army  in  Spain  is  defeated  at 
the  battle  of  Almanza. 

1708.  Marlborough’s  victory  at  Oudenarde. 


444 


BAITLE  OF  PULTOWA, 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA,  A.  D.  1709. 

Dread  Pultowa’s  day. 

When  fortune  left  the  royal  Swede, 

Around  a slaughtered  army  lay. 

No  more  to  combat  and  to  bleed. 

The  power  and  fortune  of  the  war 
Had  passed  to  the  triumphant  Czar. 

Byron. 

485.  Napoleon  prophesied,  at  St.  Helena,  that  all 
Europe  would  soon  he  either  Cossack  or  Republican. 
Three  years  ago,  the  fulfillment  of  the  last  of  these  al- 
ternatives appeared  most  probable.  But  the  democra- 
tic movements  of  1848  were  sternly  repressed  in  1849. 
The  absolute  authority  of  a single  ruler,  and  the  aus- 
tere stillness  of  martial  law,  are  now  paramount  in 
the  capitals  of  the  Continent,  which  lately  owned  no 
sovereignty  save  the  will  of  the  multitude,  and 
where  that  which  the  Democrat  calls  his  sacred  right 
of  insurrection  was  so  loudly  asserted  and  so  often 
fiercely  enforced.  Many  .causes  have  contributed  to 
bring  about  this  reaction,  but  the  most  effective  and 


BATTLE  OF  FULTOWA. 


445 


the  most  permanent  have  been  Russian  influence 
and  Russian  arms.  Russia  is  now  the  avowed  and 
acknowledged  champion  of  monarchy  against  demo- 
cracy ; of  constituted  authority,  however  acquired, 
against  revolution  and  change,  for  whatever  purpose 
desired ; of  the  imperial  supremacy  of  strong  states 
over  their  weaker  neighbors  against  all  claims  for 
political  independence  and  all  strivings  for  separate 
nationality.  She  had  crushed  the  heroic  Hungari- 
ans ; and  Austria,  for  whom  nominally  she  crushed 
them,  is  now  one  of  her  dependents.  Whether  the 
rumors  of  her  being  about  to  engage  in  fresh  en- 
terprises be  well  or  ill  founded,  it  is  certain  that 
recent  events  must  have  fearfully  augmented  the 
power  of  the  Muscovite  empire,  which,  even  pre- 
viously, had  been  the  object  of  well-founded  anxiety 
to  all  Western  Europe. 

486.  It  was  truly  stated,  eleven  years  ago,  that 
“the  acquisitions  which  Russia  has  made  within  the 
[then]  last  sixty-four  years  are  equal  in  extent  and  im- 
portance to  the  whole  empire  she  had  in  Europe  before 
that  time  ; that  the  acquisitions  she  had  made  from 
Sweden  are  greater  than  what  remains  of  that  an- 
cient kingdom ; that  her  acquisitions  from  Poland 
are  as  large  as  the  whole  Austrian  empire;  that  the 
territory  she  has  wrested  from  Turkey  in  Europe  is 
equal  to  the  dominions  of  Prussia,  exclusive  of  her 
Rhenish  provinces;  and  that  her  acquisitions  from 
Turkey  in  Aisa  are  equal  in  extent  to  all  the  smaller 
states  of  Germany,  the  Rhenish  province  of  Prussia, 
Belgium,  and  Holland  taken  together;  that  the 


446 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA, 


country  she  has  conquered  from  Persia  is  about  the 
size  of  England ; that  her  acquisitions  in  Tartary 
have  an  area  equal  to  Turkey  in  Europe,  Greece, 
Italy,  and  Spain.  In  sixty-four  years  she  has  ad- 
vanced her  frontier  eight  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
toward  Vienna,  Berlin,  Dresden,  Munich,  and  Paris; 
she  has  approached  four  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
nearer  to  Constantinople;  she  has  possessed  herself 
of  the  capital  of  Poland,  and  has  advanced  to  witliin 
a few  miles  of  the  capital  of  Sweden,  from  wliich, 
when  Peter  the  First  mounted  the  throne,  h r fron- 
tier was  distant  three  hundred  miles.  Since  lliat 
time  she  has  stretched  herself  forward  about  one 
thousand  miles  toward  India,  and  the  same  distance 
toward  the  capital  of  Persia.”* 

487.  Such,  at  that  period,  had  been  the  recent  ag- 
grandizement of  Russia ; and  the  events  of  the  last 
lew  years  by  weakening  and  disuniting  all  her 
European  neighbors,  have  immeasurably  augmented 
the  relative  superiority  of  the  Muscovite  empire  over 
all  the  other  Continental  powers. 

488.  With'^a  population  exceeding  sixty  millions, 
all  implicitly  obeying  the  impulse  of  a single  ruling 
mind ; with  a territorial  area  of  six  millions  and  a 
half  of  square  miles ; with  a standing  army  eight 
hundred  thousand  strong;  with  powerful  fleets  on 
the  Baltic  and  Black  Seas ; with  a skillful  host  of 
diplomatic  agents  planted  in  every  court  and 
among  every  tribe ; with  the  confidence  which  un- 
expected success  creates,  and  the  sagacity  which  long 

* “Progress  of  Russia  in  the  East,”  p.  143- 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


447 


experience  fosters,  Russia  now  grasps,  with  an  armed 
right  hand,  the  tangled  thread  of  European  politics, 
and  issues  her  mandates  as  the  arhitress  of  the  move- 
ments of  the  age.  Yet  a century  and  a half  have 
hardly  elapsed  since  she  was  first  recognized  as  a 
member  of  the  drama  of  modern  European  history 
— previous  to  the  battle  of  Pultowa,  Russia  played 
no  part.  Charles  V.  and  his  great  rival,  our  Eliza- 
beth and  her  adversary  Philip  of  Spain,  the  Guises, 
Sully,  Richelieu,  Cromwall,  De  Witt,  William  of  Or- 
ange, and  the  other  leading  spirits  of  the  sixteenth 
and  seventeenth  centuries,  thought  no  more  about 
the  Muscovite  Czar  than  we  now  think  about  the 
King  of  Timbuctoo.  Even  as  late  as  1735,  Lord  Bo- 
lingbroke,  in  his  admirable  ‘‘Letters  on  History,” 
speaks  of  the  history  of  the  Muscovites  as  having  no 
relation  to  the  knowledge  which  a practical  English 
statesman  ought  to  acquire.*  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  a cabinet  council  often  takes  place  now  in  * 
our  Foreign  Office  without  Russia  being  uppermost 
in  every  English  statesman's  thoughts. 

489.  But,  though  Russia  remained  thus  long  un- 
heeded among  her  snows,  there  was  a Northern  pow- 
er, the  influence  of  which  was  acknowledged  in  the 
principal  European  quarrels,  and  whose  good  will 
was  sedulously  courted  by  many  of  the  boldest  chiefs 
and  ablest  counselors  of  the  leading  states.  This  was 
Sweden ; Sweden,  on  whose  ruins  Russia  has  risen, 
but  whose  ascendency  over  her  semi-barbarous  neigh- 

t Bolingbroke’s  Works,  vol.  ii.,  p.  374.  In  the  same  page 
he  observes  how  Sweden  had  often  turned  her  arms  south- 
ward with  prodigious  effect. 


448 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


bor  was  complete,  until  the  fatal  battle  that  now 
forms  our  subject. 

490.  As  early  as  1542  f ranee  had  sought  the  al- 
liance of  Sweden  to  aid  her  in  her  struggle  against 
Charles  V.  And  the  name  of  Gustavus  Adolphus  is 
of  itself  sufficient  to  remind  us  that  in  the  great  con- 
test for  religious  liberty,  of  which  Germany  was  for 
thirty  years  the  arena,  it  was  Sweden  that  rescued 
the  falling  cause  of  Protestantism,  and  it  was  Swe- 
den that  principally  dictated  the  remodeling  of  the 
European  state-system  at  the  peace  of  Westphalia. 

491.  From  the  proud  pre-eminence  in  which  the 
valor  of  the  “Lion  of  the  North,’’  and  Torstenston, 
Bannier,  Wrangel,  and  the  other  generals  of  Gusta- 
vus, guided  by  the  wisdom  of  Oxenstiern,  had  placed 
Sweden,  the  defeat  of  Charles  XII.  at  Pultowa  hurled 
her  down  at  once  and  forever.  Her  efforts  during 
the  wars  of  the  French  revolution  to  assume  a leading 

* part  in  European  politics  met  with  instant  discom- 
fiture, and  almost  provoked  derision.  But  the  Swe- 
den whose  sceptre  was  bequeathed  to  Christina, 
and  whose  alliance  Cromwell  valued  so  highly,  was 
a different  power  to  the  Sweden  of  the  present  day. 
Finland,  Ingria,  Livonia,  Esthonia,  Carelia,  and  other 
districts  east  of  the  Baltic,  then  were  Swedish  pro- 
vinces ; and  the  possession  of  Pomerania,  Rugen,  and 
Bremen  made  her  an  important  member  of  the  Ger- 
manic empire.  These  territories  are  now  all  reft 
from  her,  and  the  most  valuable  of  them  form  the 
staple  of  her  victorious  rival’s  strength.  Could  she 
resume  them — could  the  Sweden  of  1648  be  recon- 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


449 


structed,  we  should  have  a first-class  Scandinavian 
state  in  the  North,  well  qualified  to  maintain  the 
balance  of  power,  and  check  the  progress  of  Eussia ; 
whose  power,  indeed,  never  could  have  become  for- 
midable to  Europe  save  by  Sweden  becoming  weak. 

492.  The  decisive  triumph  of  Russia  over  Sweden 
at  Pultowa  was  therefore  all-important  to  the  world, 
on  account  of  what  it  overthrew  as  well  as  for  what 
it  established ; and  it  is  the  more  deeply  interesting, 
because  it  was  not  merely  the  crisis  of  a struggle  be- 
tween two  states,  but  it  was  a trial  of  strength  be- 
tween two  great  races  of  mankind.  We  must  bear 
in  mind,  that  while  the  Swedes,  like  the  English,  the 
Dutch,  and  others,  belong  to  the  Germanic  race,  the 
Russians  are  a Sclavonic  people.  Nations  of  Sclavo- 
nian  origin  have  long  occupied  the  greater  part  of 
Europe  eastward  of  the  Vistula,  and  the  populations 
also  of  Bohemia,  Croatia,  Servia,  Dalmatia,  and  other 
important  regions  westward  of  that  river  are  Scla- 
vonic. In  the  long  and  varied  conflicts  between 
them  and  the  Germanic  nations  that  adjoin  them,  the 
Germanic  race  had,  before  Pultowa,  almost  always 
maintained  a superiority.  With  the  single  but  im- 
portant exception  of  Poland,  no  Sclavonic  state  had 
made  aijy  considerable  figure  in  history  before  the 
time  when  Peter  the  Great  won  his  great  victory 
over  the  Swedish  king.*  What  Russia  has  done  since 
that  time  we  know  and  we  feel.  And  some  of  the 
wisest  and  best  men  of  our  own  age  and  nations,  who 

* The  Hussite  wars  may,  perhaps,  entitle  Bohemia  to 
be  distinguished. 


450 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


have  watched  with  deepest  care  the  annals  and  the 
destinies  of  humanity,  have  believed  that  the  Scla- 
vonic element  in  the  population  of  Europe  has  as 
yet  only  partially  developed  its  powers ; that,  while 
other  races  of  mankind  (our  own,  the  Germanic,  in- 
cluded) have  exhausted  their  creative  energies  and 
completed  their  allotted  achievements,  the  Slavonic 
race  has  yet  a great  career  to  run ; and  that  the  nar- 
rative of  Sclavonic  ascendency  is  the  remaining  page 
that  will  conclude  the  history  of  the  world.* 

493.  Let  it  not  he  supposed  that  in  thus  regarding 
the  primary  triumph  of  Russia  over  Sweden  as  a vic- 
tory of  the  Sclavonic  over  the  Germanic  race,  we  are 
dealing  with  matters  of  mere  ethnological  pedantry, 
or  with  themes  of  mere  speculative  curiosity.  The 
fact  that  Russia  is  a Sclavonic  empire  is  a fact  of  im- 
mense practical  influence  at  the  present  moment. 
Half  the  inhabitants  of  the  Austrian  empire  are 
Sclavonians.  The  population  of  the  larger  part  of 
Turkey  in  Europe  is  of  the  same  race.  Silesia,  Posen, 
and  other  parts  of  the  Prussian  dominions  are  prin- 
cipally Sclavonic.  And  during  late  years,  an  enthu- 
siastic zeal  for  blending  all  Sclavonians  into  one  great 
united  Sclavonic  empire  has  been  growing  up  in 
these  countries,  which,  however  we  may  deride  its 
principle,  is  not  the  less  real  and  active,  and  of  which 
Russia,  as  the  head  and  the  champion  of  the  Scla- 
vonic race,  knows  well  how  to  take  her  advantage.! 

* See  Arnold’s  “Lectures  on  Modern  History,”  p.  36-39. 

t “The  idea  of  Panslavism  had  a purely  literary  origin. 
It  was  started  by  Kollar,  a Protestant  clergyman  of  the 
Sclavonic  congregationat  Peth,  in  Hungary,  who  wished 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


451 


494.  It  is  a singular  fact  that  Russia  owes  her  very 
name  to  a hand  of  Swedish  invaders  who  conquered 
her  a thousand  years  ago.  They  were  soon  absorbed 
in  the  Sclavonic  population,  and  every  trace  of  the 
Swedish  character  had  disappeared  in  Russia  for 
many  centuries  before  her  invasion  by  Charles  XII. 
She  was  long  the  victim  and  the  slave  of  the  Tar- 

to  establish  a national  literature  by  circulating  all  works, 
written  in  the  various  Sclavonic  dialects,  through  every 
country  where  any  of  them  are  spoken.  He  suggested 
that  all  the  Sclavonic  literati  should  become  acquainted 
with  the  sister  dialects,  so  that  a Bohemian,  or  other  work, 
might  be  read  on  the  shores  of  the  Adriatic  as  well  as  on 
the  banks  of  the  Volga,  or  any  other  place  where  a Scla- 
vonic languagewasspoken;  by  which  meansan  extensive 
literature  might  be  created,  tending  to  advance  knowl- 
edge in  all  Sclavonic  countries;  and  he  supported  his  ar- 
guments by  observing  that  the  dialects  of  ancient  Greece 
differed  from  each  other  like  those  of  his  own  language, 
and  yet  that  they  formed  only  one  Hellenic  literature. 
The  idea  of  an  intellectual  union  of  all  those  nations 
naturally  led  to  that  of  apolitical  one;  and  the  Sclavonians, 
seeing  that  their  numbei  s amounted  to  about  one  third 
part  of  the  whole  population  of  Europe, and  occupiedmore 
than  half  its  territory,  began  to  be  sensible  that  the> 
might  claim  for  themselves  a position  to  which  they  had 
not  hitherto  aspired. 

“ The  opinion  gained  ground ; and  the  question  now  is, 
whether  the  Sclavonians  can  form  a nation  independent 
of  Russia,  or  whether  they  ought  to  rest  satisfied  in  be- 
ing part  of  one  great  race,  with  the  most  powerful  mem- 
ber of  it  as  their  chief.  The  latter,  indeed,  is  gaining 
ground  among  them ; and  some  Poles  are  disposed  to  at- 
tribute their  sufferings  to  the  arbitrary  will  of  the  Czar, 
without  extending  the  blame  to  the  Russians  themselves. 
These  begin  to  think  that,  if  they  cannot  exist  as  Poles, 
the  best  thing  to  be  done  isto  restsatisfied  with  a position 
in  the  Sclavonic  empire,  and  they  hope  that,  when  once 
they  give  up  the  idea  of  restoring  their  country,  Russia 
may  grant  some  concessions  to  their  separate  nationality. 

“The  same  idea  has  been  put  forward  by  writers  in  the 
Russian  interest;  great  efforts  are  making  among  other 
Sclavonic  people  to  induce  them  to  look  upon  Russia  as 
their  future  head,  and  she  has  already  gained  consfdera- 
blo  influence  over  the  Sclavonic  populations  of  Turkey.” 
—Wilkinson’s  Dalmatia. 

15 


452 


BA  TTLE  OF  P UL  TO  WA . 


tars ; and  for  many  considerable  periods  of  years  the 
Poles  held  her  in  subjugation.  Indeed,  if  we  except 
the  expeditions  of  some  of  the  early  Russian  chiefs 
against  Byzantium,  and  the  reign  of  Ivan  Vasilo- 
vitch,  the  history  of  Russia  before  the  time  of  Peter 
the  Great  is  one  long  tale  of  suffering  and  degrada- 
tion. 

495.  But,  whatever  may  have  been  the  amount  of 
national  injuries  that  she  sustained  from  Swede,  from 
Tartar,  or  from  Pole  in  the  ages  of  her  weakness,  she 
has  certainly  retaliated  ten-fold  during  the  century 
and  a half  of  her  strength.  Her  rapid  transition  at 
the  commencement  of  that  period  from  being  the 
prey  of  every  conqueror  to  being  the  conqueror  of 
all  with  whom  she  comes  into  contact,  to  being  the 
oppressor  instead  of  the  oppressed,  is  almost  without 
a parallel  in  the  history  of  nations.  It  was  the  work 
of  a single  ruler ; who,  himself  without  education, 
promoted  science  and  literature  among  barbaric  mil- 
lions; who  gave  them  fleets,  commerce,  arts,  and 
arms  ; who,  at  Pultowa,  taught  them  to  face  and  beat 
the  previously  invincible  Swedes;  and  who  made 
stubborn  valor  and  implicit  subordination  from  that 
time  forth  the  distinguishing  characteristics  of  the 
Russian  soldiery,  which  had  before  his  time  been  a 
mere  disorderly  and  irresolute  rabble. 

496.  The  career  of  Philip  of  Macedon  resembles 
most  nearly  that  of  the  great  Muscovite  Czar ; but 
there  is  this  important  difference,  that  Philip  had, 
while  young,  received  in  Southern  Greece  the  best 
education  in  all  matters  of  peace  and  war  that  the 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


•153 


ablest  philosophers  and  generals  of  the  age  could  be- 
stow. Peter  was  brought  up  among  barbarians  and 
in  barbaric  ignorance.  He  strove  to  remedy  this, 
when  a grown  man,  by  leaving  all  the  temptations 
to  idleness  and  sensuality  which  his  court  offered, 
and  by  seeking  instruction  abroad.  He  labored  with 
his  own  hands  as  a common  artisan  in  Holland  and 
England,  that  he  might  return  and  teach  his  subjects 
how  ships,  commerce,  and  civilization  could  be  ac- 
quired. There  is  a degree  of  heroism  here  superior 
to  any  thing  that  we  know  of  in  the  Macedonian 
king.  But  Philip’s  consolidation  of  the  long-dis- 
united Macedonian  empire;  his  raising  a people, 
which  he  found  the  scorn  of  their  civilized  Southern, 
neighbors,  to  be  their  dread ; his  organization  of  a 
brave  and  well-disciplined  army  instead  of  a dis- 
orderly militia ; his  creation  of  a maritime  force,  and 
his  systematic  skill  in  acquiring  and  improving  sea- 
ports and  arsenals ; his  patient  tenacity  of  purpose 
under  reverses  ; his  personal  bravery,  and  even  his 
proneness  to  coarse  amusements  and  pleasures,  all 
mark  him  out  as  the  prototype  of  the  imperial  founder 
of  the  Russian  power.  In  justice,  however,  to  the 
ancient  hero,  it  ought  to  be  added,  that  we  find  in 
the  history  of  Philii>  no  examples  of  that  savage 
cruelty  which  deforms  so  greviously  the  character  of 
Peter  the  Great. 

497.  In  considering  the  effects  of  the  overthrow 
Avhich  the  Swedish  arms  sustained  at  Pultowa,  and 
in  speculating  on  the  probable  consequences  that 
would  have  followed  if  the  invaders  had  been  sue- 


454 


BA  TTLE  OF  P UL  TO  WA . 


cessful,  we  must  not  only  bear  in  mind  the  wretched 
state  in  which  Peter  found  Russia  at  his  accession, 
compared  with  her  present  grandeur,  but  we  must 
also  keep  in  view  the  fact  that,  at  the  time  when 
Pultowa  was  fought,  his  reforms  were  yet  incomplete 
and  his  new  institutions  immature.  He  had  broken 
up  the  Old  Russia ; and  the  New  Russia,  which  he 
ultimately  created,  was  still  in  embryo.  Had  he 
been  crushed  at  Pultowa,  his  immense  labors  would 
have  ben  buried  with  him,  and  (to  use  the  words  of 
Voltaire)  “ the  most  extensive  empire  in  the  world 
would  have  relapsed  into  the  chaos  from  which  it 
had  been  so  lately  taken.”  It  is  this  fact  that  makes 
the  repulse  of  Charles  XII.  the  critical  point  in  the 
fortunes  of  Russia.  The  danger  which  she  incurred 
a century  afterward  from  her  invasion  by  Napoleon 
was  in  reality  far  less  than  her  peril  when  Charles 
attacked  her,  though  the  French  emperor,  as  a mili- 
tary genius,  was  infinitely  superior  to  the  Swedish 
king,  and  led  a host  against  her,  compared  with 
which  the  armies  of  Charles  seem  almost  insignifi- 
cant. But  as  Fouche  well  warned  his  imperial  mas- 
ter, when  he  vainly  endeavored  to  dissuade  him  from 
his  disastrous  expedition  against  the  empire  of  the 
Czars,  the  difference  between  the  Russia  of  1812  and 
the  Russia  of  1709  w^as  greater  than  the  disparity 
l>etween  the  power  of  Charles  and  the  might  of  Na- 
poleon. “ If  that  heroic  king,”  said  Fouche,  “ had 
not,  like  your  imperial  majest}^,  half  Europe  inarms 
to  back  him,  neither  had  his  opponent,  the  Czar 
Peter,  400,000  soldiers  and  50,000  Cossacks.”  The 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


45o 


historians  who  describe  the  state  of  the  Muscovite 
empire  when  revolutionary  and  imperial  France  en- 
countered it,  narrate  with  truth  and  justice  how,  “at 
the  epoch  of  the  French  Revolution,  this  immense 
empire,  comprehending  nearly  half  of  Europe  and 
Asia  within  its  dominions,  inhabited  by  a patient  and 
indomitable  race,  ever  ready  to  exchange  the  luxury 
and  adventure  of  the  South  for  the  hardships  and 
monotony  of  the  North,  was  daily  becoming  more 
formidable  to  the  liberties  of  Europe.  * * The 
Russian  infantry  had  then  long  been  celebrated  for 
its  immovable  firmness.  Her  immense  population, 
amounting  then  in  Europe  alone  to  nearly  thirty- 
five  millions,  afforded  an  inexhaustible  supply  of 
men.  Her  soldiers,  inured  to  heat  and  cold  from 
their  infancy,  and  actuated  by  a blind  devotion  to 
their  Czar,  united  the  steady  valor  of  the  English  to 
the  impetuous  energy  of  the  French  troops.”*  So, 
also,  we  read  how  the  haughty  aggressions  of  Bona- 
parte “went  to  excite  a national  feeling  from  the 
banks  of  the  Borysthenes  to  the  wall  of  China,  and 
to  unite  against  him  the  wild  and  uncivilized  inhab- 
itants of  an  extended  empire,  possessed  by  a love  to 
their  religion,  their  government,  and  their  country, 
and  having  a character  of  stern  devotion,  which  he 
was  incapable  of  estimating.”!  But  the  Russia  of 
1709  had  no  such  forces  to  oppose  to  an  assailant. 
Her  whole  population  then  was  below  sixteen  mil- 
lions ; and,  what  is  far  more  important,  this  popu- 

* Alison. 

t Scott’s  “ Life  of  Napoleon.” 


456 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


lation  had  neither  acquired  military  spirit  nor  strong 
nationality,  nor  was  it  united  in  loyal  attachment  to 
its  ruler. 

498.  Peter  had  wisely  abolished  the  old  regular 
troops  of  the  empire,  the  Strelitzes ; but  the  forces 
which  he  had  raised  in  their  stead  on  a new  and 
foreign  plan,  and  principally  officered  with  foreigners, 
had,  before  the  Swedish  invasion,  given  no  proof  that 
they  could  be  relied  on.  In  numerous  encounters 
with  the  Swedes,  Peter’s  soldiery  had  run  like  sheep 
before  inferior  numbers.  Great  discontent,  also,  had 
been  excited  among  all  classes  of  the  community  by 
the  arbitrary  changes  which  their  great  emperor  in- 
troduced, many  of  which  clashed  with  the  most 
cherished  national  prejudices  of  his  subjects.  A 
career  of  victory  and  prosperity  had  not  yet  raised 
Peter  above  the  reach  of  that  disaffection,  nor  had 
superstitious  obedience  to  the  Czar  yet  become  the 
characteristic  of  the  Muscovite  mind.  The  victorious 
occupation  of  Moscow  by  Charles  XII.  would  have 
quelled  the  Russian  nation  as  effectually,  as  had  been 
the  case  when  Baton  Khan,  and  other  ancient  in- 
vaders, captured  the  capital  of  primitive  Muscovy. 
How  little  such  a triumph  could  effect  toward  sub  • 
duing  modern  Russia,  the  fate  of  Napoleon  demon- 
strated at  once  and  forever. 

499.  The  character  of  Charles  XII.  has  been  a 
favorite  theme  with  historians,  moralists,  philoso- 
phers, and  poets.  But  it  is  his  military  conduct 
during  the  campaign  in  Russia  that  alone  requires 
comment  here.  Napoleon,  in  the  Memoirs  dictated 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


457 


by  him  at  St.  Helena,  has  given  us  a systematic  criti- 
cism on  that,  among  other  celebrated  campaigns,  his 
own  Kussian  campaign  included.  He  labors  hard  to 
prove  that  he  himself  observed  all  the  true  princi- 
ples of  offensive  war ; and  probably  his  censures  on 
Charles’s  generalship  were  rather  highly  colored,  for 
the  sake  of  making  his  own  military  skill  stand  out 
in  more  favorable  relief.  Yet,  after  making  all  al- 
lowances, we  must  admit  the  force  of  Napoleon’s 
strictures  on  Charles’s  tactics,  and  own  that  his  judg- 
ment, though  severe,  is  correct,  when  he  pronounces 
that  the  Swedish  king,  unlike  his  great  predecessor 
Gustavus,  knew  nothing  of  the  art  of  war,  and  was 
nothing  more  than  a brave  and  intrepid  soldier. 
Such,  however,  was  not  the  light  in  which  Charles 
was  regarded  by  his  contemporaries  at  the  com- 
mencemenhof  his  Russian  expedition.  His  numerous 
victories,  his  daring  and  resolute  spirit,  combined 
with  the  ancient  renown  of  the  Swedish  arms,  then 
filled  all  Europe  with  admiration  and  anxiety.  As 
Johnson  expresses  it,  his  name  was  then  one  at 
which  the  world  grew  pale.  Even  Louis  le  Grand 
earnestly  solicited  his  assistance ; and  our  own  Marl- 
borough, then  in  the  full  career  of  his  victories,  was 
specially  sent  by  the  English  court  to  the  camp  of 
Charles,  to  propitiate  the  hero  of  the  North  in  favor 
of  the  cause  of  the  allies,  and  to  prevent  the  Swed- 
ish sword  from  being  fiun^'  into  the  scsCle  in  the 
French  king’s  favor.  But  Charles  at  that  time  was 
solely  bent  on  dethroning  the  sovereign  of  Russia,  as 
he  had  already  dethroned  the  sovereign  of  Poland, 


458 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


and  all  Europe  fully  believed  that  he  would  entirely 
crush  the  Czar,  and  dictate  conditions  of  peace  in 
the  Kremlin  * Charles  himself  looked  on  success  as 
a matter  of  certainty,  and  the  romantic  extravagance 
of  his  views  was  continually  increasing.  “ One  year, 
he  thought,  would  suffice  for  the  conquest  of  Russia. 
The  court  of  Rome  was  next  to  feel  his  vengeance, 
as  the  pope  had  dared  to  oppose  the  concession  of  re- 
ligious liberty  to  the  Silesian  Protestants.  No  enter- 
j)rise  at  that  time  appeared  impossible  to  him.  He 
had  even  dispatched  several  officers  privately  into 
Asia  and  Egypt,  to  take  plans  of  the  towns,  and  ex- 
amine into  the  strength  and  resources  of  those  coun- 
tries.”! 

500.  Napoleon  thus  epitomizes  the  earlier  opera- 
tions of  Charles’s  invasion  of  Russia : 

“That  prince  set  out  from  his  camp  at  Aldstadt, 
near  Leipsic,  in  September,  1707,  at  the  head  of  45,. 
000  men,  and  traversed  Poland ; 20,000  men,  under 
Count  Lewenhaupt,  disembarked  at  Riga : and  15,- 
000  were  in  Finland.  He  was  therefore  in  a condi- 
tion to  have  brought  together  80,000  of  the  best 
troops  in  the  world.  He  left  10,000  men  at  Warsaw 
to  guard  King  Stanislaus,  and  in  January,  1708,  ar- 
rived at  Grodno,  where  he  wintered.  In  June,  he 
crossed  the  forest  of  Minsk,  and  presented  himself 
before  Borisov ; forced  the  Russian  army,  which  occu- 
pied the  left  bank  of  the  Beresina ; defeated  20,000 

* Voltaire  attests,  from  personal  inspection  of  the  let- 
ters of  several  public  ministers  to  their  respective  courts, 
that  such  was  the  g*eneral  expectation. 

t Crighton’s  “Scandinavia.” 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


459 


Russians  who  were  strongly  intrenched  behind 
marshes ; passed  the  Borysthenes  at  Mohilov,  and 
vanquished  a corps  of  16,000  Muscovites  near  Smo- 
lensko  on  the  22d  of  September.  He  was  now  ad- 
vanced to  the  confines  of  Lithuania,  and  was  about 
to  enter  Russia  Proper : the  Czar,  alarmed  at  his  ap- 
proach, made  him  proposals  of  peace.  Up  to  this 
time  all  his  movements  were  conformable  to  rule, 
and  his  communications  were  well  secured.  He  was 
master  of  Poland  and  Riga,  and  only  ten  days’  march 
distant  from  Moscow  ; and  it  is  probable  that  he 
would  have  reached  that  capital,  had  he  not  quitted 
the  high  road  thither,  and  directed  his  steps  toward 
the  Ukraine,  in  order  to  form  a junction  with  Mazep- 
pa,  who  brought  him  only  6,000  men.  By  this  move- 
ment, his  line  of  operations,  beginning  at  Sweden, 
exposed  his  flank  to  Russia  for  a distance  of  four  hun- 
dred leagues,  and  he  was  unable  to  protect  it,  or  to 
receive  either  re-enforcements  or  assistance.” 

501.  Napoleon  severely  censures  this  neglect  of  one 
of  the  great  rules  of  war.  He  points  out  that  Charles 
had  not  organized  his  war,  like  Hannibal,  on  the 
principle  of  relinquishing  all  communications  with 
home,  keeping  all  his  foices  concentrated,  and  creat- 
ing a base  of  operations  in  the  conquered  countr}*. 
Such  had  been  the  bold  system  of  the  Carthaginian 
general ; but  Charles  acted  on  no  such  principle,  in- 
asmuch as  he  caused  Lewenhaupt,  one  of  his  gener- 
als who  commanded  a considerable  detachment,  and 
escorted  a most  important  convoy,  to  follow  him  at 
a distance  of  twelve  days’  march.  By  this  disloca- 


460 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


tion  of  his  forces  he  exposed  Lewenhaupt  to  he  over- 
whelmed separately  by  the  full  force  of  the  enem}', 
and  deprived  the  troops  under  his  own  command  of 
the  aid  which  that  general’s  men  and  stores  might 
have  afforded  at  the  very  crisis  of  the  campaign. 

502.  The  Czar  had  collected  an  army  of  about 
100,000  effective  men ; and  though  the  Swedes,  in 
the  beginning  of  the  invasion,  were  successful  in 
every  encounter,  the  Russian  troops  were  graduallj' 
acquiring  discipline ; and  Peter  and  his  officers  were 
learning  generalship  from  their  victors,  as  the  The- 
bans of  old  learned  it  from  the  Spartans.  When 
Lewenhaupt,  in  the  October  of  1708,  was  striving  to 
join  Charles  in  the  Ukraine,  the  Czar  suddenly  at- 
tacked him  near  the  Borysthenes  with  an  overwhelm- 
ing force  of  50,000  Russians.  Lewenhaupt  fought 
bravely  for  three  days,  and  succeeded  in  cutting  his 
way  through  the  enemy  with  about  4000  of  his  men 
to  where  Charles  awaited  him  near  the  River  Desna  j 
but  upward  of 8000  Swedes  fell  in  these  battles ; Lew- 
enhaupPs  cannon  and  ammunition  were  abandoned ; 
and  the  whole  of  his  important  convoy  of  provisions,  on 
which  Charles  and  his  half-starved  troops  were  rely- 
ing, fell  into  the  enemy’s  hands.  Charles  was  com- 
pelled to  remain  in  the  Ukraine  during  the  winter ; 
but  in  the  spring  of  1709  he  moved  forward  toward 
Moscow,  and  invested  the  fortified  town  of  Pultowa, 
on  the  River  Vorskla  ; a place  where  the  Czar  had 
stored  up  large  supplies  of  provisions  and  military 
stores,  and  which  commanded  the  passes  leading 
toward  Moscow.  The  possession  of  this  place  would 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA, 


461 


have  given  Charles  the  means  of  supplying  all  the 
wants  of  his  suffering  army,  and  would  also  have  fur- 
nished him  with  a secure  base  of  operations  for  his 
advance  against  the  Muscovite  capital.  The  siege 
was  therefore  hotly  pressed  by  the  Swedes ; the  gar- 
rison resisted  obstinately ; and  the  Czar,  feeling  the 
importance  of  saving  the  town,  advanced  in  June  to 
its  relief,  at  the  head  of  an  army  from  fifty  to  sixty 
thousand  strong. 

503.  Both  sovereigns  now  prepared  for  the  general 
action,  which  each  saw  to  be  inevitable,  and  which 
each  felt  would  be  decisive  of  his  own  and  of  his  coun- 
try’s destiny.  The  Czar,  by  some  xuasterly  maneuv- 
ers, crossed  the  Vorskla,  and  posted  his  army  on  the 
same  side  of  that  river  with  the  besiegers,  but  a little 
higher  up.  The  Vorskla  falls  into  the  Borysthenes 
about  fifteen  leagues  below  Pultowa,  and  the  Czar  ar- 
ranged his  forces  in  two  lines,  stretching  from  one 
river  toward  the  other,  so  that  if  the  Swedes  attacked 
him  and  were  repulsed,  they  would  be  driven  back- 
ward into  the  acute  angle  formed  by  the  two  streams 
at  their  junction.  He  fortified  these  lines  with  sev- 
eral redoubts,  lined  with  heavy  artillery ; and  his 
troops,  both  horse  and  foot,  were  in  the  best  possible 
condition,  and  amply  provided  with  stores  and  am- 
munition. Charles’s  forces  were  about  24,000  strong. 
But  not  more  than  half  of  these  were  Swedes:  so  much 
had  battle,  famine,  fatigue,  and  the  deadly  frosts  of 
Kussia  thinned  the  gallant  bands  which  the  Swedish 
king  and  Lewenhaupt  had  led  to  the  Ukraine.  The 
other  12,000  men,  under  Charles,  were  Cossacks  and 


462 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


Wallachians,  who  had  joined  him  in  the  country. 
On  hearing  that  the  Czar  was  about  to  attack  him, 
he  deemed  that  his  dignity  required  that  he  himself 
should  he  assailant ; and,  leading  his  army  out  of  their 
intrenched  lines  before  the  town,  he  advanced  with 
them  against  the  Kussian  redoubts. 

504.  He  had  been  severely  wounded  in  the  foot  in 
a skirmish  a few  days  before,  and  was  borne  in  a lit- 
ter along  the  ranks  into  the  thick  of  the  fight.  Not- 
withstanding the  fearful  disparity  of  numbers  and 
disadvantage  of  position,  the  Swedes  never  showed 
their  ancient  valor  more  nobly  than  on  that  dreadful 
day.  Nor  do  their  Cossack  and  Wallachian  allies 
seem  to  have  been  unworthy  of  fighting  side  by  side 
with  Charles’s  veterans.  Two  of  the  Russian  redoubts 
were  actually  entered,  and  the  Swedish  infantry  be- 
gan to  raise  the  cry  of  victory.  But,  on  the  other 
side,  neither  general  or  soldiers  flinched  in  their  du- 
ty. The  Russian  cannonade  and  musketry  were 
kept  up ; fresh  masses  of  defenders  were  poured  into 
the  fortifications,  and  at  length  the  exhausted  rem- 
nants of  the  Swedish  columns  recoiled  from  the  blood- 
stained redoubts.  Then  the  Czar  led  the  infantry 
and  cavalry  of  his  first  line  outside  the  works,  drew 
them  up  steadily  and  skillfully,  and  the  action  was 
renewed  along  the  whole  fronts  of  the  two  armies  on 
the  open  ground.  Each  sovereign  exposed  his  life 
freely  in  the  world-winning  battle,  and  on  each  side 
the  troops  fought  obstinately  and  eagerly  under  their 
ruler’s  eye.  It  was  not  till  two  hours  from  the  com- 
mciu'ement  of  the  action  that,  overpowered  by  mini- 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOJVA, 


bers,  the  hitherto  invincible  Swedes  gave  way.  All 
was  then  hopeless  disorder  and  irreparable  rout, 
driven  downward  to  where  the  rivers  join,  the  fugi- 
tive Swedes  surrendered  to  their  victorious  pur- 
suers, or  perished  in  the  w aters  of  the  Borysthenes. 
Only  a few  hundred  swam  that  river  with  their  king 
and  the  Cossack  Mazeppa,  and  escaped  into  the  Turk- 
ish territory.  Nearly  10,000  lay  killed  and  wounded 
in  the  redoubts  and  on  the  field  of  battle. 

505.  In  the  joy  of  his  heart  the  Czar  exclaimed, 
when  the  strife  was  over,  “ That  the  son  of  the 
morning  had  fallen  from  heaven,  and  that  the  foun- 
dation of  St.  Petersburg  at  length  stood  firm.”  Even 
on  that  battle-field,  near  the  Ukraine,  the  Kussian 
emperor’s  first  thoughts  were  of  conquests  and 
aggrandizements  on  the  Baltic.  The  peace  of  Nystadt, 
which  transferred  the  fairest  provinces  of  Sweden  to 
Russia;  ratified  the  judgment  of  battle  which  was 
pronounced  at  Pultowa.  Attacks  on  Turkey  and 
Persia  by  Russia  commenced  almost  directly  after 
that  victory.  And  though  the  Czar  failed  in  his 
first  attempts  against  the  sultan,  the  successors  of 
Peter  have,  one  and  all  carried  on  a uniformally  ag- 
gressive and  uniformally  successive  system  of  policy 
against  Turkey,  and  against  every  other  state,  Asi- 
atic as  well  as  European,  which  has  had  the  misfor- 
tune of  having  Russia  for  a neighbor. 

506.  Orators  and  authors,  who  have  discussed  the 
progress  of  Russia,  have  often  alluded  to  the  simili- 
tude between  the  modern  extension  of  the  Muscovite 
empire  and  the  extension  of  the  Roman  dominions 


464 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


in  ancient  times.  But  attention  has  scarcely  been 
drawn  to  the  closeness  of  the  parallel  between  con- 
quering Russia  and  conquering  Rome,  not  only  in 
the  extent  of  conquests,  but  in  the  means  of  effecting 
conquest.  The  history  of  Rome  during  the  century 
and  a half  which  followed  the  close  of  the  second 
Punic  war,  and  during  which  her  largest  acquisi- 
tions of  territory  were  made,  should  be  minutely 
compared  with  the  history  of  Russia  for  the  last  one 
hundred  and  fifty  years.  The  main  points  of  simili- 
tude can  only  be  indicated  in  these  pages  ; but  they 
deserve  the  fullest  consideration.  Above  all,  the 
sixth  chapter  of  Montesquieu’s  great  treatise  on 
Rome,  “Z>e  la  conduite  que  les  Eomains  Unrent  pour 
soumettre  les  peuples''  should  be  carefully  studied  by 
every  one  who  watches  the  career  and  policy  of  Rus- 
sia. The  classic  scholar  will  remember  the  state- 
craft of  the  Roman  senate,  which  took  care  in  eveiy 
foreign  war  to  appear  in  the  character  of  a Protector. 
Thus  Rome  protected  the  ^tolians  and  the  Greek 
cities  against  Macedon  * she  protected  Bithynia  and 
other  small  Asiatic  states  against  the  Syrian  kings ; 
she  protected  Numidia  against  Carthage;  and  in 
numerous  other  instances  assumed  the  same  specious 
character.  But  “ woe  to  the  people  whose  liberty 
depends  on  the  continued  forbearance  of  an  over- 
mighty  protector.”*  Every  state  which  Rome  pro- 
tected was  ultimately  subjugated  and  absorbed  l)y 
her.  And  Russia  has  been  the  protector  of  Poland — 
the  protector  of  the  Crimea — the  protector  of  Cour- 
* Malkin’s  “ History  of  Greece.’ 


BATTLE  OF  PULTOWA. 


465 


Jand — the  protector  of  Georgia,  Immeritia,  Mingrelia, 
the  Tcherkessian  and  Caucasian  tribes,  etc.  She  has 
first  protected,  and  then  appropriated  them  all.  She 
protects  Moldavia  and  Wallachia.  A few  years  ago 
she  became  the  protector  of  Turkey  from  Mehemet 
Ali ; and  since  the  summer  of  1849,  she  has  made 
herself  the  protector  of  Austria. 

507.  When  the  partisans  of  Russia  speak  of  the 
disinterestedness  with  which  she  withdrew  her  pro- 
tecting troops  from  Constantinople  and  from  Hun- 
gary, let  us  here  also  mark  the  ominous  exactness  of 
the  parallel  between  her  and  Rome.  While  the  an- 
cient world  yet  contained  a number  of  independent 
states,  which  might  have  made  a formidable  league 
against  Rome  if  she  had  alarmed  them  by  openly 
avowing  her  ambitious  schemes,  Rome’s  favorite  pol- 
icy was  seeming  disinterestedness  and  moderation. 
After  her  first  war  against  Philip,  after  that  against 
Antiochus,  and  many  others,  victorious  Rome  prompt- 
ly withdrew  her  troops  from  the  territories  which 
they  occupied.  She  affected  to  employ  her  arms  only 
for  the  good  of  others.  But,  when  the  favomble  mo- 
ment came,  she  always  found  a pretext  for  marching 
her  legions  back  into  each  coveted  district,  and  mak- 
ing it  a Roman  province.  Fear,  not  moderation,  is 
the  only  effective  check  on  the  ambition  of  such  pow- 
ers as  ancient  Rome  and  modern  Russia.  The  amount 
of  that  fear  depends  on  the  amount  of  timely  vigi- 
lance and  energy  which  other  states  choose  to  em- 
ploy against  the  common  enemy  of  their  freedom  and 
national  independence. 


466 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of 

PULTOWA,  A.  D.  1719,  AND  THE  DEFEAT  OF  BUR- 

GOYNE  AT  Saratoga,  A.  D.  1777. 

A.  D.  1713.  Treaty  of  Utrecht.  Philip  is  left  by 
it  in  possession  of  the  throne  of  Spain.  But  Naples, 
Milan,  the  Spanish  territories  on  the  Tuscan  coast, 
the  Spanish  Netherlands,  and  some  parts  of  the 
French  Netherlands,  are  given  to  Austria.  France 
cedes  to  England  Hudson’s  Bay  and  Straits,  the  island 
of  St.  Christopher,  Nova  Scotia,  and  Newfoundland 
in  America.  Spain  cedes  to  England,  Gibraltar  and 
Minorca,  which  the  English  had  taken  during  the 
war.  The  King  of  Prussia  and  the  Duke  of  Savoy 
both  obtain  considerable  additions  of  territory  tO' 
their  dominions. 

1715.  Death  of  Queen  Anne.  The  house  of  Han- 
over begins  to  reign  in  England.  A rebellion  in  fa- 
vor of  the  Stuarts  is  put  down.  Death  of  Louis 
XIV. 

1718.  Charles  XII.  killed  at  the  siege  of  Frederick- 
shall. 

1725.  Death  of  Peter  the  Great  of  Russia. 

1740.  Frederic  II.  king  of  Prussia.  He  attacks  the 
Austrian  dominions,  and  conquers  Silesia. 

1742.  War  between  France  and  England. 

1743.  Victory  of  the  English  at  Dettingen. 

1745.  Victory  of  the  French  at  Fontenoy.  Rebel- 
lion in  Scotland  in  favor  of  the  house  of  Stuart; 
hnally  quelled  by  the  battle  of  Culloden  in  the  next 
year. 

1748.  Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle, 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


467 


1756-1763.  The  Seven  Years’  War,  during  which 
Ih'ussia  makes  an  heroic  resistance  against  the  armies 
of  Austria,  Russia,  and  France.  England,  under  the 
administration  of  the  elder  Pitt  (afterward  Lord 
Chatham),  takes  a glorious  part  in  the  war  in  oppo- 
sition to  France  and  Spain.  Wolfe  wins  the  battle 
of  Quebec,  and  the  English  conquer  Canada,  Cape 
Breten,  and  St.  John.  Clive  begins  his  career  of  con- 
quest in  India.  Cuba  is  taken  by  the  English  from 
Spain. 

1763.  Treaty  of  Paris ; which  leaves  the  Power  of 
Prussia  increased,  and  its  military  reputation  greatly 
exalted. 

“ France,  by  the  treat}^  of  Paris,  ceded  to  England, 
Canada  and  the  island  of  Cape  Breton,  with  the 
islands  and  coasts  of  the  gulf  and  river  of  St.  Law- 
rence. The  boundaries  between  the  two  nations  in- 
North  ximerica  were  fixed  by  a line  drawn  along  the 
middle  of  the  Mississippi,  from  its  source  to  its  mouth. 
All  on  the  left  or  eastern  bank  of  that  river  was  given 
up  to  England,  except  the  city  of  New  Orleans,  which 
was  reserved  to  France;  as  was  also  the  liberty  of 
the  fisheries  on  a part  of  the  coasts  of  Newfoundland 
and  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence.  The  islands  of  St. 
Peter  and  Miquelon  were  given  them  as  a shelter  for 
their  fishermen,  but  without  permission  to  raise  for- 
tifications. The  islands  of  Martinico,  Guadalou])c, 
Mariegalante,  Desirada,  and  St.  Lucia,  were  surren- 
dered to  France  ; while  Grenada,  the  Grenadines,  St. 
Fincent,  Dominica,  and  Tobago,  were  ceded  to  Eng- 
land. This  latter  power  retained  her  conquests  on 


468 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS 


the  Senegal,  and  restored  to  France  the  island  of 
Gorea,  on  the  coast  of  Africa.  France  was  put  in 
possession  of  the  forts  and  factories  which  belonged 
to  her  in  the  East  Indies,  on  the  coasts  of  Coroman- 
del, Orissa,  Malabar,  and  Bengal,,  under  the  restric- 
tion of  keeping  up  no  military  force  in  Bengal. 

In  Europe,  France  restored  all  the  conquests  she 
had  made  in  Germany,  as  also  the  island  of  Minorca. 
England  gave  up  to  her  Belleisle,  on  the  coast  of 
Brittany ; while  Dunkirk  was  kept  in  the  same  con- 
dition as  had  been  determined  by  the  peace  of  Aix- 
la-Chapelle.  The  island  of  Cuba,  with  the  Havana, 
were  restored  to  the  King  of  Spain,  who,  on  his  part, 
ceded  to  England  Florida,  with  Port  Augustine  and 
the  Bay  of  Pensacola.  The  King  of  Portugal  was 
restored  to  the  same  state  in  which  he  had  been  be- 
fore the  war.  The  colony  of  St.  Sacrament  in  Ameri- 
ca, which  the  Spaniards  had  conquered,  was  given 
back  to  him. 

The  peace  of  Paris,  of  which  we  have  just  now 
spoken,  was  the  era  of  England’s  greatest  prosperity. 
Her  commerce  and  navigation  extended  over  all 
parts  of  the  globe,  and  were  supported  by  a naval 
force,  so  much  the  more  imposing,  as  it  was  no  longer 
counterbalanced  by  the  maritime  power  of  France, 
which  had  been  almost  annihilated  in  the  preceding 
war.  The  immense  territories  which  that  peace  had 
secured  her,  both  in  Africa  and  America,  opened  up 
new  channels  for  her  industry ; and  what  deserves 
specially  to  be  remarked  is,  that  she  acquired  at  the 
same  time  vast  and  important  possessions  in  the 
East  Indies.* 

* Koch’s  “ Revolutions  of  Europe.” 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICANS. 


4G9 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICANS  OVER  BURGOYNE  AT 
SARATOGA,  A.  D.  1777. 

Westward  the  course  of  empire  takes  its  way; 

The  first  four  acts  already  past, 

A fifth  shall  close  the  drama  with  the  day, 

Time’s  noblest  offspring  is  its  last. 

Bishop  Berkeley. 

508.  Of  the  four  great  powers  that  now  principally 
rule  the  political  destinies  of  the  world,  France  and 
England  are  the  only  two  whose  influence  can  he 
dated  back  beyond  the  last  century  and  a half.  The 
third  great  power,  Russia,  was  a feeble  mass  of  bar- 
barism before  the  epoch  of  Peter  the  Great^  and  the 
very  existence  of  the  fourth  great  power,  as  an  inde- 
dependent nation,  commenced  within  the  memory  of 
living  men.  By  the  fourth  great  power  of  the  world 
I mean  the  mighty  commonwealth  of  the  Western 
Continent,  which  now  commands  the  admiration  of 
mankind.  That  homage  is  sometimes  reluctantly 
given,  and  is  .sometimes  accompanied  with  suspicion 


470 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICAm 


and  ill  will.  But  none  can  refuse  it.  All  the  physi- 
cal essentials  for  national  strength  are  undeniably  to 
be  found  in  the  geographical  position  and  amplitude 
of  territory  which  the  United  States  possess ; in  their 
almost  inexhaustible  tracts  of  fertile  but  hitherto  un- 
touched soil,  in  their  stately  forests,  in  their  moun- 
tain chains  and  their  rivers,  their  beds  of  coal,  and 
stores  of  metalic  wealth,  in  their  extensive  sea-board 
along  the  waters  of  two  oceans,  and  in  their  already 
numerous  and  rapidly-increasing  population.  And 
when  we  examine  the  character  of  this  population, 
no  one  can  look  on  the  fearless  energy,  the  sturdy 
determination,  the  ai^titude  for  local  self-government, 
the  versatile  alacrity,  and  the  unresting  spirit  of  en- 
terprise which  characterize  the  Anglo-Americans, 
without  feeling  that  here  he  beholds  the  true  ele- 
ments of  j)rogressive  might. 

509.  Three  quarters  of  a century  have  not  yet 
passed  since  the  United  States  ceased  to  be  mere  de- 
pendencies of  England.  And  even  if  we  date  their 
origin  from  the  period  when  the  first  permanent 
European  settlements  out  of  which  they  grew  were 
made  on  the  western  coast  of  the  North  Atlantic,  the 
increase  of  their  strength  is  unparalleled  either  in 
rapidity  or  extent. 

510.  The  ancient  Eoman  boasted,  with  reason,  of 
the  growth  of  Rome  from  humble  beginnings  to  the 
greatest  magnitude  which  the  world  had  then  ever 
witnessed.  But  the  citizen  of  the  United  States  is 
still  more  justly  entitled  to  claim  this  praise.  In  twn 
centuries  and  a half  his  country  has  acquired  ampler 


AT  SARATOGA. 


471 


dominion  than  the  Eoman  gained  in  ten.  And  even 
if  we  credit  the  legend  of  the  band  of  shepherds  and 
outlaws  with  which  Romulus  is  said  to  have  colon- 
ized the  Seven  Hills,  we  find  not  there  so  small  a 
germ  of  future  greatness  as  we  find  in  the  group  of  a 
hundred  and  five  ill -chosen  and  disunited  emigrants 
who  founded  Jamestown  in  1607,  or  in  the  scanty 
band  of  Pilgrim  Fathers  who,  a few  years  later, 
moored  their  bark  on  the  wild  and  rock-bound  coast 
of  the  wilderness  that  was  to  become  New  England. 
The  power  of  the  United  States  is  emphatically  the 
“ imperium  quo  neque  ab  exordio  ullum  fere  minus, 
neque  increments  toto  orbe  amplius  humana  potest 
memoria  recordari.”^^ 

511.  Nothing  is  more  calculated  to  impress  the 
mind  with  a sense  of  the  rapidity  with  which  the 
resources  of  the  American  republic  advance,  than  the 
difficulty  which  the  historical  inquirer  finds  in  as- 
certaining their  precise  amount.  If  he  consults  the 
most  recent  works,  and  those  written  by  the  ablest 
investigators  of  the  subject,  he  finds  in  them  admir- 
ing comments  on  the  change  which  the  last  few  years, 
before  those  books  were  written,  had  made;  but 
when  he  turns  to  apply  the  estimates  in  those  books 
to  the  present  moment,  he  finds  them  wholly  inade- 
quate. Before  a book  on  the  subject  of  the  United 
States  has  lost  its  novelty,  those  states  have  out- 
grown the  descriptions  which  it  contains.  The 
celebrated  work  of  the  French  statesman,  De  Tocque- 
ville,  appeared  about  fifteen  years  ago.  In  the  pas- 

* Eutropius,  lib.  i.,  exordium. 


47-2 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICANS 


sage  which  I am  about  to  quote,  it  will  be  seen  that 
he  predicts  the  constant  increase  of  the  Anglo-Amer- 
ican power,  but  he  looks  on  the  Rocky  Mountains  as 
their  extreme  western  limit  for  many  years  to  come. 
He  had  evidently  no  expectation  of  himself  seeing 
that  power  dominant  along  the  Pacific  as  well  as 
along  the  Atlantic  coast.  He  says 

512.  “ The  distance  from  Lake  Superior  to  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  extends  from  the  47th  to  the  30th  de- 
gree of  latitude,  a distance  of  more  than  1200  miles, 
as  the  bird  flies.  The  frontier  of  the  United  States 
winds  along  the  whole  of  this  immense  line,  some- 
times falling  within  its  limits,  but  more  frequently 
extended  far  beyond  it  into  the  waste.  It  has  been 
calculated  that  the  whites  advance  every  year  a mean 
distance  of  seventeen  miles  along  this  vast  boundary. 
Obstacles,  such  as  an  unproductive  district,  a lake, 
or  an  Indian  nation  unexpectedly  encountered,  are 
some  times  met  with.  The  advancing  column  then 
halts  for  a whUe  ; its  two  extremities  fall  back  upon 
Themselves,  and  as  soon  as  they  are  reunited,  they 
proceed  onward.  This  gradual  and  continuous  pro- 
gress of  the  European  race  toward  the  Rocky  Moun- 
tains has  th6  solemnity  of  a providential  event ; it  is 
like  a deluge  of  men  rising  unabatedly,  and  daily 
driven  onward  by  the  hand  of  God. 

* The  original  French  of  these  passages  will  be  found 
in  the  chapter  on  Quelles  sont  les  chances  de  duree 
I’Union  Americaine— Quels  dangers  lamenacent,”  in  the 
third  volume  of  the  first  part  of  De  Tocqueville,  and  in 
the  conclusion  of  the  first  part.  They  are  (with  others) 
collected  and  translated  by  Mr  Alison,  in  his  “Essays,” 
vol.  iii.,  p.  374. 


AT  SARATOGA. 


473 


513.  “Within  this  first  line  of  conquering  settlers, 
towns  are  built  and  vast  states  founded.  In  1790 
there  were  only  a few  thousand  pioneers  sprinkled 
along  the  valleys  of  the  Mississippi ; and  at  the 
present  day,  these  valleys  contain  as  many  inhabi- 
tants as  were  to  be  found  in  the  whole  Union  in  1790. 
Their  population  amounts  to  nearly  four  millions. 
The  City  of  Washington  was  founded  in  1800,  in  the 
very  centre  of  the  Union ; but  such  are  the  changes 
which  have  taken  place,  that  it  now  stands  at  one  of 
the  extremities ; and  the  delegates  of  the  most  re- 
mote W^estern  States  are  already  obliged  to  perform 
a journey  as  long  as*  that  from  Vienna  to  Paris. 

514.  “ It  must  not,  then,  be  imagined  that  the  im- 
pulse of  the  British  race  in  the  New  World  can  be 
arrested.  The  dismemberment  of  the  Union,  and 
the  hostilities  which  jnight  ensue,  the  abolition  of 
republican  institutions,  and  the  tyrannical  govern- 
ment which  might  succeed  it,  may  retard  this  im- 
pulse, but  they  can  not  prevent  it  from  ultimately 
fulfilling  the  destinies  to  which  that  race  is  reserved. 
No  power  upon  earth  can  close  upon  the  emigrants 
that  fertile  wilderness,  which  oflers  resources  to  all 
industry,  and  a refuge  from  all  want.  Future  events, 
of  whatever  nature  they  may  be,  will  not  deprive  the 
Americans  of  their  climate  or  of  their  inland  seas,  of 
their  great  rivers  or  of  their  exuberant  soil.  Nor 
will  bad  laws,  revolutions,  and  anarchy  be  able  to 
obliterate  that  love  of  prosperity  and  that  spirit  of 
enterprise  which  seem  to  be  the  distinctive  charac- 
teristics of  their  race,  or  to  extinguish  that  knowl- 
dege  which  guides  them  on  their  way. 


474 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICANS 


515.  “Thus,  in  the  midst  of  the  uncertain  future,  one 
event  at  least  is  sure.  At  a period  which  may  be  said  to 
be  near  (for  we  are  speaking  of  the  life  of  a nation),  the 
Anglo-Americans  will  alone  cover  the  immense  space 
contained  between  the  Polar  Regions  and  the  Tropics, 
extending  from  the  coast  of  the  Atlantic  to  the  shores 
of  the  Pacific  Ocean  ; the  territory  which  will  proba- 
bly be  occupied  by  the  Anglo-Americans  at  some 
future  time  may  be  computed  to  equal  three-quarters 
of  Europe  in  extent.  The  climate  of  the  Union  is 
upon  the  whole  preferable  to  that  of  Europe,  and  its 
natural  advantages  are  not  less  great ; it  is  therefore 
(evident  that  its  population  will  at  some  future  time 
be  proportionate  to  our  own.  Europe,  divided  as  it 
is  between  so  many  different  nations,  and  torn  as  it 
has  been  by  incessant  w^ars  and  the  barbarous  man- 
ners of  the  Middle  Ages,  has,  notwithstanding,  at- 
tained a population  of  410  inhabitants  to  the  square 
league.  What  cause  can  prevent  the  United  States 
from  having  as  numerous  a population  in  time  ? 

516,  “ The  time  will  therefore  come  when  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  millions  of  men  will  be  living  in  North 
America,  equal  in  condition,  the  progeny  of  one  race, 
owing  their  origin  to  the  same  cause,  and  preserving 
the  same  civilization,  the  same  language,  the  same 
religion,  the  same  habits,  the  same  manners,  and  im- 
bued with  the  same  opinions,  propagated  under  the 
same  forms.  The  rest  is  uncertain,  but  this  is  certain; 
and  it  is  a fact  new  to  the  world,  a fact  fraught  with 
such  portentous  consequences  as  to  bafiie  the  efforts 
even  of  the  imagination,’’ 


AT  SARATOGA, 


475 


517.  Lefc  us  turn  from  the  French  statesman  writ- 
ing in  1835,  to  an  English  statesman  who  is  justly 
regarded  as  the  highest  authority  in  all  statistical 
subjects,  and  who  described  the  United  States  only 
five  years  ago.  Macgregor*  tells  us — 

“ The  states  which,  on  the  ratification  of  independ- 
ence formed  the  American  Republican  Union,  were 
thirteen,  viz.: 

“ Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  Connecticut, 
Rhode  Island,  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Delaware 
Maryland,  Pennsylvania,  Virginia,  North  Carolina, 
South  Carolina,  and  Georgia. 

518.  “ The  foregoing  thirteen  states  {the  whole  in- 
hahited  territory  of  which,  with  the  exception  of  a few 
small  settlements,  was  confined  to  the  region  extending  he- 
tween  the  Alleghany  Mountains  and  the  Atlantic)  were 
those  which  existed  at  the  period  when  they  became 
an  acknowledged  separate  and  independent  federal 
sovereign  power.  The  thirteen  stripes  of  the  stand- 
ard or  flag  of  the  United  States  continue  to  represent 
the  original  number.  The  stars  have  multiplied  to 
twenty-six,f  according  as  the  number  of  states  have 
increased. 

519.  “ The  territory  of  the  thirteen  original  stales 
of  the  Union,  including  Maine  and  Vermont,  compre- 
hended a superflcies  of  371,124  English  square  miles; 
that  of  the  whole  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  120,354 ; that  of  France,  including  Cor- 
sica, 214,910;  and  that  of  the  Austrian  empire,  in- 

* Macgreg-or’s  “Commercial  Statistics,’’  vol.  iii.,  p.i:i. 

Fresh  stars  have  dawned  since  this  was  written. 


4TG 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICANS 


eluding  Hungary  and  all  the  Imperial  States,  257,540 
English  square  miles. 

520.  “The  present  superficies  of  the  twenty-six 
constitutional  states  of  the  Anglo-American  Union, 
and  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  territories  of 
Florida,  include  1,029,025  square  miles  ; to  which  if 
we  add  the  Northwest,  or  Wisconsin  Territory,  east 
of  the  Mississippi,  and  hound  by  Lake  Superior  on 
the  north,  and  Michigan  on  the  east,  and  occupying 
at  least  100,000  square  miles,  and  then  add  the  great 
western  region,  not  yet  well  defined  territories,  but 
at  the  most  limited  calculation  comprehending  700,- 
000  square  miles,  the  whole  unbroken  in  its  vast 
length  and  breadth  by  foreign  nations,  comprehends 
a portion  of  the  earth’s  surface  equal  to  1,729,025  Eng- 
lish, or  1,296,770  geographical  square  miles.” 

521.  We  may  add  that  the  population  of  the  states 
when  they  declared  their  independence  was  about 
two  millions  and  a half;  it  is  now  twenty-three  mil- 
lions. 

523.  I have  quoted  Maegregor,  not  only  on  account 
of  the  clear  and  full  view  which  he  gives  of  the  pro- 
gress of  America  to  the  date  when  he  wrote,  but  be- 
cause his  description  may  be  contrasted  with  what 
the  United  States  have  become  even  since  his  book 
appeared.  Only  three  years  after  the  time  when  Mae- 
gregor thus  wrote  the  American  president  truly 
stated : 

“ Within  less  than  four  years  the  annexation  ot 
Texas  to  the  Union  has  been  consummated ; all  con- 
fiicting  title  to  the  Oregon  Territory,  south  of  the  49th 


AT  SARATOGA, 


477 


degree  of  north  latitude,  adjusted;  and  Xew  Mexico 
and  Upper  California  have  been  acquired  by  treaty. 
The  area  of  these  several  territories  contains  1,193,- 
(J61  square  miles,  or  763,559,040  acres ; while  the  area 
of  the  remaining  twenty-nine  states,  and  the  terri- 
tory not  yet  organized  into  states  east  of  the  Rocky 
Mountains,  contains  2,059,513  square  miles,  or  1,318,- 
126,058  acres.  These  estimates  show  that  the  terri- 
tories recently  acquired,  and  over  which  our  exclu- 
sive jurisdiction  and  dominion  have  been  extended, 
constitute  a country  more  than  half  as  large  as  all 
that  which  was  held  by  the  United  States  before 
their  acquisition.  If  Oregon  be  excluded  from  the 
estimate,  there  will  still  remain  within  the  limits  of 
Texas,  New  Mexico,  and  California,  851,598  square 
miles,  or  545,012,720  acres,  being  an  addition  equal  to 
more  than  one-third  of  all  the  territory  owned  by 
the  United  States  before  their  acquisition,  and,  in- 
cluding Oregon,  nearly  as  great  an  extent  of  territory 
as  the  whole  of  Europe,  Russia  only  excepted.  The 
Mississippi^  so  lately  the  frontier  of  our  country^  is  now 
only  its  centre.  With  the  addition  of  the  late  acqui- 
sitions, the  United  States  are  now  estimated  to  be 
nearly  as  large  as  the  whole  of  Europe.  The  extent 
of  the  sea-coast  of  Texas  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  is 
upward  of  400  miles  ; of  the  coast  of  Upper  Califor- 
nia, on  the  Pacific,  of  970  miles  ; and  of  Oregon,  in- 
cluding the  Straits  of  Fuca,  of  650  miles ; making 
the  whole  extent  of  sea-coast  on  the  Pacific  1620  miles, 
and  the  whole  extent  on  both  the  Pacific  and  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  2020  miles.  The  length  of  the  coast 


478 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICANS 


on  the  Atlantic,  from  the  northern  limits  of  the 
United  States,  round  the  Capes  of  Florida  to  the 
Sabine  on  the  eastern  boundary  of  Texas,  is  estimated 
to  be  3100  miles,  so  that  the  addition  of  sea-coast,  in- 
cluding Oregon,  is  very  nearly  two-thirds  as  great  as 
all  we  possessed  before ; and,  including  Oregon,  is  an 
addion  of  1370  miles,  being  nearly  equal  to  one-half 
the  extent  of  coast  which  we  possessed  before  these 
acquisitions.  We  have  now  three  great  maritime 
fronts — on  the  Atlantic,  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  the 
Pacific,  making,  in  the  whole,  an  extent  of  sea-coast 
exceeding  5000  miles.  This  is  the  extent  of  the  sea- 
coast  of  the  United  States,  not  including  bays,  sounds, 
and  small  irregularities  of  the  main  shore  and  of  the 
sea  islands.  If  these  be  included,  the  length  of  the 
shore-line  of  coast,  as  estimated  by  the  superintend- 
ent of  the  Coast  Survey  in  his  report,  would  be  33,- 
063  miles.” 

524.  The  importance  of  the  power  of  the  United 
States  being  then  firmly  planted  along  the  Pa- 
cific applies  not  only  to  the  New  World,  but  to  the 
Old.  Opposite  to  San  Francisco,  on  the  coast  of  that 
ocean,  lie  the  wealthy  but  decrepit  empires  of  China 
and  Japan.  Numerous  groups  of  islets  stud  the  larger 
part  of  the  intervening  sea,  and  form  convenient 
stepping-stones  for  the  progress  of  commerce  or  am- 
bition. The  intercourse  of  traffic  between  these  ancient 
Asiatic  monarchies  and  the  young  Anglo-American 
republic  must  be  rapid  and  extensive.  Any  attempt 
of  the  Chinese  or  Japanese  rulers  to  check  it  will 
only  accelerate  an  armed  collision.  The  American  will 


AT  SARATOGA. 


479 


either  buy  or  force  his  way.  Between  such  populations 
as  that  of  China  and  Japan  on  the  one  side,  and 
that  of  the  United  States  on  the  other — the  former 
haughty,  formal,  and  insolent ; the  latter  bold,  in- 
trusive, and  unscrupulous — causes  of  quarrel  must 
sooner  or  later  arise.  The  result  of  such  a quarrel 
can  not  be  doubted.  America  will  scarcely  imitate 
the  forbearance  shown  by  England  at  the  end  of  our 
late  war  with  the  Celestial  Empire ; and  the  con- 
quests of  China  and  Japan,  by  the  fleets  and  armies 
of  the  United  States,  are  events  which  many  now 
living  are  likely  to  witness.  Compared  with  the 
magnitude  of  such  changes  in  the  dominion  of  the 
Old  World,  the  certain  ascendency  of  the  Anglo- 
Americans  over  Central  and  Southern  America 
seems  a matter  of  secondary  importance.  Well  may 
w^e  repeat  De  Tocqueville’s  words,  that  the  growing 
power  of  this  commonwealth  is  “un  fait  entierement 
noveau  dans  le  monde,  et  dont  Timagination  elle-me- 
me  ne  saurait  saisir  la  port^^e.” 

525.  An  Englishman  may  look,  and  ought  to  look, 
on  the  growing  grandeur  of  the  Americans  wdth  no 
small  degree  of  generous  sympathy  and  satisfaction. 
They,  like  ourselves,  are  members  of  the  great  Anglo- 
Saxon  nation,  ‘Vhose  race  and  language  are  now 
overrunning  the  world  from  one  end  of  it  to  the  oth- 
er.”* And  whatever  differences  of  form  of  govern- 
ment may  exist  between  us  and  them — whatever 
reminiscences  of  the  days  when,  though  brethren,  we 
strove  together,  may  rankle  in  the  minds  of  us,  the 


^ Arnold. 


480 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICANS 


deleated  party,  we  should  cherish  the  bonds  of  com- 
mon nationality  that  still  exist  between  us.  We 
should  remember,  as  the  Athenians  remembered  of 
the  Spartans  at  a season  of  jealousy  and  temptation, 
that  our  race  is  one,  being  of  the  same  blood,  speaking 
the  same  language,  having  an  essential  resemblance 
in  our  institutions  and  usages,  and  worshiping  in  the 
temples  of  the  same  God.*  All  this  may  and  should 
be  borne  in  mind.  And  yet  an  Englishman  can 
hardly  watch  the  progress  of  America  without 
the  regretful  thought  that  America  once  was  English, 
and  that,  but  for  the  folly  of  our  rulers,  she  might  be 
English  still.  It  is  true  that  the  commerce  between 
the  two  countries  has  largely  and  beneficially  in- 
creased, but  this  is  no  proof  that  the  increase  would 
not  have  been  still  greater  had  the  states  remained 
integral  portions  of  the  same  great  empire.  By  giv- 
ing a fair  and  just  participation  in  political  rights, 
these,  “the  fairest  possessions”  of  the  British  crown, 
might  have  been  preserved  to  it.  “This  ancient  and 
most  noble  monarchy”!  would  not  have  been  dis- 
membered ; nor  should  we  see  that  which  ought  to 
be  the  right  arm  of  our  strength,  now  menacing  us 
in  every  political  crisis  as  the  most  formidable  rival 
of  our  commercial  and  maritime  ascendency. 

526.  The  war  which  rent  away  the  North  Ameri- 
can colonies  from  England  is,  of  all  subjects  in  his- 
tory, the  most  painful  for  an  Englishman  to  dwell  on. 

* ’Ebi'  ofiaifiov  T€  Kal  o/txbyAaxro’oi',  /cal  ®€(ov  iBpvfiard  re  kolpo. 
/cat  9v<riat,,  re  b/aorpoTra. — HERODOTUS,  viii.,  144. 

t Lord  Chatham. 


AT  SARATOGA, 


4K1 


It  was  commenced  and  carried  on  by  the  Britisli 
ministry  in  iniquity  and  folly,  and  it  was  concluded 
ill  disaster  and  shame.  But  the  contemplation  of  it 
can  not  he  evaded  by  the  historian,  however  much 
it  may  be  abhorred.  Nor  can  any  military  event  be 
said  to  have  exercised  more  important  influence  on 
the  future  fortunes  of  mankind  than  the  complete 
defeat  of  Burgoyne’s  expedition  in  1777;  a defeat 
which  rescued  the  revolted  colonists  from  certain 
subjection,  and  which  by  inducing  the  courts  of 
France  and  Spain  to  attack  England  in  their  behalf, 
insured  the  independence  of  the  United  States,  and 
the  formation  of  that  transatlantic  power  which  not 
only  America,  but  both  Europe  and  Asia  now  see  and 
feel. 

527.  Still  in  proceeding  to  describe  this  ‘‘decisive 
battle  of  the  world,”  a very  brief  recapitulation  of 
the  earlier  events  of  the  war  may  be  sufficient ; nor 
shall  I linger  unnecessarily  on  a painful  theme. 

The  five  northern  colonies  of  Massachusetts,  Con- 
necticut, Rhode  Island,  New  Hampshire,  and  Ver- 
mont, usually  classed  together  as  the  New  England 
colonies,  were  the  strongholds  of  the  insurrection 
against  the  mother  country.  The  feeling  of  resis- 
tance was  less  vehement  and  general  in  the  central 
settlement  of  New  York,  and  still  less  so  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, Maryland  and  the  other  colonies  of  the  South 
although  every  where  it  was  formidably  strong.  But 
it  was  among  the  descendants  of  the  stern  Puritans 
that  the  spirit  of  Cromwell  and  Vane  breathed  in  all 
its  fervor;  it  was  from  the  New  Englanders  that  the 


482 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICAm 


first  armed  opposition  to  the  British  crown  had  been 
offered  ; and  it  was  by  theiii  that  the  most  stubborn 
determination  to  fight  to  the  last,  rather  than  waive 
a single  right  or  privilege,  had  been  displayed.  In 
1775  they  had  succeeded  in  forcing  the  British  troops 
to  evacuate  Boston  ; and  the  events  of  1776  had  made 
New  York  (which  the  Royalists  captured  in  that 
year)  the  principal  basis  of  operations  for  the  armies 
of  the  mother  country. 

528.  A glance  at  the  map  will  show  that  the  Hud- 
son river,  which  falls  into  the  Atlantic  at  New  York, 
runs  down  from  the  north  at  the  back  of  the  New 
England  States,  forming  an  angle  oAabout  forty -five 
degrees  with  the  line  of  the  coast  of  the  Atlantic, 
along  which  the  New  England  States  are  situate. 
Northward  of  the  Hudson  we  see  a small  chain  of 
lakes  communicating  with  the  Canadian  frontier.  It 
is  necessary  to  attend  closely  to  geographical  points, 
in  order  to  understand  the  plan  of  the  operations 
which  the  English  attempted  in  1777,  and  which  the 
battle  of  Saratoga  defeated. 

529.  The  English  had  a considerable  force  in  Cana- 
da, and  in  1776  had  completely  repulsed  an  attack 
which  the  Americans  had  made  upon  that  province. 
The  British  ministry  resolved  to  avail  themselves,  in 
the  next  year,  of  the  advantage  which  the  occupation 
of  Canada  gave  them,  not  merely  for  the  purpose  of 
defense,  but  for  the  x^urpose  of  striking  a vigorous 
and  crushing  blow  against  the  revolted  colonies. 
With  this  view  the  army  in  Canada  was  largely  re- 
enforced. Seven  thousand  veteran  troops  were  sent 


AT  SARATOGA. 


483 


out  from  England,  with  a corps  of  artillery  abun- 
dantly supplied,  and  led  by  select  and  experienced 
officers.  Large  quantities  of  military  stores  were 
also  furnished  for  the  equipment  of  the  Canadian 
volunteers,  who  w^ere  expected  to  join  the  expedition. 
It  was  intended  that  the  force  thus  collected  should 
march  southward  by  the  line  of  the  lakes,  and  thence 
along  the  banks  of  the  Hudson  Eiver.  The  British 
army  from  New  York  (or  a large  detachment  of  it) 
was  to  make  a simultaneous  movement  northward, 
up  the  line  of  the  Hudson,  and  the  two  expeditions 
were  to  unite  at  Albany,  a town  on  that  river.  By 
these  operations,  all  communication  between  the 
northern  colonies  and  those  of  the  centre  and  south 
would  be  cut  off.  An  irresistible  force  would  be  con- 
centrated, so  as  to  crush  all  further  opposition  in 
New  England ; and  when  this  was  done,  it  was  be- 
lieved that  the  other  colonies  would  speedily  submit. 
The  Americans  had  no  trooj)s  in  the  field  that  seemed 
able  to  baffie  these  movements.  Their  principal 
avmy,  under  Washington,  was  occupied  in  watching 
over  Pennsylvania  and  the  South.  At  any  rate,  it 
was  believed  that,  in  order  to  oppose  the  plan  in- 
tended for  the  new  campaign,  the  insurgents  must 
risk  a pitched  battle,  in  which  the  superiority  of  the 
Royalists,  in  numbers,  in  discipline,  and  in  equip- 
ment, seemed  to  promise  to  the  latter  a crowning 
victory.  Without  question,  the  plan  was  ably  formed  ; 
and  had  the  success  of  the  execution  been  equal  to 
the  ingenuity  of  the  design,  the  reconquest  or  sub- 
mission of  the  thirteen  United  States  must  in  all 


16 


4R4 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICANS 


Imman  i)robability  have  followed,  and  the  index^end- 
ence  which  they  proclaimed  in  1776  would  have  been 
extinguished  before  it  existed  a second  year.  No 
Eurox^ean  power  had  as  yet  come  forward  to  aid 
America.  It  is  true  that  England  was  generally  re- 
garded with  jealousy  and  ill  will,  and  was  thought 
to  have  acquired,  at  the  treaty  of  Paris,  a preponder- 
ance of  dominion  which  was  perilous  to  the  balance 
of  power;  but,  though  many  were  willing  to  wound, 
none  had  yet  ventured  to  strike ; and  America,  if 
defeated  in  1777,  would  have  been  suffered  to  fall 
unaided. 

530.  Burgoyne  had  gained  celebrity  by  some  bold 
and  dashing  exploits  in  Portugal  during  the  last 
war ; he  was  personally  as  brave  an  officer  as  ever 
headed  British  troops ; he  had  considerable  skill  as 
a tactitian ; and  his  general  intellectual  abilities  and 
acquirements  were  of  a high  order.  He  had  several 
very  able  and  experienced  officers  under  him,  among 
whom  were  Major-General  Philips  and  Brigadier 
General  Frazer.  His  regular  troops  amounted,  ex- 
clusively of  the  corps  of  artillery,  to  about  7200  men, 
rank  and  file.  Nearly  half  of  these  were  Germans. 
He  had  also  an  auxiliary  force  of  from  two  to  three 
thousand  Canadians.  He  summoned  the  warriors  of 
several  tribes  of  the  red  Indians  near  the  Western 
lakes  to  join  his  army.  Much  eloquence  was  poured 
forth  both  in  America  and  in  England  in  denouncing 
the  use  of  these  savage  auxiliaries.  Yet  Burgoyne 
seems  to  have  done  no  more  than  Montcalm,  Wolfe, 
and  other  French,  American,  and  English  generals 


AT  SAEATOGA. 


485 


had  done  before  him.  But,  in  truth,  the  lawless 
ferocity  of  the  Indians,  their  unskillfulness  in  regu- 
lar action,  and  the  utter  impossibility  of  bringing 
them  under  any  discipline,  made  their  services  of 
little  or  no  value  in  times  of  difficulty  ; while  the  in- 
dignation which  their  outrages  inspired  went  far  to 
rouse  the  whole  population  of  the  invaded  districts 
into  active  hostilities  against  Burgoyne’s  force. 

531.  Burgoyne  assembled  his  troops  and  confed- 
erates near  the  River  Bouquet,  on  the  west  side  of 
Lake  Champlain.  He  then,  on  the  21st  of  June,  1777, 
gave  his  red  allies  a war  feast,  and  harangued  them 
on  the  necessity  of  abstaining  from  their  usual  cruel 
practices  against  unarmed  people  and  prisoners.  At 
the  same  time,  he  published  a pompous  manifesto  to 
the  Americans,  in  which  he  threatened  the  refractory 
with  all  the  horrors  of  war, Indian  as  well  as  European. 
The  army  proceeded  by  water  to  Crown  Point,  a for- 
tification which  the  Americans  held  at  the  northern 
extremity  of  the.  inlet,  by  which  the  water  from 
Lake  George  is  conveyed  to  Lake  Champlain.  He 
landed  here  without  opposition  ; but  the  reduction 
of  Ticonderoga,  a fortification  about  twelve  miles  to 
the  south  of  Crown  Point,  was  a more  serious  mat- 
ter, and  was  supposed  to  be  the  critical  part  of  the 
expedition.  Ticonderoga  commanded  the  passage 
along  the  lakes,  and  was  considered  to  be  the  key  to 
the  route  which  Burgoyne  wished  to  follow.  The 
English  had  been  repulsed  in  an  attack  on  it  in  the 
war  with  the  French  in  1758  with  severe  lo«s.  But 
Burgoyne  now  invested  it  with  great  skill ; and  the 


4S6 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMEBIC ANS 


American  general,  St.  Clair,  who  had  only  an  ill- 
equipped  army  of  about  3000  men,  evacuated  it  on 
the  5th  of  July.  It  seems  evident  that  a different 
course  would  have  caused  the  destruction  or  capture 
of  his  whole  army,  which,  weak  as  it  was,  was  the 
chief  force  then  in  the  field  for  the  protection  of  the 
New  England  States.  When  censured  by  some  of  his 
countrymen  for  abandoning  Ticonderoga,  St.  Clair 
truly  replied  “ that  he  had  lost  a post,  but  saved  a 
province.”  Burgoyne’s  troops  pursued  the  retiring 
Americans,  gained  several  advantages  over  them,  and 
took  a large  part  of  their  artillery  and  military 
stores. 

532.  The  loss  of  the  British  in  these  engagements 
was  trifling.  The  army  moved  southward  along  Lake 
George  to  Skenesborough,  and  thence,  slowly  and 
with  great  difficulty,  across  a broken  country,  full  of 
creeks  and  marshes,  and  clogged  by  the  enemy  with 
felled  trees  and  other  obstacles,  to  Fort  Edward,  on 
the  Hudson  River,  the  American  troops  continuing  to 
retire  before  them. 

533.  Burgoyne  reached  the  left  bank  of  the  Hud- 
son River  on  the  30th  of  July.  Hitherto  he  had 
overcome  every  difficulty  which  the  enemy  and  the 
nature  of  the  country  had  placed  in  his  way.  His 
army  was  in  excellent  order  and  in  the  highest  spirits, 
and  the  peril  of  the  expedition  seemed  over  when 
they  were  once  on  the  bank  of  the  river  which  was 
to  be  the  channel  of  communication  between  them 
and  the  British  army  in  the  South.  But  their  feel- 
ings, and  those  of  the  English  nation  in  general  when 


AT  SABA  TOGA. 


487 


their  successes  were  announced,  may  best  be  learnea 
from  a contemporary  writer.  Burke,  in  the  “ Annual 
Kegister  ” for  1777,  describes  them  thus  : 

534.  “ Such  was  the  rapid  torrent  of  success,  which 
swept  everything  away  before  the  Northern  army  in 
its  onset.  It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  if  both  officers 
and  private  men  were  highly  elated  with  their  good 
fortune,  and  deemed  that  and  their  prowess  to  be  irre- 
sistible; if  they  regarded  their  enemy  with  the  great- 
est contempt ; considered  their  own  toils  to  be  nearly 
at  an  end ; Albany  to  be  already  in  their  hands  ; and 
the  reduction  of  the  northern  provinces  to  be  rather 
a matter  of  some  time  than  an  arduous  task  full  of 
difficulty  and  danger. 

535.  “At  home,  the  joy  and  exultation  was  extreme ; 
not  only  at  court,  but  with  all  those  who  hoped  or 
wished  the  unqualified  subjugation  and  uncondi- 
tional submission  of  the  colonies.  The  loss  in  repu- 
tation was  greater  to  the  Americans,  and  capable  of 
more  fatal  consequences,  than  even  that  of  ground, 
of  posts,  of  artillery,  or  of  men.  All  the  contemptu- 
ous and  most  degrading  charges  which  had  been  made 
by  their  enemies,  of  their  wanting  the  resolution  and 
abilities  of  men,  even  in  their  defense  of  whatever 
was  dear  to  them,  were  now  repeated  and  believed. 
Those  who  still  regarded  them  as  men,  and  who  had 
not  yet  lost  all  affection  to  them  as  brethren ; who 
also  retained  hopes  that  a happy  reconciliation  upon 
constitutional  principles,  without  sacrificing  the  dig- 
nity of  the  just  authority  of  government  on  the  one 
side,  or  a dereliction  of  the  rights  of  freemen  on  the 


488 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICANS 


other,  was  not  even  now  impossible,  notwithstanding 
their  favorable  dispositions  in  general,  could  not  help 
feeling  upon  this  occasion  that  the  Americans  sunk 
not  a little  in  their  estimation.  It  was  not  difficult 
to  diffuse  an  opinion  that  the  war  in  effect  was  over, 
and  that  any  farther  resistance  could  serve  only  to 
render  the  terms  of  their  submission  the  worse. 
Such  were  some  of  the  immediate  effects  of  the  loss 
of  those  grand  keys  of  North  America — Ticonderoga, 
and  the  lakes.” 

536.  The  astonishment  and  alarm  which  tliese 
events  produced  among  the  Americans  were  naturally 
great ; but  in  the  midst  of  their  disasters,  none  of  the 
colonists  showed  any  disposition  to  submit.  The 
local  governments  of  the  New  England  States,  as  well 
as  the  Congress,  acted  with  vigor  and  firmness  in  their 
efforts  to  repel  the  enemy.  General  Gates  was  sent  to 
take  the  command  of  the  army  at  Saratoga  ; and  Ar- 
nold, a favorite  leader  of  the  Americans,  was  dispatch- 
ed by  Washington  to  act  under  him,  with  re-enforce- 
ments of  troops  and  guns  from  the  main  American 
army.  Burgoyne’s  employment  of  the  Indians  now 
produced  the  worst  possible  effects.  Though  he 
labored  hard  to  check  the  atrocities  which  they  were 
accustomed  to  commit,  he  could  not  prevent  the  oc- 
currence of  many  barbarous  outrages,  repugnant  both 
to  the  feelings  of  humanity  and  to  the  laws  of  civil- 
ized warfare.  The  American  commanders  took  care 
that  the  reports  of  these  excesses  should  be  circulated 
far  and  wide,  well  knowing  that  they  would  make 
the  stern  New  Englanders  not  droop,  but  rage. 


AT  SARATOGA. 


489 


Such  was  their  effect ; and  though,  when  each  man 
looked  upon  his  wife,  his  children,  his  sisters,  or  his 
aged  parents,  the  thought  of  the  merciless  Indian 
“ thirsting  for  the  blood  of  man,  woman  and  child,” 
of  “ the  cannibal  savage  torturing,  murdering,  roast- 
ing, and  eating  the  mangled  victims  of  his  barbarous 
battles,”*  might  raise  terror  in  the  bravest  breasts ; 
this  very  terror  produced  a directly  contrary  effect 
to  causing  submission  to  the  royal  army.  It  was 
seen  that  the  few  friends  of  the  royal  cause,  as  well 
as  its  enemies,  were  liable  to  be  the  victims  of  the 
indiscriminate  rage  of  the  savages;!  and  thus  “the 
inhabitants  of  the  open  and  frontier  countries  had 
no  choice  of  acting;  they  had  no  means  of  security 
left  but  by  abandoning  their  habitations  and  taking 
up  arms.  Every  man  saw  the  necessity  of  becoming 
a temporary  soldier,  not  only  for  his  own  security, 
but  for  the  protection  and  defense  of  those  connec- 
tions which  are  dearer  than  life  itself.  Thus  an 
army  was  poured  forth  by  the  woods,  mountains, 
and  marshes,  which  in  this  part  were  thickly  sown 
with  plantations  and  villages.  The  Americans  re- 
called their  courage,  and,  when  their  regular  army 
seemed  to  be  entirely  wasted,  the  spirit  of  the  coun- 
try produced  a much  greater  and  more  formidable 
force.”! 

537.  While  resolute  recruits,  accustomed  to  the 

* Lord  Chatham’s  speech  on  the  employment  of  Indians 
in  the  war. 

t See,  In  the  “ Annual  Register”  1777,  p.  117,  the  “ Nar- 
rative of  the  Murder  of  Miss  M’Crea,  the  daughtor  of  an 
American  Loyalist.” 

t Burke. 


490 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICANS 


use  of  fire-arms,  and  all  j)artially  trained  by  service 
in  the  provincial  militias,  were  thus  flocking  to  the 
standard  of  Gates  and  Arnold  at  Saratoga,  and  while 
Burgoyne  was  engaged  at  Fort  Edward  in  providing 
the  means  for  the  farther  advance  of  his  army 
through  the  intricate  and  hostile  country  that  still 
lay  before  him,  two  events  occurred,  in  each  of 
which  the  British  sustained  loss  and  the  Americans 
obtained  advantage,  the  moral  effects  of  which  were 
even  more  important  than  the  immediate  result  of 
the  encounters.  When  Burgoyne  left  Canada,  Gen- 
eral St.  Leger  was  detached  from  that  province  with 
a mixed  force  of  about  1,000  men  and  some  light 
field-pieces  across  Lake  Ontario  against  Fort  Stan- 
wix,  which  the  Americans  held.  After  capturing 
this,  he  was  to  march  along  the  Mohawk  River  to 
its  confluence  with  the  Hudson,  between  Saratoga 
and  Albany,  where  his  force  and  that  of  Burgoyne^s 
were  to  unite.  But,  after  some  successes,  St.  Leger 
was  obliged  to  retreat,  and  to  abandon  his  tents  and 
large  quantities  of  stores  to  the  garrison.  At  the 
very  time  that  General  Burgoyne  heard  of  this  disas- 
ter, he  experienced  one  still  more  severe  in  the  defeat 
of  Colonel  Baum,  with  a large  detachment  of  German 
troops,  at  Bennington,  whither  Burgoyne  had  sent 
them  for  the  purpose  of  capturing  some  magazines  of 
provisions,  of  which  the  British  army  stood  greatly 
in  need.  The  Americans,  augmented  by  continual 
accessions  of  strength,  succeeded,  after  many  attacks, 
in  breaking  this  corps,  which  fled  into  the  woods, 
and  left  its  commander  mortally  wounded  on  the 


AT  SARATOGA, 


491 


field  : they  then  marched  against  a force  of  five  hun- 
dred grenadiers  and  light  infantry,  which  was  ad- 
vancing to  Colonel  Baum’s  assistance  under  Lieuten- 
ant Colonel  Breyman,  who,  after  a gallant  resistance, 
was  obliged  to  retreat  on  the  main  army.  The  Brit- 
ish loss  in  these  two  actions  exceeded  six  hundred 
men;  and  a party  of  American  Loyalists,  on  their 
way  to  join  the  army,  having  attached  themselves  to 
Colonel  Baum’s  corx3S,  were  destroyed  with  it. 

538.  Notwithstanding  these  reverses,  which  ad- 
ded greatly  to  the  spirit  and  numbers  of  the  Ameri- 
can forces,  Burgoyne  deterniine4  to  advance.  It 
was  impossible  any  longer  to  keep  up  his  communi- 
cations with  Canada  by  way  of  the  lakes,  so  as  to  sup- 
ply his  army  on  his  southward  march  ; but  having, 
by  unremitting  exertions,  collected  provisions  for 
thirty  days,  he  crossed  the  Hudson  by  means  of  a 
bridge  of  rafts,  and,  marching  a short  distance  along 
its  western  bank,  he  encamped  on  the  14th  of  Sep- 
tember on  the  heights  of  Saratoga,  about  sixteen 
miles  from  Albany.  The  Americans  had  fallen  back 
from  Saratoga,  and  were  now  strongly  posted  near 
Stillwater,  about  half  way  between  Saratoga  and  Al- 
bany, and  showed  a determination  to  recede  no 
farther. 

539.  Meanwhile  Lord  Howe,  with  the  bulk  of  the 
British  army  that  had  lain  at  New  York,  had  sailed 
away  to  the  Delaware,  and  there  commenced  a cam- 
paign against  Washington,  in  which  the  English 
general  took  Philadelphia,  and  gained  other  showy 
but  unprofitable  successes.  But  Sir  Henry  Clinton, 


492 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICANS 


a brave  and  skillful  officer,  was  left  with  a consider- 
able force  at  New  York,  and  he  undertook  the  task 
of  moving  up  the  Hudson  to  co-operate  with  Bur- 
goyne.  Clinton  was  obliged  for  this  purpose  to  wait 
for  re-enforcements  which  had  been  promised  from 
England,  and  these  did  not  arrive  till  September.  As 
soon  as  he  received  them,  Clinton  embarked  about 
3000  of  his  men  on  a flotilla,  convoyed  by  some  ships 
of  war  under  Commander  Hotham,  and  proceeded  to 
force  his  way  up  the  river. 

540.  The  country  between  Burgoyne’s  position  at 
Saratoga  and  that  of  the  Americans  at  Stillwater  Avas 
rugged,  and  seamed  with  creeks  and  water-courses ; 
but,  after  great  labor  in  making  bridges  and  tem- 
porary causeways,  the  British  army  moved  forward. 
About  four  miles  from  Saratoga,  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  19th  of  September,  a sharp  encounter  took  place 
between  part  of  the  English  right  wing,  under  Bur- 
goyne  himself,  and  a strong  body  of  the  enemy,  under 
Gates  and  Arnold.  The  conflict  lasted  till  sunset. 
The  British  remained  masters  of  the  field  ; but  the 
loss  on  each  side  was  nearly  equal  (from  five  hun- 
dred to  six  hundred  men) ; and  the  spirits  of  the 
Americans  were  greatly  raised  by  having  withstood 
the  best  regular' troops  of  the  English  army.  Burgoyne 
now  halted  again,  and  strengthened  his  position  by 
field-works  and  redoubts;  and  the  Americans  also 
improved  their  defenses.  The  two  armies  remained 
nearly  within  cannon-shot  of  each  other  for  a con- 
siderable time,  during  which  Burgoyne  was  anxiously 
looking  for  intelligence  of  the  promised  expedition 


AT  SARATOGA. 


493 


from  Ne\\  York,  which,  according  to  the  original 
plan,  ought  by  this  time  to  have  been  approaching 
Albany  from  the  south.  At  last  a messenger  from 
Clinton  made  his  way,  with  great  difficulty,  to  Bur- 
goyne’s  camp,  and  brought  the  information  that 
Clinton  was  on  his  way  up  the  Hudson  to  attack  the 
American  forts  which  barred  the  passage  up  that 
river  to  Albany.  Bi^rgoyne,  in  reply,  stated  his 
hopes  that  the  promised  co-operation  would  be  speedy 
and  decisive,  and  added,  that  unless  he  received 
assistance  before  the  10th  of  October,  he  would  be 
obliged  to  retreat  to  the  lakes  through  want  of  pro- 
visions. 

541.  The  Indians  and  Canadians  now  began  to 
desert  Burgoyne,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  Gates’s 
army  was  continually  re-enforced  by  fresh  bodies  of 
the  militia.  An  expeditionary  force  was  detached 
by  the  Americans,  which  made  a bold,  though  un- 
successful attempt  to  retake  Ticonderoga.  And  find- 
ing the  number  and  spirit  of  the  enemy  to  increase 
daily,  and  his  own  stores  of  provisions  to  diminish, 
Burgoyne  determined  on  attacking  the  Americans  in 
front  of  him,  and,  by  dislodging  them  from  their 
position,  to  gain  the  means  of  moving  upon  Albany, 
or,  at  least,  of  relieving  his  troops  from  the  straitened 
position  in  which  they  were  cooped  up. 

542.  Burgoyne’s  force  was  now  reduced  to  less  than 
6000  men.  The  right  of  his  camp  was  on  some  high 
ground  a little  to  the  west  of  the  river ; thence  his 
intrenchments  extended  along  the  lower  ground  to 
the  bank  of  the  Hudson,  their  line  being  nearly  at  a 


494 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICANS. 


right  angle  with  the  course  of  the  stream.  The  lines 
were  fortified  in  the  centre  and  on  the  left  with  re- 
doubts and  field-works.  The  numerical  force  of  the 
Americans  was  now  greater  than  the  British,  even  in 
regular  troops,  and  the  numbers  of  the  militia  and 
volunteers  which  had  joined  Gates  and  Arnold  were 
greater  still.  The  right  of  the  American  position, 
that  is  to  say,  the  part  of  it  nearest  to  the  river,  was 
too  strong  to  be  assailed  with  any  prospect  of  .suc- 
cess, and  Burgoyne  therefore  determined  to  endeavor 
to  force  their  left.  For  this  purpose  he  formed  a 
column  of  1500  regular  troops,  with  two  twelve- 
pounders,  two  howitzers,  and  six  six-pounders.  He 
headed  this  in  person,  having  Generals  Philips, 
Peidesel,  and  Frazer  under  him.  The  enemy’s  force 
immediately  in  front  of  his  lines  was  so  strong  that 
he  dared  not  weaken  the  troops  who  guarded  them 
by  detaching  any  more  to  strengthen  his  column  of 
attack.  The  right  of  the  camp  was  commacded  by 
Generals  Hamilton  and  Spaight ; the  left  part  of  it 
was  committed  to  the  charge  of  Brigadier  Goll. 

543.  It  was  on  the  7th  of  October  that  Burgoyne 
led  his  column  on  to  the  attack ; aud  on  the  preced- 
ing day,  the  6th,  Clinton  had  successfully  executed  a 
))rilliant  enterprise  against  the  two  American  forts 
which  barred  his  progress  up  the  Hudson.  He  had 
captured  them  both,  with  severe  loss  to  the  Ameri- 
can forces  opposed  to  him ; he  had  destroyed  the 
fieet  which  the  Americans  had  been  forming  on  the 
Hudson,  under  the  protection  of  their  forts ; and  the 
ui)ward  river  was  laid  open  to  his  squadron.  He  was 


AT  SAMA20GA, 


495 


now  only  a hundred  and  fifty-six  miles  distant  from 
Burgoyne,  and  a detachment  of  1700  men  actually 
advanced  within  forty  miles  of  Albany.  Unfortu- 
nately, Burgoyne  and  Clinton  were  each  ignorant  ot 
the  other’s  movements;  but  if  Burgoyne  had  won  his 
battle  on  the  7th,  he  must,  on  advancing,  have  soon 
learned  the  tidings  of  Clinton’s  success,  and  Clinton 
would  have  heard  of  his.  A junction  would  soon 
have  been  made  of  the  two  victorious  armies,  and  the 
great  objects  of  the  campaign  might  yet  have  been 
accomplished.  All  depended  on  the  fortune  of  the 
column  with  which  Burgoyne,  on  the  eventful  7th 
of  October,  1777,  advance  against  the  American 
position.  There  were  brave  men,  both  English  and 
German,  in  its  ranks ; and,  in  particular,  it  comprised 
one  of  the  best  bodies  of  Grenadiers  in  the  British 
service. 

544.  Burgoyne  pushed  forward  some  bodies  of 
irregular  troops  to  distract  the  enemy’s  attention,  and 
led  his  column  to  within  three-quarters  of  a mile 
from  the  left  of  Gates’s  camp,  and  then  deployed  his 
men  into  line.  The  Grenadiers  under  Major  Ack- 
land  were  drawn  up  on  the  left,  a corps  of  Germans 
in  the  centre,  and  the  English  Light  Infantry  and 
the  24th  regiment  on  the  right.  But  Gates  did  not 
wait  to  be  attacked ; and  directly  the  British  line 
was  formed  and  began  to  advance,  the  American 
general,  with  admirable  skill,  caused  a strong  force 
to  make  a sudden  and  vehement  rush  against  its  left. 
The  Grenadiers  under  Ackland  sustained  the  charge 
of  superior  numbers  nobly.  But  Gates  sent  more 


4%* 


VICTORY  OF  THE  AMERICANS, 


Americans  forward,  and  in  a few  minutes  the  action 
became  general  along  the  centre,  so  as  to  prevent  the 
Germans  from  sending  any  help  to  the  Grenadiers. 
Burgoyne’s  right  was  not  yet  engaged  ; but  a mass 
of  the  enemy  were  observed  advancing  from  their 
extreme  left,  with  the  evident  intention  of  turning 
the  British  right,  and  cutting  off  its  retreat.  The 
Light  Infantry  and  the  24th  now  fell  back,  and 
formed  an  oblique  second  line,  which  enabled  them 
to  baffle  this  maneuver,  and  also  to  succor  their  com- 
rades in  the  left  wing,  the  gallant  Grenadiers,  who 
Avere  overpowered  by  superior  numbers,  and,  but  for 
this  aid,  must  have  been  cut  to  pieces.  Arnold  now 
came  up  with  three  American  regiments,  and  attacked 
the  right  flanks  of  the  English  double  line.  Bur- 
goyne’s whole  force  Avas  soon  compelled  to  retreat 
toward  their  camp  ; the  left  and  centre  were  in  com- 
plete disorder;  but  the  Light  Infantry  and  the  24th 
checked  the  fury  of  the  assailants,  and  the  remains 
of  Burgoyne’s  column  with  great  difficulty  effected 
their  return  to  their  camp,  leaving  six  of  their  guns 
in  the  possession  of  the  enemy,  and  great  numbers 
of  killed  and  wounded  on  the  field  ; and  especially  a 
large  proportion  of  the  artillery-men,  who  had  stood 
to  their  guns  until  shot  down  or  bayoneted  besides 
them  by  the  advancing  Americans. 

545.  Burgoyne’s  column  had  been  defeated,  but  the 
action  Avas  not  yet  over.  The  English  had  scarcely 
entered  the  camp,  when  the  Americans,  pursuing 
their  success,  assaulted  it  in  several  places  with  un- 
common fierceness,  rushing  to  the  lines  through  a 


A7'  SAEATOGA. 


497 


severe  fire  of  grape-shot  and  musketry  with  the  ut- 
most fury.  Arnold  especially,  who  on  this  day 
appeared  maddened  w ith  the  thirst  of  combat  and 
carnage,  urged  on  the  attack  against  a part  of  the 
intrenchments  which  was  occupied  by  the  Light  In- 
fantry under  Lord  Balcarras.*  But  the  English 
received  him  with  vigor  and  spirit.  The  struggle 
here  was  obstinate  and  sanguinary.  At  length,  as  it 
grew  toward  evening,  Arnold,  having  forced  all 
obstacles,  entered  the  works  with  some  of  the  most 
fearless  of  his  followers.  But  in  this  critical  moment 
of  glory  and  danger,  he  received  a painful  wound  in 
the  same  leg  which  had  already  been  injured  at  the 
assault  on  Quebec.  To  his  bitter  regret,  he  was 
obliged  to  be  carried  back.  His  party  still  continued 
the  attack  ; but  the  English  also  continued  their 
obstinate  resistance  and  at  last  night  fell,  and  the 
assailants  withdrew  from  this  quarter  of  the  British 
intrenchments.  But  in  another  part  the  attack  had 
been  more  successful.  A body  of  the  Americans, 
under  Colonel  Brooke,  forced  their  way  in  through  a 
j)art  of  the  intrenchments  on  the  extreme  right,  which 
w^as  defended  by  the  German  reserve  under  Colonel 
Breyman.  The  Germans  resisted  well,  and  Breyman 
died  in  defense  of  his  post ; but  the  Americans  made 
good  the  ground  which  they  had  won,  and  captured 
baggage,  tents,  artillery,  and  a store  of  ammunition, 
which  they  were  greatly  in  need  of.  They  had,  by 
establishing  themselves  on  this  point,  acquired  the 
means  of  completely  turning  the  right  flank  of  the 

* JBotta’s  “American  War?"  book  viii. 


498 


VICTORY  OF  THE  A3IEBlCAm 


British,  and  gaining  their  rear.  To  prevent  this 
calamity,  Burgoyne  effected  during  the  night  a com- 
plete change  of  position,  With  great  skill,  he  re- 
moved his  whole  army  to  some  heights  near  the 
river,  a little  northward  of  the  former  camp,  and  he 
there  drew  up  his  men,  expecting  to  be  attacked  on 
the  following  day  But  Gates  was  resolved  not  to 
risk  the  certain  triumph  which  his  success  had 
already  secured  for  him.  He  harassed  the  English 
with  skirmishes,  but  attempted  no  regular  attack. 
Meanwhile  he  detached  bodies  of  troops  on  both 
sides  of  the  Hudson  to  prevent  the  British  from  re- 
crossing  that  river  and  to  bar  their  retreat.  When 
night  fell,  it  became  absolutely  necessary  for  Bur- 
goyne to  retire  again,  and,  accordingly,  the  troops 
were  marched  through  a stormy  and  rainy  night 
toward  Saratoga,  abandoning  their  sick  and  wounded, 
and  the  greater  part  of  their  baggage  to  the  enemy. 

546.  Before  the  rear  guard  quitted  the  camp,  the 
last  sad  honors  were  paid  to  the  brave  General  Fra- 
zer, who  had  been  mortally  wounded  on  the  7th,  and 
expired  on  the  following  day.  The  funeral  of  this 
gallant  soldier  is  thus  described  by  the  Italian  his- 
torian Botta : 

“ Toward  midnight  the  body  of  General  Frazer 
was  buried  in  the  British  camp.  His  brother  officers 
assembled  sadly  round  while  the  funeral  service  was 
read  over  the  remains  of  their  brave  comrade,  and 
his  body  was  committed  to  the  hostile  earths  The 
ceremony,  always  mournful  and  solemn  of  itself,  was 
rendered  even  terrible  by  the  sense  of  recent  losses. 


AT  SARATOGA. 


499 


of  present  and  future  dangers,  and  of  regret  for  the 
deceased.  Meanwhile  the  blaze  and  roar  of  the 
American  artillery  amid  the  natural  darkness  and 
stillness  of  the  night  came  on  the  senses  with  start- 
ling awe.  The  grave  had  been  dug  within  range  of 
the  enemy’s  batteries ; and  while  the  service  was 
proceeding,  a cannon  ball  struck  the  ground  close  to 
the  coffin,  and  spattered  earth  over  the  face  of  the 
officiating  chaplain.”* 

547.  Burgoyne  now  took  up  his  last  position  on  the 
heights  near  Saratoga  ; and  hemmed  in  by  the  enemy, 
who  refused  any  encounter,  and  baffled  in  all  his  at- 
tempts at  finding  a path  of  escape,  he  there  lingered 
until  famine  compelled  him  to  capitulate.  The  forti- 
tude of  the  British  army  during  this  melancholy 
period  has  been  justly  eulogized  by  many  native  his- 
torians, but  I prefer  quoting  the  testimony  of  a 
foreign  writer,  as  free  from  all  possibility  of  partiality. 
Botta  says  :f 

548.  “ It  exceeds  the  power  of  words  to  describe 
the  pitiable  condition  to  which  the  British  army  was 
now  reduced.  The  troops  were  worn  down  by  a series 
of  toil,  privation,  sickness,  and  desperate  fighting. 
They  were  abandoned  by  the  Indians  and  Canadians, 
and  the  effective  force  of  the  whole  army  was  now 
diminished  by  repeated  and  heavy  losses,  which  had 
principally  fallen  on  the  best  soldiers  and  the  most 
distinguished  officers,  from  10,000  combatants  to  less 
than  one  half  that  number.  Of  this  remnant  little 
more  than  3000  were  English. 

* Botta,  book  viii.  t Book  viii. 


500 


VICTORY  OF  THE  A3IERICAN8 


549.  “ In  these  circumstances,  and  thus  weakened, 
they  were  invested  by  an  army  of  four  times  their 
own  number,  whose  position  extended  three  parts  of 
a circle  round  them  ; Avho  refused  to  fight  them,  as 
knowing  their  weakness,  and  who,  from  the  nature 
of  the  ground,  could  not  be  attacked  in  any  part.  In 
this  helpless  condition,  obliged  to  be  constantly  un- 
der arms,  while  the  enemy’s  cannon  played  on  every 
part  of  their  camp,  and  even  the  American  rifle  balls 
whistled  in  many  parts  of  the  lines,  the  troops  of 
Burgoyne  retained  their  customary  firmness,  and, 
Avhile  sinking  under  a hard  necessity,  they  showed 
theinsslves  worth  of  a better  fate.  They  could  not 
be  reproached  with  an  action  or  a word  which  be- 
trayed a want  of  temper  or  of  fortitude.” 

550.  At  length  the  13th  of  October  arrived,  and  as 
no  prospect  of  assistance  appeared,  and  the  provisions 
were  nearly  exhausted,  Burgoyne,  by  the  unanimous 
advice  of  a council  of  war,  sent  a messenger  to  the 
American  camp,  to  treat  of  a convention. 

551.  General  Gates  in  the  first  instance  demanded 
that  the  royal  army  should  surrender  prisoners  of  war, 
He  also  proposed  that  the  British  should  ground  their 
arms.  Burgoyne  replied,  ‘‘This  article  is  inadmis- 
sible in  every  extremity  ; sooner  than  this  army  Avill 
consent  to  ground  their  arms  in  their  encampment 
they  will  rush  on  the  enemy,  determined  to  take  no 
quarter.”  After  various  messages,  a convention  lor 
the  surrender  of  the  army  was  settled,  which  pro- 
vided that  “the  troops  under  General  Burgoyne  were 


AT  SARATOGA. 


501 


to  march  out'of  their  camp  with  the  honors  of  war, 
and  the  artillery  of  the  intrenchments,  to  the  verge 
of  the  river,  where  the  arms  and  artillery  were  to  be 
left.  The  arms  to  be  piled  by  word  of  command 
from  their  own  officers.  A free  passage  was  to  be 
granted  to  the  army  under  Lieutenant  General  Bur- 
goyne  to  Great  Britain,  upon  condition  of  not  serving 
again  in  North  America  during  the  present  contest.’’ 

552.  The  articles  of  Capitulation  were  settled  on 
the  15th  of  October ; and  on  that  very  evening  a mes- 
senger arrived  from  Clinton  with  an  account  of  his 
successes,  and  with  the  tidings  that  part  of  his  force 
had  penetrated  as  far  as  Esopus,  within  fifty  miles  of 
Burgoyne’s  camp.  But  it  was  too  late.  The  public 
faith  was  pledged ; and  the  army  was  indeed  too  de- 
bilitated by  fatigue  and  hunger  to  resist  an  attack,  if 
made ; and  Gates  certainly  would  have  made  it,  if  the 
Convention  had  been  broken  off.  Accordingly,  on 
the  17th,  the  Convention  of  Saratoga  was  carried  in- 
to elfect.  By  this  Convention  5790  men  surrendered 
themselves  as  prisoners.  The  sick  and  wounded 
left  in  the  camp  when  the  British  retreated  to  Sara- 
toga, together  with  the  numbers  ol  the  British,  Ger- 
man, and  Canadian  troops  who  were  killed,  wounded, 
or  taken,  and  who  had  deserted  in  the  preceding- 
part  of  the  expedition,  were  reckoned  to  be  4689. 

553.  The  British  sick  and  wounded  who  had  fallen 
into  the  hands  of  the  Americans  after  the  battle  of 
the  seventh  were  treated  with  exemplary  humanity ; 
and  when  the  Convention  was  executed,  General 
Gates  showed  a noble  delicacy  of  feeling,  which  Oe- 


502  VICTORY  OF  THE  AMEBIC ANS 


serves  the  highest  degree  of  honor.  Every  circum- 
stance was  avoided  which  could  give  the  appearance 
of  triumph.  The  American  troops  remained  within 
their  lines  until  the  British  had  piled  their  arms ; 
and  when  this  was  done,  the  vanquished  officers  and 
soldiers  were  received  with  friendly  kindness  by 
their  victors,  and  their  immediate  wants  were  prompt- 
ly and  liberally  supplied.  Discussions  and  disputes 
afterward  arose  as  to  some  of  the  terms  ot  the  Con- 
vention, and  the  American  Congress  refused  for  a 
long  time  tx)  carry  into  effect  the  article  which  pro- 
vided for  the  return  of  Burgoyne’s  men  to  Europe  ; 
but  no  blame  was  imputable  to  General  Gates  or  his 
army,  who  showed  themselves  to  be  generous  as  they 
had  proved  themselves  to  be  brave. 

554.  Gates,  after  the  victory,  immediately  dis- 
patched Colonel  Wilkinson  to  carry  the  happy  tid- 
ings to  Congress.  On  being  introduced  into  the  hall, 
he  said,  “The  whole  British  army  has  laid  down  its 
arms  at  Saratoga ; our  own,  full  of  vigor  and  courage, 
expect  your  orders.  It  is  for  your  wdsdom  to  decide 
where  the  country  may  still  have  need  for  their  ser- 
vice.” Honors  and  rewards  were  liberally  voted  by 
the  Congress  to  their  conquering  general  and  his  men; 
and  it  would  be  difficult  (says  the  Italian  historian) 
to  describe  the  transports  of  j oy  which  the  news  of  this 
event  excited  among  the  Americans.  They  began  to 
flatter  themselves  with  a still  more  happy  future.  No 
one  any  longer  felt  any  doubt  about  their  achiev- 
ing their  independence.  All  hoped,  and  with  good 
reason,  that  a success  of  this  importance  would  at 


AT  SARATOGA. 


503 


length  determine  France,  and  the  other  European 
powers  that  waited  for  her  example,  to  declare  them* 
selves  in  favor  ot  America.  There  could  no  longer 
he  any  question  respecting  the  future^  since  there  was  no 
longer  the  risk  of  espousing  the  cause  of  a people  too 
feeble  to  defend  themselves. 

555.  The  truth  of  this  was  soon  displayed  in  the 
conduct  of  France.  When  the  news  arrived  at  Par- 
is of  the  capture  of  Ticonderoga,  and  of  the  victorious 
march  of  Burgoyne  toward  Albany,  events  which 
seemed  decisive  in  favor  of  the  English,  instructions 
had  been  immediately  dispatched  to  Nantz,  and  the 
other  ports  of  the  kingdom,  that  no  American  priva- 
teers should  be  suffered  to  enter  them,  except  from 
indispensable  necessity,  as  to  repair  their  vessels,  to 
obtain  provisions,  or  to  escape  the  perils  of  the  sea. 
The  American  commissioners  at  Paris,  in  their  disgust 
and  despair,  had  almost  broken  off  all  negotiations 
with  the  French  government ; and  they  even  endeav- 
ored to  open  communications  with  the  British  minis- 
try. But  the  British  government,  elated  with  the 
first  successes  of  Burgoyne,  refused  to  listen  to  any 
overtures  for  accommodation.  But  when  the  news  of 
Saratoga  reached  Paris,  the  whole  scene  was  changed. 
Franklin  and  his  brother  commissioners  found  all 
their  difficulties  with  the  French  government  vanish. 
The  time  seemed  to  have  arrived  for  the  house  of 
Bourbon  to  take  a full  revenge  for  all  its  humiliations 
and  losses  in  previous  wars.  In  December  a treaty 
was  arranged,  and  formally  signed  in  the  February 

Botta,  book  ix. 


504 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS, 


following,  by  which  France  acknowledged  the  Inde- 
pendent United  States  of  America,  This  was,  of 
course,  tantamount  to  a declaration  of  war  with 
England.  Spain  soon  followed  France ; and  before 
long  Holland  took  the  same  course.  Largely  aided 
by  French  fleets  and  troops,  the  Americans  vigor- 
ously maintained  the  war  against  the  armies  which 
England,  in  spite  of  her  European  foes,  continued  to 
send  across  the  Atlantic.  But  the  struggle  was  too 
unequal  to  be  maintained  by  this  country  for  many 
years;  and  when  the  treaties  of  1783  restored  peace 
to  the  world,  the  independence  of  the  United  States 
was  reluctantly  recognized  by  their  ancient  parent 
and  recent  enemy,  England. 


Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Defeat  of 
Burhoyne  at  Saratoga,  A.  D.  1777,  and  the 
Battle  of  Valmy,  A.  D.  1792.  y;, 

1781.  Surrender  of  Lord  Cornwallis  and  the 
British  army  to  Washington. 

1782.  Eodney’s  victory  over  the  Spanish  fleet. 
Unsuccessful  siege  of  Gibraltar  by  the  Spaniards  and 
French. 

1783.  End  of  the  American  w ar. 

1788.  The  States-General  are  convened  in  France ; 
beginning  of  the  Revolution. 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY. 


i05 


CHAPTEE  XIV. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  VALMY,  A.  D.  1792. 

Purpurei  metuunt  tyranni 
Injurioso  ne  pede  proruas 
Stantem  coluranam : neu  populus  f requens 
Ad  arma  cessaiites  ad  arma 
Concitet,  imperiumque  frangat. 

Ho  RAT,  Od.  i.,  35. 

A little  fire  is  quickly  trodden  out, 

Which,  being  suffered,  rivers  can  not  quench. 

Shakspeare. 

556.  A few  miles  distant  Ifoni  the  little  town  of 
St.  Menehouldjin  the  northeast  of  France,  are  the 
village  and  hill  of  Valmy ; and  near  the  crest  of  that 
hill  a simple  monument  points  out  the  burial-place 
of  the  heart  of  a general  of  the  French  republic  and 
a marshal  of  the  French  empire. 

557.  The  elder  K.ellerman  (father  of  the  distin- 
guished officer  of  that  name,  whose  cavalry  charge 
decided  the  battle  of  Marengo)  held  high  commands 
in  the  French  armies  throughout  the  wars  of  the 
Convention,  the  Directory,  the  Consulate,  and  the 


506 


BATTLE  OF  VAL3IY. 


Empire.  He  survived  those  wars,  and  the  empire 
itself,  dying  in  extreme  old  age  in  1820.  The  last 
wish  of  the  veteran  on  his  death-bed  was  that  his 
heart  should  be  deposited  in  the  battle-field  of 
Valmy,  there  to  repose  among  the  remains  of  his  old 
companions  in  arms,  who  had  fallen  at  his  side  on 
that  spot  twenty-eight  years  before,  on  the  momora- 
ble  day  when  they  won  the  primal  victory  of  Ee vo- 
lutionary France,  and  prevented  the  armies  of  Bruns- 
wick and  the  emigrant  bands  of  Conde  from  march- 
ing on  defenseless  Paris,  and  destroying  the  imma- 
ture democracy  in  its  cradle. 

558.  The  Duke  of  Valmy  (for  Kellerman,  when 
made  one  of  Napoleon’s  military  peers  in  1802,  took 
his  title  from  this  same  battle-field)  had  participated, 
during  his  long  and  active  career,  in  the  gaining  of 
many  a victory  far  more  immediately  dazzling  than 
the  one,  the  remembrance  of  which  he  thus  cherished. 
He  had  been  present  at  many  a scene  of  carnage, 
where  blood  fiowed  in  deluges,  compared  with 
which  the  libations  of  slaughter  poured  out  at  Valmy 
would  have  seemed  scant  and  insignificant.  But  he 
rightly  estimated  the  paramount  importance'  of  the 
battle  with  which  he  thus  wished  his  appellation 
while  living,  and  his  memory  after  his  death,  to  be 
identified.  The  successful  resistance  which  the  raw 
Carmagnole  levies  and  the  disorganized  relics  of  the 
old  monarchy’s  army  then  opposed  to  the  combined 
hosts  and  chosen  leaders  of  Prussia,  Austria,  and  the 
French  refugee  noblesse,  determined  at  once  and  for- 
ever the  belligerent  character  of  the  revolution.  The 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY. 


507 


raw  artisans  and  tradesmen,  the  clumsy  burghers, 
the  base  mechanics,  and  low  peasant-churls,  as  it 
had  been  the  fashion  to  term  the  middle  and  lower 
classes  in  France,  found  that  they  could  face  cannon 
balls,  pull  triggers,  and  cross  bayonets  without  hav- 
ing been  drilled  into  military  machines,  and  without 
being  officered  by  scions  of  noble  houses.  They 
awoke  to  the  consciousness  of  their  own  instinctive 
soldiership.  They  at  once  acquired  confidence  in 
themselves  and  in  each  other ; and  that  confidence 
soon  grew  into  a spirit  of  unbounded  audacity  and 
ambition.  “ From  the  cannonade  of  Valmy  may  be 
dated  the  commencement  of  that  career  of  victory 
which  carried  their  armies  to  Vienna  and  the  Krem- 
lin.”* 

559.  One  of  the  gravest  reflections  that  arises  from 
the  contemplation  of  the  civil  restlessness  and  mili- 
tary enthusiasm  which  the  close  of  the  last  century 
saw  nationalized  in  France,  is  the  consideration  that 
these  disturbing  influences  have  become  perpetual. 
No  settled  system  of  government,  that  shall  endure 
from  generation  to  generation,  that  shall  be  proof 
against  corruption  and  popular  violence  seems  capa- 
ble of  taking  root  among  the  French.  And  every 
revolutionary  movement  in  Paris  thrills  throughout 
the  rest  of  the  world.  Even  the  successes  which  the 
powers  allied  against  France  gained  in  1814  and 
1815,  important  as  they  were,  could  not  annul  the 
effects  of  the  preceding  twenty  three  years  of  general 
convulsion  and  war. 


* Alison. 


508 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY. 


560.  lu  1830,  the  dynasty  which  foreign  hayonets 
had  imposed  on  France  was  shaken  olf,  and  men 
trembled  at  the  expected  outbreak  of  Frencli  anarchy 
and  the  dreaded  inroads  of  French  ambition.  They 

looked  forward  with  harassing  anxiety  to  a period 
of  destruction  similar  to  that  which  the  Roman 
world  experienced  about  the  middle  of  the  third  cen- 
tury of  our  era.”*  Louis  Philippe  cajoled  Revolu- 
tion, and  then  strove  with  seeming  success  to  stifle 
it.  But.  in  spite  of  Fieschi  laws,  in  spite  of  the  daz- 
zle of  Algerian  razzias  and  Pyrenee-effacing  marri- 
ages, in  spite  of  hundreds  of  armed  forts,  and  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  coercing  troops, Revolution  lived, 
and  struggled  to  get  free.  The  old  Titan  spirit  heav- 
ed restlessly  beneath  “ the  monarchy  based  on  Repub- 
lican institutions.”  At  last,  thi'ee  years  ago,  the 
whole  fabric  of  kingcraft  was  at  once  rent  and  scat- 
tered to  the  winds  by  the  uprising  of  the  Parisian 
democracy ; and  insurrections,  barricades,  and  de- 
tlironements,  the  downfalls  of  coronets  and  crowns, 
tlie  armed  collisions  of  parties,  systems,  and  popula- 
tions, became  the  commonplaces  of  recent  European 
history. 

561.  France  now  calls  herself  a republic.  She  first 
assumed  that  title  on  the  20th  of  September,  1792, 
on  the  very  day  on  which  the  battle  of  Valmy  w^as 
fought  and  won.  To  that  battle  the  democratic 
spirit  which  in  1848,  as  well  as  1792,  proclaimed  the 
Republic  in  Paris,  owed  its  preservation,  and  it  is 

* See  Niebuhr’s  Preface  to  the  second  volume  of  the 
History  of  Rome,  written  in  October,  1830. 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY, 


509 


thence  that  the  imperishable  activity  of  its  princi- 
ples may  be  dated. 

562.  Far  different  seemed  the  prospects  of  democ- 
racy in  Europe  on  the  eve  of  that  battle,  and  far  dif- 
ferent would  have  been  the  present  position  and  in- 
fluence of  the  French  nation,  if  Brunswick’s  columns 
had  charged  with  more  boldness,  or  the  lines  of 
Dumouriez  resisted  with  less  firmness.  When  France, 
in  1792,  declared  war  with  the  great  powers  of  Eu- 
rope, she  was  far  from  possessing  that  splendid  mili- 
tary organization  which  the  experience  of  a few  revolu- 
tionary campaigns  taught  her  to  assume,  and  which 
she  has  never  abandoned.  The  army  of  the  old  mon- 
archy had,  during  the  latter  part  of  the  reign  of 
Louis  XV.,  sunk  into  gradual  decay,  both  in  numeri- 
cal force,  and  in  efficiency  of  equipment  and  spirit. 
The  laurels  gained  by  the  auxiliary  regiments  which 
Louis  XVI.  sent  to  the  American  war,  did  but  little 
to  restore  the  general  tone  of  the  army.  The  insub- 
ordination and  license  which  the  revolt  of  the  French 
guards,  and  the  participation  of  other  troops  in  many 
of  the  first  excesses  of  the  Revolution  introduced 
among  the  soldiery,  were  soon  rapidly  disseminated 
through  all  the  ranks.  Under  the  Legislative  As- 
sembly, every  complaint  of  the  soldier  against  his 
officer,  however  frivolous  or  ill  founded,  was  listened 
to  with  eagerness,  and  investigated  with  partiality, 
on  the  principles  of  liberty  and  equality.  Discipline 
accordingly  became  more  and  more  relaxed  ; and  the 
dissolution  of  several  of  the  old  corps,  under  the  pre- 
text of  their  being  tainted  with  an  aristocratic  feel- 


510 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY. 


ing,  aggravated  the  confusion  and  inefficiency  of  the 
war  department.  Many  of  the  most  effective  regi- 
ments during  the  last  period  of  the  monarchy  had 
consisted  of  foreigners.  These  had  either  been  slaugh  - 
tered in  defense  of  the  throne  against  insurrections, 
like  the  Swiss,  or  had  been  disbanded,  and  had 
crossed  the  frontier  to  recruit  the  forces  which  were 
assembling  for  the  invasion  of  France.  Above  all, 
the  emigration  of  the  noblesse  had  stripped  the  French 
army  of  nearly  all  its  officers  of  high  rank,  and  of 
the  greatest  portion  of  its  subalterns.  Above  twelve 
thousand  of  the  high-born  youth  of  France,  who  had 
been  trained  to  regard  military  command  as  their 
exclusive  patrimony,  and  to  whom  the  nation  had 
been  accustomed  to  look  up  as  its  natural  guides 
and  champions  in  the  storm  of  war,  were  now  mar- 
shaled beneath  the  banner  of  Cond4  and  the  other 
emigrant  princes  for  the  overthrow  of  the  French 
armies  and  the  reduction  of  the  French  capital.  Their 
successors  in  the  French  regiments  and  brigades  had 
as  yet  acquired  neither  skill  nor  experience ; they 
possessed  neither  self  reliance,  nor  the  respect  of  the 
men  who  were  under  them. 

563.  Such  was  the  state  of  the  wrecks  of  the  old 
army  ; but  the  bulk  of  the  forces  with  which  France 
began  the  war  consisted  of  raw  insurrectionary  levies, 
which  were  even  less  to  be  depended  on.  The  Car- 
magnoles, as  the  revolutionary  volunteers  were  called, 
flocked,  indeed,  readily  to  the  frontier  from  every 
department  when  the  war  was  proclaimed,  and  the 
fierce  leaders  of  the  Jacobins  shouted  that  the  coun- 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY. 


511 


try  was  in  danger.  They  were  full  of  zeal  and  cour- 
age, “ heated  and  excited  by  the  scenes  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, and  inflamed  by  the  florid  eloquence,  the  songs, 
dances,  and  signal  words  with  which  it  had  been 
celebrated.”  * But  they  were  utterly  undisciplined, 
and  turbulently  impatient  of  superior  authority  or 
systematic  control.  Many  ruffians,  also,  who  were 
sullied  with  participation  in  the  most  sanguinary 
horrors  of  Paris,  joined  the  camps,  and  were  pre- 
eminent alike  for  misconduct  before  the  enemy  and 
for  savage  insubordination  against  their  own  officers. 
On  one  occasion  during  the  campaign  of  Valmy,  eight 
battalions  of  federates,  intoxicated  with  massacre  and 
sedition,  joined  the  forces  under  Dumouriez,  and 
soon  threatened  to  uproot  all  discipline,  saying  open- 
ly that  the  ancient  officers  were  traitors,  and  that  it 
was  necessary  to  purge  the  army,  as  they  had  Paris, 
of  its  aristocrats.  Dumouriez  posted  these  battalions 
apart  from  the  others,  placed  a strong  force  of  cavalry 
behind  them  and  two  pieces  of  cannon  on  their  flank. 
Then,  affecting  to  review  them,  he  halted  at  the  head 
of  the  line,  surrounded  by  all  his  staff,  and  an  escort 
of  a hundred  hussars.  “ Fellows,”  said  he,  “ for  I 
will  not  call  you  either  citizens  or  soldiers,  you  see 
before  you  this  artillery,  behind  you  this  cavalry ; 
you  are  stained  with  crimes,  and  I do  not  tolerate 
here  assassins  or  executioners.  I know  that  there 
are  scoundrels  among  you  charged  to  excite  you  to 
crime.  Drive  them  from  among  you,  or  denounce 

* Scott,  “ Life  of  Napoleon,”  vol.  i.,  c.  viii. 


612 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY, 


them  to  me,  for  I shall  hold  you  responsible  for  their 
conduct.”  * 

564.  One  of  our  recent  historians  of  the  Revolution, 
who  narrates  this  incident,!  thus  apostrophizes  the 
French  general  : 

“ Patience,  O Dumouriez  ! this  uncertain  heap  of 
shriekers,  mutineers,  were  they  once  drilled  and 
inured,  will  become  a phalanxed  mass  of  fighters ; 
and  wheel  and  whirl  to  order  swiftly,  like  the  wind 
or  the  whirlwind ; tanned  mustachio-figures,  often 
barefoot,  even  barebacked,  with  sinews  of  iron,  who 
require  only  bread  and  gunpowder  ; very  sons  of  fire, 
the  adroitest,  hastieth,  hottest  ever  seen,  perhaps, 
since  Attila’s  time.” 

565.  Such  phalanxed  masses  of  fighters  did  the 
Carmagnoles  ultimately  become ; but  France  ran  a 
fearful  risk  in  being  obliged  to  rely  on  them,  when 
the  process  of  their  transmutation  had  barely  com- 
menced. 

566.  The  first  events,  indeed,  of  the  war  were  dis- 
astrous and  disgraceful  to  France,  even  beyond  what 
might  have  been  expected  from  the  chaotic  state  in 
which  it  found  her  armies  as  well  as  her  govern- 
ment. In  the  hopes  ol‘  profiting  by  the  unprepared 
state  of  Austria,  then  the  mistress  of  the  Nether- 
lands, the  French  opened  the  campaign  of  1792  by 
an  invasion  of  Flanders,  with  forces  whose  muster- 
rolls  showed  a numerical  overwhelming  superiority 
to  the  enemy,  and  seemed  to  promise  a speedy  con- 

* Lamartine, 
t-  Carlyle. 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY. 


613 


quest  of  that  old  battle-field  of  Europe.  But  the 
fir^st  flash  of  an  Austrian  sabre,  or  the  first  sound  of 
an  Austrian  gun.  was  enough  to  discomfit  the 
French.  Tlicir  first  corps,  four  thousand,  strong, 
that  advanced  from  Lille  across  the  frontier,  came 
suddenly  upon  a far  inferior  detachment  of  the  Aus- 
trian garrison  of  Tournay.  Not  a shot  was  fired, 
nor  a bayonet  leveled.  With  one  simultaneous  cry 
of  panic,  the  French  broke  and  ran  headlong  back 
to  Lille,  where  they  completed  the  specimen  of  iir- 
subordination  which  they  had  given  in  the  field  by 
murdering  their  general  and  several  of  their  chief 
officers.  On  the  same  day,  another  division  under 
Biron,  mustering  ten  thousand  sabres  and  bayonets, 
saw  a few  Austrian  skirmishers  reconnoitering  their 
position.  The  French  advanced  posts  had  scarcely 
given  and  received  a volley,  and  onl}^  a few  balls 
from  the  enemy’s  field  pieces  had  fallen  among  the 
lines,  when  two  regiments  of  French  dragoons  raised 
the  cry  “We  are  betrayed,”  galloped  off,  and  were 
followed  in  disgraceful  rout  by  the  rest  of  the  whole 
army.  Similar  panics,  or  repulses  almost  equally 
discreditable,  occurred  whenever  Rochambeau,  or 
Luckner,  or  La  Fayette,  the  earliest  French  generals 
in  the  war,  brought  their  troops  into  the  presence  of 
the  enemy. 

567.  Meanwhile  the  allied  sovereigns  had  gradu- 
ally collected  on  the  Rhine  a veteran  and  finely-dis- 
cipled  army  for  the  invasion  of  France,  which  for 
numbers,  equipment,  and  martial  renown,  both  of 
generals  aud  men,  was  equal  to  any  that  Germany 


514 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY. 


had  ever  sent  forth  to  conquer.  Their  design  was  to 
strike  boldly  and  decisively  at  the  heart  of  France, 
and,  penetrating  the  country  through  the  Ardennes, 
to  proceed  by  Chalons  upon  Paris.  The  obstacles 
that  lay  in  their  way  seemed  insignificant.  The  dis- 
order and  imbecility  of  the  French  armies  had  been 
even  augmented  by  the  forced  flight  of  La  Fayette 
and  a sudden  change  of  generals.  The  only  troops 
posted  on  or  near  the  track  by  which  the  allies  were 
about  to  advance  were  the  23,000  men  at  Sedan, 
whom  La  Fayette  had  commanded,  and  a corps  of 
20,000  near  Metz,  the  command  of  which  had  just 
been  transferred  from  Luckner  to  Kellerman.  There 
were  only  three  fortresses  which  it  was  necessary  for 
the  allies  to  capture  or  mask — Sedan,  Longwy,  and 
Verdan.  The  defenses  and  stores  of  all  these  three 
were  known  to  be  wretchedly  dismantled  and  in- 
sufiicient ; and  when  once  these  feeble  barriers  were 
overcome  and  ChMons  reached,  a fertile  and  unpro- 
tected country  seemed  to  invite  the  invaders  to  that 
“ military  promenade  to  Paris  which  they  gaily 
talked  of  accomplishing. 

568.  At  the  end  of  July,  the  allied  army,  having 
fully  completed  all  preparations  for  the  campaign, 
broke  up  from  its  cantonments,  and,  marching  from 
Luxembourg  upon  Longwy,  crossed  the  French  fron- 
tier. Sixty  tli3nsau{l  Prussians,  trained  in  the  schools, 
and  many  of  llicin  under  the  eye  of  the  Great  Fred- 
eric, heirs  of  the  glories  of  the  Seven  Years-  War, 
and  universally  esteemed  the  best  troops  in  Europe, 
marched  in  one  column  against  the  central  point  of 


BATTLE  OF  J AL3IY. 


515 


attack.  Forty-five  Ihonsand  Austrians,  the  greater 
part  of  \vhom  were  picked  troops,  and  had  served  in 
the  recent  Turkish  war,  supplied  two  1‘ormidahle 
corps  that  supported  the  flanks  of  the  Prussians. 
There  was  also  a powerful  body  of  Hessians;  and 
leagued  Avith  the  Germans  against  the  Parisian  de- 
mocracy came  15,000  of  the  noblest  and  the  bravest 
among  the  sons  of  France.  In  these  corps  of  emi- 
grants, many  of  the  highest  born  of  the  French  no- 
bility, scions  of  houses  rvhose  chivalric  trophies  had 
for  centuries  filled  Europe  with  renown,  served  as 
rank  and  file.  They  looked  on  the  road  to  Paris  as 
the  path  which  they  were  to  carve  out  by  their 
SAvords  to  victory,  to  honor,  to  the  rescue  of  their 
king,  to  re-union  with  their  families,  to  the  recovery 
of  their  patrimony,  and  to  the  restoration  of  their 
order.^* 

569.  OA^er  this  imposing  army  the  allied  sovereigns 
placed  as  generalissimo  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  one 
of  the  minor  reigning  princes  of  Germany,  a states- 
man of  no  mean  capacity,  and  who  had  acquired  in 
the  Seven  Years’  War  a military  reputation  second 
only  to  that  of  th-e  Great  Frederic  himself.  He  had 
been  deputed  a few  years  before  to  quell  the  popular 
movements  Avhich  then  took  place  in  Holland,  and 
he  had  put  down  the  attempted  revolution  in  that 
country  with  a promptitude  Avhich  appeared  to  augur 
equal  success  to  the  army  that  now  marched  under 
his  orders  on  a similar  mission  into  France. 

570.  Moving  majestically  forward,  Avith  leisurely 

* See  Scott,  “Life  of  Napoleon,”  vol.  i.,  c.  xi. 

17 


516 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY. 


deliberation,  that  seemed  to  show  the  consciousness 
of  superior  strength,  and  a steady  purpose  of  doing 
their  work  thoroughly,  the  allies  appeared  before 
J^ongwy  on  the  20th  of  August,  and  the  dispirited 
and  despondent  garrison  opened  the  gates  of  that 
fortress  to  them  after  the  first  shower  of  bombs.  On 
the  2d  of  September,  the  still  more  important  strong- 
hold of  Verdun  capitulated  after  scarcely  the  shadow 
of  resistance. 

571.  Brunswick’s  superior  force  was  now  inter- 
po.sed  between  Kellerman’s  troops  on  the  left  and 
the  other  French  army  near  Sedan,  which  La  Fay- 
ette’s flight  had,  for  the  time,  left  destitute  of  a 
commander.  It  was  in  the  power  of  the  German 
general,  by  striking  with  an  overwhelming  mass  to 
the  right  and  left,  to  crush  in  succession  each  of 
these  weak  armies,  and  the  allies  might  then  have 
marched  irresistible  and  unresisted  upon  Paris.  But 
at  this  crisis  Dumouriez,  the  new  commander-in - 
chief  of  the  French,  arrived  at  the  camp  near  Sedan, 
and  commenced  a series  of  movements  by  which  he 
reunited  the  dispersed  and  disorganized  forces  ol’  liis 
country,  checked  the  Prussian  columns  at  the  very 
moment  when  the  last  obstacles  to  their  triumph 
seemed  to  have  given  way,  and  finally  rolled  back 
the  tide  of  invasion  /ar  across  the  enemy’s  frontier. 

572.  The  French  fortresses  had  fallen  ; but  nature 
herself  still  offered  to  brave  and  vigorous  defenders 
of  the  land  the  means  of  opposing  a barrier  to  the 
progress  of  the  allies.  A ridge  of  broken  ground, 
called  the  Argonne,  extends  from  the  vicinity  of 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY, 


517 


Sedan  toward  the  southwest  for  about  fifteen  or  six- 
teen leagues.  The  country  of  L’Argonne  has  now 
been  cleared  and  drained  ; but  in  1792  it  was  thickly 
wooded,  and  the  lower  portions  of  its  unequal  sur- 
face were  filled  with  rivulets  and  marshes.  It  thus 
I)resented  a natural  barrier  of  from  four  or  five 
leagues  broad  which  was  absolutely  impenetrable  to 
an  army,  except  by  a few  defiles,  such  as  an  inferior 
force  might  easily  fortify  and  defend.  Dumouriez 
succeeded  in  marching  his  army  down  from  Sedan 
behind  the  Argonne,  and  in  occupying  its  passes, 
wliile  the  Prussians  still  lingered  on  the  northeastern 
side  of  the  forest  line.  Ordering  Kellerman  to  wheel 
round  from  Metz  to  St.  Menehould,  and  the  re-en- 
forcements  from  the  interior  and  extreme  north  also 
to  concentrate  at  that  spot,  Dumouriez  trusted  to 
assemble  a powerful  force  in  the  rear  of  the  south- 
\vest  extremity  of  the  Argonne,  while  with  the 
twenty- five  thousand  men  under  his  immediate  com- 
mand he  held  the  enemy  at  bay  before  the  passes,  or 
forced  him  to  a long  circumvolution  round  one  ex- 
tremity of  the  forest  ridge,  during  which,  favor- 
able opportunities  of  assailing  his  flunk  were  almost 
certain  to  occur.  Dumouriez  fortified  the  principal 
defiles,  and  boasted  of  the  Thermopylae  which  he 
had  found  for  the  invaders;  but  the  simile  was 
nearly  rendered  fatally  complete  for  the  defending 
force.  A pass,  which  was  thought  of  inferior  impor- 
tance, had  been  but  slightly  manned,  and  an  Aus- 
trian corps,  under  Clairfayt,  forced  it  after  some 
sharp  fighting.  Dumouriez  with  great  difficulty 


518 


BATTLE  OF  VAL3IY. 


saved  himself  from  being  enveloped  and  destroyed 
by  the  hostile  columns  that  now  pushed  through  the 
forest.  But  instead  of  despairing  at  the  failure  of 
his  plans,  and  falling  back  into  the  interior,  to  be 
completely  severed  from  Kellerman’s  army,  to  be 
hunted  as  a fugitive  under  the  walls  of  Paris  by  the 
victorious  Germans,  and  to  lose  all  chance  of  ever 
rallying  his  dispirited  troops,  he  resolved  to  cling  to 
the  difficult  country  in  which  the  armies  still  were 
grouped,  to  force  a junction  with  Kellerman,  and  so 
to  place  himself  at  the  head  of  a force  which  the  in- 
vaders would  not  dare  to  disregard,  and  by  which  he 
might  drag  them  back  from  the  advance  on  Paris, 
which  1^  had  not  been  able  to  bar.  Accordingly,  by 
a rapid  movement  to  the  south,  during  which,  in  his 
own  words,  “ France  w^as  within  a hair’s-breadth  of 
destruction,”  and  after  with  difficulty  checking  sev- 
eral panics  of  his  troops,  in  which  they  ran  by  thou- 
sands at  the  sight  of  a few  Prussian  hussars,  Dum- 
ouriez  succeeded  in  establishing  his  head-quarters  in 
a strong  position  at  St.  Menehould,  protected  by  the 
marshes  and  shallows  of  the  rivers  Aisne  and  Aube, 
beyond  which,  to  the  northwest,  rose  a firm  and  ele- 
vated plateau,  called  Dampierre’s  camp,  admirably 
situated  for  commanding  the  road  by  Chalons  to 
Paris,  and  where  he  intended  to  post  Kellerman’s 
army  so  soon  as  it  came  up.* 

^ Some  late  writers  represent  that  Brunswick  did  not 
wish  to  crush  Dumouriez.  There  is  no  sufficient  author- 
ity for  this  insinuation  which  seems  to  have  been  first 
prompted  by  a desire  to  soothe  the  wounded  military  pride 
of  the  Prussians. 


BATTLE  OF  VALMF, 


519 


573.  The  news  of  the  retreat  of  Dumouriez  from 
the  Argonne  passes,  and  of  the  panic  flight  of  some 
divisions  of  his  troops,  spread  rapidly  throughout  the 
country,  and  Kellerman,  who  believed  that  his  com- 
rade’s army  had  been  annihilated,  and  feared  to  fall 
among  the  victorious  masses  of  the  Prussians,  had 
halted  on  his  march  from  Metz  when  almost  close  to 
St.  Menehould.  He  had  actually  commenced  a retro- 
grade movement,  when  couriers  from  his  commander- 
in-chief  checked  him  from  that  fatal  course;  and 
then  continuing  to  wheel  round  the  rear  and  left 
flank  of  the  troops  at  St.  Menehould,  Kellerman, 
with  twenty  thousand  of  the  army  of  Metz,  and  some 
thousands  of  volunteers,  who  had  joined  him  in  the 
march,  made  his  appearance  to  the  west  of  Dumouriez 
on  the  very  evening  when  Westerman  and  Thouve- 
not,  two  of  the  staff-officers  of  Dumouriez,  galloped 
in  with  the  tidings  that  Brunswick’s  army  had  come 
through  the  upper  passes  of  the  Argonne  in  full  force, 
and  was  deploying  on  the  heights  of  La  Lune,  a chain 
of  eminences  that  stretch  obliquely  from  southwest 
to  northeast,  opposite  the  high  ground  which  Du- 
mouriez held,  and  also  opposite,  but  at  a shorter  dis- 
tance from  the  position  which  Kellerman  was  de- 
signed to  occupy. 

574.  The  allies  were  now,  in  fact,  nearer  to  Paris 
than  were  the  French  troops  themselves;  but,  as 
Dumouriez  had  foreseen,  Brunswick  deemed  it  un- 
safe to  march  upon  the  capital  with  so  large  a hostile 
force  left  in  his  rear  between  his  advancing  columns 
and  his  base  of  operations.  The  young  King  of 


520 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY. 


Prussia,  who  was  in  the  allied  camp,  and  the  emi- 
grant princes,  eagerly  advocated  an  instant  attack 
upon  the  nearest  French  general.  Kellerman  had 
laid  himself  unnecessaril}^  open,  by  advancing  be- 
yond Dampierre’s  camp,  which  Dumouriez  had  de- 
signed for  him,  and  moving  forward  across  the  Aube 
to  the  plateau  of  Valmy,  a post  inferior  in  strength 
and  space  to  that  which  he  had  left,  and  which 
brought  him  close  upon  the  Prussian  lines,  leaving 
him  separated  by  a dangerous  interval  from  the 
troops  under  Dumouriez  himself.  It  seemed  easy 
lor  the  Prussian  army  to  overwhelm  him  while  thus 
isolated,  and  then  they  might  surround  and  crush 
Dumouriez  at  their  leisure. 

575.  Accordingly,  the  right  wing  of  the  allied  army 
moved  forward  in  the  grey  of  the  morning  of  the 
20th  of  September  to  gain  Kellerman’s  left  flank  and 
rear,  and  cut  him  off  from  retreat  upon  Chalons, 
while  the  rest  of  the  army,  moving  from  the  heights 
of  La  Lune,  which  here  converge  semicircularly 
round  the  plateau  of  Valmy,  were  to  assail  his  posi- 
tion in  front,  and  interpose  between  him  and  Du- 
mouriez. An  unexpected  collision  between  some  of 
the  advanced  cavalry  on  each  side  in  the  low  ground 
warned  Kellerman  of  the  enemy’s  approach.  Du- 
mouriez had  not  been  unobservant  of  the  danger  of 
his  comrade,  thus  isolated  and  involved,  and  he  had 
ordered  up  troops  to  support  Kellerman  on  either 
flank  in  the  event  of  his  being  attacked.  These 
troops,  however,  moved  forward  slowly  ; and  Keller- 
man’s army  ranged  on  the  plateau  of  Valmy  “pro- 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY. 


521 


jected  like  a cape  into  the  midst  of  the  line  of  the 
Prussian  bayonets.”*  A thick  autumnal  mist  floated 
in  waves  of  vapor  over  the  plains  and  ravines  that 
lay  between  the  two  armies,  leaving  only  the  crests 
and  peaks  of  the  hills  glittering  in  the  early  light. 
About  ten  o’clock  the  fog  began  to  clear  off,  and  then 
the  French  from  their  promontory  saw  emerging 
from  the  white  wreaths  of  mist,  and  glittering  in  the 
sunshine,  the  countless  Prussian  cavalry,  which  were 
to  envelop  them  as  in  a net  if  once  driven  from  their 
position,  the  solid  columns  of  the  infantry,  that 
moved  forward  as  if  animated  by  a single  will,  the 
bristling  batteries  of  the  artillery,  and  the  glancing 
clouds  of  the  Austrian  light  troops,  fresh  from  their 
contests  with  the  Spahis  of  the  east. 

576.  The  best  and  bravest  of  the  French  must  have 
beheld  this  spectacle  with  secret  apprehension  and 
awe.  However  bold  and  resolute  a man  may  be  in 
the  discharge  of  duty,  it  is  an  anxious  and  fearful 
thing  to  be  called  on  to  encounter  danger  among 
comrades  of  whose  steadiness  you  can  feel  no  cer- 
tainty. Each  soldier  of  Kellerman’s  army  must  have 
remembered'  the  series  of  panic  routs  which  had 
hitherto  invariably  taken  place  on  the  French  side 
during  the  war,  and  must  have  cast  restless  glances 
to  the  right  and  left,  to  see  if  any  symptoms  of  wav- 
ering  began  to  show  themselves,  and  to  calculate  how 
long  it  was  likely  to  be  before  a general  rush  of  his 
comrades  to  the  rear  would  either  hurry  him  off 

* See  Lamartine,  Hist.  Girond  , livre  xvii.  I have  drawn 
much  of  the  ensuing  description  from  him. 


522 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY, 


with  involuntary  disgrace,  or  leave  him  alone  and 
helpless  to  he  cut  down  by  assailing  multitudes. 

577.  On  that  very  morning,  and  at  the  self-same 
hour  in  which  the  allied  forces  and  the  emigrants 
began  to  descend  from  La  Lune  to  the  attack  of 
Valmy,  and  while  the  cannonade  was  opening  be- 
tween the  Prussian  and  the  Revolutionary  batteries, 
the  debate  in  the  National  Convention  at  Paris  com- 
menced on  the  proposal  to  proclaim  France  a re- 
public. 

578.  The  old  monarchy  had  little  chance  of  sup- 
port in  the  hall  of  the  Convention  ; but  if  its  more 
effective  advocates  at  Valmy  had  triumphed,  there 
were  yet  the  elements  existing  in  France  for  an  effect- 
ive revival  of  the  better  part  of  the  ancient  institu- 
tions, and  for  substituting  Reform  for  Revolution. 
Only  a few  weeks  before,  numerously-signed  ad- 
dresses from  the  middle  classes  in  Paris,  Rouen,  and 
other  large  cities  had  been  presented  to  the  king  ex- 
pressive of  their  horror  of  the  anarchists,  and  their 
readiness  to  uphold  the  rights  of  the  crown,  together 
with  the  liberties  of  the  subject.  And  an  armed  re- 
sistance to  the  authority  of  the  Convention,  and  in 
favor  of  the  king,  was  in  reality  at  this  time  being 
actively  organized  in  La  Vendee  and  Brittany,  the 
importance  of  which  may  be  estimated  from  the 
formidable  opposition  which  the  Royalists  of  these 
provinces  made  to  the  Republican  party  at  a later 
period,  and  under  much  more  disadvantageous  cir- 
cumstances. It  is  a fact  peculiarly  illustrative  of 
the  importance  of  the  battle  of  Valmy,  that  “ during 


BATTLE  OF  VAL3IY, 


523 


the  summer  of  1792,  the  gentlemen  of  Brittany  en- 
tered into  an  extensive  association  for  the  purpose  of 
rescuing  the  country  from  the  oppressive  yoke  which 
had  been  imposed  by  the  Parisian  demagogues.  At 
the  head  of  the  whole  was  the  Marquis  de  la  Eouarie, 
one  of  those  remarkable  men  who  rise  into  eminence 
during  the  stormy  days  of  a revolution,  from  con- 
scious ability  to  direct  its  current.  Ardent,  impetu- 
ous, and  enthusiastic,  he  was  first  distinguished  in 
the  American  war,  when  the  intrepidity  of  his  con- 
duct attracted  the  admiration  of  the  Republican 
troops,  and  the  same  qualities  rendered  him  at  first 
an  ardent  supporter  of  the  Revolution  in  France; 
but  wrhen  the  atrocities  of  the  people  began,  he  es- 
poused with  equal  warmth  the  opposite  side,  and  used 
the  utmost  efforts  to  rouse  the  noblesse  of  Brittany 
against  the  plebeian  yoke  which  had  been  imposed 
upon  them  by  the  National  Assembly.  He  submitted 
his  plan  to  the  Count  d’ Artois,  and  had  organized 
one  so  extensive  as  w^ould  have  proved  extremely 
formidable  to  the  Convention,  if  the  retreat  of  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick,  in  September,  1792,  had  not 
damped  the  ardor  of  the  whole  of  the  west  of  France, 
then  ready  to  break  out  into  insurrection.”^ 

579.  And  it  was  not  only  among  the  zealots  of  the 
old  monarchy  that  the  cause  of  the  king  would  then 
have  found  friends.  The  ineffable  atrocities  of  the 
September  massacres  had  just  occurred,  and  the  reac- 
tion produced  by  them  among  thousands  who  had 
previously  been  active  on  the  ultra-democratic  side, 
* Alison,  vol.  iii.,  p.  333. 


524 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY. 


was]fresh  and  powerful.  The  nobility  had  not  yet  been 
made  utter  aliens  in  the  eyes  of  the  nation  by  long  ex- 
patriation and  civil  war.  There  was  not  yet  a gen- 
eration of  youth  educated  in  revolutionary  princi- 
ples, and  knowing  no  worship  save  that  of  military 
glory.  Louis  XYI.  was  just  and  humane,  and  deeply 
sensible  of  the  necessity  of  a gradual  extension  of 
political  rights  among  all  classes  of  his  subjects.  The 
Bourbon  throne,  if  rescued  in  1792,  would  have  had 
the  chances  of  stability  such  as  did  not  exist  for  it 
in  1814,  and  seem  never  likely  to  be  found  again  in 
France. 

580.  Serving  under  Kellerman  on  that  day  was 
one  who  experienced,  perhaps  the  most  deeply  of  all 
men,  the  changes  for  good  and  for  evil  which  the 
French  Revolution  has  produced.  He  who,  in  his 
s-^cond  exile,  bore  the  name  of  the  Count  de  Xeuilly 
ill  this  country,  and  who  lately  was  Louis  Philij^pe, 
king  of  the  French,  figured  in  the  French  lines  at 
Yalmy  as  a young  and  gallant  officer,  cool  and  saga- 
cious beyond  his  years,  and  trusted  accordingly  by 
Kellerman  and  Dumouriez  with  an  important  station 
in  the  national  army.  The  Due  de  Chartres  (the 
title  he  then  bore)  commanded  the  French  right, 
General  Yalence  was  on  the  left,  and  Kellerman 
himself  took  his  post  in  the  centre,  which  was  the 
strength  and  key  of  his  position. 

581.  Besides  these  celebrated  men  who  were  in 
the  French  army,  and  besides  the  King  of  Prussia, 
the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  and  other  men  of  rank  and 
power  who  were  in  the  lines  of  the  allies,  there  was 


BATTLE  OF  VAL3JY. 


525 


an  individual  present  at  the  battle  of  Yaliny,  of  lit- 
tle political  note,  but  who  has  exercised,  and  exer- 
cises, a greater  influence  over  the  human  mind,  and 
whose  fame  is  more  widely  spread  than  that  of  eithe^ 
duke,  or  general,  or  king.  This  was  the  German 
poet  Gothe,  then  in  early  youth,  and  who  had,  out 
of  curiosity,  accompanied  the  allied  army  on  its 
march  into  France  as  a mere  spectator.  He  has 
given  us  a curious  record  of  the  sensations  which  he 
experienced  during  the  cannonade.  It  must  be  re- 
membered that  many  thousands  in  the  French  ranks 
then,  like  Gothe,  felt  the  “cannon  fever”  for  the 
first  time.  The  German  poet  says  :* 

582.  “I  had  heard  so  much  of  the  cannon  fever, 
that  I wanted  to  know  what  kind  of  thing  it  was. 
Emiulj  and  a sj)irit  which  every  kind  of  danger  ex- 
<dtes  to  daring,  nay,  even  to  rashness,  induced  me  to 
ride  up  quite  coolly  to  the  outwork  of  La  Lune. 
This  was  again  occupied  by  our  people ; but  it  pre- 
sented the  wildest  aspect.  The  roofs  were  shot  to 
pieces,  the  corn-shocks  scattered  about,  the  bodies 
of  men  mortally  wounded  stretched  upon  them  here 
and  there,  and  occasionally  a spent  cannon  ball  iell 
and  rattled  among  the  ruins  of  the  tile  roofs. 

583.  “Quite  alone,  and  left  to  myself,  I rode  away 
on  the  heights  to  the  left,  and  could  plainly  survey 
the  favorable  position  of  the  French;  they  were 
standing  in  the  form  of  a semicircle,  in  the  greatest 
quiet  and  security,  Kellerman,  then  on  the  left  wing, 
being  the  easiest  to  reach. 

* Gothe’s  “ Campaig-n  in  France  in  1792,”  Farie’s  trans- 
lation, p.  77. 


526 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY. 


584.  “I  fell  in  with  good  company  on  the  way, 
officers  of  my  acquaintance,  belonging  to  the  general 
staff  and  the  regiment,  greatly  surprised  to  find  me 
liere.  They  wanted  to  take  me  hack  again  with 
them ; but  I spoke  to  them  of  particular  objects  I 
had  in  view,  and  they  left  me,  without  farther  dis- 
suasion, to  my  well-known  singular  caprice. 

585.  “I  had  now  arrived  quite  in  the  region  where 
the  balls  were  playing  across  me : the  sound  of  them 
is  curious  enough,  as  if  it  were  composed  of  the  hum- 
ming of  tops,  the  gurgling  of  Avater,  and  the  whist- 
ling of  birds.  They  were  less  dangerous  by  reason 
of  the  wetness  of  the  ground ; wherever  one  fell,  it 
stuck  fast.  And  thus  my  foolish  experimental  ride 
was  secured  against  the  danger  at  least  of  the  balls 
rebounding. 

586.  “In  the  midst  of  these  circumstances,  I was 
soon  able  to  remark  that  something  unusual  was 
taking  place  within  me.  I paid  close  attention  to  it, 
and  still  the  sensation  can  be  described  onlyby  simil- 
tude.  It  appeared  as  if  you  were  in  some  extremely 
hot  place,  and,  at  the  same  time,  quite  penetrated  b^^ 
the  heat  of  it,  so  that  you  feel  yourself,  as  it  were, 
quite  one  with  the  element  in  which  you  are.  The 
eyes  lose  nothing  of  their  strength  or  clearness;  but  it 
is  as  if  the  world  had  a kind  of  brown-red  tint,  which 
makes  the  situation,  as  well  as  the  surrounding  ob- 
jects, more  impressive.  I was  unable  to  perceiAe 
any  agitation  of  the  blood ; but  e\’ery  thing  seemed 
rather  to  be  swallowed  up  in  the  glow  of  which  I 
speak.  From  this,  then,  it  is  clear  in  what  sense 


BATTLE  OF  VAL3IY. 


527 


this  condition  can  he  called  a fever.  It  is  remarka- 
ble, however,  that  the  horrible  uneasy  feeling  arising 
from  it  is  produced  in  us  solely  through  the  ears. 
For  the  cannon  thunder,  the  howling  and  crashing 
of  the  balls  through  the  air,  is  the  real  cause  of  these 
sensations. 

587.  “After  I had  ridden  back  and  was  in  perfect 
security,  I remarked,  with  surprise,  that  the  glow 
was  completely  extinguished,  and  not  the  slightest 
feverish  agitation  was  left  behind.  On  the  whole, 
this  condition  is  one  of  the  least  desirable ; as,  indeed, 
among  my  dear  and  noble  comrades,  I found  scarcely 
one  who  expressed  a really  passionate  desire  to  try 
it.” 

588.  Contrary  to  the  expectations  of  both  friends 
and  foes,  the  French  infantry  held  their  ground 
steadily  under  the  fire  of  the  Prussian  guns,  which 
thundered  on  them  from  La  Lune,  and  their  own 
artillery  replied  with  equal  spirit  and  greater  . effect 
on  the  denser  masses  of  the  allied  army.  Thinking 
that  the  Prussians  were  slacking  in  their  fire,  Kel  - 
lermaii  formed  a column  in  charging  order,  and 
dashed  down  into  the  valley  in  the  hopes  of  captur- 
ing some  of  the  nearest  guns  of  the  enemy.  A 
masked  battery  opened  its  fire  on  the  French  col- 
umn, and  drove  it  back  in  disorder,  Kellerman  hav- 
ing his  horse  shot  under  him,  and  being  with  difii- 
culty  carried  off  by  his  men.  The  Prussian  columns 
now  advanced  in  turn.  The  French  artillery-men 
began  to  waver  and  desert  their  posts,  but  were  ral- 
lied by  the  efforts  and  example  of  their  officers,  and 


528 


BATTLE  OF  VALMY. 


Kellerman,  reorganizing  the  line  of  his  infantry,  took 
his  station  in  the  ranks  on  foot,  and  called  out  to  his 
men  to  let  the  enemy  come  close  up,  and  then  to 
charge  them  with  the  bayonet.  The  troops  caught 
the  enthusiasm  of  their  general,  and  a cheerful  shout 
of  Vive  la  nation^  taken  up  by  one  battalion  from 
another,  pealed  across  the  valley  to  the  assailants. 
The  Prussians  hesitated  from  a charge  up  hill  against 
a force  that  seemed  so  resolute  and  formidable  ; they 
halted  for  a while  in  the  hollow,  and  then  slowly 
retreated  up  their  own  side  of  the  valley. 

589.  Indignant  at  being  thus  repulsed  by  such  a 
foe,  the  King  of  Prussia  formed  the  flow  er  of  his 
men  in  person,  and,  riding  along  the  column,  bitterly 
reproached  them  with  letting  their  standard  be  thus 
humiliated.  Then  he  led  them  on  again  to.  the  at- 
tack, marching  in  the  front  line,  and  seeing  his  staff 
mowxd  down  around  him  by  the  deadly  fire  which 
the  French  artillery  reopened.  But  the  troops  sent 
by  Dumouriez  were  now  co-operating  effectually 
Avitli  Kellerman,  and  that  general’s  own  men,  flushed 
by  success,  presented  a firmer  front  than  ever.  Again 
the  Prussians  retreated,  leaving  eight  hundred  dead 
behind,  and  at  night-fall  the  French  remained  victors 
on  the  heights  of  Yalmy. 

590.  All  hopes  of  crushing  the  Revolutionary  ar- 
mies, and  of  the  promenade  to  Paris,  had  now  van- 
ished, though  Brunswick  lingered  long  in  the 
Argonne,  till  distress  and  sickness  wasted  aw^ay  his 
once  splendid  force,  and  finally  but  a mere  wu'eck  of 
it  recrossed  the  frontier.  France,  meanwhile,  felt 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


529 


that  she  possessed  a giant’s  strength,  and  like  a giant 
did  she  use  it.  Before  the  close  of  that  year  all  Bel- 
gium obeyed  the  National  Convention  at  Paris,  and 
the  kings  of  Europe,  after  the  lapse  of  eighteen  cen- 
turies, trembled  once  more  before  a conquering  mili- 
tary republic. 

591.  Gothe’s  description  of  the  cannonade  has  been 
quoted.  His  observation  to  his  comrades,  and  the 
camp  of  the  allies  at  the  end  of  the  battle,  deserves 
quotation  also.  It  shows  that  the  poet  felt  (and  pro- 
bably he  alone,  of  the  thousands  there  assembled, 
lelt)  the  full  importance  of  that  day.  He  describes 
the  consternation  aud  the  change  of  demeanor  which 
he  observed  among  his  Prussian  friends  that  evening. 
He  tells  us  that  most  of  them  were  silent ; and,  in 
fact,  the  power  of  reflection  and  judgment  was  want- 
ing to  all.  At  last  I was  called  upon  to  say  what  I 
thought  of  the  engagement,  for  I had  been  in  the 
habit  of  enlivening  and  amusing  the  troop  with 
short  sayings.  This  time  I said,  Nrom  this  place  and 
from  this  day  forth  commences  a new  era  in  the  world's 
history^  and  you  can  all  say  that  you  were  present  at  its 
birth.'  ” 


Synopsis  of  Events  between  the  Battle  of 
VALMY,  a.  D.  1792,  AND  THE  BATTLE  OF 
Wateeloo,  a.  D.  1815. 

A.  D.  1793.  Trial  and  execution  of  Louis  XVI.  at 
Paris.  England  and  Spain  declare  war  against  France. 
Koyalist  war  in  La  Vendee.  Second  invasion  of 
France  by  the  alliesv 


530 


srxopsrs  of  even7S, 


1794.  Lord  Howe’s  victory  over  the  Freuch  fleet. 
Final  partition  of  Poland  by  Knssia,  Prussia,  and 
Austria, 

1795.  The  French  armies,  under  Pichegru,  con- 
quer Holland.  Cessation  of  the  war  in  La  Vendee. 

1796.  Bonaparte  commands  the  French  army  of 
Italy,  and  gains  repeated  victories  over  the  Aus- 
trians. 

1797.  Victory  of  Jervis  off  Cape  St.  Vincent.  Peace 
of  Campo  Formio  between  France  and  xiustria.  De- 
feat of  the  Dutch  off  Camperdown  by  Admiral  Dun- 
can. 

1798.  Rebellion  in  Ireland.  Expedition  of  the 
French  under  Bonaparte  to  Egypt.  Lord  Nelson  de- 
stroys the  French  fleet  at  the  battle  of  the  Nile. 

1799.  Renewal  of  the  war  between  Austria  and 
France.  The  Russian  emperor  sends  an  army  in  aid 
of  Austria  under  Su  war  row.  The  French  are  repeat- 
edly defeated  in  Italy.  Bonaparte  returns  from 
Egypt  and  makes  himself  First  Consul  of  France. 
Massena  wins  the  battle  of  Zurich.  The  Russian 
emperor  makes  peace  with  France. 

1800.  Bonaparte  passes  the  Alps,  and  defeats  the. 
Austrians  at  Marengo.  Moreau  wins  the  battle  of 
Hohenlinden. 

1801.  Treaty  of  Luneville  between  France  and 
Austria.  The  battle  of  Copenhagen. 

1802.  Peace  of  Amiens. 

) 

1803.  War  between  England  and  France  renewed, 

1804.  Napoleon  Bonaparte  is  made  Emperor  of 
France. 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


531 


1805.  Great  i^rejiarations  of  Napoleon  to  invade 
England.  Austria,  supported  by  Russia,  renews  war 
with  France.  Napoleon  marches  into  Germany, 
takes  Vienna,  and  gains  the  battle  of  Austerlitz. 
Lord  Nelson  destroys  the  combined  French  and 
Spanish  fleets,  and  is  killed  at  the  battle  of  Trafalgar. 

1806.  War  between  Prussia  and  France.  Napoleon 
conquers  Prussia  at  the  battle  of  Jena. 

1807.  Obstinate  warfare  between  the  French  and 
Prussian  armies  in  East  Prussia  and  Poland.  Peace 
of  Tilsit. 

1808.  Napoleon  endeavors  to  make  his  brother 
King  of  Spain.  Rising  of  the  Spanish  nation  against 
him.  England  sends  troops  to  aid  the  Spaniards. 
Battle  of  Yimiera  and  Corunna. 

1809.  V^r  renewed  between  France  and  Austria. 
Battles  of  Asperne  and  Wagram.  Peace  granted  to 
Austria.  Lord  Wellington’s  victory  of  Talavera,  in 
Spain. 

1810.  Marriage  of  Napoleon  and  the  Archduchess 
Maria  Louisa.  Holland  annexed  to  France. 

1812.  War  between  England  and  the  United  States. 
Napoleon  invades  Russia.  Battle  of  Borodino.  The 
French  occupy  Moscow,  which  is  burned.  Disas- 
trous retreat  and  almost  total  destruction  of  the 
great  army  of  France. 

1813.  Prussia  and  Austria  take  up  arms  again 
against  France.  Battles  of  Lutzen,  Bautzen,  Dresden, 
Culm,  and  Leipsic.  The  French  are  driven  out  of 
Germany.  Lord  Wellington  gains  the  great  battle  of 
Yittoria,  which  completes  the  rescue  of  Spain  from 
France. 


532 


SYNOPSIS  OF  EVENTS. 


1814.  The  allies  invade  France  on  the  eastern,  and 
Lord  Wellington  invades  it  on  the  southern  frontier. 
Battles  of  Laon,  Montmirail,  Arcis-snr  Aube,  and 
others  in  the  northeast  of  France:  and  of  Toulouse 
in  the  south.  Paris  surrenders  to  the  allies,  and 
Napoleon  abdicates.  First  restoration  of  the  Bour- 
bons. Napoleon  goes  to  the  Isle  of  Elba,  which  is 
assigned  to  him  by  the  allies.  Treaty  of  Ghent  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  England. 


BATTLE  OF  WATER  LOO. 


533 


CHAPTER  XV. 

BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO,  A.  D.  1815. 

Thou  first  and  last  of  fields,  kingf-making  victory !— Byron 

592.  England  has  now  been  blessed  with  thirty- 
six  years  of  i>eace.  At  no  other  period  of  her  history 
can  a similarly  long  cessation  from  a state  of  warfare 
be  found.  It  is  true  that  our  troops  have  had  battles 
to  fight  during  this  interval  for  the  protection  and 
extension  of  our  Indian  possessions  and  our  colonies, 
but  these  have  been  with  distant  and  unimportant 
enemies.  The  danger  has  never  been  brought  near 
our  own  shores,  and  no  matter  of  vital  importance  to 
our  empire  has  ever  been  at  stake.  We  have  not  had 
liostilities  with  either  France,  America,  or  Russia; 
and  when  not  at  war  with  any  of  our  peers,  we  feel 
ourselves  to  be  substantially  at  peace.  There  has, 
indeed,  throughout  this  long  period,  been  no  great 
war,  like  those  with  which  the  previous  history  of 
modern  Europe  abounds.  There  have  been  formida- 
ble collisions  between  particular  states,  and  there 


534 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO, 


have  been  still  more  formidable  collisions  between 
the  armed  champions  of  the  conflicting  principles  of 
absolutism  and  democracy ; but  there  has  been  no 
general  Avar,  like  those  of  the  French  Revolution,  like 
the  American,  or  the  Seven  Years’  War,  or  like  the 
war  of  the  Spanish  Succession.  It  would  be  far  too 
much  to  augur  from  this  that  no  similar  wars  will 
again  convulse  the  world ; but  the  value  of  the 
period  of  peace  which  Europe  has  gained  is  incalcu- 
lable, even  if  we  look  on  it  as  only  a long  truce,  and 
expect  again  to  see  the  nations  pf  the  earth  recur  to 
what  some  philosophers  have  termed  man  s natural 
state  of  warfare. 

593.  No  equal  number  of  years  can  be  found  dur- 
ing which  science,  commerce,  and  civilization  have 
advanced  so  rapidly  and  so  extensively  as  has  been 
the  case  since  1815.  When  we  trace  their  progress, 
especially  in  this  country,  it  is  impossible  not  to  feel 
that  their  wondrous  development  has  been  mainly 
due  to  the  land  having  been  at  peace.^'  Their  good 
effects  cannot  be  obliterated  even  if  a series  of  wars 
were  to  recommence.  When  we  reflect  on  this,  and 
contrast  these  thirty-six  years  with  the  period  that 
preceded  them — a period  of  violence,  of  tumult,  of 
nnrestingly  destructive  energy — a period  thronghont 
which  the  wealth  of  nations  was  scattered  like  sand, 
and  the  blood  of  nations  lavished  like  water,  it  is  im- 
possible not  to  look  with  deep  interest  on  the  final 
crisis  of  that  dark  and  dreadful  epoch — the  crisis  out 

* See  the  excellent  Introduction  to  Mr.  Charles  Knight’s 
History  of  the  “Thirty  Years’ Peace.” 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


535 


of  which  our  own  happier  cycle  of  years  has  been 
evolved.  The  great  battle  which  ended  the  twenty- 
three  years’  w^ar  of  the  first  French  Revolution,  and 
which  quelled  the  man  whose  genius  and  ambition 
had  so  long  disturbed  and  desolated  the  world,  de- 
serves to  be  regarded  by  us  not  only  wfith  peculiar 
pride  as  one  of  our  greatest  national  victories,  but 
with  peculiar  gratitude  for  the  repose  which  it  secur- 
ed for  us  and  for  the  greater  part  of  the  human  race. 

594.  One  good  test  for  determining  the  importance 
of  Waterloo  is  to  ascertain  what  was  felt  by  wise  and 
prudent  statesmen  before  that  battle  respecting  the 
return  of  Napoleon  from  Elba  to  the  imperial  throne 
of  France,  and  the  probable  effects  of  his  success. 
For  this  purpose,  I will  quote  the  words,  not  of  any 
of  our  vehement  anti-Gallican  politicians  of  the 
school  of  Pitt,  but  of  a leader  of  our  Liberal  party, 
of  a man  whose  reputation  as  a jurist,  a historian 
and  a far-sighted  and  candid  statesman  was,  and  is, 
deservedly  high,,  not  only  in  this  country,  but 
throughout  Europe.  Sir  James  Mackintosh  said  of 
the  return  from  Elba, 

595.  ‘‘  Was  it  in  the  power  of  language  to  describe 
the  evil  ? Wars  which  had  raged  for  more  than 
twenty  years  throughout  Europe  ; which  had  spread 
blood  and  desolation  from  Cadiz  to  Moscow,  and 
from  Naples  to  Copenhagen ; which  had  wasted  the 
means  of  human  enjoyment,  and  destroyed  the  in- 
struments of  social  improvement ; which  threatened 
to  diffuse  among  the  European  nations  the  dissolute 
and  ferocious  habits  of  a predatory  soldiery — at 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO, 


length,  by  one  of  those  vicissitudes  which  hid  defi- 
ance to  the  foresight  of  man,  had  been  brought  to  a 
close,  upon  the  whole,  happy,  beyond  all  reasonable 
expectation,  with  no  violent  shock  to  national  inde- 
pendence, with  some  tolerable  compromise  between 
the  opinions  of  the  age  and  the  reverence  due  to  an- 
cient institutions ; with  no  too  signal  or  mortifying 
triumph  over  the  legitimate  interests  or  avowable 
feelings  of  any  numerous  body  of  men,  and,  above 
all,  without  those  retaliations  against  nations  or  par- 
ties, which  beget  new'  convulsions,  often  as  horrible 
as  those  which  they  close,  and  perpetuate  revenge, 
and  hatred,  and  blood  from  age  to  age.  Europe 
seemed  to  breathe  after  her  sufferings.  In  the  midst 
ol‘  this  fair  prospect  and  of  these  consolatory  hopes, 
Napoleon  Bonaparte  escaped  from  Elba  ; three  small 
vessels  reached  the  coast  of  Provence ; their  hopes 
are  instantly  dispelled ; the  work  of  our  toil  and  for- 
titude is  undone ; the  blood  of  Europe  is  spilled  in 
vain — 

* Tbi  omnis  effusus  labor! 

596.  The  exertions  wdiich  the  allied  powers  made 
at  this  crisis  to  grapple  promptly  with  the  French 
(unperor  have  truly  been  termed  gigantic,  and  never 
were  Napoleon’s  genius  and  activity  more  signally 
displayed  than  in  the  celerity  and  skill  by  which  he 
l>vought  forward  all  the  military  resources  of  France, 
which  the  reverses  of  the  three  preceding  years,  and 
the  pacific  policy  of  the  Bourbons  during  the  months 
of  their  first  restoration,  had  greatly  diminished  and 
disorganized.  He  re-entered  Paris  on  the  20th  of 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


537 


March,  and  by  the  end  of  May,  besides  sending  a 
Ibrce  into  La  Vendee  to  put  down  the  armed  risings 
of  the  Royalists  in  that  province,  and  besides  provid- 
ing troops  under  Massena  and  Suchet  for  the  defense 
of  the  southern  frontiers  of  France,  Napoleon  had  an 
army  assembled  in  the  northeast  for  active  operations 
under  his  own  command,  which  amounted  to  between 

120.000  and  130,000  men/  with  a superb  park  of  artil- 
lery, and  in  the  highest  possible  state  of  equipment, 
discipline,  and  efficiency. 

597.  The  approach  of  the  many.  Russians,  Aus- 
trians, Bavarians,  and  other  foes  of  the  French  em- 
peror to  the  Rhine  was  necessarily  slow;  but  the 
two  most  active  of  the  allied  powers  had  occupied 
Belgium  wnth  their  troops  while  Napoleon  was  organ- 
izing his  forces.  Marshal  Blucher  was  there  with 

116.000  Prussians,  and  the  Duke  of  Wellington  was 
there  also  with  about  106,000  troops,  either  British 
or  in  British  pay.f  Napoleon  determined  to  attack 
these  enemies  in  Belgium.  The  disparity  of  numbers 
was  indeed  great,  but  delay  was  sure  to  increase  the 
number  of  his  enemies  much  faster  than  re-enforce- 
ments could  join  his  own  ranks.  He  considered  also 
that  “ the  enemy’s  troops  were  cantoned  under  the 
command  of  two  generals,  and  composed  of  nations 
differing  both  in  interest  and  in  feelings.’’^  His  own 
army  was  under  his  own  sole  command.  It  was 
composed  exclusively  of  French  soldiers,  mostly  of 

* See,  for  these  numbers,  Siborne’s  “ History  of  the 
Campaign  of  Waterloo,”  vol.  i.,  p.  41. 

+ Ibid.,  vol.  i .,  chap.  iii. 

i See Montholon’s  “Memoirs,”  p.  45. 


538 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


veterans,  well  acquainted  with  their  officers  and 
Avith  each  other,  and  lull  of  enthusiastic  confidence 
in  their  commander.  If  he  could  separate  the  Prus- 
sians from  the  British,  so  as  to  attack  each  in  detail, 
he  felt  sanguine  of  success,  not  only  against  these, 
the  most  resolute  of  his  many  adversaries,  hut  also 
against  the  other  masses  that  were  slowly  laboring 
up  against  his  southeastern  frontiers. 

598.  The  triple  chain  of  strong  fortresses  which 
the  French  possessed  on  the  Belgian  frontier  formed 
a curtain,  behind  which  Napoleon  was  able  to  con- 
centrate his  army,  and  conceal  till  the  very  last 
moment  the  precise  line  of  attack  which  he  intended 
to  take.  On  the  other  hand,  Blucher  and  Welling- 
ton were  obliged  to  canton  their  troops  along  a line 
of  open  country  of  considerable  length,  so  as  to 
watch  for  the  outbreak  of  Napoleon  from  whichever 
point  of  his  chain  of  strongholds  he  should  please  to 
make  it.  Blucher,  with  his  army,  occupied  the 
banks  of  the  Sambre  and  the  Meuse,  from  Liege  on 
his  left,  to  Charleroi  on  his  right ; and  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  covered  Brussels,  his  cantonments  being 
partly  in  front  of  that  city,  and  between  it  and  the 
French  frontier,  and  partly  on  its  west ; their  extreme 
right  being  at  Courtray  and  Tournay,  while  their 
left  approached  Charleroi  and  communicated  with 
the  Prussian  right.  It  was  upon  Charleroi  that  Na- 
poleon resolved  to  level  his  attack,  in  hopes  of  sever- 
ing the  two  allied  armies  from  each  other,  and  then 
pursuing  his  favorite  tactic  of  assailing  each  sepa- 
rately with  a superior  force  on  the  battle-field. 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO, 


539 


though  the  aggregate  of  their  immbers  considerably 
exceeded  his  own. 

599.  On  the  15th  of  June  the  French  army  was 
suddenly  in  motion,  and  crossed  the  frontier  in  three 
columns,  which  were  pointed  upon  Charleroi  and  its 
vicinity.  The  French  line  of  advance  upon  Brussels, 
which  city  Napoleon  resolved  to  occupy,  thus  lay 
right  through  the  centre  of  the  line  of  cantonments 
of  the  allies.  The  Prussian  general  rapidly  concen- 
trated his  forces,  calling  them  in  from  the  left,  and 
tlie  English  general  concentrated  his,  calling  them 
in  from  the  right,  toward  the  menaced  centre  of  the 
combined  position.  On  the  morning  of  the  16th, 
Rlucher  was  in  position  at  Ligny,  to  the  northeast  of 
Charleroi,  with  80,000  men.  Wellington’s  troops 
were  concentrating  at  Quatre  Bras,  which  lies  due 
north  of  Charleroi,  and  is  about  nine-  miles  from 
Ligny.  On  the  16th,  Napoleon  in  i3erson  attacked 
Blucher,  and,  after  a long  and  obstinate  battle, 
defeated  him,  and  compelled  the  Prussian  army  to 
retire  northward  toward  Wavre.  On  the  same  day, 
Marshal  Ney,  with  a large  part  of  the  French  arm}^, 
attacked  the  English  troops  at  Quatre  Bras,  and  a 
very  severe  engagement  took  place,  in  which  Ney 
failed  in  defeating  the  British,  but  succeeded  in  pre- 
venting their  sending  any  help  to  Blucher,  who  was 
being  beaten  by  the  emperor  at  Ligny.  On  the  news 
of  Blucher’s  defeat  at  Ligny  reaching  Wellington,  he 
foresaw  that  the  emperor’s  army  would  now  be  di- 
rected upon  him,  and  he  accordingly  retreated  in 
order  to  restore  his  communications  with  his  ally, 


540 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


wliich  would  have  been  dislocated  by  the  Prussians 
hilling  back  from  Ligny  to  Wavre  if  the  English 
had  remained  in  advance  at  Quatre  Bras.  During 
the  17th,  therefore,  Wellington  retreated,  being  pur- 
sued, but  little  molested  by  the  main  French  army, 
over  about  half  the  space  between  Quatre  Bras  and 
Brussels.  This  brought  him  again  parallel,  on  a line 
running  from  west  to  east,  with  Blucher,  who  was 
at  Wavre.  Having  ascertained  that  the  Prussian 
army,  though  beaten  on  the  16th,  was  not  broken, 
and  having  received  a promise  from  its  general  to 
march  to  his  assistance,  Wellington  determined  to 
halt,  and  to  give  battle  to  the  French  emperor  in 
the  position,  which  from  a village  in  its  neighbor- 
hood, has  received  the  ever-memorable  name  of  the 
field  of  Waterloo. 

600.  Sir  Walter  Scott,  in  his  “ Life  of  Napoleon,” 
remarks  of  Waterloo  that  “ the  scene  of  this  celebra- 
ted action  must  be  familiar  to  most  readers  either 
from  description  or  recollection.”  The  narratives  of 
Sir  Walter  himself,  of  Alison,  Gleig,  Siborne,  and 
others,  must  have  made  the  events  of  the  battle 
almost  equally  well  known.  I might  perhaps,  con- 
tent myself  with  referring  to  their  pages,  and  avoid 
the  difficult  task  of  dealing  with  a subject  which  has 
already  been  discussed  so  copiously,  so  clearly,  and 
so  eloquently  by  others.  In  particular,  the  descrip- 
tion by  Captain  Siborne  of  the  Waterloo  campaign 
is  so  full  and  so  minute,  so  scrupulously  accurate, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  so  spirited  and  graphic  that 
it  will  long  defy  the  competition  of  far  abler  pens 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO, 


541 


than  mine.  I shall  only  aim  at  giving  a general 
idea  of  the  main  features  of  this  great  event,  of  this 
discrowning  and  crowning  victory, 

601.  When,  after  a very  hard-fought  and  long- 
doubtful  day,  Napoleon  had  succeeded  in  driving 
hack  the  Prussian  army  from  Ligny,  and  had  re- 
solved on  marching  himself  to  assail  the  English,  he 
sent,  on  the  17th,  Marshal  Grouchy  with  30,000  men 
to  pursue  the  defeated  Prussians,  and  to  prevent  their 
marching  to  aid  the  Duke  of  Wellington.  Great 
recriminations  passed  afterward  between  the  marshal 
and  the  emperor  as  to  how  this  duty  was  attempted 
to  be  performed,  and  the  reasons  why  Grouchy  failed 
on  the  18th  to  arrest  the  lateral  movement  of  the 
Prussian  troops  from  Wavre  toward  Waterloo.  It 
may  be  sufficient  to  remark  here  that  Grouchy  was 
not  sent  in  pursuit  of  Blucher  till  late  on  the  17th, 
and  that  the  force  given  him  was  insufficient  to 
make  head  against  the  whole  Prussian  army ; for 
Blucher’s  men,  though  they  were  beaten  back,  and 
suffered  severe  loss  at  Lign}%  were  neither  routed  nor 
disheartened  ; and  they  were  joined  at  Wavre  by  a 
large  division  of  their  comrades  under  General  Bulow, 
wdio  had  taken  no  part  in  the  battle  of  the  16th,  and 
who  were  fresh  for  the  march  to  Waterloo  against 
the  French  on  the  18th.  But  the  failure  of  Grouchy 
Avas  in  truth  mainly  owing  to  the  indomitable  hero- 
ism of  Blucher  himself,  who,  though  severely  in- 
jured in  the  battle  at  Ligny,  was  as  energetic  and 
active  as  ever  in  bringing  his  men  into  action  again, 
and  who  had  the  resolution  to  expose  a part  of  his 


542 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO, 


army,  under  Thielman,  to  be  overwhelmed  by  Grou- 
chy at  Wavre  on  the  18th,  while  he  urged  the  march 
of  the  mass  of  his  troops  upon  Waterloo.  “ It  is  not 
at  Wavre,  but  at  Waterloo,” said  the  old  field-marshal, 
“ that  the  campaign  is  to  be  decided ; ” and  he  risked 
a detachment,  and  won  the  campaign  accordingly, 
AVellington  and  Blucher  trusted  each  other  as  cor- 
dially, and  co-operated  as  zealously,  as  formerly  had 
been  the  case  with  Marlborough  and  Eugene.  It 
was  in  full  reliance  on  Blucher’s  promise  to  join  him 
that  the  duke  stood  his  ground  and  fought  at  Water- 
loo ; and  those  who  have  ventured  to  impugn  the 
duke’s  capacity  as  a general  ought  to  have  had  com- 
mon sense  enough  to  perceive  that  to  charge  the 
duke  with  having  won  the  battle  of  Waterloo  by  the 
help  of  the  Prussians  is  really  to  say  that  he  won  it 
by  the  very  means  on  which  he  relied,  and  without 
the  expectation  of  which  the  battle  would  not  have 
been  fought. 

602.  Napoleon  himself  has  found  fault  with  Wel- 
lington * for  not  having  retreated  beyond  Waterloo. 
The  short  answer  may  be,  that  the  duke  had  reason 
to  expect  that  his  army  could  singly  resist  the  French 
at  Waterloo  until  the  Prussians  came  up,  and  that, 
on  the  Prussians  joining,  there  would  be  a sufficient 
force,  united  under  himself  and  Blucher,  for  com- 
pletely overwhelming  the  enemy.  And  while  Napo- 
leon thus  censures  his  great  adversary,  he  involunta- 
rily bears  the  highest  possible  testimony  to  the  mili- 
tary character  of  the  English,  and  proves  decisively 

* See  Montholon’s  “ Memoirs,”  vol.  iv.,  p.  44. 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


543 


of  wliat  paramount  importance  was  the  battle  to 
which  he  challenged  his  fearless  opponent.  Napo- 
leon asks,  “jy  the  English  army  had  been  beaten  at 
Waterloo,  what  wovM  have  been  the  use  of  those  numer- 
ous bodies  of  troops,  of  Rrussians,  Austrians,  Germans, 
and  Spaniards,  which  we7'e  advancing  by  forced  march- 
es to  the  Rhine,  the  Alps,  and  the  Pyrenees  ? ” * 

603.  The  strength  of  the  army  under  the  Duke  of 
Wellington  at  Waterloo  was  49,608  infantry,  12,402 
cavalry,  and  5645  artillery  men,  with  156  guns  f 
But  of  this  total  of  67,655  men,  scarcely  24,000  were 
British,  a circumstance  of  very  serious  importance, 
if  Napoleon’s  own  estimate  of  the  relative  value  of 
troops  of  different  nations  is  to  be  taken.  In  the 
emperors  own  words,  speaking  of  his  campaign,  “ A 
French  soldier  would  not  be  equal  to  more  than  one 
English  soldier,  but  he  would  not  be  afraid  to  meet 
two  Dutchmen,  Prussians,  or  soldiers  of  the  Confed- 
eration.” X There  were  about  6000  men  of  the  old 
German  Legion  with  the  duke : these  were  veteran 
troops,  and  of  excellent  quality.  But  the  rest  of  the 
army  was  *made  up  of  Hanoverians,  Brunswickers, 
Nassauers,  Dutch,  and  Belgians,  many  of  whom  were 
tried  soldiers,  and  fought  well,  but  many  had  been 
lately  levied,  and  not  a few  were  justly  suspected  of 
a strong  wish  to  fight  under  the  French  eagles  rather 
than  against  them. 

604.  Napoleon’s  army  at  Waterloo  consisted  of 

* Montholon’9  “ Memoirs,”  voi.  iv.,  p.  44. 

+ Siborne,  vol.  i.,  p.  376 

t Montholon’8  “Memoirs,”  vol.  iv.,  p.  41. 


544 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


48,950  infantry,  15,765  cavalry,  7232  artillery -men, 
being  a total  of  71,947  men  and  246  guns  * Thry 
were  the  elite  of  the  national  forces  of  France ; and 
of  all  the  numerous  gallant  armies  which  that  mar- 
tial land  has  poured  forth,  never  was  there  one 
braver,  or  better  disciplined,  or  better  led,  than  the 
host  that  took  up  its  position  at  Waterloo  on  the 
morning  of  the  18th  of  June,  1815. 

605.  Perhaps  those  who  have  not  seen  the  field  ot 
battle  at  Waterloo,  or  the  admirable  model  of  the 
ground  and  of  the  conflicting  armies  which  was  exe- 
cuted by  Captain  Siborne,  may  gain  a generally 
accurate  idea  of  the  localities  by  picturing  to  them- 
selves a valley  between  two  and  three  miles  long,  of 
various  breadths  at  different  points,  but  generally 
not  exceeding  half  a mile.  On  each  side  of  the 
valley  there  is  a winding  chain  of  low  hills,  running 
somewhat  parallel  with  each  other.  The  declivity 
from  each  of  these  ranges  of  hills  to  the  intervening 
valley  is  gentle  but  not  uniform,  the  undulations  of 
the  ground  being  frequent  and  considerable.  The 
English  army  was  posted  on  the  northern,  and  the 
French  army  occupied  the  southern  ridge.  The 
artillery  of  each  side  thundered  at  the  other  from 
their  respective  heights  throughout  the  day,  and  the 
charges  of  horse  and  foot  were  made  across  the  valley 
111  at  has  been  described.  The  village  of  Mont  St. 
Jean  is  situate  a little  behind  the  centre  of  the  north- 
ern chain  of  hills,  and  the  village  of  La  Belle  Alliance 
is  close  behind  the  centre  of  the  southern  ridge.  The 


iSee  Siborne,  ut  supra. 


BATTLE  OF  WATEIiLOO. 


r>Ao 

high  road  from  Charleroi  to  Brussels  runs  through 
both  these  villages,  and  bisects,  therefore,  both  the 
English  and  the  French  positions.  The  line  of  this 
road  was  the  line  of  Napoleon’s  intended  advance  on 
Brussels. 

606.  There  are  some  other  local  particulars  con- 
nected with  the  situation  of  each  army  which  it  is 
necessary  to  bear  in  mind.  The  strength  of  the  Brit- 
ish position  did  not  consist  merely  in  the  occupation 
of  a ridge  of  high  ground.  A village  and  ravine, 
called  Merk  Braine,  on  the  Duke  of  Wellington’s  ex- 
treme right,  secured  him  from  his  flank  being  turned 
on  that  side  ; and  on  his  extreme  left,  two  little  ham- 
lets, called  La  Haye  and  Papillote,  gave  a similar 
though  a slighter  protection.  It  was,  however,  less 
necessary  to  provide  for  this  extremity  of  the  posi- 
tion, as  it  was  on  this  (the  eastern)  side  that  the 
Prussians  were  coming  uj3.  Behind  the  whole  Brit- 
ish position  is  the  great  and  extensive  forest  of 
Soignies.  As  no  attempt  was  made  by  the  French  to 
turn  either  of  the  English  flanks,  and  the  battle  was 
a day  of  straight-forward  fighting,  it  is  chiefly  im- 
portant to  see  what  posts  there  were  in  front  of  the 
British  line  of  hills  of  which  advantage  could  be 
taken  either  to  repel  or  facilitate  an  attack  ; and  it 
will  be  seen  that  there  were  two,  and  that  each  was 
of  very  great  importance  in  the  action.  In  front  of 
the  British  right,  that  is  to  say,  on  the  northern  slope 
of  the  valley  toward  its  western  end,  there  stood  an 
old-fashioned  Flemish  farm-house  called  Goumont  or 
Hougoumont,  with  out-buildings  and  a garden,  and 


54G 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


with  a copse  of  1)eech  trees  of  about  two  acres  in  ex- 
tent round  it.  This  was  strongly  garrisoned  by  the 
allied  troops ; and  while  it  was  in  their  possession,  it 
was  difficult  for  the  enemy  to  press  on  and  force  the 
British  right  wing.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  enemy 
could  occupy  it,  it  would  be  difficult  for  that  wing 
to  keep  its  ground  on  the  heights,  with  a strong  post 
held  adversely  in  its  immediate  front,  being  one  that 
would  give  much  shelter  to  the  enemy’s  marksmen, 
and  great  facilities  for  the  sudden  concentration  of 
attacking  columns.  Almost  immediately  in  front  of 
the  British  centre,  and  not  so  far  down  the  slope  as 
Hougoumont,  there  was  another  farm-house,  of  a 
smaller  size,  called  La  Have  Sainte,^'  which  Avas  also 
held  by  the  British  troops,  and  the  occupation  of 
which  was  found  to  be  of  very  serious  consequence. 

607.  With  respect  to  the  French  position,  the  prin- 
cipal feature  to  be  noticed  is  the  village  of  Planche- 
noit,  which  lay  a little  in  the  rear  of  their  right  {i.  e., 
on  the  eastern  side),  and  which  proved  to  be  of  great 
importance  in  aiding  them  to  check  the  advance  of 
the  Prussians. 

608.  As  has  been  already  mentioned,  the  Prussians, 
on  the  morning  of  the  18th,  were  at  Wavre,  about 
twelve  miles  to  the  east  of  the  field  of  battle  at  Wa- 
terloo. The  junction  of  Bulow’s  division  had  more 
than  made  up  for  the  loss  sustained  at  Ligny  ; and 
leaving  Thielman,  with  about  17,000  men,  to  hold  his 
ground  as  he  best  could  against  the  attack  which 

* Not  to  be  confounded  with  the  hamlet  of  La  Have,  at 
the  extreme  left  of  the  British  line. 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO, 


547 


Grouchy  was  about  to  make  on  Wavre,  Bulow  and 
Blucher  moved  with  the  rest  of  the  Prussians  upon 
Waterloo.  It  was  calculated  that  they  would  be 
there  by  three  o’clock  ; but  the  extremely  difficult 
nature  of  the  ground  which  they  had  to  traverse, 
rendered  worse  by  the  torrents  of  rain  that  had  just 
fallen,  delayed  them  long  on  their  twelve  miles’ 
march. 

609.  The  night  of  the  17th  was  wet  and  stormy  ; 
and  when  the  dawn  of  the  memorable  18th  of  June 
broke,  the  rain  was  still  descending  heavily.  The 
French  and  British  armies  rose  from  their  dreary 
bivouacs  and  began  to  form,  each  on  the  high  ground 
which  it  occupied.  Toward  nine  the  weather  grew 
clearer,  and  each  army  was  able  to  watch  the  position 
and  arrangements  of  the  other  on  the  opposite  side 
of  the  valley. 

610.  The  Duke  of  Wellington  drew  up  his  infantr}^ 
in  two  lines,  the  second  line  being  composed  princi- 
pally of  Dutch  and  Belgian  troops,  whose  fidelity 
was  doubtful,  and  of  those  regiments  of  other  na- 
tions which  had  suffered  most  severely  at  Quatre 
Bras  on  the  16th.  This  second  line  w^as  posted  on 
the  northern  declivity  of  the  hills,  so  as  to  be  shel- 
tered from  the  French  cannonade.  The  cavalry  was 
stationed  at  intervals  along  the  line  in  the  rear,  the 
largest  force  of  horse  being  collected  on  the  left  of 
the  centre,  to  the  east  of  the  Charleroi  road.  On  the 
opposite  heights  the  French  army  was  drawn  up  in 
two  general  lines,  with  the  entire  force  of  the  Im- 
perial Guards,  cavalry  as  well  as  infantry,  in  rear  of 

18 


548 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


the  centre,  as  a reserve.  English  military  critics  have* 
highly  eulogized  the  admirable  arrangement  which  ' 
Napoleon  made  of  his  forces  of  each  army,  so  as  to^ 
give  him  the  most  ample  means  of  sustaining,  by  an 
immediate  and  sufficient  support,  any  attack,  from 
whatever  point  he  might  direct  it,  and  of  drawing 
promptly  together  a strong  force,  to  resist  any  attack 
that  might  be  made  on  himself  in  any  part  of  the 
lield.^  When  his  troops  were  all  arrayed,  he  rode 
along  the  lines,  receiving  every  where  the  most  en- 
thusiastic cheers  from  his  men,  of  whose  entire  devo- 
tion to  him  his  assurance  was  now  doubly  sure.  On 
the  southern  side  of  the  valley  the  duke’s  army  was 
also  arrayed,  and  ready  to  meet  the  menaced  attack. 

Oil.  “ The  two  armies  were  now  fairly  in  presence 
of  each  other,  and  their  mutual  observation  was  gov- 
erned by  the  most  intense  interest  and  the  most  scru- 
tinizing anxiety.  In  a still  greater  degree  did  these 
feelings  actuate  their  commanders,  while  watching 
each  other’s  preparatory  movements,  and  minutely 
scanning  the  surface  of  the  arena  on  which  tactical 
skill,  habitual  prowess,  physical  strength,  and  moral 
courage  were  to  decide,  not  alone  their  own,  but,  in 
all  probability,  the  fate  of  Europe.  Apart  from  na- 
tional interests  and  considerations,  and  viewed  solely 
in  connection  with  the  opposite  characters  of  the  two» 
illustrious  chiefs,  the  apx:)roaching  contest  was  con- 
templated with  anxious  solicitude  by  the  whole  mili- 
tary world.  Need  this  create  surprise  when  w^e 
reflect  that  the  struggle  w as  one  tor  mastery  between 


* Siborne,  vol.  i.,  p.  376. 


BATTLE  OF  WATEBLOO. 


549 


the  far-famed  conqueror  of  Italy  and  the  victorious 
liberator  of  the  Peninsula  ; between  the  triumphant 
vanquisher  of  Eastern  Europe,  and  the  bold  and  suc- 
cessful invader  of  the  south  of  France  ! Never  was 
the  issue  of  a single  battle  looked  forward  to  as  in- 
volving consequences  of  such  vast  importance — of 
such  universal  influence,”* 

612.  It  was  approaching  noon  before  the  action 
commenced.  Napoleon,  in  his  memoirs,  gives  as  the 
reason  for  this  delay,  the  miry  state  of  the  ground 
through  the  heavy  rain  of  the  preceding  night  and 
day,  which  rendered  it  impossible  for  cavalry  or 
artillery  to  maneuver  on  it  till  a few  hours  of  dry 
weather  had  given  it  its  natural  consistency.  It  has 
been  supposed,  also,  that  he  trusted  to  the  effect 
which  the  sight  of  the  imposing  array  of  his  own 
forces  was  likely  to  produce  on  part  of  the  allied 
army.  The  Belgian  regiments  had  been  tampered 
with ; and  Napoleon  had  well  founded  hopes  of  see- 
ing them  quit  the  Duke  of  Wellington  in  a body, 
and  range  themselves  under  his  own  eagles.  The 
duke,  however,  who  knew  and  did  not  trust  them,; 
had  guarded  against  the  risk  of  this  by  breaking  up 
the  corps  of  Belgians,  and  distributing  them  in  sepa- 
rate regiments  among  troops  on  whom  he  could 
rely.t 

613.  At  last,  at  about  half  past  eleven  o’clcck,  Na- 
poleon began  the  battle  by  directing  a powerful  force 
from  his  left  wing  under  his  brother,  Prince  Jerome, 

* Slborne,  vol.  i.,  p.  377. 

t Ibid.  p.  373. 


550 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


to  attack  Hoiigoumont.  Column  after  column  of  the 
Freneh  now  descended  from  the  west  of  the  southern 
heights,  and  assailed  that  post  with  fiery  valor, 
which  was  encountered  with  the  most  determined 
bravery.  The  French  won  the  copse  round  the 
house,  but  a party  of  the  British  Guards  held  the 
house  itself  throughout  the  day.  Amid  shell  and 
shot,  and  the  blazing  fragments  of  part  of  the  build- 
ings, this  obstinate  contest  was  continued.  But  stijl 
the  English  held  Hougoumont,  though  the  French 
occasionally  moved  forward  in  such  numbers  as  en- 
abled them  to  surround  and  mask  this  post  with  part 
of  their  troops  from  their  left  wing,  while  others 
pressed  onward  up  the  slope,  and  assailed  the  British 
riglit. 

614.  The  cannonade,  which  commenced  at  first  be- 
tween the  British  right  and  the  French  left,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  attack  on  Hougoumont,  soon  became 
general  along  both  lines ; and  about  one  o^clock  Napo- 
leon directed  a grand  attack  to  be  made  under  Mar- 
shal Ney  upon  the  centre  and  left  wing  of  the  allied 
army.  For  this  purpose  four  columns  of  infantry, 
amounting  to  about  18,000  men,  were  collected,  sup- 
ported by  a strong  division  of  cavalry  under  the 
celebrated  Kellerman,  and  seventy-four  guns  were 
brought  forward  ready  to  be  posted  on  the  ridge  of  a 
little  undulation  of  the  ground  in  the  interval  be- 
tween the  two  main  ranges  of  heights,  so  as  to  bring 
their  fire  to  bear  on  the  duke’s  line  at  a range  of 
about  seven  hundred  yards.  By  the  combined  as- 
sault of  these  formidable  forces,  led  on  by  Ney,  “ the 


BA  TTLE  OF  \VA  TERLOO. 


551 


bravest  of  the  brave, Napoleon  hoped  to  force  the 
left  centre  of  the  British  position,  to  take  La  Haye 
Sainte,  and  then,  pressing  forward,  to  occupy  also 
the  farm  of  Mont  St.  Jean.  He  then  could  cut  the 
mass  of  Wellington’s  troops  off  from  their  line  of 
retreat  upon  Brussels,  and  from  their  own  left,  and 
also  completely  sever  them  from  any  Prussian  troops 
that  might  be  approaching. 

615.  The  columns  destined  for  this  great  and  de- 
cisive operation  descended  majestically  from  the 
French  range  of  hills,  and  gained  the  ridge  of  the 
intervening  eminence,  on  which  the  batteries  that 
supported  them  were  now  ranged.  As  the  columns 
descended  again  from  this  eminence,  the  seventy-four 
guns  opened  over  their  heads  with  terrible  effect 
upon  the  troops  of  the  allies  that  were  stationed  oh 
the  heights  to  the  left  of  the  Chaleroi  road.  One  of 
the  French  columns  kept  to  the  east,  and  attacked 
the  extreme  left  of  the  allies ; the  other  three  con- 
tinued to  move  rapidly  forward  upon  the  left  centre 
of  the  allied  position.  The  front  line  of  the  allies 
here  was  composed  of  Bylant’s  brigade  of  Dutch  and 
Belgians.  As  the  French  columns  moved  up  the 
southward  slope  of  the  height  on  which  the  Dutch 
and  Belgians  stood,  and  the  skirmishers  in  advance 
began  to  open  their  fire,  Bylant’s  entire  brigade 
turned  and  fied  in  disgraceful  and  disorderly  panic  ; 
but  there  were  men  more  worthy  of  the  name  be- 
hind. 

616.  The  second  line  of  the  allies  here  consisted  of 
two  brigades  of  English  infantry,  which  had  suffered 


552 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


severely  at  Quatre  Bras.  But  they  were  under  Pic- 
ton,  and  not  even  Ney  himself  surpassed  in  resolute 
bravery  that  stern  and  fiery  spirit.  Picton  brought 
his  two  brigades  forward,  side  by  side,  in  a thin  two- 
deep  line.  Thus  joined  together,  they  were  not  3,000 
strong.  With  these  Picton  had  to  make  head  against 
the  three  victorious  French  columns,  upward  of  four 
times  that  strength,  and  who,  encouraged  by  the 
easy  rout  of  the  Dutch  and  Belgians,  now  came  con- 
fidently over  the  ridge  of  the  hill.  The  British  in- 
fantry stood  firm  ; and  as  the  French  halted  and  be- 
gan to  deploy  into  line,  Picton  seized  the  critical 
moment : a close  and  deadly  volley  was  thrown  in 
upon  them,  and  then  with  a fierce  hurrah  the  British 
dashed  in  with  the  bayonet.  The  French  reeled 
back  in  confusion;  and  as  they  staggered  down  the 
hill,  a brigade  of  the  English  cavalry  rode  in  on 
them,  cutting  them  down  by  whole  battalions,  and 
taking  2,000  prisoners.  The  British  cavalry  galloped 
forward  and  sabred  the  artillery-men  of  Ney’s  sev- 
enty-four advanced  guns ; and  then  cutting  the 
traces  and  the  throats  of  the  horses,  rendered  these 
guns  totally  useless  to  the  French  throughout  the 
remainder  of  the  day.  In  the  excitement  of  success, 
the  English  cavalry  continued  to  press  on,  but  were 
charged  in  their  turn,  and  driven  back  with  severe 
loss  by  Milhaud’s  cuirassiers. 

617.  This  great  attack  (in  repelling  which  the 
brave  Picton  had  fallen)  had  now  completely  failed ; 
and,  at  the  same  time,  a powerful  body  of  French 
cuirassiers,  who  were  advancing  along  the  right  of 


BATTLE  OF  iVATERLOO, 


553 


fhci  Charleroi  road,  had  been  fairly  beaten  after  a 
close  hand-to-lurnd  fight  by  the  heavy  cavalry  of  the 
Englisli  household  brigade.  Hongoumont  was  still 
being  assailed,  and  was  successfully  resisting.  Troops 
Avere  now  beginning  to  appear  at  the  edge  of  the 
horizon  on  Napoleon’s  right,  which  he  too  well  knew 
to  be  Prussian,  though  he  endeavored  to  persuade  his 
followers  that  they  were  Grouchy’s  men  coming  to 
aid  them.  It  was  now  about  half  past  three  o’clock  ; 
and  though  Wellington’s  army  had  suffered  severely 
by  the  unremitting  cannonade  and  in  the  late  des- 
perate encounter,  no  part  of  the  British  position  had 
been  forced.  Napoleon  next  determined  to  try  Avhat 
effect  he  could  produce  on  the  British  centre  and 
right  by  charges  of  his  splendid  cavalry,  brought  on 
in  such  force  that  the  duke’s  cavalry  could  not  check 
them.  Fresh  troops  were  at  the  same  time  sent  to 
assail  La  Haye  Sainte  and  Hougoumont,  the  posses- 
sion of  these  posts  being  the  emperor’s  unceasing 
object.  Squadron  after  squadron  of  the  French 
cuirassiers  accordingly  ascended  the  slopes  on  the 
duke’s  right,  and  rode  forward  with  dauntless  cour- 
age against  the  batteries  of  the  British  artillery  in 
that  part  of  the  field.  The  artillery-men  were 
driven  from  their  guns,  and  the  cuirassiers  cheered 
loudly  at  their  supposed  triumph.  But  the  duke 
had  formed  his  infantry  in  squares,  and  the  cuiras- 
siers charged  in  vain  against  the  impenetrable 
hedges  of  bayonets,  while  the  fire  from  the  inner 
ranks  of  the  squares  told  with  terrible  effect  on  their 
own  squadrons.  Time  after  time  they  rode  forward 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


r,r>4 

with  invariably  the  same  result;  and  as  they  receded 
from  each  attack,  the  British  artillery-men  rushed 
forward  from  the  centres  of  the  squares,  where  they 
had  taken  refuge,  and  plied  their  guns  on  the  retir- 
ing horsemen.  Nearly  the  whole  of  Napoleon’s  mag- 
nificent body  of  heavy  cavalry  was  destroyed  in 
these  fruitless  attempts  upon  the  British  right.  But 
in  another  part  of  the  field  fortune  favored  him  for 
a time.  Donzelot's  infantry  took  La  Haye  Sainte 
between  six  and  seven  o’clock,  and  the  means  were 
now  given  for  organizing  another  formidable  attack 
on  the  centre  of  the  allies. 

618.  There  was  no  time  to  be  lost:  Blucher  and 
Bulow  were  beginning  to  press  upon  the  French 
right;  as  early  as  five  o’clock,  Napoleon  had  been 
obliged  to  detach  Lobau’s  infantry  and  Domont’s 
horse  to  check  these  new  enemies.  This  was  done 
for  a time ; but,  as  large  numbers  of  the  Prussians 
came  on  the  field,  they  turned  Lobau’s  left,  and  sent 
a strong  force  to  seize  the  village  of  Planchenoit, 
which,  it  will  be  remembered,  lay  in  the  rear  of  the 
French  right.  Napoleon  was  now  obliged  to  send 
his  Young  Guard  to  occupy  that  village,  which  was 
accordingly  held  by  them  with  great  gallantry 
against  the  reiterated  assaults  of  the  Prussian  left 
under  Bulow.  But  the  force  remaining  under  Napo- 
leon was  now  numerically  inferior  to  that  under  the 
Duke  of  Wellington,  which  he  had  been  assailing 
throughout  the  day,  without'gaining  any  other  advan- 
tage than  the  capture  of  La  Haye  Sainte.  It  is  true 
that,  owing  to  the  gross  aiisconduct  of  the  greater 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


555 


part  of  the  Dutch  and  Belgian  troops,  the  duke  was 
obliged  to  rely  exclusively  on  his  English  and  Ger- 
man soldiers,  and  the  ranks  of  these  had  been  fearful- 
ly thinned;  but  the  survivors  stood  their  ground  heroic- 
ally, and  still  opposed  a resolute  front  to  every  for- 
ward movement  of  their  enemies.  Napoleon  had 
then  the  means  of  effecting  a retreat.  His  Old 
Guard  had  yet  taken  no  part  in  the  action.  Under 
cover  of  it,  he  might  have  withdrawn  his  shattered 
forces  and  retired  upon  the  French  frontier.  But 
this  would  only  have  given  the  English  and  Prus- 
sians the  opportunity  of  completing  their  junction  ; 
and  he  knew  that  other  armies  were  fast  coming  up 
to  aid  them  in  a march  upon  Paris,  if  he  should  suc- 
ceed in  avoiding  an  encounter  with  them^  and  re- 
treating upon  the  capital.  A victory  at  Waterloo 
was  his  only  alternative  from  utter  ruin,  and  he  de- 
termined to  employ  his  Guard  in  one  bold  stroke 
more  to  make  that  victory  his  own. 

619.  Between  seven  and  eight  o’clock  the  infantry 
of  the  Old  Guard  was  formed  into  two  columns,  on 
the  declivity  near  La  Belle  Alliance.  Ney  was  placed 
at  their  head.  Napoleon  himself  rode  foward  to  a 
spot  by  which  his  veterans  were  to  pass ; and  as  they 
approached  he  raised  his  arm  and  pointed  to  the  po- 
sition of  the  allies,  as  if  to  tell  them  that  their  path 
lay  there.  They  answered  with  loud  cries  of  “Vive 
I’Empereur !”  and  descended  the  hill  from  their 
own  side  into  that  “valley  of  the  shadow  of  death,” 
while  their  batteries  thundered  with  redoubled  vigor 
over  their  heads  upon  the  British  line.  The  line  of 


556 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


march  of  the  columns  of  the  Guard  was  directed  be- 
tween Hougoumont  and  La  Haye  Sainte,  against  the 
British  right  centre ; and  at  the  same  time,  Bonze- 
lot  and  the  French,  who  had  possession  of  La  Haye 
Sainte,  commenced  a fierce  attack  upon  the  British 
centre,  a little  more  to  its  left.  This  part  of  the 
battle  has  drawn  less  attention  than  the  celebrated 
attack  of  the  Old  Guard;  but  it  formed  the  most 
perilous  crisis  for  the  allied  army  ; and  if  the  Young 
Guard  had  been  there  to  support  Bonzelot,  instead 
of  being  engaged  with  the  Prussians  at  Planchenoit, 
the  consequences  to  the  allies  in  that  part  of  the  field 
must  have  been  most  serious.  The  French  tirailleurs, 
who  were  posted  in  clouds  in  La  Haye  Sainte,  and 
the  sheltered  spots  near  it,  completely  disabled  the 
artillery-men  of  the  English  batteries  near  them;  and, 
taking  advantage  of  the  crippled  state  of  the  English 
guns,  the  French  brought  some  field-pieces  up  to  La 
Haye  Sainte,  and  commenced  firing  grape  from  them  on 
the  infantry  of  the  allies,  at  a distance  of  not  more 
than  a hundred  paces.  The  allied  infantry  here 
consisted  of  some  German  brigades,  who  were  formed 
in  squares,  as  it  was  believed  that  Bonzelot  had  cavalry 
ready  behind  La  Haye  Sainte  to  charge  them  with,  i*l 
they  left  that  order  of  formation.  In  this  state  the 
Germans  remained  for  some  time  with  heroic  fortitude, 
though  the  grape-shot  was  tearing  gaps  in  their  ranks, 
and  the  side  of  one  square  was  literally  blown  away  by 
one  tremendous  volley  which  the  French  gunners 
poured  into  it.  The  Prince  of  Orange  in  vain  en- 
deavored to  lead  some  Nassau  troops  to  their  aid. 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


557 


The  Nassauers  would  not  or  could  not  face  the 
French  ; and  some  battalions  of  Bruns  wickers,  whom 
the  Duke  of  Wellington  had  ordered  up  as  re-inforce- 
ment,  at  first  fell  back,  until  the  duke  in  person  ral- 
lied them  and  led  them  on.  The  duke  then  galloped 
ofi*  to  the  right  to  head  his  men  who  were  exposed  to 
the  attach  of  the  Imperial  Guard.  He  had  saved 
one  part  of  his  centre  from  being  routed ; but  the 
French  had  gained  ground  here,  and  the  pressure  on 
the  allied  line  was  severe,  until  it  was  relieved  by 
the  decisive  success  which  the  British  in  the  right 
centre  achieved  over  the  columns  of  the  Guard. 

620.  The  British  troops  on  the  crest  of  that  part  of 
the  position,  which  the  first  column  of  Napoleon’s 
Guards  assailed,  were  Maitland’s  brigade  of  British 
Guards,  having  Adam’s  brigade  on  their  right.  Mait- 
land’s men  were  lying  down,  in  order  to  avoid,  as  far 
as  possible,  the  destructive  effect  of  the  French  artil- 
lary, which  kept  up  an  unremitting  fire  from  the 
opposite  heights,  until  the  first  column  of  the  Im- 
perial Guard  had  advanced  so  far  up  the  slope  toward 
the  British  position  that  any  farther  firing  of  the 
French  artillery-men  would  endanger  their  own  com- 
rades. Meanwhile,  the  British  guns  were  not  idle ; 
but  shot  and  shell  plowed  fast  through  the  ranks  of 
the  stately  array  of  veterans  that  still  moved  impos- 
ingly on.  Several  of  the  French  superior  officers 
were  at  its  head.  Ney’s  horse  was  shot  under  him, 
but  he  still  led  the  way  on  foot,  sword  in  hand.  The 
front  of  the  massy  column  now  was  on  the  ridge  of 
the  hill.  To  their  surprise,  they  saw  no  troops  before 


558 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


them.  All  they  could  discern  thiough  the  smoke  was 
a small  hand  of  mounted  officers.  One  of  them  was 
the  duke  himself.  The  French  advanced  to  about  fifty 
yards  from  where  the  British  Guards  were  lying  down, 
when  the  voice  of  one  of  the  band  of  British  officers 
was  heard  calling,  as  if  to  the  ground  before  him,  “Up, 
Guards,  and  at  them !”  It  was  the  duke  who  gave  the 
order ; and  at  the  words,  as  if  by  magic,  up  started  be- 
fore them  a line  of  the  British  Guards  four  deep,  and 
in  the  most  compact  and  perfect  order.  They  poured 
an  instantaneous  volley  upon  the  head  of  the  French 
column,  by  which  no  less  than  three  hundred  of 
those  chosen  veterans  are  said  to  have  fallen.  The 
French  officers  rushed  forward,  and,  conspicuous  in 
front  of  their  men,  attempted  to  deploy  them  into  a 
more  extended  line,  so  as  to  enable  them  to  reply  with 
effect  to  the  British  fire.  But  Maitland’s  brigade 
kept  showering  in  volley  after  volley  with  deadly 
rapidity.  The  decimated  column  grew  disordered 
in  its  vain  efforts  to  expand  itself  into  a more  effi- 
cient formation.  The  right  word  was  given  at  the 
right  moment  to  the  British  for  the  bayonet-charge, 
and  the  brigade  sprang  forward  with  a loud  cheer 
against  their  dismayed  antagonists.  In  an  instant  the 
compact  mass  of  the  French  spread  out  into  a rabble, 
and  they  fled  back  down  the  hill  pursued  by  Maitland’s 
men, who,  however,  returned  to  their  position  in  time 
intake  part  in  the  repulse  of  the  second  column  of  the 
Imperial  Guard. 

621.  This  column  also  advanced  with  great  spirit 
and  firmness  under  the  cannonade  which  was  opened 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


559 


on  it,  and,  passing  by  the  eastern  wall  of  Hougou- 
mont,  diverged  slightly  to  the  right  as  it  moved  up 
the  slope  toward  the  British  position,  so  as  to  ap- 
proach the  same  spot  where  the  first  column  had  sur- 
mounted the  height  and  been  defeated.  This  enabled 
the  British  regiments  of  Adam’s  brigade  to  form  a 
line  parallel  to  the  left  flank  of  the  French  column, 
so  that  while  the  front  of  this  column  of  French 
Guards  had  to  encounter  the  cannonade  of  the  British 
batteries,  and  the  musketry  of  Maitland’s  Guards,  its 
left  flank  was  assailed  with  a destructive  fire  by  a 
four-deep  body  of  British  infantry,  extending  all 
along  it.  In  such  a position,  all  the  bravery  and 
skill  of  the  French  veterans  were  vain.  The  second 
column,  like  its  predecessor,  broke  and  fled,  taking 
at  first  a lateral  direction  along  the  front  of  the 
British  line  toward  the  rear  of  La  Haye  Sainte,  and 
so  becoming  blended  with  the  divisions  of  French  in- 
fantry, which  under  Donzelot,  had  been  pressing  the 
allies  so  severely  in  that  quarter.  The  sight  of  the 
Old  Guard  broken  and  in  flight  checked  the  ardor 
which  Donzelot ’s  troops  had  hitherto  displayed. 
They,  too,  began  to  waver.  Adam’s  victorious  brigade 
was  pressing  after  the  flying  Guard,  and  now  cleared 
away  the  assailants  of  the  allied  centre.  But  the 
battle  was  not  yet  won.  Napoleon  had  still  some 
battalions  in  reserve  near  La  Belle  Alliance.  He  was 
rapidly  rallying  the  remains  of  the  first  column  of 
his  Guards,  and  he  had  collected  into  one  body  the 
remnants  of  the  various  corps  of  cavalry,  which  had 
suffered  so  severely  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  day. 


560 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


The  duke  instantly  formed  the  bold  resolution  of 
now  himself  becoming  the  assailant,  and  leading  his 
successful  though  enfeebled  army  forward,  while  the 
disheartening  effect  of  the  repulse  of  the  Imperial 
Guard  on  the  French  army  was  still  strong,  and  be- 
fore Napoleon  and  Ney  could  rally  the  beaten  vet- 
erans themselves  for  another  and  a fiercer  charge. 
As  the  close  approach  of  the  Prussians  now  com- 
pletely protected  the  duke^s  left,  he  had  drawn  some 
reserves  of  horse  from  that  quarter,  and  he  had  a 
brigade  of  Hussars  under  Vivian  fresh  and  ready  at 
hand.  Without  a moment’s  hesitation,  he  launched 
these  against  the  cavalry  near  La  Belle  Alliance, 
The  charge  was  as  successful  as  it  was  daring ; and 
as  there  was  now  no  hostile  cavalry  to  check  the 
British  infantry  in  a forward  movement,  the  duke 
gave  the  long-wished-for  command  for  a general  ad- 
vance of  the  army  along  the  whole  line  upon  the  foe. 
It  was  now  past  eight  o’clock,  and  for  nine  deadly 
hours  had  the  British  and  German  regiments  stood 
unflinching  under  the  fire  of  artillery,  the  charge  of 
cavalry,  and  every  variety  of  assault  that  the  com- 
pact columns  or  the  scattered  tirailleurs  of  the 
enemy’s  infantry  could  inflict.  As  they  joyously 
sprang  forward  against  the  discomfited  masses  of  the 
French,  the  setting  sun  broke  through  the  clouds 
which  had  obscured  the  sky  during  the  greater  part 
of  the  day,  and  glittered  on  the  bayonets  of  the  allies 
while  they  in  turn  poured  down  into  the  valley  and 
toward  the  heights  that  were  held  by  the  foe.  Al- 
most the  whole  of  the  French  host  was  now  in  irre- 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


561 


trievable  confusion.  The  Prussian  army  was  coming 
more  and  more  rapidly  forward  on  their  right,  and 
the  Young  Guard,  which  had  held  Planchenoit  so 
bravely  was  at  last  compelled  to  give  way.  Some 
regiments  of  the  Old  Guard  in  vain  endeavored  to 
form  in  squares.  They  were  swept  a way  to  the  rear ; 
and  then  Napoleon  himself  fled  from  the  last  of  his 
many^fields,  to  become  in  a few  w eeks  a captive  and 
an  exile.  The  battle  w^as  lost  by  France  past  all  re- 
covery. The  victorious  armies  of  England  and  Prus- 
sia, meeting  on  the  scene  of  their  triumph,  continued 
to  press  forw^ard  and  overwhelm  every  attempt  that 
was  made  to  stem  the  tide  of  ruin.  The  British 
army,  exhausted  by  its  toils  and  suffering  during  that 
dreadful  day,  did  not  urge  the  pursuit  beyond  the 
heights  W'hich  the  enemy  had  occupied.  But  the 
Prussians  drove  the  fugitives  before  them  throughout 
the  night.  And  of  the  magnificent  host  which  had 
that  morning  cheered  their  emperor  in  confident  ex- 
pectation of  victory,  very  few  were  ever  assembled 
again  in  arms.  Their  loss,  both  in  the  field  and  in 
the  pursuit,  was  immense ; and  the  greater  number 
of  those  who  escaped,  dispersed  as  soon  as  they  crossed 
the  frontier. 

B22.  The  army  under  the  Duke  of  Wellington  lost 
nearly  15,000  men  in  killed  and  wounded  on  this  ter- 
rible day  of  battle.  The  loss  of  the  Prussian  army 
was  nearly  7000  more.  At  such  a fearful  price  was 
the  deliverance  of  Europe  purchased. 

623.  On  closing  our  survey  of  this,  tbe  last  of  the 
Decisive  Battles  of  the  World,  it  is  pleasing  to  con- 


562 


BATTLE  OF  WATERLOO. 


trast  the  year  which  it  signalized  with  the  one  that 
is  now  passing  over  our  heads.  We  have  not  (and 
long  may  we  want)  the  stern  excitement  of  the 
struggles  of  war,  and  we  see  no  captive  standards  of 
our  European  neighbors  brought  in  triumph  to  our 
shrines.  But  we  witness  an  infinitely  prouder  spec- 
tacle. We  see  the  banners  of  every  civilized  nation 
waving  over  the  arena  of  our  competition  with  each 
other  in  the  arts  that  minister  to  our  racers  support 
and  happiness,  and  not  to  its  suffering  and  destruc- 
tion. 

“Peace  hath  her  victories 
No  less  renowned  than  War;” 

and  no  battle-field  ever  witnessed  a victory  more 
noble  than  that  which  England,  under  her  sovereign 
lady  and  her  royal  prince,  is  now  teaching  the  peo- 
ples of  the  earth  to  achieve  over  selfish  prejudices 
and  international  feuds,  in  the  great  cause  of  the 
general  promotion  of  the  industry  and  welfare  of 
mankind. 


THE  END- 


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UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS-URBANA 


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